& SC13-1785 Dwight T. Eaglin v. State of Florida and Dwight T. Eaglin v. Julie L. Jones, etc. , 176 So. 3d 900 ( 2015 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC12-1760
____________
DWIGHT T. EAGLIN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
____________
No. SC13-1785
____________
DWIGHT T. EAGLIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
JULIE L. JONES, etc.,
Respondent.
[June 25, 2015]
PER CURIAM.
Dwight T. Eaglin, who was twenty-seven years old at the time of the crimes,
was convicted and sentenced to death for the June 2003 murders of correctional
officer Darla K. Lathrem and inmate Charles Fuston. Eaglin committed the
murders while attempting to escape from Charlotte Correctional Institution, where
he was serving a life sentence for a prior murder. This Court affirmed his
convictions and sentences on direct appeal. See Eaglin v. State, 19 So. 3d 935, 950
(Fla. 2009).
Eaglin now appeals the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief,
filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and simultaneously
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
postconviction court’s denial of relief and deny Eaglin’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On direct appeal, this Court summarized the facts of the crimes as follows:
The evidence at trial established that in 2003, the Charlotte
Correctional Institution was undergoing a renovation of the inmate
dormitories. That same year, Eaglin, [Stephen] Smith, and [Michael]
Jones, who were part of a group of inmates permitted to participate in
the renovation process, began planning an escape attempt. With
regard to the escape plans, the inmates constructed an escape ladder
and a metal tool that would hook to the outer lights of the prison, but
the tool was destroyed a month before the attempted escape. Eaglin
blamed [the inmate victim, Charles] Fuston and John Beaston, another
inmate, for destroying the tool.
Two inmates, Kenneth Christopher Lykins and Jesse Baker,
testified to what they heard about the escape plans. Lykins testified
that he overheard Eaglin, Smith, and Jones talking about their
upcoming escape. Specifically, Eaglin stated that he would kill
Fuston before he left because “he didn’t like the way he disrespected
him.” Lykins also overheard Eaglin state that he would kill anyone
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who tried to stop him from doing what he was going to do. On cross-
examination, Lykins, a twelve-time convicted felon, was impeached
with an affidavit in which he denied knowing anything about the
escape or the killing of Lathrem and Fuston. He explained this prior
inconsistency by stating he had been concerned with his own safety.
Jesse Baker, another inmate and nine-time convicted felon, also
testified to overhearing the escape plans. He specifically heard
Eaglin, Smith, and Jones stating that “they would kill any bitch that
got in their way.” Further, Baker testified that Eaglin wanted to
“straighten” Fuston, which indicated an intent to kill. Baker was
impeached with the fact that he suffered from severe depression and
was previously housed in the psychiatric dorm and the crisis unit of
the prison.
Additional testimony from correctional officers working at the
time of the escape attempt established that on June 11, 2003, Eaglin
was observed attempting to jump on the outer-perimeter fence of the
prison. When officers responded to the scene, Eaglin was sprayed
with chemical agents and subdued. Thereafter, Officer Lathrem was
found in a mop closet, huddled in a fetal position with injuries to her
head area. A medium-sized sledgehammer was located near her body.
Fuston was located in another cell lying on the floor with blood
coming from underneath his head. He was unconscious but still
breathing at that time. Beaston was found conscious in a secured cell
with a large wound in the middle of his forehead. Beaston was the
only surviving victim of the attacks.
The morning after the attempted escape, Eaglin was questioned
regarding the murders. Eaglin stated he wanted the “chair,” and that
he “tried to kill those three people.” Eaglin also admitted that he tried
to “jump the fence.”
With regard to the injuries suffered by the victims, the medical
examiner, Dr. R. H. Imami, testified that Lathrem’s injuries included a
hemorrhage in her right eye, two injuries on the right side of her head,
and injuries on her face. Dr. Imami found no evidence of defensive
wounds or injuries and concluded that skull and brain injuries were
the cause of Lathrem’s death. The cause of these injuries was heavy,
blunt force trauma. Dr. Imami opined that Lathrem was struck at least
three times and that any of the blows would have caused her death.
Finally, Dr. Imami stated that she believed the sledgehammer entered
into evidence caused the injuries.
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Dr. Imami also conducted the autopsy of Fuston. Fuston had
injuries to the right and left sides of his face and head, the back of his
head, and his mouth, in addition to skull fractures caused by blunt
trauma. In total, Fuston suffered three to four fatal blows. Dr. Imami
did not see typical defensive wounds but she observed a small skin
scrape on the back of Fuston’s left hand. She opined that the scrape
could have been caused when he fell or during subsequent medical
intervention. Ultimately, Dr. Imami concluded that skull and brain
injuries by blunt-force trauma to the head were also the cause of
Fuston’s death and that the trauma was caused by a hammer.
Upon the testing of evidence obtained during the investigation
of the murders, Lathrem’s DNA was discovered on the sledgehammer
that was near her body. Both Lathrem’s and Fuston’s DNA were
located on the pants Eaglin wore on the day of the murder. Lathrem’s
DNA was also located on Eaglin’s left boot. On cross-examination,
defense counsel referred to earlier testimony of a corrections officer
who testified that he assisted in removing Lathrem’s body from the
mop closet and then escorted Eaglin to the visiting park. The crime
laboratory analyst conceded that this scenario presented the possibility
of cross-contamination between Lathrem’s blood and Eaglin’s clothes.
She also stated that she did not analyze every item sent to her but she
matched the DNA profile of Lathrem to DNA found on codefendant
Smith’s right shoe.
The defense presented no witnesses but moved for a judgment
of acquittal, which was denied by the court. The jury convicted
Eaglin of the first-degree murders of Lathrem and Fuston.
Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 939-40.
During the penalty phase, the State presented evidence of Eaglin’s prior
violent felony—first-degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. Id. at 940. He was serving this sentence at the time of the
murders in this case. Id.Prior to testifying during the penalty phase, Eaglin stated on the record that
he did not want to present background mitigation evidence regarding his childhood
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and that his counsel had decided not to present mental health mitigation—a
decision with which Eaglin informed the trial court that he agreed. Id. at 945.
Although Eaglin had informed counsel at the outset of the case that he did not want
counsel to contact members of his family, counsel nonetheless undertook an
investigation into Eaglin’s background. Id.Upon review of this potential mitigation, counsel ultimately agreed with
Eaglin’s decision not to present this information, explaining on the trial record that
the presentation of mental health mitigation to the jury could be “dangerous,” and
stating during postconviction proceedings that Eaglin’s background represented a
“double-edged sword” that could adversely affect his case. Id. at 946. Instead, the
theme of the defense’s mitigation presentation was that the conditions at the
correctional facility contributed to the occurrence of the crime, including
inadequate supervision over construction, a failure in security staffing systems, and
permitting inmate mobility. Id. at 940, 944 n.4.
Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended that Eaglin be sentenced
to death by a vote of eight to four for each murder. After conducting a Spencer1
hearing, the trial court entered its order sentencing Eaglin to death. Id. at 941. The
trial court found that the following statutory aggravators applied to Eaglin’s
murder of Officer Lathrem: (1) the murder was committed by a person under
1. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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sentence of imprisonment; (2) Eaglin had a prior violent felony conviction; (3) the
murder was committed for the purpose of effecting an escape from custody; (4) the
murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); and (5) the victim was a law
enforcement officer engaged in the performance of legal duties (merged with
escape from custody). Id. With respect to Eaglin’s murder of Fuston, the trial
court found that the following statutory aggravators applied: (1) the murder was
committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment; (2) Eaglin had a prior
violent felony conviction; and (3) the murder was CCP. Id.After reviewing a presentence investigation report (PSI), the trial court
found in mitigation that “Eaglin suffered from a severely abusive childhood with a
severely dysfunctional family.” Id. The trial court assigned this mitigator some
weight. Id. However, the trial court rejected the proposed mitigators stemming
from the allegations of prison negligence. Id. Finding that the aggravators
outweighed the mitigators, the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation and
sentenced Eaglin to death for both murders. Id. On direct appeal, this Court
affirmed Eaglin’s convictions and death sentences. Id. at 950.2
2. Eaglin raised six issues on direct appeal, all of which this Court rejected:
(1) the trial court erred in precluding defense counsel from impeaching a State
witness; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to admit into penalty-phase evidence
the videotape of an interview of a former guard trainee; (3) the jury and the trial
court were not presented with available mitigation evidence, and the trial court
failed to consider all mitigating evidence available in the record; (4) the trial court
erred in using Eaglin’s supposed lack of remorse against him in sentencing him to
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Eaglin subsequently filed a timely initial motion for postconviction relief
and an amended motion for postconviction relief, ultimately raising eleven claims.3
Following a Huff4 hearing, the postconviction court granted an evidentiary hearing
on several of Eaglin’s claims: (1) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
adequately advise Eaglin regarding his limited waiver of penalty-phase mitigation
death; (5) the trial court erred in giving an instruction on and finding the CCP
aggravator; and (6) Florida’s death penalty statute is unconstitutional. Id. at 941.
3. Eaglin’s postconviction claims were as follows: (1) his constitutional
rights were violated because he was denied access to public records; (2) requiring
him to file his postconviction motion within one year after his conviction and
sentence became final, as required by rule 3.851, violates due process and equal
protection guarantees; (3) counsel were ineffective before trial and during the guilt
phase of trial for (A) failing to argue, in the motion to suppress Eaglin’s
statements, that he was not capable of adequately understanding his Miranda rights
and therefore did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights;
(B) failing to move for a change of venue and failing to undertake voir dire of the
jurors regarding publicity of the case during jury selection; and (C) failing to
challenge the admissibility of scientific evidence and testimony; (4) counsel were
ineffective for failing to adequately advise Eaglin regarding the nature,
circumstances, and consequences of his limited waiver of penalty-phase mitigation
and failing to advise the trial court of Eaglin’s history of mental illness and non-
compliance with necessary medication prior to the in-court colloquy; (5) counsel
were ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare mitigation
evidence; (6) newly discovered evidence established that the forensic evidence
presented by the State lacks scientific rigor; (7) Florida’s lethal injection procedure
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (8) the State’s use of inconsistent and
irreconcilable theories in order to obtain the death sentence was unconstitutional;
(9) the combination of these errors constituted cumulative error; (10) Eaglin’s
convictions are unreliable because the State withheld exculpatory evidence; and
(11) the appointment of Dr. Harry Krop as a confidential competency expert
created a conflict of interest.
4. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
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and failing to advise the trial court of his history of mental illness and non-
compliance with necessary medication prior to an in-court colloquy; (2) trial
counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and prepare
mitigation evidence; and (3) trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase of
trial for failing to argue that Eaglin was not capable of adequately understanding
his Miranda5 rights.
After the evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied Eaglin’s
amended motion for postconviction relief. This appeal follows, and Eaglin also
petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
ANALYSIS
I. Rule 3.851 Claims
On appeal to this Court, Eaglin raises three claims challenging the
postconviction court’s denial of relief. First, Eaglin asserts that his trial counsel
were ineffective during the penalty phase. Second, Eaglin contends that he also
received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase, pertaining to
motions to suppress his inculpatory statements. Finally, Eaglin asserts that the
postconviction court erred in summarily denying two of his postconviction claims.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Penalty-Phase Counsel
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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In his first claim on appeal, Eaglin argues that trial counsel were ineffective
during the penalty-phase proceedings based on two alleged errors. First, Eaglin
contends that trial counsel were ineffective with respect to his statement that he did
not wish to present background mitigation and that he agreed with counsel’s
strategic decision to not present mental health mitigation during the penalty phase.
As part of this claim alleging that his waiver of mitigation was not knowing and
voluntary, Eaglin contends both that the colloquy undertaken by the trial court did
not satisfy the requirements articulated by this Court in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.
2d 246 (Fla. 1993), and that counsel were ineffective in failing to inform the trial
court that he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was not medicated prior
to the colloquy. Second, Eaglin argues that trial counsel were ineffective for
failing to undertake an adequate investigation into his background and mental
health history, and thereby could not adequately advise him regarding the
presentation of this mitigation during the penalty phase. We address each aspect of
this ineffective assistance of penalty-phase counsel claim in turn.
Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court has explained that for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied:
First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the
lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably
competent performance under prevailing professional standards.
Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be
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demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the
proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A court
considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a
specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is
clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied.
Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 546 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Maxwell v.
Wainwright, 490 So. 2d 927, 932 (Fla. 1986) (citations omitted)).
As to the second requirement of prejudice, this Court has explained:
With respect to those claims alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel specifically during the penalty phase, penalty-phase prejudice
under the Strickland standard is measured by “whether the error of
trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence in the sentence of
death when viewed in the context of the penalty phase evidence and
the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court.” Hurst [v.
State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1013 (Fla. 2009)]. Under this standard, a
defendant is not required “to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct
more likely than not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding,
but rather that he establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in [that] outcome.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 44
(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). “To assess that
probability, [the Court] consider[s] ‘the totality of the available
mitigation evidence . . .’ and ‘reweigh[s] it against the evidence in
aggravation.’ ” Id. at 41 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
397-98 (2000)).
Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865, 873 (Fla. 2013).
“[T]his Court’s standard of review is two pronged: (1) this Court must defer
to the [trial] court’s findings on factual issues so long as competent, substantial
evidence supports them; but (2) must review de novo ultimate conclusions on the
deficiency and prejudice prongs.” Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 472 (Fla. 2010)
(quoting Reed v. State, 875 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 2004)). “Thus, under
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Strickland, both the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law
and fact, with deference to be given only to the lower court’s factual findings.”
Stephens v. State, 748 So. 2d 1028, 1033 (Fla. 1999).
1. Knowing & Voluntary Waiver of Mitigation
Eaglin’s first argument involves the colloquy undertaken prior to penalty-
phase testimony, during which Eaglin and his counsel informed the trial court that
Eaglin did not wish to present mitigation evidence regarding his background and
that counsel had made the strategic decision not to present mental health
mitigation—a strategic decision with which Eaglin informed the trial court he
agreed. Eaglin now asserts that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because
the trial court’s colloquy did not comply with the requirements established by this
Court in Koon, 619 So. 2d 246, and because counsel failed to advise the trial court
of his mental illness and lack of medication.
As an initial matter, we reject Eaglin’s argument pertaining to the adequacy
of the Koon inquiry itself because this claim should have been raised on direct
appeal. See Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 853-54 (Fla. 2003). Moreover, even if
this claim was not procedurally barred, it would still be without merit because
Koon is not applicable where the defendant does not waive all penalty-phase
mitigation. See Boyd v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 188 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he
requirements of Koon are not applicable in this case because [the defendant]
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presented mitigating evidence.”). As we recognized on direct appeal in rejecting
Eaglin’s claim that the trial court failed to consider all available mitigation in the
record, this is not a case in which the defendant waived his right to present
mitigation evidence. See Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 945.
We also reject Eaglin’s argument pertaining to counsel’s performance during
the colloquy, which the postconviction court denied after holding an evidentiary
hearing. Specifically, Eaglin contends that counsel were aware that Dr. Harry
Krop, a psychologist retained by the defense, had diagnosed Eaglin with bipolar
disorder and that, as a result of this diagnosis, he was at a greater risk of suffering
manic episodes, which he asserts directly affected his ability to have a rational
understanding of the proceedings against him.
As noted by the postconviction court in denying this claim, however, trial
counsel had no reason to question Eaglin’s competency due to his bipolar
diagnosis. Therefore, trial counsel’s decision not to inform the trial court about his
bipolar diagnosis and its effect on his competency prior to the colloquy cannot be
deemed deficient. In fact, Eaglin recognizes that trial counsel were well aware of
Eaglin’s bipolar diagnosis prior to the penalty phase. Indeed, prior to the guilt
phase of the trial, counsel had retained Dr. Krop to undertake an evaluation of
Eaglin’s mental health status.
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Although Dr. Krop diagnosed Eaglin with bipolar disorder and antisocial
personality disorder, he also informed counsel that he “did not feel that there was
neuropsychological impairment” and that Eaglin was a “very intelligent
individual.” Intelligence testing undertaken by Dr. Krop prior to trial indicated
that Eaglin had a full scale IQ score of 117. Additionally, Dr. Krop specifically
testified during the postconviction evidentiary hearing that, based on his evaluation
of Eaglin, he had no concerns regarding his competency, and counsel testified that
they were aware of Dr. Krop’s diagnoses.
Moreover, co-counsel Doug Withee testified that during the trial
proceedings, Eaglin was “bright” and “alert” and that Withee “did not have any
problem communicating with . . . Eaglin [and Eaglin] did not appear to have any
problem communicating with [him]. [Eaglin] seemed to understand the whole
picture.” Co-counsel Neil McLoughlin supported Withee’s impressions of Eaglin,
stating that in his view Eaglin was competent and that there was “no good-faith
basis” to undertake a competency evaluation.
Accordingly, Eaglin has not demonstrated that counsel’s decision not to
inform the trial court of his bipolar disorder and medication regime constituted
deficient performance. We therefore conclude that this argument is without merit
and reject Eaglin’s claim.
2. Failure to Adequately Advise Eaglin Regarding Presentation of Background &
Mental Health Mitigation Evidence
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Eaglin’s next argument is that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
properly advise him regarding the decision not to present background and mental
health mitigation during the penalty phase. Specifically, Eaglin asserts that trial
counsel did not undertake a meaningful investigation into these two categories of
potentially mitigating evidence and therefore could not adequately advise him on
the potential merit of presenting such evidence. Additionally, Eaglin argues that,
although trial counsel may have undertaken some limited investigation into
potential mitigation, counsel decided to present only the prison negligence
mitigation before reviewing the results of this investigation. Moreover, Eaglin
contends that counsel’s strategy to pursue prison negligence mitigation evidence in
lieu of “conventional” mitigation evidence was patently unreasonable.
Eaglin claims that, through several lay witnesses, he could have presented
compelling mitigation evidence regarding his traumatic childhood and extensive
head trauma that he suffered while boxing and playing football. In support, Eaglin
called multiple lay witnesses at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Although
none of these witnesses testified during the penalty phase, each of them asserted
that they were available and would have testified if they had been asked.
Additionally, Eaglin argues that he could have presented compelling mental health
mitigation. In support, Eaglin presented the testimony of numerous mental health
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experts during the postconviction evidentiary hearing to explain the extent of his
mental health problems, including alleged brain damage and bipolar disorder.
After reviewing the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the
postconviction court determined that trial counsel’s investigation into Eaglin’s
potential background and mental health mitigation was adequate and that counsel’s
decision not to present this mitigation represented reasonable trial strategy. With
respect to trial counsel’s investigation, the postconviction court noted that “[t]he
record reflects that the defense team visited [Eaglin’s] mother, grandfather, and
other family members, retained a defense mental health expert, and retained a
mitigation specialist.” The postconviction court concluded that trial counsel’s
decision not to present background or mental health mitigation was clear trial
strategy, made after having adequately investigated Eaglin’s background and
mental health and with his complete agreement with that strategy at that time.
As to deficiency, the postconviction court concluded as follows:
Merely because postconviction counsel has secured experts
years after trial who have more favorable opinions does not establish
that trial counsel was deficient for relying on the defense experts at
the time of trial. Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 986 (Fla. 2000); Jones
v. State, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999). The information from Dr. Krop
at the time of trial reveal[ed] no evidence of post concussive
syndrome, seizures, or that Defendant’s brain was not functioning
normally. Rather, Dr. Krop found no neurological impairment. Trial
counsel were not ineffective for relying on this information in
formulating their trial strategy and deciding to focus on what they
believed was the more effective mitigation evidence of negligence on
the part of the Department of Corrections.
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Regarding Eaglin’s potential background mitigation, the postconviction
court explained that Eaglin’s mother left him when he was three years old and thus,
“even had she been called to testify at trial, it is unlikely she would have been able
to provide any information about [Eaglin] except his first year or so, and nothing
about the rest of [his] life.” The postconviction court also explained that, while
Eaglin’s brother would have been able to testify about the childhood abuse both he
and Eaglin suffered, Eaglin “presented no testimony [at the postconviction
evidentiary hearing] that [he] was negatively affected mentally by that abuse.” In
fact, Eaglin’s brother affirmatively testified that “their abusive childhood did not
result in [Eaglin] behaving erratically or unpredictably.” The postconviction court
concluded that “any potential mitigation evidence regarding [Eaglin’s] abusive
childhood . . . would have been countered in cross-examination by all the positive
aspects of his life and his accomplishments in spite of enduring an abusive
childhood.”
Regarding Eaglin’s potential mental health mitigation, the postconviction
court explained that his “family and friends did not testify as to any obvious signs
of mental illness or drastic mood changes, and that [Eaglin] did not report any such
symptoms until he was arrested.” The postconviction court observed that “the
defense experts merely diagnosed [Eaglin] with bipolar disorder based on one prior
diagnosis given without any supporting testing, and based solely on [Eaglin’s] own
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self-reporting.” In addition, the postconviction court found significance in
Eaglin’s “inconsistencies in self reporting his symptoms to defense experts during
postconviction evaluations.”
Ultimately, the postconviction court determined that even if there was
deficiency, there was no prejudice established. We agree. We do not address
deficiency because it is clear that the prejudice component cannot be established
even if counsel were deemed deficient. See Schoenwetter, 46 So. 3d at 546 (“A
court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific
ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice
component is not satisfied.” (quoting Maxwell, 490 So. 2d at 932)).
Even if counsel had presented testimony during the penalty phase that shed
light on Eaglin’s abusive childhood, his dysfunctional family, and that he suffered
from mental health disorders, our confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase
would not be undermined when viewed in the context of the penalty phase
evidence and the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial court. See Hurst, 18
So. 3d at 1013. Both of Eaglin’s death sentences were supported by multiple
aggravators, two of which—CCP and prior violent felony conviction—this Court
has recognized as among the most serious aggravators under Florida’s death
penalty scheme. See Silvia v. State, 60 So. 3d 959, 974 (Fla. 2011). Further, the
prior violent felony aggravator is especially significant in this case, given that
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Eaglin was serving a life sentence for a prior murder when he committed the
murders in this case.
In addition, although the jury did not hear information regarding Eaglin’s
childhood, the trial court considered his abusive childhood based on the PSI. In
fact, the trial court found as a nonstatutory mitigator that “Eaglin suffered from a
severely abusive childhood with a severely dysfunctional family.” The trial court
assigned this factor some weight, but still concluded that the numerous aggravators
outweighed the mitigators. See Eaglin, 19 So. 3d at 941.
Accordingly, we conclude that any alleged failures of counsel during the
penalty phase do not undermine confidence in the outcome of the penalty phase.
We therefore affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief on this claim.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Guilt-Phase Counsel
In his next claim, Eaglin asserts that trial counsel were ineffective during the
guilt-phase proceedings for failing to effectively argue several motions to suppress
statements Eaglin made to Florida Department of Law Enforcement Agent
Uebelacker after his arrest. The statements at issue occurred on the morning of
June 12, 2003, at Charlotte Correctional Institution, where Agent Uebelacker met
Eaglin in an administrative office at the prison. When Eaglin entered the office, he
made several unsolicited spontaneous statements to Agent Uebelacker, which
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included references to wanting the electric chair and that Eaglin had “tried to kill
those three people.”
After Eaglin made these statements, Agent Uebelacker read Eaglin his
Miranda rights. Then, after Eaglin stated that he understood his rights, Agent
Uebelacker asked him if he would allow the interview to be recorded. In the
recorded interview, Eaglin himself actually recited his Miranda rights for Agent
Uebelacker without solicitation. To ensure that Eaglin understood his rights,
Agent Uebelacker proceeded to read Eaglin his Miranda rights again. During the
recorded interview, Eaglin stated that he “decided to jump the fence” and reiterated
that he wanted “the chair.”
Eaglin’s trial counsel filed multiple motions to suppress the statements,
arguing several theories of suppression, including a Miranda violation and lack of
voluntariness. With respect to Eaglin’s claim that his statements were not
voluntary, counsel argued that Eaglin was unable to exercise free will because he
suffered from lacerations on his arms, back, and legs; was sprayed with a chemical
agent during the escape attempt; was kicked in the head; received minimal medical
treatment; and had not slept for more than thirty hours. The trial court denied the
motions to suppress.
In his postconviction claim, Eaglin argued that trial counsel were deficient in
litigating the motions to suppress because counsel should have argued that a
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bipolar “manic episode” rendered him incapable of knowingly and voluntarily
waiving his Miranda rights. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing
on this claim but ultimately denied it.
We conclude that the postconviction court did not err in denying this claim.
Eaglin has not established either that trial counsel were deficient in litigating the
motions to suppress or that raising the bipolar “manic episode” as a basis to
suppress his statements would have resulted in the motions being granted.
In support of this claim, Eaglin relies on testimony elicited during the
postconviction evidentiary hearing that demonstrated he may have been suffering
from a bipolar “manic episode” at the time he met with Agent Uebelacker.
Specifically, Eaglin points to the testimony of Dr. Philip Harvey, a clinical
psychologist, who testified that it was his opinion that Eaglin was suffering from a
bipolar “manic episode” at the time of the crimes and that bipolar “manic
episodes” can last for several days. Dr. Harvey explained that suffering from a
bipolar “manic episode” can affect an individual’s judgment. This testimony was
supported by Dr. David Pickar, a psychiatrist, who also testified at the
postconviction evidentiary hearing that Eaglin was likely experiencing bipolar
manic symptoms on the day of the murders.
However, as noted by the postconviction court, this testimony presented at
the postconviction evidentiary hearing is contradicted by the evidence that was
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presented during the trial proceedings regarding the motions to suppress. For
example, a nurse at the correctional facility testified before the trial court that she
observed Eaglin in a holding cell following his apprehension, and he was “alert
and oriented, responding to her questions verbally.” Eaglin also testified during a
hearing on the motions to suppress, where he admitted that he had made the
statements, that he had recited his rights during the recorded interview, and that he
understood those rights.
Trial counsel litigated the motions to suppress at length, asserting multiple
bases for suppression. Although Eaglin now contends that trial counsel were
deficient in not raising his mental illness, his postconviction counsel did not
question trial counsel during the evidentiary hearing regarding their strategy in
litigating the motions to suppress or why the bipolar “manic episode” was not
raised. While we disagree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that this
failure to specifically question trial counsel constituted a waiver of the claim, we
agree with the postconviction court’s conclusion that the evidence Eaglin did
present fails to establish that he was incapable of understanding his Miranda rights.
Eaglin has also failed to demonstrate how, even if the bipolar “manic episode” had
been raised in litigating the motions to suppress, this would have resulted in the
motions being granted. Accordingly, because Eaglin cannot demonstrate either
deficiency or prejudice, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of this claim.
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C. Summarily Denied Claims
Eaglin also asserts on appeal that the postconviction court erred in
summarily denying two claims without holding an evidentiary hearing: (1) the
State utilized inconsistent, irreconcilable, and misleading theories of prosecution in
his trial and the trial of one of his codefendants, Stephen Smith; and (2) the State
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963). Because both of these claims are refuted by the record, we affirm the
postconviction court’s summary denial of these claims.
1. The State’s Use of Inconsistent Theories of Prosecution in Eaglin’s Trial
& in the Trial of Eaglin’s Codefendant
Eaglin first asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying
his claim that the State utilized inconsistent theories in prosecuting Eaglin and
codefendant Stephen Smith and thereby violated his due process rights.
Specifically, Eaglin argues that in Smith’s trial, the State argued that Smith had
been planning the escape for months and only brought Eaglin in as the “muscle”
shortly before the escape attempt. He also argues that Smith, who did not testify at
Eaglin’s trial, said in a recorded statement that was introduced at Smith’s trial that
there was no plan to kill inmate Fuston or whichever prison guard they
encountered. Eaglin asserts that in his trial, the State conversely portrayed him as
the primary actor, which directly conflicts with the State’s theory in Smith’s trial.
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Even if the use of inconsistent theories of prosecution could rise to the level
of a due process violation, the postconviction court correctly concluded that the
State presented consistent theories of prosecution in Eaglin’s and Smith’s trials.
As noted by the postconviction court, “the State argued in Smith’s case that Eaglin
committed the murders, followed Smith’s plan, and Smith was a principal. At
[Eaglin’s] trial, the State again argued [Eaglin] committed the murders.” A review
of the record supports the postconviction court’s factual findings.
The fact that the State used consistent prosecution theories is further
bolstered by the fact that the trial court in Smith’s case stated that the State could
not argue that Smith may have wielded the sledgehammer. Therefore, Eaglin’s
claim is refuted by the record, and the postconviction court did not err in
summarily denying this claim.
2. The State Withheld Exculpatory Evidence from Eaglin in Violation of Brady
Eaglin next asserts that the postconviction court erred in summarily denying
his claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence from the defense in
violation of Brady. Specifically, Eaglin asserts that the State failed to disclose to
the defense that one of his other codefendants, Michael Jones, had been offered a
plea agreement in exchange for his cooperation. Additionally, Eaglin contends
that, as part of a plea agreement, the State Attorney’s Office agreed that it would
use its best efforts to have codefendant Jones incarcerated in a prison outside the
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State of Florida and that letters between an assistant state attorney and the Florida
Department of Corrections (DOC) regarding these efforts were not revealed.
Eaglin claims he only learned of this information on May 20, 2011, upon
postconviction counsel’s review of Jones’s 2008 court file at the Charlotte County
Clerk’s Office.
The record conclusively refutes this claim because the record demonstrates
that on November 10, 2005, an assistant state attorney took proffered testimony
from Jones while in the presence of Jones’s counsel, and on December 22, 2005,
the assistant state attorney provided a copy of Jones’s proffered testimony to
Eaglin’s co-counsel Withee. At the outset of the proffer, the State made clear that
the parties had not entered into a plea agreement. In the proffer, Jones discussed
the escape attempt that occurred on the night of the murders, consistently
implicating Eaglin in the escape attempt. Jones did not testify at Eaglin’s trial, and
Eaglin was subsequently convicted of the murders on March 31, 2006.
After Eaglin was convicted and sentenced to death, Jones subsequently
entered into a plea agreement with the State in January 2007. In return, Jones
would be sentenced to life in prison, and the State Attorney’s Office would use its
best efforts to encourage the DOC to allow Jones to serve his sentence outside the
State of Florida. In Jones’s plea colloquy, the State confirmed on the record that
these were terms agreed to in the plea agreement.
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In order to show a Brady violation, Eaglin must demonstrate that “(1)
favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) was willfully or
inadvertently suppressed by the State; and (3) because the evidence was material,
[he] was prejudiced.” Johnson v. State, 135 So. 3d 1002, 1027-28 (Fla. 2014).
With respect to Jones’s proffer, the record refutes Eaglin’s claim that this
information was suppressed by the State. As noted by the postconviction court, a
transcript of this proffer was provided to Eaglin’s co-counsel Withee on December
22, 2005, months before Eaglin’s trial. Similarly, Eaglin’s claim that the State
suppressed the terms of Jones’s plea agreement, including that the State Attorney’s
Office would use its best efforts to ensure Jones served his sentence out of state, is
refuted by the record in that the State agreed to the terms of the plea agreement in
open court, during Jones’s plea colloquy, which took place in January 2007.
Moreover, the record refutes Eaglin’s assertion that the allegedly suppressed
information constituted favorable evidence. The record shows that Jones’s proffer,
as well as the terms of the subsequent plea agreement, were not exculpatory. In his
proffer, Jones consistently inculpated Eaglin in the escape attempt. Further,
neither the proffer itself nor the terms of the plea agreement had any impeachment
value, as Jones did not testify at Eaglin’s trial and did not enter into the plea
agreement until after Eaglin had already been convicted.
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For all these reasons, we affirm the postconviction court’s summary denial
of this claim. We turn next to Eaglin’s habeas corpus petition.
II. Habeas Corpus Petition
In his habeas petition, Eaglin raises one issue—appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to identify and raise on direct appeal that an actual conflict of
interest was created when the trial court appointed Dr. Krop to serve as a
confidential competency expert for Eaglin’s codefendant, Michael Jones. Eaglin
asserts that Dr. Krop’s appointment as a competency expert in Jones’s case
prejudiced his own case and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise this claim on direct appeal. Eaglin also asserts that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to supplement the record with portions of the Jones trial
transcript. We disagree.
In preparation for trial, Eaglin’s counsel retained Dr. Krop on March 22,
2004, to undertake a mental health evaluation. Dr. Krop interviewed Eaglin,
administered testing, and ultimately diagnosed him with bipolar disorder and
antisocial personality disorder. Although trial counsel originally indicated that
they intended to call Dr. Krop during the penalty-phase proceedings, counsel
decided against presenting mental health mitigation, and Dr. Krop did not testify.
Eaglin was ultimately sentenced to death on March 31, 2006, and he filed his
notice of appeal in this Court on April 21, 2006.
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Several months after the trial court had sentenced Eaglin to death and Eaglin
had filed his notice of appeal, Jones attempted to enter into a plea agreement
regarding the first-degree murder of the correctional officer killed during the
escape attempt. However, the trial court did not initially accept Jones’s plea and
orally appointed Dr. Krop, along with two other doctors, to evaluate Jones’s
competency. Subsequently, in October 2006, the trial court issued a written order
appointing Dr. Krop to undertake a competency evaluation in Jones’s case. In
accordance with this appointment, Dr. Krop undertook a competency evaluation of
Jones, and the trial court ultimately accepted Jones’s plea in January 2007.
Eaglin alleges that Dr. Krop’s subsequent appointment as a competency
expert in Jones’s case created a conflict of interest due to the fact that he had
previously served as a confidential mental health expert in Eaglin’s case. Eaglin
alleges that the conflict of interest is established by “the simple fact that he was
working as a confidential psychologist for two codefendants with opposing
interests.” Based on this alleged conflict of interest, Eaglin asserts that the counsel
he received was adversely affected. In seeking habeas corpus relief, Eaglin argues
that appellate counsel’s failure to raise this conflict of interest on direct appeal
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Eaglin
relies on this Court’s opinion in Walton v. State, 847 So. 2d 438, 445-46 (Fla.
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2003), in which this Court stated that it was error for a postconviction court to
allow a mental health expert to testify for the State at an evidentiary hearing where
that expert had previously been appointed as a confidential mental health expert for
a codefendant. This Court stated that, because the codefendants’ interests were
antagonistic, a conflict of interest existed, and it was unlikely that the expert could
render a truly objective opinion. Id.While Eaglin appears to analogize Walton to this case, Walton is completely
inapposite. Unlike in Walton, Eaglin cannot establish any alleged conflict of
interest that prejudiced his case, as Dr. Krop did not offer any testimony at
Eaglin’s trial and was only appointed to Jones’s case after he had completed all
work on Eaglin’s case and after Eaglin was convicted and sentenced to death.
Moreover, Dr. Krop, along with two other mental health experts, evaluated Jones
only for competence and did not undertake any further investigation into Jones’s
mental health. Thus, Eaglin’s reliance on Walton is misplaced, and his assertion
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this argument on direct
appeal is unavailing.
Accordingly, appellate counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to
raise this meritless issue on direct appeal, or for failing to supplement the record in
order to facilitate presentation of this meritless claim. See Jennings v. State, 123
So. 3d 1101, 1124 (Fla. 2013) (holding that appellate counsel was not deficient for
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failing to raise a meritless issue on appeal). Therefore, we deny Eaglin’s petition
for habeas corpus relief.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief,
and we also deny Eaglin’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON,
and PERRY, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Two Cases:
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Charlotte County,
Christine Hissam Greider, Judge - Case No. 082003CF0015250001X
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus
Neal Andre Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, William
McKinley Hennis, III, Litigation Director, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-
South, and Elizabeth Tandiwe Stewart, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional
Counsel-South, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Appellant/Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen D. Ake,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee/Respondent
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