State of Florida v. Ronnie J. Knighton , 235 So. 3d 312 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •           Supreme Court of Florida
    ____________
    No. SC16-1426
    ____________
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Petitioner,
    vs.
    RONNIE J. KNIGHTON,
    Respondent.
    [February 1, 2018]
    PER CURIAM.
    The State of Florida seeks review of the decision of the Fourth District Court
    of Appeal in Knighton v. State, 
    193 So. 3d 115
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), on the
    ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Second
    District Court of Appeal in Harris v. State, 
    742 So. 2d 835
    (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), on
    a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Knighton was charged with one count of lewd or lascivious battery.
    
    Knighton, 193 So. 3d at 116
    . The information charged Knighton by specifically
    alleging penile union or penetration with the child victim’s vagina. 
    Id. “During the
    charge conference, Knighton requested the jury be instructed on the lesser-
    included offense of unnatural and lascivious act. The State objected to the request,
    reasoning that there is nothing ‘unnatural’ about traditional penile-vaginal
    intercourse.” 
    Id. The trial
    court denied Knighton’s request and the jury ultimately
    convicted Knighton of lewd or lascivious battery. 
    Id. The Fourth
    District reversed, explaining that Knighton was entitled to the
    unnatural and lascivious instruction because, agreeing with the Fifth District in
    Funiciello v. State, 
    179 So. 3d 388
    (Fla. 5th DCA 2015), “digital penetration and
    sexual intercourse between an adult perpetrator and a child victim constitute
    unnatural and lascivious acts in that such conduct is not in accordance with nature
    or with normal feelings or behavior and are lustful acts performed with sensual
    intent on the part of the defendant.” 
    Knighton, 193 So. 3d at 117
    (emphasis
    omitted) (quoting 
    Funiciello, 179 So. 3d at 391
    ). Because Knighton, an adult,
    engaged in sexual intercourse with a minor victim, the Fourth District found that
    he was entitled to the unnatural and lascivious instruction. 
    Id. The State
    then
    sought review of the Fourth District’s decision in Knighton in this Court, alleging
    conflict with Harris, 
    742 So. 2d 835
    .
    In Harris, which also involved an adult perpetrator having sexual intercourse
    with a child victim, the Second District came to the opposite conclusion, holding
    that a defendant charged with lewd or lascivious battery is not entitled to an
    -2-
    instruction on unnatural and lascivious act where penile union with a child victim’s
    vagina is alleged in the information, regardless of the evidence adduced at 
    trial. 742 So. 2d at 838
    . The Second District reasoned that “the legislature intended for
    section 800.02 [unnatural and lascivious act] to be applied to different factual
    situations than would fall under section 800.04 [lewd or lascivious battery]. The
    term ‘unnatural’ in 800.02 distinguishes 800.02 from 800.04, and implies
    something more than what is covered by 800.04.” 
    Id. This review
    follows.
    ANALYSIS
    Because this matter involves a solely legal determination based on
    undisputed facts, our standard of review is de novo. See Khianthalat v. State, 
    974 So. 2d 359
    , 360-61 (Fla. 2008); Williams v. State, 
    957 So. 2d 595
    , 598 (Fla. 2007).
    At issue in this case is whether Knighton was entitled to an instruction on
    the permissive lesser included offense of unnatural and lascivious act.
    We begin by defining lesser included offenses. Lesser included
    offenses fall into two categories: necessary and permissive.
    Necessarily lesser included offenses are those offenses in which the
    statutory elements of the lesser included offense are always subsumed
    within those of the charged offense. State v. Paul, 
    934 So. 2d 1167
    ,
    1176 (Fla. 2006). A permissive lesser included offense exists when
    “the two offenses appear to be separate [on the face of the statutes],
    but the facts alleged in the accusatory pleadings are such that the
    lesser [included] offense cannot help but be perpetrated once the
    greater offense has been.” State v. Weller, 
    590 So. 2d 923
    , 925 n.2
    (Fla. 1991).
    -3-
    Sanders v. State, 
    944 So. 2d 203
    , 206 (Fla. 2006) (alterations in original). We have
    previously explained the circumstances under which a defendant is entitled to an
    instruction on a permissive lesser included offense:
    Upon request, a trial judge must give a jury instruction on a
    permissive lesser included offense if the following two conditions are
    met: “(1) the indictment or information must allege all the statutory
    elements of the permissive lesser included offense; and (2) there must
    be some evidence adduced at trial establishing all of these elements.”
    We recently reiterated this longstanding rule by stating that “[a]n
    instruction on a permissive lesser included offense is appropriate only
    if the allegations of the greater offense contain all the elements of the
    lesser offense and the evidence at trial would support a verdict on the
    lesser offense.”
    
    Khianthalat, 974 So. 2d at 361
    (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. State, 
    666 So. 2d
    960, 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); 
    Williams, 957 So. 2d at 599
    ).
    Knighton was charged with and convicted of lewd or lascivious battery
    under section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (2013). The standard jury instruction for
    lewd or lascivious battery (engaging in sexual activity) reads as follows:
    To prove the crime of Lewd or Lascivious Battery, the State must
    prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
    1. (Victim) was twelve years of age or older, but under the age
    of sixteen years.
    2. (Defendant)
    a. [committed an act [upon] [with] (victim) in which the
    sexual organ of the [(defendant)] [(victim)] penetrated or
    had union with the [anus] [vagina] [mouth] of the
    [(victim)] [(defendant)].]
    -4-
    b. [committed an act [upon] [with] (victim) in which the
    [anus] [vagina] of [(victim)] [(defendant)] was penetrated
    by an object.] The definition of “an object” includes a
    finger.
    Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10(a). “ ‘Union’ means contact.” 
    Id. Furthermore, “
    ‘lewd’ and ‘lascivious’ mean the same thing and mean a wicked, lustful,
    unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act.” Fla.
    Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.10.
    At trial, Knighton requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the
    permissive lesser included offense of unnatural and lascivious act under section
    800.02, Florida Statutes (2013). The standard jury instruction for unnatural and
    lascivious act reads as follows:
    To prove the crime of Committing an Unnatural and Lascivious Act,
    the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable
    doubt:
    1. (Defendant) (copy from charge) with (person named in
    charge).
    2. The act was unnatural and lascivious.
    Definitions.
    “Unnatural” means not in accordance with nature or with
    normal feelings or behavior.
    “Lascivious” means a wicked, lustful or unchaste, licentious, or
    sensual intent on the part of the person doing an act.
    Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 11.8.
    -5-
    In addressing the question of whether “unnatural” in the unnatural and
    lascivious act instruction includes penile-vaginal sexual intercourse, we must look
    to the well-established rules of statutory interpretation.
    Statutory interpretation is a “holistic endeavor,” and when engaged in
    the task of discerning the meaning of a statute, we “ ‘will not look
    merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but
    will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . .’ ” Adverting to
    our catalogue of rules of statutory construction,
    [w]e are required to give effect to “every word, phrase,
    sentence, and part of the statute, if possible, and words in
    a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”
    Moreover, “a basic rule of statutory construction
    provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact
    useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that
    would render part of a statute meaningless.” “[R]elated
    statutory provisions must be read together to achieve a
    consistent whole, and . . . ‘[w]here possible, courts must
    give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe
    related statutory provisions in harmony with one
    another.’ ”
    [see also] Goode v. State, 
    50 Fla. 45
    , 
    30 So. 461
    , 463 (1905) (“It is the
    general rule, in construing statutes, ‘that construction is favored which
    gives effect to every clause and every part of the statute, thus
    producing a consistent and harmonious whole. A construction which
    would leave without effect any part of the language used should be
    rejected, if an interpretation can be found which will give it effect.’ ”).
    Quarantello v. Leroy, 
    977 So. 2d 648
    , 651-52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (some citations
    omitted) (quoting United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 
    484 U.S. 365
    , 371 (1988); Kokoszka v. Belford, 
    417 U.S. 642
    , 650 (1974); and Heart
    of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 
    963 So. 2d 189
    , 198-99 (Fla. 2007)).
    -6-
    Notably, the term “unnatural” in the unnatural and lascivious act instruction
    is separately defined from the term “lascivious,” which distinguishes unnatural
    from lascivious. Therefore, the “unnatural” element of section 800.02 is what
    separates the crime of unnatural and lascivious act from the crime of lewd and
    lascivious battery under section 800.04(4). Thus, in reading sections 800.02 and
    800.04(4) in a way that gives full effect to all statutory provisions, we conclude
    that the Legislature must have intended for the crime of unnatural and lascivious
    act under section 800.02 to be separate and distinct from the crime of lewd and
    lascivious battery under section 800.04(4).
    The Fourth District’s contrary conclusion below renders the crimes under
    sections 800.02 and 800.04(4) as identical crimes with differing penalties. In other
    words, the decision below results in one crime essentially subsuming the other—a
    result that clearly cannot stand when the two statutes are read and construed to give
    logical and orderly meaning to all sections. See 
    Harris, 742 So. 2d at 838
    .
    Moreover, as we previously stated in Wong v. State, 
    212 So. 3d 351
    (Fla.
    2017), in cases not involving penile-vaginal sexual intercourse, the instruction on
    unnatural or lascivious act is a permissive lesser included offense of lewd and
    lascivious battery. 
    Id. at 361.
    We acknowledge that, historically, section 800.02
    “has been applied to homosexual acts, bestiality, digital sex, and oral sex—
    anything other than adult male and female sexual intercourse.” Harris, 742 So. 2d
    -7-
    at 838 (citing Franklin v. State, 
    257 So. 2d 21
    (Fla. 1971); Button v. State, 
    641 So. 2d
    106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Mohammed v. State, 
    561 So. 2d 384
    (Fla. 1st DCA
    1990); McGahee v. State, 
    561 So. 2d 333
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)). Thus, we
    conclude that it was not error here for the trial court to decline to give the
    permissive lesser instruction of unnatural and lascivious acts.
    CONCLUSION
    Therefore, we quash the decision of the Fourth District in Knighton and
    remand to the district court for any further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion. Furthermore, we disapprove of the Second District’s decision in Harris,
    to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion, and we approve of Harris, to the
    extent that it is consistent with this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
    CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
    IF FILED, DETERMINED.
    Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
    Conflict of Decisions
    Fourth District - Case No. 4D13-4630
    (Palm Beach County)
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia Terenzio, Bureau
    Chief, and Jeanine M. Germanowicz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm
    Beach, Florida,
    -8-
    for Petitioner
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Tatjana Ostapoff, Assistant Public
    Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
    for Respondent
    -9-