State v. Pierce ( 2018 )


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  • SUPERIOR COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    Jef`f`rey J Clark Kent Count Courthouse
    Judge 38 The Green
    Dover, DE 19901
    302-735-2111
    January 26, 2018
    Gregory R. Babowal, DAG Lloyd A. Schmid, Jr., Esq.
    Lisa Whitelock, DAG Richard F. Matoni, III, Esq.
    Department of` Justice Of`fice of the Public Defender
    102 West Water Street 45 The Green - Sykes Building
    Dover, DE 19901 Dover, DE 19901
    RE: State v. Larry Pierce
    ID No. 1601006859
    Submitted: January 22, 2018
    Decided: January 26, 2018
    Counsel:
    Defendant Larry Pierce’s (“Mr. Pierce’s”) Murder First Degree trial is
    scheduled to begin on February 5, 2018. ln advance of` trial, Mr. Pierce filed three
    motions in limine challenging the admissibility of` testimony from three State
    experts. Namely, Mr. Pierce challenges the opinions of` Brian Daly (a cell phone
    tower expert), Dr. Gary Collins (the State Medical Examiner), and Carl Rone (a
    firearms identification expert).1 On January l l and 12, the Court held three separate
    evidentiary hearings. Af`ter considering the evidence at those hearings and the
    Written submissions and arguments of` the parties, the Court denies Mr. Pierce’s
    motions to exclude portions of` the opinions of the Medical Examiner. The Court
    1 After the hearing, but before the Court’s decision, the State notified the Court and opposing
    counsel that it Will not seek to of`f`er Mr. Rone’s testimony at trial.
    also denies Mr. Pierce’s motion to exclude portions of Mr. Rone’s testimony as
    moot. The Court, however, grants in part Mr. Pierce’s motion regarding Mr. Daly’s
    cell phone tower opinions. The Court defers the balance of its decision regarding
    the admissibility of Mr. Daly’s opinion testimony until trial, to permit additional
    evidentiary context.
    Factual Background
    All facts cited herein are those found by the Court after the two relevant
    evidentiary hearings held to determine the admissibility of the experts’ opinions.
    On April 18, 2009, Josue Barclay died from a gunshot wound to the rear of his head.
    The alleged murder scene was on Govemor’s Avenue in Dover. According to an
    Office of the Chief` Medical Examiner “Death Investigator Report’?, witnesses heard
    a shot on the street and discovered the alleged victim lying halfway on the sidewalk
    and halfway on the street, between two vehicles. Mr. Barclay’s autopsy confirmed
    his cause of death to be a gunshot wound to the rear of his head. The State indicted
    Mr. Pierce seven years later, charging him with Mr. Barclay’s murder.
    Dr. Collins, the medical examiner, reviewed the autopsy report, autopsy
    photographs, crime scene photographs, and the on-scene investigative report, Af`ter
    his review, he agreed with and offers the same opinion as that of` his predecessor,
    Dr. Tobin, the medical examiner initially offering an opinion regarding cause and
    manner of death. Namely, Dr. Collins offers the opinion that the alleged victim died
    from a gunshot wound to the rear of the head, and that the manner of death was a
    “homicide” as opposed to an “accident” or a “suicide.”
    Next, Brian Daly, a Department of Justice investigator, testified that he
    secured training in comparing call detail records to cell tower locations. Using this
    method, he seeks to identify the towers used during phone calls and which one of`
    the three sides of the tower the phone accessed during the calls. Af`ter applying this
    information to a “key”, he can pinpoint the location of the tower on a map.
    In this case, he applied this methodology to a telephone number the State
    proffers was associated With Mr. Pierce at or about the time of the alleged murder.
    The call detail records provide information sufficient for him to offer an opinion
    regarding the cell tower used to initiate a call and the last cellular tower used to
    handle the same call. The State seeks to offer his opinion through testimony and
    exhibits that certain towers in the Dover area were used for calls the night before and
    the morning of the shooting.
    There are significant limits to this method that make it impossible for it to
    provide a specific location of a cellular phone during a call. These limits are
    compounded because there is no assurance that a given cellular phone accessed the
    nearest tower. Rather, it merely seeks the strongest signal at a given location, which
    may or may not be from the nearest tower. According to Mr. Daly, the most this
    method shows is that a cellular phone accessed one of three sides of a given tower
    and did so within twenty miles of that tower.
    Furthermore, one of the maps referenced by Mr. Daly shows that there are at
    least three towers within less than two miles of the alleged murder scene. The phone
    at issue accessed those three towers at various times the night before and the morning
    of the alleged murder. There is also no evidence regarding the location and number
    of other towers within twenty miles of the alleged crime scene.
    Standard
    Mr. Pierce filed a motion pursuant to Dauberi2 to exclude Brian Daly’s
    testimony. He also filed a second motion in limine seeking to exclude Dr. Collins’
    opinion that the alleged victim’s manner of death was a homicide and that the
    decedent was shot by an unknown assailant. With regard to both motions, Mr. Pierce
    primarily challenges the reliability of these opinions by arguing that both experts
    incorrectly applied their methods to the facts of the case. He also challenges both
    based on Delaware Rule of Evidence 403 (hereinafter “D.R.E. 403”) concems.
    In order to be admissible, an expert must be qualified, his or her testimony
    must assist the trier of fact, be based upon sufficient information, be the product of
    reliable principles and methods, and must apply the principles and methods reliably
    to the facts of the case.3 Furthermore, if challenged, expert testimony must undergo
    the reliability analysis required by Daubert. The Court’s function in that regard is
    described as that of a gatekeeper.4 In a Daubert analysis, the Court must apply a
    non-exclusive list of factors to evaluate the overall validity of the method.5 The
    proponent of this testimony bears the burden of establishing its admissibility by a
    preponderance of the evidence.6 Finally, if challenged, any such testimony must
    survive a D.R.E. 403 balancing test.
    Brian Daly’s Opinions
    The State proffers Brian Daly’s testimony to establish a general location for a
    cell phone around the time of the alleged murder. Furthermore, the State proffers
    2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
    509 U.S. 579
    (1993).
    3 D.R.E. 702.
    4 Bowen v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 
    906 A.2d 787
    , 794 (Del. 2006).
    5 See 
    id. at 794-795
    (directing the trial judge to apply a non-exclusive list of factors to evaluate
    the overall science or method, and then to apply a five-step test consistent with D.R.E. 702).
    6 
    Id. 4 that
    the phone’s access of different towers during relevant times shows movement
    or lack of movement during the time of the call detail reports. Mr. Pierce challenges
    Mr. Daly’s opinions on multiple grounds. He focuses mainly on his allegation that
    Mr. Daly’s opinion is inadmissible because it is unreliable as applied. He also asserts
    that its limited probative value would be substantially outweighed by confusion of
    the issues and unfair prejudice.
    In support of his motion, Mr. Pierce offered testimony of his own cell tower
    expert Joseph Kennedy. With regard to the issues germane to the Court’s decision,
    the two experts generally agree. Namely, this method cannot pinpoint an
    individual’s location; it permits verification that a particular tower and which of the
    three sides of the tower were used in a call; and the cell phone accessing the tower
    could have been anywhere within twenty miles of the tower. Both Mr. Daly and Mr.
    Kennedy agree that the calls listed in the call detail report could have been made
    anywhere from near the tower to twenty miles away. Mr. Kennedy also offered a
    map through his testimony illustrating that phones from the various towers in
    downtown Dover could have accessed the three towers from as far away as
    Millington, Maryland, Townsend, Delaware, or Sea Breeze, New Jersey. Mr. Daly’s
    testimony, although not couched in those terms, is consistent in that respect.
    As far as an analysis pursuant to Daubert, the Court finds consistently with
    the Superior Court in State v. Taylor that the methodology used by Brian Daly meets
    Daubert standards.7 In fact, in an appeal of that same case, the Delaware Supreme
    Court expressly affirmed the Superior Court’s findings as to the reliability of this
    limited testimony pursuant to Daubert.8 The science and expertise involved satisfies
    each of the Daubert criteria.
    1 stare v. Taylor, c.A. No. 0904013885, at 73-77 (Del. super. Apr. 21, 2010)(TRANSCR1PT).
    
    8 Taylor v
    . S¢a¢e, 
    23 A.3d 851
    , 856 (Dei. 2011).
    5
    This case turns more on a Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 (hereinafter
    “D.R.E. 702”) analysis and on D.R.E. 403. The majority rule provides that testimony
    such as this is reliable and admissible.9 Likewise, this Court finds that Mr. Daly’s
    method generally meets D.R.E. 702 criteria in at least certain circumstances F or
    instance, it has potential to help the trier of fact when a very general location of a
    phone is at issue. However, based on the evidence at the hearing, and the proffers
    of the State regarding its relevance, the Court finds it to be only marginally relevant
    in this particular case. Namely, the Court finds the urban setting of the crime, the
    location of three towers within two miles of the crime scene, and the expert’s
    inability to explain why any particular tower was accessed at a given time,
    significantly minimizes the evidence’s probativeness as to location and movement.
    The Court also finds a substantial risk of confusion and unfair prejudice that is
    necessarily to balance against the State’s limited proffer regarding its relevance.
    Furthermore, any “pie-graph” chart, showing sectors with a radius of l.15
    miles (or any particular radius for that matter) would constitute an incorrect
    application of Mr. Daly’s methods to the facts of this case. For that reason, that
    portion of his opinion does not satisfy D.R.E. 702’s standard for admissibility. Its
    propensity to confuse the trier of fact would also substantially outweigh any limited
    relevance. Accordingly, any such pie-graph on a map relating to cell towers that
    Were accessed during relevant times will be inadmissible at trial.
    At this stage, absent further development of the evidence at trial, the Court
    will not rule that Mr. Daly’s opinion testimony is barred. As previously mentioned,
    the Court recognizes that such an opinion could of’cen be helpful to the trier of fact.
    9 See Unitea' States v. Machado-Erazo, 
    950 F. Supp. 2d 49
    , 56 (D. D.C. 2013) (recognizing that
    this method has been widely accepted by numerous courts.”). Most examining courts, however,
    recognize the significant limitations of this method. See U.S. v. Reynolds, 626 Fed. Appx. 610,
    617 (6th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that historical cell-site tracking cannot reliably determine a
    caller’s location and has significantly limited evidentiary value in many circumstances).
    6
    In a number of circumstances, its potential probative value would not be
    substantially outweighed by D.R.E. 403 concems. However, under the
    circumstances of this case, the risks of confusion of the issues and unfair prejudice
    are significant To mitigate against this risk of unfair prejudice, the parties shall not
    present evidence or argument regarding this proposed testimony without first
    addressing the issue outside the presence of jury. The State’s proffered relevance at
    this point is not sufficient to justify its admission. If the State requests admission of
    his testimony, upon additional evidentiary context and proferred relevance, the Court
    will evaluate the extent to Which its probative value may not be substantially
    outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury given the limits of this method’s
    helpfulness within an urban setting with multiple cell towers in close proximity.
    Dr. Collins’ Opinion Regarding Manner of Death
    Mr. Pierce also challenges Dr. Collins’ opinion that the case involves a
    homicide. While he does not challenge the science involved, he argues that Dr.
    Collins does not accurately apply his methodology to the facts of this case. In this
    regard, Mr. Pierce argues that based on a medical examination/autopsy alone, a
    coroner cannot reliably differentiate between a homicide and an accident or suicide
    as the manner of death. In further support of his argument, Mr. Pierce cites the
    Center for Disease Control’s Medical Examiner and Coroner’s Handbook. That
    handbook defines the two manners `of death primarily at issue - accident or
    homicide. Mr. Pierce argues that Dr. Collins opinion that this was a homicide is not
    reliable in this case.
    Here, after considering the doctor’s testimony and the basis for his opinions,
    the Court finds it sufficiently reliable to be presented to the trier of fact. Here, the
    Court agrees that Dr. Collins’ opinion could not include differentiating the manner
    of death between an accident and a homicide if it were based solely on the autopsy
    results. However, Dr. Collins persuasively testified that the facts and information
    relied upon by a medical examiner are not limited to the findings in an autopsy.
    Namely, he testified that he bases his opinion both on the autopsy results and the on-
    scene investigative report. That report provided significant information, including
    witness statements and physical findings, reasonably relied upon by an expert such
    as Dr. Collins.10 In one sense, relying on this information is no different than a
    treating physician relying upon the medical history of a patient to determine
    causation of an injury. The facts available to Dr. Collins support his opinion that the
    manner of death was a homicide as opposed to a suicide or an accident. Likewise,
    his reference to an unknown assailant does not cause significant unfair prejudice to
    Mr. Pierce. Nothing regarding these statements involve Dr. Collins providing an
    opinion regarding the state of mind of the person or persons who shot Mr. Barclay.
    Dr. Collins testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact and D.R.E 403 concerns do
    not justify barring it.
    Of course, the ultimate weight due the opinion will be an issue for the jury.
    Many of the good points raised by Mr. Pierce will be the subject of and tested by
    cross examination at trial. Nevertheless, Dr. Collins’ opinions are admissible after
    reviewing Daubert, D.R.E. 702, and D.R.E. 403 concems. Accordingly, Mr.
    Pierce’s motion to bar Dr. Collins’ opinion is denied.
    Conclusion
    F or the reasons discussed, Mr. Pierce’s motion to exclude or limit the
    testimony of Dr. Collins is denied. Mr. Pierce’s motion to exclude the testimony of
    1° See D.R.E. 703 (requiring that facts and data forming the basis of an expert’s opinion be “of a
    type reasonably relied upon by experts in a particular field.”). In his written submission filed
    after the hearing, Mr. Pierce argues that it is inappropriate for Dr. Collins to rely upon the
    layered hearsay contained in the investigative report when forming his opinions. However,
    D.R.E. 703 recognizes that in terms of foundation for expert testimony “the facts or data [relied
    upon] need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion . . . to be admitted.”).
    8
    Mr. Daly is granted in part as to the use of a pie chart showing a range limit to the
    cell towers’ signals. The Court’s decision regarding the balance of his opinion
    regarding a cell phone’s access to certain towers and sides of towers during the
    relevant period of time is deferred until trial. The State shall offer no evidence and
    shall not comment to the jury regarding his opinions without first raising the issue
    outside their presence Finally, since the State no longer seeks to offer Mr. Rone’s
    testimony at trial, Mr. Peirce’s motion to exclude it is denied as moot.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    /s/ Jef`f`rey.l Clark
    Judge
    JJC:jb
    oc: Prothonotary
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1601006859

Judges: Clark J.

Filed Date: 1/26/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/26/2018