Briggs v. Marriott International, Inc. , 205 F. App'x 183 ( 2006 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-1616
    ROBERT BRIGGS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED; LIBERTY
    LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
    (CA-04-3427-8-AW)
    Argued:   September 19, 2006             Decided:    November 28, 2006
    Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
    Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge for the District of
    South Carolina, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John Marshall, MULHERN, PATTERSON & MARSHALL, L.L.P., Rockville,
    Maryland, for Appellant.    Henry Mark Stichel, GOHN, HANKEY &
    STICHEL, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Robert Briggs commenced this action under § 502(a) of the
    Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (a), for long-term disability benefits under an employee
    benefit plan sponsored by his employer, Marriott International,
    Inc., and administered by Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston.
    Beginning in September 2002, Liberty Life began paying Briggs
    short-term disability benefits based on Briggs’ chronic lower-back
    and leg pain, but, on August 21, 2003, following a review, it
    denied his claim for long-term disability benefits.        When Briggs’
    treating   doctor   complained   about   the   decision,   Liberty   Life
    reopened Briggs’ claim, collected additional medical information,
    and submitted the file to an independent orthopedic surgeon for
    review, who concluded that Briggs was “capable of a sedentary job
    with frequent position changes.” Liberty Life again denied Briggs’
    long-term disability benefits on March 9, 2004.      Briggs then filed
    this action.
    The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
    concluding that based on the objective evidence relating to Briggs’
    disability, “Liberty [Life] properly concluded that, with the
    appropriate sedentary modifications, Briggs was able to perform the
    duties of [his job].”    The court explained:
    In sum, the evidence supports Liberty’s discretionary
    decision that Briggs did not provide sufficient evidence
    of a disability under the Policy. While Liberty has a
    conflict of interest, based on the reasons articulated
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    above, this court concludes that Liberty’s decision was
    nevertheless “consistent with an exercise of discretion
    by an [administrator] acting free of the interests that
    conflict with those beneficiaries.”
    Briggs v. Marriott Int’l., Inc., No. CA-04-3427-8-AW (D. Md. May 6,
    2005) (quoting Ellis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
    126 F.3d 228
    , 233
    (4th Cir. 1997)).   Based on our de novo review of the district
    court’s decision, we affirm.
    For some 21 years, Briggs worked for Marriott International in
    its WorldWide Reservation Center as a senior systems analyst, a
    sedentary job that primarily entailed computer work.
    In 1989, Briggs was diagnosed with a herniated disc, and in
    1991, he underwent surgery -- a discectomy to remove the herniated
    portion of the disc and a laminectomy to remove a portion of the
    vertebra that impinged on the nerve.   Six years later, Briggs had
    follow-up surgery, in which the fifth lumbar and first sacral
    vertebrae were fused and a Ray Cage installed to limit movement of
    his lower spine.
    Even though the surgeries relieved Briggs’ pain for a while,
    it returned, and Briggs continued to see several doctors -- Dr.
    Michael Anchors, his primary physician; Dr. William Lauerman, an
    orthopedic surgeon; Dr. Rosita Dee, a pain management specialist;
    and Dr. Harikant Shah, his treating orthopedist.
    In September 2002, Briggs made a claim to Liberty Life for
    disability benefits and submitted records from his doctors, as well
    as x-rays, myelogram results, and several MRIs.    In addition, Dr.
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    Anchors and Dr. Lauerman submitted opinions on Briggs’ behalf,
    concluding   that    Briggs   was   totally    disabled.      Liberty    Life
    investigated   the    claim   and   supplemented   its     file   with   video
    surveillance of Briggs, which captured Briggs walking with and
    without a cane, driving his car, checking his oil, carrying a trash
    bag and a small suitcase, and picking up medications. Liberty Life
    also had Briggs examined by Dr. Michael April, an internist who
    performed work for Liberty Life.           Dr. April found mixed results
    from his tests of Briggs’ abilities, yet determined that Briggs had
    a “sedentary functional capacity.”          After submitting Dr. April’s
    findings to Dr. Anchors, Briggs’ primary doctor, and receiving no
    substantive response, Liberty denied Briggs’ disability claim with
    a letter dated August 21, 2003, in which it stated:
    Based on the medical information in relation to your
    occupation requirements, you are able to perform the
    duties of your Own Occupation. Therefore, you do not
    meet your policy’s definition of disability. We must
    close your claim as of August 22, 2003.
    Shortly thereafter, Dr. Anchors sent Liberty Life a cryptic
    letter, in which he suggested that Briggs was disabled by his pain
    medications.   Without a request from either Dr. Anchors or Briggs
    himself, Liberty Life reopened the claim, collected more medical
    information, and sent the entire file to Dr. Richard Silver, an
    independent and elaborately credentialed orthopedic surgeon, for
    another opinion.     Based on his review of the file, Dr. Silver found
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    no objective evidence to support a finding of disability.                       He
    stated:
    Mr. Briggs is not capable of performing activities
    consistent with a light or heavy work capacity.      Mr.
    Briggs is, however, capable of a sedentary job with
    frequent position changes. . . . [H]e certainly could be
    functional in a sedentary capacity as a senior system
    analyst for Marriott.
    Thus, on March 9, 2004, Liberty again denied Briggs’ claim for
    long-term disability benefits, and this suit ensued.
    The benefit plan under which Briggs brings his claim grants
    Liberty   Life   “the   authority,   in    its    sole   absolute      and    final
    discretion, to construe the terms of this policy and to determine
    benefit eligibility hereunder.”       The plan also required Briggs to
    prove his claim for disability with “objective medical evidence,”
    a provision permitting Liberty Life to discount self-serving claims
    and reports of disability in favor of objective evidence.                       The
    administrator’s decision on a claim must nonetheless be the result
    of a deliberate principled reasoning process and be supported by
    substantial evidence.      See Brogan v. Holland, 
    105 F.3d 158
    , 161
    (4th Cir. 1997).
    Because     Liberty   Life   acts     both    as    a   trustee    for    the
    beneficiaries and as a potential payor on the claim, we heighten
    our scrutiny of Liberty Life’s discretionary decision to the extent
    necessary to simulate review of an unconflicted trustee. See Ellis
    v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 
    126 F.3d 228
    , 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v.
    Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 
    3 F.3d 80
     (4th Cir. 1993).
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    Briggs challenges the administrator’s discretionary decision
    in two respects. First, he says that Liberty Life ignored evidence
    of the effect of his medications on his ability to do his job.
    While Briggs was taking an increasing amount of painkillers over
    the years, he did not provide sufficient objective evidence that
    the painkillers disabled him from working.             His best evidence is a
    letter from Dr. Anchors, his primary care physician, in which Dr.
    Anchors stated:
    I don’t believe [Briggs] can do serious mental work on
    those meds, and I don’t see how he can sit without them.
    In fact, when Robert sees me in the office, he remains
    standing, propping himself against the wall or supporting
    himself erect with hands on the exam table as people with
    severe lumbar nerve compression characteristically do.
    The   relevant    file   also   shows    that   when    Briggs   talked    with
    representatives of Liberty Life on the telephone, he sounded
    “groggy” and “disoriented.”            Briggs himself reported that the
    medications interfered with his “ability to concentrate on complex
    tasks.”     This evidence, however, is not the objective medical
    evidence required by the terms of the plan.              Dr. Anchors’ letter
    stops short of giving a medical opinion that Briggs was unable to
    do his job because of the painkillers that he was taking, and the
    other generalized anecdotes do not amount to objective medical
    evidence.        On   this   record,     we   cannot     conclude   that   the
    administrator acted unreasonably in rejecting this evidence and
    denying Briggs’ claim.
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    Briggs also contends that Dr. Silver, Liberty Life’s hired
    independent medical consultant, systematically misread the record.
    He complains that Dr. Silver repeatedly and almost automatically
    used the term “mild” to describe Briggs’ condition.    Yet, Briggs
    fails to recognize that nearly every use by Dr. Silver of that term
    directly tracks language used by the MRI technicians who evaluated
    Briggs’ back and whom no one has accused of any wrongdoing.
    Even with heightened scrutiny applicable in this case, we
    cannot conclude that the administrator’s decision was unreasonable
    based on the record and the processes that the administrator
    employed.   As we have noted, the “trustee’s discretionary decision
    will not be disturbed if reasonable, even if the court itself would
    have reached a different conclusion.”    Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores,
    Inc., 
    201 F.3d 335
    , 341 (4th Cir. 2000).
    AFFIRMED
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