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2022-06

Granville Ritchie v. State of Florida ( 2022 )

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          Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC20-1422
____________
GRANVILLE RITCHIE,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
June 9, 2022
PER CURIAM.
Granville Ritchie appeals his convictions and sentences,
including his judgment of conviction of first-degree murder and his
sentence of death. We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const., and for the reasons below affirm Ritchie’s convictions and
sentences.
BACKGROUND
Ritchie sexually battered and strangled to death the nine-year-
old child victim in this case, F.W., who had been left in Ritchie’s
care by a friend of the child’s family. Ritchie then dumped the
victim’s body in the water off of the Courtney Campbell Causeway
and fabricated a story about her disappearance. The victim’s body
was found washed up against the shoreline the day after she had
been left alone with Ritchie, and Ritchie was later arrested and
indicted on three counts of alleged crimes against the victim: (1)
first-degree murder; (2) sexual battery of a victim less than twelve
years of age by a defendant over the age of eighteen; and (3)
aggravated child abuse. Ritchie’s jury found him guilty as charged
on all three counts. As to first-degree murder, the jury found that
the killing was both premeditated murder and felony murder.
Although Ritchie does not concede guilt, he concedes in his
initial brief that the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to
support all three of his convictions. The trial court summarized
that evidence in its sentencing order as follows:
On May 16, 2014, [Ritchie] and Eboni Wiley picked
up the child-victim, [F.W.], from her home in Tampa. Ms.
Wiley was a friend of the victim’s family, and she and
[Ritchie] had recently become involved in a romantic
relationship. After retrieving the victim from her home,
[Ritchie] drove Ms. Wiley and the victim to a fast food
drive-through, to get food for the child-victim, and then
to his mother’s apartment in Temple Terrace [where
Ritchie also lived]. Upon arrival, [Ritchie] provided Ms.
Wiley with “Molly,” a drug similar in its effects to Ecstasy.
After a short time at the apartment, [Ritchie] sent Ms.
-2-
Wiley from the apartment to procure marijuana for him.
Ms. Wiley initially attempted to take the victim with her
to make the purchase of marijuana. However, [Ritchie]
intervened and instructed Ms. Wiley to leave the child-
victim with him at the apartment because Ms. Wiley had
no driver’s license and would have drugs in the car. Ms.
Wiley relented and agreed to leave young [F.W.] alone and
in [Ritchie’s] care.
While alone with [F.W.], [Ritchie] brutally attacked
her, stripped her of her clothing, and sexually battered
her. During the sexual battery, [Ritchie] violently
inflicted blunt force injury to the victim’s head and body
and caused several injuries, both external and internal,
to her genitals by forcefully penetrating the child-victim’s
vagina with his penis. In the course of the attack,
[Ritchie] manually strangled the child-victim with such
force that he caused extensive injuries to her neck,
including damage to the deep internal muscular and
cartilaginous structures. [F.W.] eventually died as a
result of the strangulation. Following the victim’s death,
[Ritchie] proceeded to conceal his actions by hiding the
victim’s body from discovery and informing Ms. Wiley
that the child-victim had left the apartment to buy candy
at a nearby pharmacy. Not finding the child-victim at the
store, Ms. Wiley returned to the apartment, where she
and [Ritchie] fabricated a story concerning the victim’s
whereabouts. [Ritchie] also contacted his mother, and
informed her that the victim was missing and advised her
regarding the fabricated story, in the event she was
questioned by law enforcement.
Later that evening, [Ritchie] drove Ms. Wiley back to
Tampa and dropped her off. He then returned to the
apartment and placed the victim’s body in a rolling
suitcase in order to relocate the body for disposal.
[Ritchie] then rolled the suitcase out of the apartment
and to the vehicle he was driving, where he placed the
suitcase containing the victim’s body into the trunk of
-3-
the car. [As established by red light camera footage and
cell tower data, Ritchie] then proceeded to drive away
from the apartment late that night, travelling across
Hillsborough County, through the City of Tampa toward
Clearwater, across the Courtney Campbell Causeway.
Shortly after crossing the main bridge of the causeway,
[Ritchie] entered onto a side access road running along
the north side of the causeway. After travelling
approximately two miles down the access road, [Ritchie]
came to an area of thick vegetation that provided
concealment from the main road of the causeway. It was
at this location that [Ritchie] removed the suitcase from
the trunk of the vehicle, retrieved the child-victim’s body
from the suitcase, and dumped her into the dark waters
of the bay. After disposing of the victim’s body, [Ritchie]
travelled to St. Petersburg to stay the night at the home
of another girlfriend . . . . At some point, [Ritchie]
disposed of the victim’s clothing and the suitcase used to
transport her body.
While [Ritchie] was actively attempting to conceal
any evidence of his rape and murder of [F.W.], law
enforcement and the victim’s family met with Ms. Wiley
in Temple Terrace, near the location of the crime. Ms.
Wiley initially advised law enforcement and the victim’s
family as to the fabricated story concocted by [Ritchie],
that she had taken the victim to visit a friend of hers, and
while at that location, the child had run away from her
friend’s apartment. At first, Ms. Wiley made no mention
of [Ritchie] ever having involvement with the child-victim.
However, after extensive questioning by law enforcement,
Ms. Wiley finally yielded, and admitted that she and
[Ritchie] had taken the victim to [Ritchie’s] apartment,
where the child-victim disappeared while in [Ritchie’s]
care. After the discovery of [Ritchie’s] identity, law
enforcement made contact with him and ultimately
placed [Ritchie] into custody. On May 17, 2014, [F.W.’s]
body was recovered on the north side of the Courtney
Campbell Causeway in Old Tampa Bay, in the same
-4-
approximate location [Ritchie] had dumped her, washed
up against the rocky shoreline of the causeway.
Following the guilt-phase verdict, Ritchie’s case proceeded to a
penalty phase on the first-degree murder conviction. After hearing
evidence and argument from the State and Ritchie, the jury
unanimously found that the State had established beyond a
reasonable doubt the following three aggravating factors: (1) the
victim of the capital felony was a person less than twelve years of
age, (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was
engaged in the commission of a sexual battery, and (3) the capital
felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). The jury
further unanimously found that the aggravating factors proven by
the State beyond a reasonable doubt are sufficient to warrant a
possible sentence of death. One or more individual jurors found
that one or more mitigating factors were established by the greater
weight of the evidence. The jury then unanimously found that the
aggravating factors proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt
outweigh the established mitigating circumstances. Finally, the
jury unanimously recommended the death penalty.
-5-
After holding a Spencer1 hearing at which neither party
presented additional witnesses or evidence, the trial court followed
the jury’s recommendation and sentenced Ritchie to death. 2 In its
sentencing order, the trial court found that the State had proven
beyond a reasonable doubt all three of the aggravating factors found
by the jury. The trial court assigned great weight to each
aggravator and further found the aggravating factors sufficient to
warrant the imposition of a death sentence. Regarding mitigation,
the trial court rejected several of Ritchie’s proposed statutory and
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, but found and assigned
moderate weight to the statutory mitigating circumstance that
Ritchie had no significant history of prior criminal activity. The trial
court also found and assigned the noted weight to the following
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) defendant suffered
1. Spencer v. State,

615 So. 2d 688

 (Fla. 1993).
2. In addition to sentencing Ritchie to death for the first-
degree murder of F.W., the trial court also sentenced Ritchie to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for his conviction of
sexual battery of a victim less than twelve years of age by a
defendant over the age of eighteen, and to thirty years’
imprisonment for his conviction of aggravated child abuse, with all
three sentences to run consecutively.
-6-
mental and physical abuse by his father and defendant’s father was
often absent because of four different families (moderate weight); (2)
defendant was raised in a poverty-stricken and violent
neighborhood in Kingston, Jamaica (little weight); (3) defendant was
the oldest of eighteen siblings and helped raised them (little weight);
(4) defendant was gainfully employed at various jobs (little weight);
and (5) defendant was kind and generous to others and possesses
other positive redeeming qualities (little weight). In imposing the
death sentence, the trial court found that the aggravating factors
“heavily outweigh” the mitigating circumstances.
Ritchie now appeals.
ANALYSIS
In this direct appeal, Ritchie challenges his sentence of death. 3
He argues that he is entitled to a new penalty phase because (1) the
3. Because Ritchie does not challenge his convictions or
sentences for the nonhomicide crimes against the victim, we affirm
those convictions and sentences without further comment.
Although Ritchie also does not challenge his first-degree murder
conviction, we nevertheless review the sufficiency of the evidence to
support that conviction. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5) (“On direct
appeal in death penalty cases, whether or not insufficiency of the
evidence is an issue presented for review, the court shall review the
issue and, if necessary, remand for the appropriate relief.”). As
Ritchie acknowledges in his initial brief, competent, substantial
-7-
cumulative impact of improper comments by the prosecutor during
the penalty phase closing argument deprived him of a fair penalty
phase; (2) Florida law regarding the presentation of victim impact
evidence is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in his case;
(3) the trial court erred in ordering audio redactions to a mitigation
video submitted by Ritchie and by allowing the State to present
improper rebuttal evidence to the video; and (4) the cumulative
prejudicial effect of the trial errors alleged in issues one through
three deprived him of a fair penalty phase.
(1) The Prosecutor’s Comments
Ritchie first argues that the cumulative impact of several
improper comments by the prosecutor during the penalty phase
closing argument—only one of which trial counsel objected to—
deprived him of a fair penalty phase. We first analyze each of the
comments. Then, as explained below, because Ritchie failed to
properly preserve any issue for appeal since the trial court did not
rule on trial counsel’s lone objection, we consider whether,
evidence in the record, including the facts set forth above, supports
his conviction for the first-degree murder of F.W., under both
theories of premeditated and felony murder.
-8-
cumulatively, the comments we determine are improper amount to
fundamental error. See Smith v. State,

320 So. 3d 20

, 27 (Fla.
2021) (“If an issue is not preserved, it is reviewed only for
fundamental error.”); see also Braddy v. State,

111 So. 3d 810

, 838
(Fla. 2012) (reviewing whether “the cumulative effect of those
unpreserved comments in which we identif[ed] possible error
constitute[s] fundamental error”). 4
Mercy
Ritchie first argues that the prosecutor improperly asked the
jury to extend the “same mercy” to Ritchie that Ritchie extended to
the victim. See Brooks v. State,

762 So. 2d 879

, 901 (Fla. 2000)
(explaining that “same mercy” arguments are prohibited).
In addressing the HAC aggravator during his penalty phase
closing argument, the prosecutor stated, without objection:
This isn’t pleasant to think about. It isn’t pleasant.
It’s not natural to sit here and think about this and walk
through this. This is ugly. This is nastiness. But you
have to think about this because you’re considering what
4. Ritchie’s initial brief was not clear as to whether, in
addition to his cumulative error claim, he was also seeking reversal
as a result of prejudicial error caused by each improper comment.
However, Ritchie’s counsel conceded at oral argument that he is
only seeking relief based on cumulative error.
-9-
his penalty should be. And to ultimately, to be able to do
that in an honest and fair and just manner, you have to
consider what this little girl suffered and what she went
through.
Remember this when you’re back there deliberating.
Remember this when the idea of mercy maybe starts to
[percolate] a little bit up into your mind. Remember that
during these several minutes at least three minutes to
inflict all of these injuries to her body, remember there
was never, not for one second, relief for this little girl.
She never had relief during this. She was suffering in
excruciating pain from . . . her genitals all the way up [to
the top of her head]. There was nothing that wasn’t
unpleasant, painful about this murder. He absolutely
brutalized her.
. . . And you can consider that when you’re
considering whether we have proven whether this is
heinous, atrocious or cruel or torturous, because you can
consider, like I said earlier, whether he exerted any
mercy at all to her, any pity to her.
Shortly thereafter, while still addressing the HAC aggravator,
the prosecutor stated, “[W]hen you’re back there deliberating, when
you’re considering whether you should give him life and whether
you should personally extend mercy to this defendant. Did he
extend mercy to this little girl?” The prosecutor continued to argue,
“Because in the heinous, atrocious [or] cruel instruction --,” at
which point Ritchie’s trial counsel objected and requested to
approach the bench.
- 10 -
During the bench conference, trial counsel moved for a
mistrial, arguing that “the State has made two maybe three mercy
arguments” that improperly ask the jury to “give the same mercy” to
the defendant that he gave to the victim. The prosecutor responded
that he had not argued that the jury should give Ritchie the “same
mercy” that Ritchie gave to the victim, but that he was instead
“talking about [Ritchie’s] failure to exercise mercy to [the victim],”
which is “part of the instruction on HAC.” After hearing from
counsel, the trial judge stated,
I don’t recall him saying that, but obviously relate the
term mercy . . . to the context of HAC. Don’t relate it to
any mercy the jury may or may not show the defendant,
okay.
Following the trial court’s instruction, the bench conference
concluded and the penalty phase continued without the trial court
having ruled on either the objection or the motion for mistrial.
When the prosecutor continued his argument after the bench
conference, the first thing he said was, “When you’re considering
whether [t]he State has proven the aggravating factor of heinous,
atrocious[, or] cruel, you can consider whether the defendant
extended mercy to her, you can consider how pitiless the crime
- 11 -
was.” Thereafter, Ritchie’s trial counsel did not renew either the
objection or motion for mistrial or otherwise raise the trial court’s
failure to rule. Trial counsel also did not request a curative
instruction.
Before we address whether these comments were improper, we
analyze whether Ritchie properly preserved this issue for our
review. We do so because although Ritchie has raised only a
cumulative error claim, and although our cumulative error analysis
must “examine[] the entire closing argument, paying specific
attention to the challenged comments—whether preserved or not,”
the standard of review differs depending upon whether an issue is
preserved. Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 846-47

 (explaining the harmless
error standard of review that applies where a challenge to improper
prosecutorial comments is preserved and the fundamental error
standard of review that applies where the challenge is not
preserved). Our precedent is clear that “[t]o be preserved, the issue
or legal argument must be raised and ruled on by the trial court.”
Rhodes v. State,

986 So. 2d 501

, 513 (Fla. 2008).
In Ritchie’s case, when the prosecutor first referenced mercy,
trial counsel did not contemporaneously object and thus failed to
- 12 -
preserve any issue with respect to that portion of the closing
argument. See Card v. State,

803 So. 2d 613

, 622 (Fla. 2001) (“As a
general rule, the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection when
improper closing argument comments are made waives any claim
concerning such comments for appellate review.”).
Later, while still reviewing the evidence that supported the
HAC aggravator, the prosecutor again referenced mercy. This time
trial counsel contemporaneously objected and requested a mistrial.
However, contrary to our precedent requiring trial counsel to obtain
a ruling on any such objection or motion, see Rhodes,

986 So. 2d at 513

, trial counsel here failed to do so. The record before us is that
the trial court did not “recall” the prosecutor having made a “same
mercy” argument, but nonetheless instructed the prosecutor to
“obviously relate the term mercy . . . to the context of HAC. Don’t
relate it to any mercy the jury may or may not show the defendant,
okay.”
At oral argument, Ritchie’s counsel maintained that the trial
court’s statement effectively overruled the objection, thereby
preserving his challenge to this portion of the prosecutor’s
argument and obviating the requirement to obtain a ruling on the
- 13 -
motion for mistrial. See Robinson v. State,

989 So. 2d 747

, 750
(Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“[T]o preserve an error founded on an objection
at trial, it is necessary to move for a mistrial only when the
objection is sustained, not when it is overruled. When objections
are overruled, a motion for mistrial would be futile.”) (citing Simpson
v. State,

418 So. 2d 984

, 986 (Fla. 1982)). We disagree with Ritchie
that the trial court ruled on, let alone overruled, the objection.
On analogous facts, in a decision not cited by either of the
parties, we held that an “objected-to comment was not adequately
preserved” where “[t]he trial court did not sustain or overrule the
objection, but asked the prosecutor to clarify his argument.”
Wheeler v. State,

4 So. 3d 599

, 609 (Fla. 2009). In Wheeler, defense
counsel objected to the prosecutor’s closing argument regarding the
“number of people that have been affected” by the victim’s murder
on the ground that the prosecutor was improperly arguing victim
impact evidence as aggravation.

Id. at 610

. The prosecutor
responded, “It is not in any way intended to be argued as an
aggravator. It is simply for [the jury] to understand that everybody
has been affected by this. And my further comment will be, that’s
not what they can make their decision on.”

Id.

 The trial court then
- 14 -
instructed the prosecutor to “[m]ake that clear and limit it as best
you can,” and the prosecutor clarified his argument accordingly.

Id.

We see no meaningful difference between the trial court’s
instruction in Wheeler and the trial court’s instruction here.
Accordingly, because Ritchie’s trial counsel failed to
contemporaneously object to the prosecutor’s first mercy comment
and failed to obtain a ruling on his objection to the second
comment, Ritchie’s challenge to these comments is not preserved
for our review. 5
Although Ritchie’s failure to properly preserve his challenge to
the prosecutor’s mercy comments precludes application of the
harmless error standard of review, we write further to address
5. In arguing for the harmless error standard of review,
Ritchie noted in his initial brief that the trial court had granted his
pretrial “Motion in Limine Precluding Improper Penalty Phase
Argument.” However, we have previously explained that “[t]he
general pretrial motion in limine does not constitute a
contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor’s arguments.”
Wheeler,

4 So. 3d at 609

; see also

id.

 at 609 n.6 (explaining that
section 90.104(1), Florida Statutes, which “was amended in 2003 to
make a contemporaneous objection to admission or exclusion of
evidence unnecessary in order to preserve the issue for appeal
where a prior ‘definitive ruling’ has been obtained . . . . does not
apply . . . to claims of error in prosecutorial argument”).
- 15 -
another glaring problem with Ritchie’s argument in favor of that
standard. The harmless error standard would only apply if the trial
court had overruled trial counsel’s objection. See Cardona v. State,

185 So. 3d 514

, 520 (Fla. 2016) (“Where the comments were
improper and the defense objected, but the trial court erroneously
overruled defense counsel’s objection, we apply the harmless error
standard of review.”). Here, the trial court agreed with trial counsel
that it was improper for the State to argue mercy outside of asking
the jury to find the HAC aggravator and cautioned the prosecutor to
limit his argument accordingly before allowing the penalty phase to
continue. Thus, if we could read rulings into the record, which we
cannot, see Rhodes,

986 So. 2d at 513

, we would conclude that the
trial court sustained trial counsel’s objection but denied the related
motion for mistrial. On those facts, we would review for abuse of
discretion, not harmless error. See Andres v. State,

254 So. 3d 283

,
301 (Fla. 2018) (holding the trial court properly sustained defense
counsel’s objection to an improper comment by the prosecutor but
did not abuse its discretion in denying the related motion for
mistrial).
- 16 -
Turning to whether the prosecutor’s mercy comments were
improper, Ritchie correctly argues that the State may not, in
seeking a recommendation of death, ask the jury to show the
defendant the “same mercy” as the defendant showed to the victim.
See Brooks,

762 So. 2d at 901

. However, the prosecutor in Ritchie’s
case referenced mercy while arguing for the HAC aggravator, where
the mercy or lack thereof shown to the victim by the defendant is
relevant. See Davis v. State,

121 So. 3d 462

, 497-98 (Fla. 2013)
(“This Court has emphasized that in order to qualify as HAC, ‘the
crime must be both conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily
torturous to the victim.’ ”) (quoting Richardson v. State,

604 So. 2d 1107

, 1109 (Fla. 1992)).
Viewing the prosecutor’s comments in context, the first one
was not improper. Rather, the prosecutor limited his argument to
evidence that was relevant to the proper application of the HAC
aggravator, namely evidence establishing that Ritchie’s murder of
the victim was merciless. In contrast, in the second comment, after
asking the jurors to consider whether Ritchie had extended mercy
to the victim, the prosecutor also asked them to consider the lack of
mercy that Ritchie had showed to the victim “when you’re
- 17 -
considering whether you should give him life and whether you
should personally extend mercy to this defendant.” We
acknowledge that because the prosecutor addressed mercy in the
context of HAC, this argument is not as clear-cut of a violation as
many of the “same mercy” arguments we have previously
condemned. See, e.g., Brooks,

762 So. 2d at 901

 (“[I]f you are
tempted to show the defendants mercy or pity, I’m going to ask you
show them the same mercy, the same pity that they showed [the
victim] on [the day of the murder], and that is none.”); Merck v.
State,

975 So. 2d 1054

, 1061-62 (Fla. 2007) (condemning as
improper the prosecutor’s description of the defendant’s proposed
mitigation as “[t]hings about [the defendant’s] background they
believe should warrant you affording him some mercy that he never
afforded [the victim]” and the argument that “there should be no
mercy for a merciless crime”). Nevertheless, the jury’s ability to
extend mercy to Ritchie is irrelevant to the HAC aggravator. See
Davis,

121 So. 3d at 497-98

. Similarly, whether Ritchie showed the
victim mercy during the killing is irrelevant to the jury’s
determination as to whether to extend mercy to Ritchie. See Fla.
Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 (“Regardless of the results of each
- 18 -
juror’s individual weighing process—even if you find that the
sufficient aggravators outweigh the mitigators—the law neither
compels nor requires you to determine that the defendant should be
sentenced to death.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor
crossed the line into improper argument when he related the jury’s
ability to extend mercy to Ritchie to Ritchie’s failure to show the
victim any mercy.
Golden Rule Arguments
Ritchie next contends that the prosecutor made two “classic”
and one “variant” golden rule arguments. A golden rule argument
is an “argument[] that invite[s] the jurors to place themselves in the
victim’s position and ‘imagine the victim’s final pain, terror and
defenselessness.’ ” Merck,

975 So. 2d at 1062

 (quoting Bertolotti v.
State,

476 So. 2d 130

, 133 (Fla. 1985)).
As to the two alleged “classic” violations, Ritchie first argues
that the prosecutor improperly asked the jurors, “Can you imagine
the dread of knowing that your life is ending and you’re feeling pain
all over your body as it’s bleeding internally from all of these
injuries, the pain and suffering of feeling the penetration, feeling the
tearing and ripping of sensitive tissue . . . . And that pain would
- 19 -
have been exponentially greater for a little girl, a little, innocent
girl.” Second, Ritchie argues that the prosecutor made an improper
golden rule argument by inviting the jury to “go back” to the minute
of silence he had included in his guilt-phase closing argument to
demonstrate how long Ritchie would have choked the victim while
waiting for her to die.
As we have explained, “The State can comment on the crime
as long as the comments ‘are based on evidence introduced at trial
and are relevant to the circumstances of [the crime] or relevant
aggravators,’ but may not ‘cross the line by inviting the jurors to
place themselves in the position of the victim.’ ” Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 842

 (quoting Mosley v. State,

46 So. 3d 510

, 521 (Fla. 2009)).
In Ritchie’s case, viewing the arguments in the context in which
they were made, we hold that the first, but not the second,
argument was an improper golden rule argument.
Both arguments were clearly made in support of the HAC
aggravator, to which the victim’s suffering and the defendant’s
indifference to the victim’s suffering are relevant. See Merck,

975 So. 2d at 1062-63

. However, in the first argument, the prosecutor
did not simply use pronouns like “you” and “your” while recounting
- 20 -
what the evidence showed about the victim’s injuries and suffering;
rather, he expressly asked the jurors whether they could “imagine”
what it would be like if that was happening to them. Cf. Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 843

 (recognizing that the prosecutor’s “repeated use
of the pronoun ‘you’ suggests” an improper invitation for the jurors
to place themselves in the victim’s position) (emphasis added).
Moreover, after asking the jurors to “imagine” Ritchie’s attack on
the victim happening to them, the prosecutor went further, stating
“that pain would have been exponentially greater for a little girl.”
We find these comments, taken together and in context,
impermissibly asked the jurors to imagine pain to themselves, and
to compare that pain to an idea of what the victim must have felt.
Such an argument “inviting the jurors to place themselves in the
position of the victim,” Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 842

 (quoting Mosley,

46 So. 3d at 521

), is precisely what the rule prohibits.
In contrast, in his second argument, the prosecutor
appropriately focused on asking the jury to consider what the
evidence showed as to the length of the attack and what the victim
experienced while Ritchie was compressing her neck. See Merck,

975 So. 2d at 1064

 (“invit[ing] the jurors to vividly imagine how long
- 21 -
a minute could feel . . . did not invite the jurors to place themselves
in the victim’s position”).
Ritchie also claims, and the State appears to concede, at least
in part, that an “imaginary script” variant violation of the rule
occurred when the prosecutor improperly asked the jury to put the
prosecutor’s “own imaginary words in the victim’s mouth.” Urbin v.
State,

714 So. 2d 411

, 421 (Fla. 1998), receded from on other
grounds by Lawrence v. State,

308 So. 3d 544

 (Fla. 2020).
Specifically, the prosecutor made the following argument regarding
evidence presented during the guilt phase establishing that a 911
call, on which nothing from the caller could be heard before the call
disconnected, was made from Ritchie’s phone during the time
period that the victim was alone with Ritchie:
[S]he wouldn’t have made a call to 9-1-1 unless this little
girl was so scared as to be scared out of her mind.
And as we talked about, the innocence, the
vulnerability of children, their fear is a heightened level of
fear, a special kind of fear. This is before this man laid
hands on her. And we know that because she was able
to get his phone and make this call. Maybe he had
fondled her or kissed her or taken her clothes off or had
started doing something to her, but he wasn’t strangling
her to death at this point. This is well before that. That’s
-- This is well before the multiple minutes of suffering
- 22 -
physically and emotionally that she went through with
strangulation and rape.
But even before all of that, when you’re back there
deliberating on this verdict . . . I want you to consider
that call and consider the fear that that little girl must
have been experiencing even before he put a hand on her.
And that was just the beginning of the attack, that’s just
the beginning.
In that call, I asked you a couple of days ago if you
could hear the fear in her silence. I’d ask you now, can
you hear the echoes in that call of the screams that came
after that and the crying and the pain and the anguish
that reverberated off the walls of that empty apartment.
Although portions of the State’s argument, including that the
victim experienced pain, confusion, and fear during the attack,
could reasonably be inferred from the evidence presented, there was
no evidence establishing when the 911 call was made relative to the
attack, including whether the call was made before or after any
kissing, fondling, or undressing had occurred, or what the victim’s
state of mind was during the call. We agree with Ritchie that
attempting to fill the silence of the 911 call with such improper
speculation violates the “imaginary script” variant of the prohibition
on golden rule arguments. See Urbin,

714 So. 2d at 421

 (holding
that “the prosecutor . . . went far beyond the evidence in
emotionally creating an imaginary script” for the murder).
- 23 -
Comment on Right to Jury Trial and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment
Next, Ritchie claims that the prosecutor improperly
commented on his exercise of his right to a jury trial and improperly
encouraged the jury to recommend a death sentence based on anti-
immigrant sentiment. Immediately prior to making the comments
that Ritchie claims are improper, the prosecutor had been
addressing certain mitigation submitted by Ritchie, including
witness testimony about Ritchie’s family in Jamaica and a video
that Ritchie had submitted to depict the conditions in the area of
Jamaica where he lived for a number of years. Specifically, the
prosecutor had argued:
Now, I’m not going to sit up here and tell you that
where he grew up in the garrison and Kingston, Jamaica
is some up scale neighborhood, it clearly is not, it clearly
is not. We have neighborhoods like that here in this
country. . . . [T]hey are call[ed] ghettoes or slums. We
have high crime areas . . . .
....
So [Ritchie] was raised in a status and privileged
position as the son of the Don or Dan of this garrison.
He enjoyed that privilege.
You saw a bunch of really not horrible but kind of
rundown neighborhoods, but then you see this beautiful
high school that he went to . . . that he had to make good
- 24 -
grades to get into . . . [and that] his privilege helped him
get into the school.
This defendant was raised with privilege. This
defendant was able to get a GED or a[n] equivalent of a
high school diploma. And then we know this defendant
was able to immigrate to this country. I believe the one
lady in the video called it migrating.
Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor continued his
argument with the following comments, which Ritchie contends are
improper:
He immigrated here to this country years ago. And as he
lived here, he enjoyed the benefits of this country we live
in, the greatest country on the face of the earth.
He enjoyed all these benefit[s] we talked about. He
enjoyed the due process rights we talked about. He
enjoyed the fact that we carry the burden of proof to
prove his guilt, that he is presumed innocent, that he is
entitled to a jury of his peers to not just determine
whether he’s guilty or not, but a jury of his peers to
determine the appropriate sentence. Because this isn’t
Jamaica or some other country, this is the United States
where this defendant gets to have you determine his
sentence, not some bureaucrat, not some single judge,
not some single person, not some star chamber, but you,
his fellow citizens. He [has] enjoyed all of these benefits.
He’s enjoyed the benefit of a neutral and unbiased judge.
He’s enjoyed the benefit of competent -- very competent
defense counsel during this case.
After making these comments, which Ritchie now challenges,
the prosecutor immediately continued, “So we know he was able to
- 25 -
pull himself up out of that situation, move here where he had all
these opportunities to this country. And we saw how he took
advantage of those opportunities. He took advantage of them by
manipulating all these women in his life . . . .”
Although portions of the prosecutor’s comments, which we will
address below, are improper, viewed in context, the argument does
not amount to an improper comment on Ritchie’s exercise of his
right to a jury trial. The prosecutor certainly referenced the right,
but we have previously recognized that “referencing” the right to a
jury trial will not always cross the line into an improper comment.
Evans v. State,

177 So. 3d 1219

, 1236 (Fla. 2015) (“referencing” the
right to a jury trial “may at times fall within the ‘wide latitude’ that
is given to attorneys during closing arguments” (quoting Merck,

975 So. 2d at 1061

)), receded from on other grounds by Johnson v. State,

252 So. 3d 1114

 (Fla. 2018). In Evans, we explained that error
occurs where the prosecutor’s remarks “negatively reflect[] upon
[the defendant’s] exercise of his constitutional right.”

Id.

 For
example, in Evans, the prosecutor’s comment crossed the line
because it was “specifically directed at [the defendant’s] decision to
seek a jury trial despite the significant incriminating evidence
- 26 -
against him” and “suggested that he wasted the time of the court
and the jury by seeking a jury trial.”

Id.

 In contrast, in Ritchie’s
case, the prosecutor addressed the right to a jury trial in a positive
fashion in describing how far Ritchie had come from his troubled
life in Jamaica without negatively reflecting upon Ritchie’s exercise
of that right or any other constitutional right. Accordingly, we
disagree with Ritchie that the challenged argument constitutes an
improper comment on Ritchie’s exercise of his right to a jury trial.
We agree with Ritchie, however, that portions of the
prosecutor’s argument went too far. Ritchie’s proposed
nonstatutory mitigation put at issue his background, including his
experiences in Jamaica and his emigration. Similarly, his proposed
statutory mitigator of substantial impairment, see § 921.141(7)(f),
Fla. Stat. (2021), allowed the prosecutor to address evidence
showing that Ritchie had the ability to manipulate others and, in
the prosecutor’s words, the ability to “pull himself up out of [his]
situation” in Jamaica. However, the fact remains that Ritchie was
not on trial in Jamaica. Thus, it was improper for the prosecutor to
comment about the Jamaican legal system or to compare it to the
legal system in the United States.
- 27 -
In the same vein, we find particularly troubling another
comment, which Ritchie also mentions in his brief, where the
prosecutor compared Ritchie’s “comfortable” life while awaiting trial
in jail, to what his life would have been like had he been on trial in
Jamaica. Referring to Ritchie’s ability to have his girlfriend deposit
money in his jail canteen account, which Ritchie used to purchase
food that allowed him to gain weight while awaiting trial, the
prosecutor argued, “You really think that would happen in
Jamaica? You think that would happen in the countries of the
Caribbean? It happens here in this country because he enjoyed all
those rights, the constitutional rights.”
We agree with Ritchie’s argument on appeal that such
irrelevant comparisons served no purpose except to imply that he
had “bit the hand that fed him.” See Bertolotti,

476 So. 2d at 134

(“The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the evidence
and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from the evidence. Conversely, it must not be used to inflame the
minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an
emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather than the
logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law.”). To
- 28 -
the extent the prosecutor’s rhetoric could be taken as anti-
immigrant, we condemn such rhetoric in the strongest possible
terms; it has no place in our courts.
President Reagan
Ritchie next argues that, by comparing his difficult childhood
to the difficult childhood experienced by the late President Ronald
Reagan, the prosecutor improperly attached an aggravating label to
a mitigating factor and improperly appealed to the jury’s emotions.
See Walker v. State,

707 So. 2d 300

, 314 (Fla. 1997) (“[T]he State
may not attach aggravating labels to factors that actually should
militate in favor of a lesser penalty . . . .”); Ruiz v. State,

743 So. 2d 1

, 6-7 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the prosecutor’s request for “jurors
to do their duty as citizens just as her own father had done his duty
for his country in Operation Desert Storm” was a “blatant appeal to
jurors’ emotions”). We disagree.
The Reagan comparison did not improperly ask the jury to
consider mitigation as aggravation. Rather, the prosecutor made
the comments at issue in the context of arguing the appropriate
weight that the jury should give to Ritchie’s proposed mitigation
related to his difficult and abusive childhood where the record also
- 29 -
showed that Ritchie had been able to “pull himself up out of [his]
situation” in Jamaica by immigrating to the United States. See
Bush v. State,

295 So. 3d 179

, 211 (Fla. 2020) (finding no error
where, in comparing the defendant’s difficult childhood to the
evidence that the defendant “had the ability to pull himself out of all
of that stuff from his childhood,” “the prosecutor consistently
framed his comments in terms of the amount of weight that the jury
should assign”); see also Fletcher v. State,

168 So. 3d 186

, 215 (Fla.
2015) (recognizing that although prosecutors “may not ask the jury
to compare the life choices of the victim with the life choices of the
defendant,” this Court’s precedent does not “stand[] for the
proposition that a prosecutor cannot make broad statements that
other people in the community with the same background or
characteristics as the defendant do not commit murder”). Nor is
the prosecutor’s Reagan comparison remotely similar to the
impermissible appeal to the jurors’ emotions that occurred when
the prosecutor in Ruiz asked the jurors to do their moral duty by
returning a recommendation for death just as her own heroic father
had done his duty by serving in Operation Desert Storm despite
also having cancer. Ruiz,

743 So. 2d at 6-7

.
- 30 -
Speculation Regarding Mitigation Video
Ritchie also claims that the prosecutor improperly speculated
as to what defense mitigation witnesses would have said on cross-
examination. See Hutchinson v. State,

882 So. 2d 943

, 953 (Fla.
2004) (“Improper bolstering occurs when the State . . . indicates
that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s
testimony.”), abrogated on other grounds by Deparvine v. State,

995 So. 2d 351

 (Fla. 2008); Thompson v. State,

318 So. 2d 549

, 551-52
(Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (explaining that it is improper for the
prosecutor to imply that he possesses additional knowledge or
information about the case that was not disclosed to the jury).
Specifically, when addressing the individuals who were interviewed
for a video that Ritchie presented in mitigation, the prosecutor
argued:
Neither of them, none of them, not a one of them
was subjected to cross-examination about what their
potential biases would be, their potential motives would
be, what their past is, what their relationship is to the
defendant other than a little blurb up there. None of
them were subjected to the testing, the due process
testing that this defendant was able to receive all through
this trial. We didn’t get that. We weren’t afforded that.
We didn’t get an opportunity and you didn’t get an
opportunity to hear what we may have asked them and
what they may have told us if we had cross-examined
- 31 -
them. You got a light-most-favorable-to-the-defendant
version of facts about him.
We disagree that this argument constitutes improper
speculation as to how these individuals would have testified had
they been cross-examined, let alone the improper bolstering
prohibited by Hutchinson or a suggestion, contrary to Thompson,
that the prosecutor had additional information that was not
presented to the jury. Rather, the prosecutor accurately stated that
these individuals had not been subjected to cross-examination.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s argument as to not knowing what
possible biases or motives the people on the video may have had
was supported by evidence presented during the penalty phase,
namely the testimony of a witness who suggested that the people
who were interviewed for the video may have been motivated by
Ritchie’s father’s status in their community.
True and Just Verdict
In his final challenge to the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing
argument, Ritchie takes issue with the following argument:
These aggravating circumstances, as I said, they
tower because they are giant pillars of proof, they really
are. They are like mountains of proof with deep running,
deep foundations that support them; the kind of proof,
- 32 -
the kind of aggravating factors you can stand on in
determining that this defendant should be sentenced to
death; the kind of evidence that would support that
decision and give you the firm belief and knowledge that
it’s the true and just verdict in this case; and it allows
your decision to be one that you can live with for the rest
of the day, for the rest of the week, for the rest of this
year and for the rest of your lives knowing you did the
right and just thing sentencing this defendant to death.
Having reviewed the closing argument in its entirety, we find
no error because the prosecutor was not arguing, contrary to Urbin,

714 So. 2d at 421

, that “any juror’s vote for a life sentence would be
irresponsible and a violation of the juror’s lawful duty.” Rather,
after explaining why the aggravation was sufficient to support a
recommendation of death and why the aggravation outweighed the
mitigation, the above comments constituted the prosecutor’s
argument as to why the jury should determine that the death
penalty was an appropriate sentence. At no point during the
prosecutor’s argument did he improperly argue that the jury could
not lawfully recommend a life sentence.
Cumulative Error
As explained above, the prosecutor’s closing argument
included an erroneous “same mercy” argument, presented two
improper golden rule arguments, and improperly expressed anti-
- 33 -
immigrant sentiment. However, because none of these issues were
properly preserved for our review, and because Ritchie’s sole claim
on appeal with respect to these comments is one of cumulative
error, he is entitled to new penalty phase only if the combined
prejudice resulting from these errors amounts to fundamental error.
See Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 838

.
Fundamental error “reaches down into the validity of the trial
itself to the extent that a . . . jury recommendation of death could
not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.”
Card,

803 So. 2d at

622 (citing McDonald v. State,

743 So. 2d 501

,
505 (Fla. 1999)). As we have recently reiterated, “Defendants have
no constitutional due process right to correct an unpreserved error,
and appellate courts should ‘exercise . . . discretion under the
doctrine of fundamental error very guardedly.’ ” Smith, 320 So. 3d
at 27 (quoting Sanford v. Rubin,

237 So. 2d 134

, 137 (Fla. 1970)).
In Smith, we explained that “[c]ourts correct errors as fundamental
despite a party’s failure to conform to procedural rules regarding
preservation” where necessary “ ‘to protect the interests of justice
itself.’ ”

Id.

 (quoting Maddox v. State,

760 So. 2d 89

, 98 (Fla.
2000)); see also Calloway v. State,

210 So. 3d 1160

, 1191 (Fla.
- 34 -
2017) (“Fundamental error must amount to a denial of due process,
and consequently, should be found to apply where prejudice
follows.”).
In Ritchie’s case, the interests of justice do not require a new
penalty phase. The improper prosecutorial comments were isolated
statements in an otherwise proper closing argument that, on the
whole, asked the jury to return a death recommendation based on
the evidence. Ritchie’s jury was properly instructed by the trial
court, including as to the HAC aggravator and that Florida law
never requires a juror to recommend death. The State proved
substantial aggravation, with two of the three aggravators having
been established by the jury’s guilt phase verdict. Based on the
evidence presented during the guilt and penalty phases, the third
aggravator, HAC, was never in doubt. In comparison, the trial court
found minimal mitigation. On the record before us in this
substantially aggravated and minimally mitigated case involving the
rape and murder of a nine-year-old child, we cannot say that, but
for the cumulative impact of the improper prosecutorial comments,
the jury could not have recommended a sentence of death. Thus,
- 35 -
we cannot conclude that cumulative fundamental error occurred.
See Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 838

.
Review of our prior decisions undertaking cumulative error
analyses—where, unlike in Ritchie’s case, at least some of the
issues were properly preserved—underscores why. For example, in
Braddy,

111 So. 3d at 855-56

, we declined to find “cumulative
fundamental error” in a heavily aggravated and minimally mitigated
case involving comparable “golden rule” violations and other
improper argument. Similarly, in the heavily aggravated and
minimally mitigated case of Card,

803 So. 2d at 623

, we reviewed
the entire closing argument, which included an erroneous
“conscience of the community” argument, and held that,
cumulatively, the “closing argument errors did not compromise the
integrity of the judicial process and did not deprive Card of a fair
penalty phase hearing.” See also Merck,

975 So. 2d at 1064

(holding the defendant “received a fair penalty-phase proceeding”
following cumulative review of an improper mercy argument that
had been “objected to” and “unobjected-to improper arguments”
comparing the number of books and magazines the defendant had
read in prison, which was presented as mitigation, with the number
- 36 -
of books and magazines the victim could have read had he not been
murdered).
In sum, we cannot say that the improper arguments precluded
Ritchie’s jury from making a reasoned assessment based on the
evidence so as to amount to a denial of due process. Rather,
viewing the record in its totality, it was the evidence of Ritchie’s
horrific and senseless crimes against the victim, not the
prosecutor’s missteps, that secured the recommendation of death.
Accordingly, we reject Ritchie’s claim that, cumulatively, errors
in the prosecutor’s penalty phase closing argument require a new
penalty phase.
(2) Victim Impact Evidence
In his second claim, Ritchie raises facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges to the presentation of victim impact
evidence. We deny relief as to both claims.
We have previously rejected facial challenges like Ritchie’s
claim that admitting victim impact evidence probative of “the
victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being and the
resultant loss to the community’s members by the victim’s death,”
§ 921.141(8), Fla. Stat. (2021), violates the United States and
- 37 -
Florida Constitutions. See Windom v. State,

656 So. 2d 432

, 438
(Fla. 1995). Although Ritchie asks us to reconsider our decision in
Windom, his arguments do not persuade us that our precedent is
“clearly erroneous.” State v. Poole,

297 So. 3d 487

, 507 (Fla. 2020);
see also McKenzie v. State,

333 So. 3d 1098

, 1105 & n.3 (Fla. Feb.
2022) (explaining that admission of the victim impact evidence
authorized by section 921.141(8) “is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Payne v. Tennessee,

501 U.S. 808

 (1991)”
(quoting Victorino v. State,

127 So. 3d 478

, 496 (Fla. 2013))).
In his as-applied challenge, Ritchie argues that a portion of
the victim impact evidence presented through the victim’s mother
exceeded the scope of permissible victim impact evidence. The
victim’s mother concluded her testimony by reading the following
Bible verse: “If anyone causes one of these little ones, those who
believe in me, to stumble, it would be better for them to have a large
milestone [sic] hung around their neck and to be thrown in the
depths of the sea.” She then stated, “That scripture is talking to
someone that knows better. And Granville Ritchie knew better.”
On appeal, the State properly concedes that this testimony
exceeds the scope of relevant victim impact evidence.
- 38 -
See § 921.141(8) (“Characterizations and opinions about the crime,
the defendant, and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted
as part of the victim impact evidence.”). However, because trial
counsel did not contemporaneously object below, we review the
admission of this evidence for fundamental error. See Sexton v.
State,

775 So. 2d 923

, 932 (Fla. 2000) (“The failure to
contemporaneously object to a comment on the basis that it
constitutes improper victim testimony renders the claim
procedurally barred absent fundamental error.”).
Considering the totality of the record, we agree with the State
that the admission of this improper testimony does not constitute
fundamental error. The testimony was a small portion of otherwise
permissible victim impact evidence. It did not become a feature of
the penalty phase; the State did not mention it in its closing
argument; Ritchie’s jury was correctly instructed as to victim
impact evidence, including that it “may not consider [victim impact]
evidence as an aggravating factor,” and that “[n]o facts other than
proven aggravating factors may be considered in support of a death
sentence”; and the trial court did not rely on the improper
testimony in sentencing Ritchie to death. In this highly aggravated
- 39 -
and minimally mitigated case, we cannot conclude that the “jury
recommendation of death could not have been obtained without the
assistance of” the improper victim impact testimony and therefore
cannot hold that its erroneous admission constitutes fundamental
error. Card,

803 So. 2d at 622

.
(3) Mitigation Video
In his third claim, Ritchie raises two challenges related to his
mitigation video. First, he argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by ordering, over trial counsel’s objection, certain audio
redactions to the video. The point of the video was to depict the
area of Jamaica where Ritchie lived and establish mitigation
concerning his difficult upbringing. The trial court ordered audio
redactions to certain portions of the video which addressed events
that it concluded were either not part of the relevant timeframe or
lacked a sufficient nexus to the relevant timeframe, but it still
permitted defense counsel to show the video. Ordering such limited
audio redactions was well within the trial court’s discretion, and we
reject Ritchie’s argument that the trial court improperly excluded
relevant evidence. See Snelgrove v. State,

107 So. 3d 242

, 254 (Fla.
- 40 -
2012) (“A trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under
section 921.141 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).
Second, Ritchie argues that the State presented improper
rebuttal to the video. To rebut the evidence put forth by Ritchie
regarding his difficult upbringing, the State called Georgette Redley,
a native of Jamaica from the same area as Ritchie, who immigrated
to the United States in 2005, but who regularly returns to visit
Jamaica. The trial court overruled Ritchie’s objection that one
portion of Redley’s testimony about how community leaders live and
are viewed in the area constituted improper speculation. Although
he did not argue this below, Ritchie now contends that Redley “was
permitted to speculatively provide the jury with irrelevant,
prejudicial, and misleading information” in several additional
respects. Our review of the record, however, shows that Redley’s
testimony was appropriately limited to either the specific or general
matters with which she was familiar. Moreover, even accounting for
the redactions to Ritchie’s mitigation video, Redley’s testimony was
limited to matters raised by the defense. Accordingly, there was no
error, preserved or otherwise, in the State’s rebuttal presentation.
- 41 -
(4) Cumulative Prejudice
In his last claim, Ritchie argues that the cumulative prejudice
of all the alleged trial errors addressed above entitles him to a new
penalty phase. Because we have held that the trial court did not err
with respect to the mitigation video and because no other issue was
preserved for our review, to analyze this claim, we consider whether
the combined prejudice resulting from any errors in the
prosecutor’s closing argument together with the erroneous
admission of improper victim impact testimony amounts to
fundamental error. See Smith, 320 So. 3d at 27 (“If an issue is not
preserved, it is reviewed only for fundamental error.”). We hold that
it does not. The aggravation in Ritchie’s case includes HAC, which
is “one of the weightiest aggravating circumstances in Florida,”
Jeffries v. State,

222 So. 3d 538

, 550 (Fla. 2017), and Ritchie
committed the capital felony while sexually battering a nine-year-
old child. As the trial court found, the aggravators “greatly
outweigh” the scant mitigation, and although we recognize that the
State easily could have avoided the errors that occurred below and
that similar errors, particularly if preserved, might be outcome-
determinative in a closer case, Ritchie’s case is simply not one
- 42 -
where the “jury recommendation of death could not have been
obtained without the assistance of” the errors addressed in issues
one and two. Card,

803 So. 2d at 622

. Accordingly, we reject his
cumulative prejudice claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Ritchie’s convictions and
sentences.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and LAWSON, MUÑIZ, COURIEL, and
GROSSHANS, JJ., concur.
POLSTON, J., concurs in result.
LABARGA, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
LABARGA, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the
judgment of conviction of first-degree murder. However, because of
the cumulative, unnecessary, inflammatory, and improper
statements of the prosecutor during his penalty phase closing
argument, I dissent to the majority’s affirmance of the sentence of
death and would require a new sentencing hearing.
- 43 -
The purpose of closing argument is to afford counsel an
opportunity “to review the evidence and to explicate those
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.”
Merck v. State,

975 So. 2d 1054

, 1061 (Fla. 2007). Conversely, as
noted by the majority, “[closing argument] must not be used to
inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict
reflects an emotional response to the crime or the defendant rather
than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable
law.” Majority op. at 28 (quoting Bertolotti v. State,

476 So. 2d 130

,
134 (Fla. 1995)). While attorneys are permitted wide latitude in
closing arguments, they are not permitted to make improper
argument. See Gore v. State,

719 So. 2d 1197

, 1200 (Fla. 1998).
Here, the prosecutor made improper comments during his
penalty phase closing argument by making a “same mercy”
argument, violating the well-established prohibition on “golden rule”
arguments, and commenting on Ritchie’s exercise of his
constitutional rights in the context of anti-immigrant sentiments.
“Same mercy” arguments urge “the jury to show a defendant
the same amount of mercy as he showed his victim,” and they carry
the danger of “unnecessarily appeal[ing] to the sympathies of the
- 44 -
jury” to obtain a death sentence. Conahan v. State,

844 So. 2d 629

,
641 (Fla. 2003). When arguing that a murder is especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel (HAC) for the purpose of establishing the HAC
aggravator, a prosecutor may discuss a defendant’s lack of
conscience or pity with respect to the means and manner of death.
See Cruz v. State,

320 So. 3d 695

, 728 (Fla. 2021) (“The HAC
aggravator applies to murders that are both ‘conscienceless or
pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.’ ” (quoting
Francis v. State,

808 So. 2d 110

, 134 (Fla. 2001))). However, such
comments must still avoid becoming “same mercy” arguments.
While addressing the HAC aggravator in the present case, the
prosecutor stated, “I want you to think about this, again, when
you’re back there deliberating, when you’re considering whether
you should give him life and whether you should personally extend
mercy to this defendant. Did he extend mercy to this little girl?”
This comment is improper because it urges the jury to
consider Ritchie’s lack of mercy outside of the HAC context, places
the question in the context of the jurors’ mercy, and specifically
requests that they consider it when personally deciding to extend
mercy. Although presented in the form of a rhetorical question, the
- 45 -
prosecutor’s comments here ultimately urge the jury to base its own
exercise of mercy on Ritchie’s lack of mercy to the victim.
As noted by the majority, the trial court, during a bench
conference addressing the prosecutor’s comment, agreed with trial
counsel that it was improper for the State to argue mercy outside of
asking the jury to find the HAC aggravator. Before allowing the
penalty phase to continue, the court cautioned the prosecutor to
limit his argument accordingly. See majority op. at 16.
In addition to the improper “same mercy” argument, the
prosecutor also made a long-prohibited “golden rule” argument.
“Golden rule arguments are arguments that invite the jurors to
place themselves in the victim’s position and ‘imagine the victim’s
final pain, terror and defenselessness.’ ” Merck,