State v. Watson ( 2023 )


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  •       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                          )
    )
    v.                                    )
    )     I.D. No. 2211007276
    DAQUAN WATSON,                              )
    )
    Defendant.                )
    ORDER
    Submitted: May 18, 2023
    Decided: June 27, 2023
    Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
    DENIED
    Lindsay A. Taylor, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Dover,
    Delaware, Attorney for the State.
    Regina E. Gray, Esquire, Office of Defense Services, Dover, Delaware, Attorney for
    Defendant.
    Primos, J.
    1
    Before the Court is a motion to suppress filed by Defendant Daquan Watson
    (hereinafter “Defendant”) seeking suppression of evidence obtained in the course of
    two warrantless administrative searches conducted by probation officers. The Court
    held a suppression hearing on May 18, 2023, at which the State presented testimony
    from Probation and Parole Officers Ricky Porter (hereinafter “Officer Porter”) and
    Eric Larsen (hereinafter “Officer Larsen”) and Probation Supervisor Joel Duquette
    (hereinafter “Officer Duquette”). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion
    to suppress is DENIED.
    FINDINGS OF FACT1
    1.      In November 2022, Officer Porter received tips from two confidential
    informants2 alleging that Defendant, while serving a sentence of probation, was in
    possession of a firearm and dealing drugs.3 Specifically, the informants indicated
    that Defendant was carrying a black semi-automatic pistol and that he was selling
    cocaine and heroin in downtown Dover.4 The informants also said that Defendant
    was packaging heroin and cocaine at an unspecified residence in downtown Dover.5
    Based on his years of experience as a probation officer involved in Operation Safe
    Streets, Officer Porter understood “downtown Dover” to refer to a specific three-to-
    four block area which he described as “high-drug.”6
    1
    “At a suppression hearing, the Court sits as the finder of fact and evaluates the credibility of the
    witnesses.” State v. Brown, 
    287 A.3d 1222
    , 1230 (Del. Super. 2023).
    2
    The incident report, written by Officer Larsen, mentions only one informant. See Def. Ex. 1.
    Officer Larsen testified that he personally dealt directly only with one informant. Tr. of
    Suppression H’rg [hereinafter “H’rg Tr.”] at 38:4–5. Officer Porter testified that he spoke with two
    informants and did not know why Officer Larsen only mentioned one in the report. 
    Id.
     at 22:12–
    13, 18.
    3
    Hr’g Tr. at 7:17–21.
    4
    
    Id.
     at 8:21–9:5.
    5
    
    Id.
    6
    
    Id.
     at 11:7–10.
    2
    2.      The informants identified Defendant by a DELJIS photograph,
    provided his phone number, and stated that he drove a gray Infiniti.7 Officer Porter
    considered both informants to be past-proven reliable because they had previously
    provided tips that led to arrests related to drug and firearm offenses.8 The informants
    received monetary payment for information that was proven accurate or led to
    arrests.9
    3.      The officers corroborated the tips in several ways. They verified that
    the phone number provided matched Defendant’s phone number on file in the
    Delaware Automated Correction System (DACS) probation database.10 In addition,
    Defendant’s supervising probation officer was familiar with Defendant’s gray
    Infiniti, and Officer Porter had seen Defendant driving it several days earlier.11 The
    vehicle was especially recognizable because it had bullet holes in the door.12 Finally,
    the officers checked the license plate number with Dover’s License Plate Reader
    system and confirmed that the gray Infiniti had been driven in the downtown Dover
    area multiple times daily over the course of the month of November.13
    4.      On November 17, 2022, an undercover police officer spotted
    Defendant’s gray Infiniti parked in downtown Dover.14 An Operation Safe Streets
    unit, including Officers Porter and Larsen, responded. Before officers contacted
    him, however, Defendant “went mobile” and was followed to his residence.15
    Officers Porter and Larsen believed that Defendant was driving on a suspended
    7
    
    Id.
    8
    
    Id.
     at 8:3–5; 27:3–6.
    9
    
    Id.
     at 8:10–11, 27:9–12.
    10
    
    Id.
     at 9:4–7.
    11
    
    Id.
     at 9:12–16.
    12
    
    Id.
     at 9:18–20.
    13
    See Def. Ex. 1; Hr’g Tr. at 37:3–7.
    14
    Hr.’g Tr. at 11:21–23.
    15
    
    Id.
     at 12:11–21.
    3
    license, and Officer Larsen confirmed this fact via DELJIS on the way to the
    residence.16
    5.      While en route to the residence, Officer Porter called Officer Duquette
    and obtained permission for an administrative search of Defendant’s vehicle (the
    Infiniti) and his person.17 Officer Porter and Officer Duquette reviewed the four
    decision factors provided for in Probation and Parole Procedure 7.19 (hereinafter
    “Procedure 7.19”) and went over a pre-search checklist.18 Officer Porter told Officer
    Duquette the substance of the tips and that Defendant was on probation for a firearms
    offense.19 He explained that the tips were corroborated by the phone number and
    DELJIS identification, the accurate description of Defendant’s vehicle, and the
    observation of Defendant in downtown Dover,20 but may have omitted that the
    officers had used the Dover License Plate Reader to verify Defendant’s daily trips
    to downtown Dover.21
    6.      Defendant was stopped outside of the residence and officers searched
    his vehicle and his person. In the vehicle, they found two mason jars with marijuana
    residue, plastic bags, and a digital scale,22 which in Officer Porter’s experience are
    all indicative of drug dealing.23 The search of Defendant’s person also yielded 17
    bags of suspected heroin (which later turned out to be fentanyl upon testing).24
    16
    
    Id.
     at 38:15–22.
    17
    Officer Larsen wrote in his report only that permission was obtained to search the vehicle. Def.
    Ex. 1. Officer Porter’s unrebutted testimony, however, was that he obtained permission to search
    both the vehicle and Defendant’s person. Hr’g Tr. at 18:23–19:2 (“I received approval from my
    supervisor to search Daquan Watson and the vehicle he was operating . . . .”).
    18
    Hr’g Tr. at 13:12–22; State Ex. 1.
    19
    Hr’g Tr. at 16:10–17:2, 17:6–7.
    20
    
    Id.
     at 18:8–12.
    21
    Officer Porter testified that he could not recall if the license plate reader results were specifically
    discussed on the call. 
    Id.
     at 18:16–18.
    22
    
    Id.
     at 19:3–6.
    23
    
    Id.
     at 19:16–20.
    24
    
    Id.
     at 19:9–12, 39:17–18.
    4
    7.       Officer Porter called Officer Duquette again and told him what was
    found in the initial search, and Officer Duquette granted permission to conduct a
    second administrative search, this time of Defendant’s bedroom.25 Officer Duquette
    based his decision both on the evidence discussed in the first call and the new
    information provided about the results of the initial search.26
    LEGAL STANDARD
    8.       At a suppression hearing challenging a warrantless search, the State
    bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it complied with
    the United States Constitution, the Delaware Constitution, and any applicable
    statutes.27
    9.       “By agreeing to probation, individuals sacrifice some of their privacy
    rights in exchange for freedom from incarceration.”28 A probation officer needs only
    “a reasonable suspicion or reasonable grounds to justify an administrative search of
    a residence or car.”29 Delaware courts consider probation officers “to have acted
    reasonably so long as they substantially comply with Delaware Department of
    Corrections [sic] regulations.”30
    10.      Under Procedure 7.19, a probation officer must hold a case conference
    with the officer’s supervisor and review the following four decision factors in order
    to obtain permission to conduct an administrative search:
    (1) Whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the offender possesses
    contraband;
    25
    
    Id.
     at 21:3–9; 21:15–17. Officer Porter had already spoken with Defendant’s aunt, the owner of
    the residence, and she had given him permission to enter and had told him which room was
    Defendant’s. 
    Id.
     at 20:1–16.
    26
    
    Id.
     at 32:18–20.
    27
    Brown, 
    287 A.3d 1229
    –30.
    28
    Sierra v. State, 
    958 A.2d 825
    , 832 (Del. 2008) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
    483 U.S. 868
    , 874
    (1987)).
    29
    Murray v. State, 
    45 A.3d 670
    , 678 (Del. 2012).
    30
    Id.
    5
    (2) Whether there is sufficient reason to believe that the offender is in
    violation of probation or parole;
    (3) Whether there is information from a reliable informant indicating that the
    offender possesses contraband or is violating the law; and
    (4) Whether the information from the informant has been corroborated.31
    In considering the reliability of an informant, the probation officer must also
    consider (1) the detail and consistency of the information; (2) the reliability of the
    informant in the past; and (3) any reasons why the informant would supply the
    information.32
    11.      Procedure 7.19 was promulgated pursuant to the Department of
    Correction’s statutory authority under 11 Del. C. § 4321, and lack of substantial
    compliance with the regulation is a statutory violation warranting exclusion of
    evidence.33 “Administrative searches must be supported by reasonable suspicion to
    be in compliance with Procedure 7.19.”34
    ANALYSIS
    12.      At the suppression hearing, Defendant clarified that his primary
    argument is that the informants’ tips were not sufficiently corroborated under the
    fourth prong of the Procedure 7.19 analysis.35
    31
    Culver v. State, 
    956 A.2d 5
    , 10 (Del. 2008); Gibson v. State, 
    135 A.3d 78
    , 
    2016 WL 943842
    , at
    *2 (Del. 2016) (TABLE); Sierra, 
    958 A.2d at 829
    .
    32
    Gibson, 
    2016 WL 943842
    , at *2; Culver, 
    956 A.2d at 11
    .
    33
    See Culver, 
    956 A.2d at
    7 n.1 (“Because we find that probation officers violated their clear
    statutory mandate, we do not reach any constitutional questions.”); see also Walker v. State, 
    205 A.3d 823
    , 826 (Del. 2019) (explaining that failure to determine reasonable suspicion in accordance
    with Procedure 7.19 is a statutory violation apart from the constitutional argument warranting
    suppression at a violation of probation hearing); Lloyd v. State, 
    292 A.3d 100
    , 105 (Del. 2023)
    (“Delaware statutory law governs the exercise of the power of probation officers to search and
    arrest probationers without a warrant.”).
    34
    Lloyd, 292 A.3d at 106.
    35
    See H’rg Tr. at 4:17–5:4. It is indisputable that the facts alleged in the tips, if true, were sufficient
    to support the first two decision factors, i.e., (1) that Defendant possessed contraband (illegal
    narcotics and a firearm as a person prohibited) and (2) that he was in violation of his probation.
    6
    13.     While the third prong of Procedure 7.19 is not the primary focus of
    Defendant’s argument, the Court finds first that the tips provided to Officer Porter
    were reliable. “An informant is ‘past proven reliable,’ if the informant has given
    reliable information in the past.”36 Officer Porter had personal knowledge that both
    informants had supplied information leading to arrests in the past and that they each
    had a financial incentive to provide accurate information. Moreover, the two tips
    were consistent with one another and detailed in most respects (save for not
    identifying the specific residence that Defendant used to package heroin).
    14.     Turning to the fourth prong, prior to obtaining permission for the first
    administrative search, the officers corroborated both the personal and vehicle
    information relayed by the informants. They also confirmed that Defendant’s
    vehicle was regularly frequenting downtown Dover.                        Given Officer Porter’s
    knowledge of the area’s reputation for drug activity and the informants’ tips, this
    information was sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that contraband or
    evidence would be found in the vehicle and on Defendant’s person.37 Officer Porter
    relayed and discussed most of this information with Officer Duquette through a
    phone call before the search was approved, thus substantially complying with
    Procedure 7.19.38 Even if he was unaware of the license plate reader results, Officer
    Duquette knew that the informants were past-proven reliable, that the personal
    36
    Shepeard v. State, 
    133 A.3d 204
    , 
    2016 WL 690544
    , at *2 (Del. 2016) (TABLE).
    37
    See Fuller v. State, 
    844 A.2d 290
    , 292–93 (Del. 2004) (“Officer DuPont had received
    information from a past proven reliable informant that a probationer of a certain description was
    selling drugs in a particular area and driving a vehicle of a certain description. . . . When he located
    a vehicle and its driver matching the description in the general area described in the tip, and then
    confirmed that the car was registered to a probationer, the informant’s tip was corroborated.”); see
    also Woody v. State, 
    765 A.2d 1257
    , 1265 (Del. 2001) (explaining that an area’s “high crime
    nature” is a “‘relevant contextual consideration’ in a reasonable suspicion analysis” (quoting
    Illinois v. Wardlow, 
    528 U.S. 119
    , 124 (2000))).
    38
    Pendleton v. State, 
    990 A.2d 417
    , 420 (Del. 2010) (explaining that a telephonic case conference
    in which the decision factors are discussed and rationally assessed substantially complies with
    Procedure 7.19).
    7
    information was corroborated, and that Defendant was seen driving the same vehicle
    described by the informants in downtown Dover prior to granting approval for the
    search.
    15.     The second administrative search (the search of Defendant’s bedroom
    inside the residence) occurred only after the officers found suspected heroin and
    other indicia of drug dealing in the first search. That first search occurred just
    outside of Defendant’s residence, further corroborating the allegation that Defendant
    was packaging heroin in a residence in downtown Dover. Thus, by the time the
    officers acted on the less detailed portion of the tip (regarding drug packaging at a
    residence), it had been corroborated with specific evidence supporting the
    allegations of criminal activity.39 In accordance with Procedure 7.19, Officer Porter
    discussed this new information with Officer Duquette via phone and obtained
    permission to conduct a second administrative search.
    16.     Defendant relies primarily on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
    in Gibson v. State to argue for suppression.40              Gibson, however, supports the
    opposite conclusion. In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial
    of a probationer’s motion to suppress on facts closely analogous to this case. In
    Gibson, the source of the tip was a “past, reliable CI” whose previous tips had led to
    arrests.41 The informant in Gibson alleged that the probationer possessed a firearm
    and drugs.42 He “relayed specific personal details about Gibson including Gibson’s
    full name, probation level, curfew, and the reason why he was on probation.”43 By
    way of corroboration, the probation officer confirmed that “the personal information
    39
    Cf. Lloyd, 292 A.3d at 110 (holding that reasonable suspicion existed to search a probationer’s
    home after heroin was found during a search of his person).
    40
    
    135 A.3d 78
    , 
    2016 WL 943842
     (Del. 2016) (TABLE).
    41
    Id. at *2.
    42
    Id.
    43
    Id.
    8
    was accurate.”44       Notably, there is no indication in Gibson that the officers
    independently corroborated the firearm or drug allegations, including the specific
    allegation that Gibson was stashing the contraband in his car just prior to his 8:00
    p.m. curfew.45 Likewise, in this case, probation officers acted on information from
    past-proven reliable informants, whose tips had led to prior arrests, and corroborated
    the probationer’s personal information prior to conducting any search.
    CONCLUSION
    As explained above, the tips from these two past-proven reliable informants
    were sufficiently corroborated to justify the initial search of Defendant’s vehicle and
    person, and the fruits of the first search provided sufficient corroboration to justify
    the search of Defendant’s home.          Officer Porter substantially complied with
    Procedure 7.19 by conducting a telephonic conference and discussing the decision
    factors with his supervisor prior to each search.
    Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to suppress is
    DENIED.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    NEP/tls
    Via Email
    oc: Prothonotary
    cc: Counsel of Record
    44
    Id.
    45
    Id.
    9