Baker v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC ( 2022 )

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
TRACY BAKER, Individually and )
as the Administratrix of the )
Estate of Douglas H, Baker, Jr., ) C.A. No. S18C-06-002 CAK
)
Plaintiff, )
v. )
)
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, )
DAIMLER NORTH AMERICA )
CORPORATION AND )
MERCEDES-BENZ U.S. )
INTERNATIONAL, INC., ET AL. )
)
Defendants. )
)
Submitted: November 15, 2022
Decided: December 12, 2022
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
UPON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DENIED IN PART
Heather Long, Esquire, Kimmel Carter Roman Peltz & O’Neill, PA, 56 West Main
Street, 4th Floor, Newark, DE 19714, Attorney for Plaintiff.
David L. Kwass, Esquire, Benjamin Baer, Esquire, Saltz Mongeluzzi & Bendesky
P.C., One Liberty Place, 1650 Market Street, 52nd Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19103,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Shari L. Milewski, Esquire, Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy, LLC, 1201
N. Market Street, Suite 900, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Defendants
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.
David Killoran, Esquire, Squire Patton Boggs, 475 Sansome Street, 16th Floor, San
Francisco, CA 94111, Attorney for Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and
Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.
Gerard Cedrone, Esquire, Lavin, Cedrone, Graver, Boyd & DiSipio, 190 North
Independence Mall West, Suite 500, Philadelphia, PA 19106, Attorney for
Defendants Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc.
During the evening hours of July 30, 2016, Douglas and Tracy Baker
travelled home from work, heading south on U.S. Route 13 near Laurel, Delaware.
An intoxicated driver slammed a truck into the rear of the Baker’s 1998 Mercedes
ML320 forcing it into a spin and off the roadway. The Mercedes SUV flipped
over. Mrs. Baker was able to get out of the vehicle which then exploded in a
fireball. Mrs. Baker suffered burns and Mr. Baker died in the explosion.
The tragic events led to this lawsuit. When filed the suit included many
defendants including the intoxicated driver, his employer, the business entity
which rented the truck to the intoxicated driver, the manufacturer of the Mercedes
SUV, and others. The case has been heavily litigated, and I have written an
opinion concerning liability issues not related to the Mercedes defendants,1 and
others. All defendants except the Mercedes defendants have now settled their
claims with the Plaintiff.2 The remaining products liability claims are set for trial
in February 2023.
The Mercedes defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (the
“Motion”). Plaintiff responded to the Motion, and the Court held oral argument on
November 15, 2022.
1
The Mercedes defendants include Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Mercedes-Benz U.S.
International, Inc.
2
The Plaintiff is Mrs. Baker individually and as Administratrix of her husband’s estate.
1
The Motion addresses what Defendants believe are deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
proof. Specifically, Defendants attack the testimony of Neil Hannemann, an
engineer offered as an expert by Plaintiff. Mr. Hannemann is an employee of
Forensic Automotive Collision Team (FACT) of Santa Ynez, California, and an
automotive design expert. The Mercedes defendants do not challenge Mr.
Hannemann’s credentials, but vigorously assault his opinions and the basis he uses
to support his opinions. The Mercedes defendants also contend that an undisputed
fact undermines his opinions.
Discovery is completed and the evidence is, to the extent it can ever be,
locked in. The expert evidence certainly is. While it is difficult to assess the state
of the case from a paper record, I have reviewed everything submitted in support of
and opposition to the motion. Mercedes defendants make reasonable and rational
arguments. But for me they are best left to be decided by a jury. In my opinion the
Mercedes defendants raise factual questions. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56,
a motion to dismiss must leave no factual questions. I deny the Motion in part. I
grant it with respect to the claim for punitive damages. My reasoning follows.
2
I. Mercedes Defendants Liability Contributions
First year law students are taught that to support a negligence claim,
Plaintiffs must prove (1) a duty of the defendant, (2) breach of the duty, (3)
proximate cause and (4) damages.3 There are several corollaries in an automobile
crashworthy case. The standard of care is that of an ordinarily prudent
manufacturer4, and expert testimony must establish the standard.5 Expert opinion
must be relevant and reliable and trustworthy with an appropriate foundation. In
short expert opinions must meet the Daubert6 standards. Here the Mercedes
defendants manufactured the automobile in question in 1997, so we must look to
that time for any standards.
I digress to outline what I read as Mr. Hannemann’s opinions. He tells us
that he is an automotive design engineer with many years of experience. In that
time, he has developed his principles of good engineering for automotive design.
The principles include that motor vehicles should be designed to be as crashworthy
as possible to do the following:
(1) Maintain survival space
(2) Provide proper space throughout the entire accident
3
Lenkenicz v. Wilmington City Ry. Co., 74 A.11 (Del. Super. 1980).
4
Nacci v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 325 A.2d 617 (Del. Super. 1974).
5
Robinson v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc. 971.A.2d 899 (Del. 2009).
6
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmacuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3
(3) Prevent ejection
(4) Manage the collision energy
(5) Prevent post-crash fires7
The Mercedes defendants correctly argue the Hannemann principles are
aspirational goals, and not standards of care. But Mr. Hannemann does get
specific and address his principle 5, applicable to this case. He analyzes the design
of the vehicle at issue, and reviews that design with what he believes happened.
The 1998 ML320 has a polymer hose which travelled from the gas tank and
traversed a portion of the occupied section of the vehicle, and ultimately to the side
of the vehicle where gas could be added. Mr. Hannemann opined that the hose was
unprotected and was severed in the collision. The severed hose allowed gas to
escape, through the potential crash zone, and into the occupied area. The escaped
gas fed a fire and led to the explosion destroying the vehicle and killing its
occupant.
Mr. Hannemann posits that one of several alternatives designed should have,
been used which would have prevented this tragedy. The fuel hose could have,
and according to Mr. Hannemann, should have, been run outside the vehicle and
7
Hannemann report, p.6, Ex G to D.I. 372.
4
protected with steel.8 The fuel hose could have also had a check valve to prevent
the flow of gasoline from a ruptured hose. Such valves were available in 1998.
I have no doubt my description of Mr. Hannemann’s views would
seem simplistic to him and other automotive engineers. But I understand them and
have faith that a jury could as well.
The Mercedes defendants make a number of challenges to this
testimony.
A. Lack of Standards
The Mercedes defendants contend Mr. Hannemann gives no standards at all.
This contention for me conflates Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards9 with
what Mr. Hannemann is saying. Hannemann tells us he is not applying the
FMVSS standards. As a matter of unchallenged fact FMVSS 301 was undergoing
substantial revision at the time Mercedes made this car, and everyone in the
industry knew it. Rather Hannemann applied what he believes are, and were at the
time, appropriate automotive engineering standards. The Mercedes defendants
disagree, and they are free to present their alternative views at trial. Hannemann
opines to standards he believes are legitimate and raise jury questions.
8
Hannemann deposition, p. 159, D.I. 372, Ex H.
9
The standard at issue here is FMVSS 301.
5
B. Mercedes defendants claim Hannemann has no legitimate
foundation for his opinions
In this portion of their argument the Mercedes defendants again attack the
basis of Hannemann’s opinions. Their attacks raise a number of issues concerning
Hannemann’s factual assumptions and opinions. The issues defendants raise are
legitimate for cross examination, and response by Defendant’s experts. For me they
are not reason to exclude Mr. Hannemann’s testimony.
The Mercedes defendants claim Hannemann agrees that they met the FMVSS
301 standard. Plaintiff responds that the standard was inadequate and under review
at the time Mercedes designed its vehicle, and everyone in the industry knew it. In
addition, Hannemann’s opined and, fairly read, asserts the vehicle did not meet a
standard a reasonable engineer would apply.
The Mercedes defendants challenge the physics of the rear end collision
accident and assert no fuel system could have survived the forces of this collision.
Again, perhaps effective cross-examination, and expert response, would establish
this, but it is not a reason to exclude Hannemann’s testimony.
The Mercedes defendants make a multi-pronged attack on Hannemann’s
standards. They say no relevant standard required his alternative fuel design, and he
only points to “irrelevant standards.” Hannemann references standards he applies
relying upon his many years as an automotive design engineer. Hannemann’s views
are for me understandable and pointed. I summarize as follows: vehicles stricken
6
in a collision should be designed to avoid gas fueled explosions. A manufacture
could avoid fire by securing the fuel line. Defendants ran the vehicle’s fuel line
though the occupied area greatly increasing the risk of gas explosion. The explosion
here was a result. None of this may be persuasive to a jury, but for me it is their
decision, not mine.
C. Causation
The Mercedes defendants make a final argument that they have evidence the
gas explosion here resulted from a ruptured fuel tank, not a ruptured hose, and, thus,
they say, there is no causation between Hannemann’s opinions and the horrible
losses suffered by the Plaintiffs. They point to the post-accident examination which
showed the surviving portion of the fuel tank, and in particular the surviving filler
hose spud, to conclude the explosion was not the result of the collision’s effect on
the hose.
Plaintiff’s response notes the severe damage done to the fuel system, and
eyewitness testimony from responding emergency personnel as evidence that the
accident ruptured the fuel hose and caused the explosion. Emergency personnel saw
two explosions, the second one being much larger. According to Plaintiff this
supports its theory that escaping gas from the hose cause the secondary
conflagration.
7
In order for Plaintiff to succeed in a defective design case, Plaintiff must prove
a design defect caused injuries over and above what would have resulted had the
produce been property designed.10 The issue of proximate cause is almost always a
question for the jury if it is supported by some degree of evidence.11 In this case
there is the requisite degree of evidence.
A portion of that evidence comes from eyewitness. Tracy Baker suffered
minor injuries in the crash, but much more severe burn injuries when she tried to aid
her husband. Mr. Baker survived the crash but died in the conflagration. The
difference between the injuries caused by the collision, and those caused by the fire
are stark. And it is a jury question as to the role played by the fuel system design.
II. Punitive Damages
Delaware law requires a high bar for punitive damage claims. Plaintiffs
must show “outrageous conduct”, “an evil motive,” or “reckless indifference.”12
For me this case is a claim of negligence. Nothing in the record shows the type of
conduct necessary to support a claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff has pointed
me to no evidence of reckless conduct, only their say so. That is not enough, and I
grant the Mercedes defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to this claim.
10
Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, at 532. (Del. 1998).
11
Id., at 532.
12
Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987).
8
In summary, I am of the opinion that Plaintiff’s expert testimony presents
sufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s negligence claims. These claims are for
the jury to determine. The Mercedes defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
is DENIED as to negligence claims.
Plaintiff does not present evidence of the type of reckless conduct to sustain
punitive damage claims. The Mercedes defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED as to the punitive damage claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Craig A. Karsnitz
cc: Prothonotary
9