Cameron v. Godlewsk ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                               SUPERIOR COURT
    OF THE
    STATE OF DELAWARE
    Charles E. Butler                                   Leonard L. Williams Justice Center
    Resident Judge                                    500 North King Street, Suite 10400
    Wilmington, Delaware 19801-3733
    Telephone (302) 255-0656
    August 11, 2021
    Christian G. Heesters, Esquire
    Schuster Jachetti, LLP
    3407 Lancaster Pike, Suite A
    Wilmington, DE 19805-5543
    Kenneth M. Doss, Esquire
    Casarino Christman Shalk Ransom & Doss, P.A.
    1007 N. Orange Street
    Nemours Building
    Suite 1100
    P.O. Box 1276
    Wilmington, DE 19899
    Erin K. Radulski, Esquire
    Law Office of Dawn L. Becker
    Citizens Bank Center
    919 Market Street, Suite 550
    Wilmington, DE 19801
    Re:   Cameron v. Godlewsk, et al.
    C.A. No. N18C-11-002 CEB
    Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Evidence of Certain
    Medical Expenses. DENIED.
    Counsel:
    I have a motion in limine before me seeking to exclude evidence of Plaintiff’s
    “PIP eligible expenses” pursuant to 21 Del. C. §2118.
    1
    As briefly as I can, here is the issue: Plaintiff was in a car accident and claims
    a total of approximately $40,000 in medical expenses. She had an auto insurance
    policy that called for $15,000 in personal injury protection (“PIP”) coverage with a
    $10,000 deductible. She has sued the tortfeasor and the defense has filed a motion
    to preclude evidence of her medical expenses.
    21 Del. C. §2118 (a)(2)(f) says “An insured person may not plead and
    introduce into evidence in an action for damages against a tortfeasor the amount of
    the deductible…” So, by the plain language of the statute, the first $10,000 in
    medical expenses paid by the Plaintiff are not admissible in evidence.
    21 Del. C. §2118 (h) states that a person eligible for Personal Injury Protection
    – and there is no question this includes the Plaintiff – is precluded from “pleading or
    introducing into evidence . . . damages for which compensation is available . . .
    without regard to any elective reductions in such coverage and whether or not such
    benefits are actually recoverable.” So the payments “available” under her PIP policy
    are not admissible in the trial against the tortfeasor.
    Since the Plaintiff had $15,000 in “available” coverage, the parties agree that
    as a practical matter, the two statutory provisions together mean that the first $25,000
    in medical expenses are not “boardable.” That certainly implies that the medical
    expenses in excess of $25,000 are boardable.
    2
    But, of course, there’s a complication.      A defense-ordered Independent
    Medical Examination (“IME”) concluded that the Plaintiff’s expenses in excess of
    $10,500 were not “reasonable and necessary.” After paying $10,500, Plaintiff’s PIP
    carrier declined making further payments on her behalf. Plaintiff was thus barred
    from full recovery of PIP benefits, $4500 short of the maximum payout under the
    policy.
    Defendant claims that Plaintiff had a duty to file suit against her PIP carrier
    for the remaining $4500. Defendant says that because she did not file a lawsuit
    against the carrier, she has not, and never will recover the maximum amount
    “available” under her policy.
    The Court must reject Defendant’s reading of the requirements of Section
    2118. Defendant – wrongly, the Court believes – equates PIP exhaustion with PIP
    availability. Nowhere in Section 2118 is there an instruction that suit must be filed
    against a PIP carrier where PIP benefits are not exhausted as a predicate for filing
    suit against the tortfeasor. Section 2118 contains evidentiary limits on claimed
    damages in a tort suit; it does not set forth a rule of substantive law. Defendant’s
    reading places a burden on the Plaintiff not contained in the statute and unsupported
    by any case citation.
    Faced with a relatively modest amount in controversy with her PIP carrier (of
    $4500) and a relatively large boardable recovery in her suit against the tortfeasor
    3
    ($15,000), Plaintiff elected to forego the modest recovery and pursue the larger one.
    She certainly could have filed suit against the PIP carrier and contested the IME’s
    conclusion as to what expenses were “reasonable and necessary,” but there is
    nothing in the language or purpose of Section 2118 that would make such a suit a
    necessity. As it is, she will have a trial against the tortfeasor at which the Defendant
    will all but certainly produce the IME physician as a witness to testify that expenses
    in excess of $10,500 were not “reasonable and necessary.” That evidentiary burden
    does not, as Defendant suggests, force her out of court. Rather, it is but one more
    item of evidence the jury may consider in reaching its verdict.
    In this motion, then, the Court rules that 1) the $10,000 deductible is not
    admissible, 2) the $15,000 in “available” insurance coverage is not admissible,
    regardless of the amounts actually paid, and 3) the remaining $15,000 (actually,
    $14,392.14) in claimed medical expenses is “boardable,” subject to Defendant’s
    evidence that such amounts were not “reasonable and necessary” medical expenses
    to remediate the damage caused by the tortfeasor.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    Resident Judge Charles E. Butler
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: N18C-11-002 CEB

Judges: Butler R.J.

Filed Date: 8/11/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/11/2021