Eric Green v. Calvin Cottrell , 204 So. 3d 22 ( 2016 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC15-1805
____________
ERIC GREEN,
Petitioner,
vs.
CALVIN COTTRELL, et al.,
Respondents.
[November 10, 2016]
LABARGA, C.J.
Petitioner Eric Green seeks review of the decision of the First District Court
of Appeal in Green v. Cottrell, 172 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015), on the basis
that it expressly and directly conflicts with Calhoun v. Nienhuis, 110 So. 3d 24
(Fla. 5th DCA 2013), on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V,
§ 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons discussed below, we quash the decision in
Green and approve the holding in Calhoun, but not the analysis of the Fifth District
in that case.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 22, 2012, inmate Eric Green filed a pro se complaint against four
employees of the Santa Rosa County Jail: a shift lieutenant, two deputies, and a
sergeant who was assigned as a hearing officer to consider disciplinary reports.
Green alleged that on June 22, 2008, he was attacked at the jail by two inmates.
According to Green, all of the inmates housed in his dormitory were classified as
extreme high risk due to their aggressive and violent tendencies. The complaint
alleged that prior to the attack, Green informed the deputies that he was
experiencing conflict with the two inmates, and the situation had escalated to
threats. Green asked to be removed from the dormitory where the two inmates
were housed and placed in protective custody. Green’s complaint asserted that one
of the inmates had recently been involved in an attack on another inmate which
resulted in injury, and the attacked inmate had since been placed in protective
custody. One deputy allegedly stated that Green should not be worried, but that he
would arrange for Green to speak with the shift lieutenant. According to the
complaint, when Green reiterated his concerns to the lieutenant, the lieutenant
stated that there was only one confinement unit, which had limited bed space and
no available room. The lieutenant also advised that he could not relocate Green to
another dormitory.
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When Green returned to the dormitory, one of the inmates accused him of
“snitching.” Upon hearing the accusation, the other inmate said that he was going
to beat Green. Green returned to his cell and attempted to lock himself inside, but
the lock was secured in the open position. According to the complaint, Green
pleaded with one of the deputies to release the lock because the inmates were
coming to attack him, but the deputy failed to do so. Green retrieved a homemade
“shank,” placed it in his waistband, and fled from the cell. At that point, the
inmates allegedly attacked Green, while the same deputy appeared to watch. Once
the fight ceased, one of the inmates quickly left the area, while Green proceeded to
chase the other inmate. Several deputies then appeared, and Green was escorted to
an interview room. A deputy searched Green and discovered the shank in his
waistband. He was subsequently taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries,
which included stitches for a lip laceration. Upon his return to the jail, Green was
placed in administrative confinement and given a disciplinary report for fighting.
Two days later, the sergeant held a hearing on the disciplinary report, after which
he sentenced Green to five days in disciplinary confinement.
Based upon the facts as alleged in the complaint, Green raised claims under
Florida law of negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against
the shift lieutenant and the two deputies. Green claimed that these jail employees
had failed to exercise the reasonable care necessary to protect him from foreseeable
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harm after they were placed on notice that the inmates had made threats against
him. Green also raised federal law claims against all four jail employees. The
complaint included the following statement with regard to the exhaustion of
administrative remedies:
The Plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies by use of the
grievance procedure that was available to him at S.R.C.J. to try and
correct the violations. However, the Plaintiff was transferred back to
Florida State Prison on or about June 30, 2008. Therefore, he was
unable to receive a response or submit his grievances to the next level.
Accordingly, the grievance process is considered exhausted.
Green sought damages for both physical and emotional injury.
On June 24, 2014, the circuit court dismissed the complaint. The court
concluded that Green’s state law claims were time-barred under section
95.11(5)(g), Florida Statutes (2007), which provides a one-year time limit for “an
action brought by or on behalf of a prisoner, as defined in s. 57.085, relating to the
conditions of the prisoner’s confinement.” With regard to Green’s federal law
claims, the court noted that they were governed by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), and exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory. The court
concluded that Green’s transfer from the jail to Florida State Prison was
insufficient to absolve him of the exhaustion requirement:
Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint shows he filed a grievance prior to
being transferred. But, it also shows that he did nothing to follow up
or to appeal any lack of answer or negative decision. . . .
Accordingly, the four corners of the Complaint itself show GREEN
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Where an inmate’s
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failure to dismiss [sic] is “readily apparent from Plaintiff’s pleadings
and/or attachments,” sua sponte dismissal of the action without
prejudice is appropriate. Here, Plaintiff could have finished his
administrative remedies anytime between the occurrence of the fight
with two other inmates on June 22, 2008; and, the mailing of his
complaint four years later on June 22, 2012. If he had received a
negative response or no response at all, he had an appeal mechanism
available to him by following up with the Santa Rosa County Jail.
But, his pleading admits he did nothing, but simply “consider[] [his
grievance] exhausted.” Accordingly, dismissal of all claims is not
only warranted, but required.
(Citations and parentheticals omitted.)
On appeal, Green challenged three of the circuit court’s determinations:
(1) that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing the federal
law claims; (2) that the failure to exhaust was apparent from the face of the
complaint; and (3) that the state law claims were barred by the one-year statute of
limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g). See Green, 172 So. 3d at 1010. The First
District Court of Appeal affirmed the first two challenges without discussion. Id.
The district court also affirmed the circuit court’s holding that the one-year
statute of limitations in section 95.11(5)(g) governed Green’s state law claims and
rejected his assertion that the four-year time limit in section 768.28(14), Florida
Statutes (2007), was applicable instead. Id. at 1010-11. The district court noted
that section 768.28, enacted in 1973, applies to “[e]very claim against the state or
one of its agencies or subdivisions for damages for a negligent or wrongful act or
omission pursuant to this section . . . .” Id. at 1011 (quoting § 768.28(14), Fla.
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Stat.). Conversely, section 95.11(5)(g), which was enacted in 1996, governs
actions brought by or on behalf of a prisoner that relate to conditions of the
prisoner’s confinement. The First District concluded that the more recently
enacted section 95.11(5)(g) was the more specific statute, and controlled over the
earlier enacted section 768.28(14). Id. The district court disagreed with Calhoun,
110 So. 3d 24, in which the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the four-year
statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) applied to a negligence action filed
against a sheriff. See Green, 172 So. 3d at 1010.
We granted review of Green based upon conflict with Calhoun.
ANALYSIS
Statute of Limitations Claim
The first issue presented by this case is which statute of limitations governs
the state law claims raised in Green’s complaint. Questions of statutory
interpretation are matters of law that are reviewed de novo. See Raymond James
Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 126 So. 3d 186, 190 (Fla. 2013); see also Hamilton v.
Tanner, 962 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“A legal issue surrounding a
statute of limitations question is an issue of law subject to de novo review.”). The
standard of review for the dismissal of a complaint is also de novo. See Mlinar v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 186 So. 3d 997, 1004 (Fla. 2016).
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The first statute, titled “Limitations other than for the recovery of real
property,” provides:
Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced
as follows:
....
(5) WITHIN ONE YEAR.—
....
(g) Except for actions described in subsection (8) [actions
challenging correctional disciplinary proceedings], an action brought
by or on behalf of a prisoner, as defined in s. 57.085, relating to the
conditions of the prisoner’s confinement.
§ 95.11(5)(g), Fla. Stat. By its plain terms, section 95.11(5)(g) applies solely to
prisoners, as that term is statutorily defined,1 and then only to actions that relate to
conditions of their confinement. If either of these qualifications is not met, section
95.11(5)(g) does not apply.
The second statute provides, with certain exceptions not applicable here, a
four-year limitations period for actions against government entities where
sovereign immunity has been waived. See § 768.28(14), Fla. Stat. The limited
waiver of sovereign immunity for tort actions is provided in section 768.28:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X of the State Constitution,
the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives
sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent
specified in this act. Actions at law against the state or any of its
agencies or subdivisions to recover damages in tort for money
1. Section 57.085(1), Florida Statutes (2016), defines a prisoner as “a
person who has been convicted of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or who
is being held in custody pending extradition or sentencing.”
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damages against the state or its agencies or subdivisions for injury or
loss of property, personal injury, or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the agency or
subdivision while acting within the scope of the employee’s office or
employment under circumstances in which the state or such agency or
subdivision, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, in
accordance with the general laws of this state, may be prosecuted
subject to the limitations specified in this act.
(Emphasis added.) Florida counties are encompassed within this statute. See
§ 768.28(2), Fla. Stat. Green alleges that while he was housed at the Santa Rosa
County Jail, he suffered physical injury and emotional distress due to the failure of
a shift lieutenant and two deputies to protect him from an attack. Therefore, unless
the state law claims raised by Green fall under section 95.11(5)(g), the four-year
statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) is applicable to his action.
There is no question that Green satisfies the first condition of section
95.11(5)(g) because he is a prisoner as that term is defined in section 57.085(1).
However, whether the alleged attack at the jail constituted a condition of Green’s
confinement is not as clear. We have explained, “[i]t is an elementary principle of
statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word,
phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should
not be construed as mere surplusage.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New
York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). An argument can be made that every single
thing that happens to a prisoner within the confines of the prison or jail walls
qualifies as a condition of confinement. However, were that the case, there would
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be no need to qualify prisoner actions with the language “relating to the conditions
of . . . confinement.” The one-year statute of limitations in section 95.11(5)(g)
could simply be applied to all actions “brought by or on behalf of a prisoner.”2
Therefore, to ensure that the phrase “conditions of the prisoner’s confinement”
does not constitute mere surplusage, we must determine the meaning of this
language. As we have often stated, “[l]egislative intent is the polestar that guides a
court’s statutory construction analysis.” Bautista v. State, 863 So. 2d 1180, 1185
(Fla. 2003). To assist us, we turn to the chapter law that enacted the statute of
limitations.
The preamble to this chapter law reflects that section 95.11(5)(g) was
enacted to curb frivolous and malicious filings by prisoners:
WHEREAS, frivolous inmate lawsuits congest civil court
dockets and delay the administration of justice for all litigants, and
WHEREAS, each year self-represented indigent inmates in
Florida’s jails and prisons file an ever-increasing number of frivolous
lawsuits at public expense against public officers and employees, and
2. We note that section 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes, which was enacted
under the same chapter law as section 95.11(5)(g), places a one-year statute of
limitations on all extraordinary writ petitions filed by or on behalf of a prisoner,
except for petitions challenging a criminal conviction. See ch. 96-106, § 4, at 96,
Laws of Fla. Thus, within the same chapter law, the Florida Legislature applied a
statute of limitations to an entire group of prisoner filings. By making subsection
(5)(g) applicable only to those actions that challenge “conditions of . . .
confinement,” it is evident that the Legislature did not intend to impose a blanket
one-year statute of limitations on all prisoner actions.
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WHEREAS, state and local governments spend millions of
dollars each year processing, serving, and defending frivolous
lawsuits filed by self-represented indigent inmates, and
WHEREAS, the overwhelming majority of civil lawsuits filed
by self-represented indigent inmates are frivolous and malicious
actions intended to embarrass or harass public officers and employees,
and
WHEREAS, under current law frivolous inmate lawsuits are
dismissible by the courts only after considerable expenditure of
precious taxpayer and judicial resources . . .
Ch. 96-106, at 92-93, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Frivolous is defined as
“Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 739 (9th ed. 2009). A Senate Staff Analysis and
Economic Impact Statement provided examples of the types of claims that
spearheaded the legislative action:
Some lawsuits that have been recently publicized by the Florida
Attorney General include inmates who sued because they wanted to
be served more than two pancakes and fresh milk rather than
reconstituted milk, one inmate found gristle in his turkey and sued,
and another inmate sued because he had to eat off paper plates.
Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Justice, SB 8 (1995) Senate Staff Analysis and Economic
Impact Statement on Committee Substitute for SB 8, at 2 (Sept. 27, 1995).
Neither the definition of frivolous as that term is commonly understood, nor
the examples cited by the staff analysis as a basis for the need to curb frivolous
prisoner lawsuits, would seem to encompass the situation where a prisoner asserts
he was physically injured due to the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of
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prison/jail employees. We cannot envision that the Florida Legislature, when it
enacted chapter 96-106 with the goal of limiting frivolous or malicious lawsuits,
also intended to lessen the ability of a prisoner to seek legal redress for physical
injuries that were allegedly suffered at the hands of those who were charged with
his custody and care. Such a claim, on its face, clearly is not of the pancake or
paper plate frivolous filing variety, and nothing in the preamble to chapter 96-106
suggests that the statutory changes were intended to limit apparently legitimate
claims by prisoners. Therefore, we conclude that the term “conditions of the
prisoner’s confinement” in section 95.11(5)(g) does not encompass the situation
where a prisoner alleges that he suffered actual physical injury due to the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of an employee of a government entity.
Other provisions of the chapter law that enacted section 95.11(5)(g) support
our conclusion. For example, the law also created section 57.085, Florida Statutes
(2016), which addresses the deferral of prepayment of court costs and fees for
indigent prisoners. See ch. 96-106, § 2, at 93-95, Laws of Fla. Section 57.085(6)
provides that before an indigent prisoner may initiate a judicial proceeding, “the
court must review the prisoner’s claim to determine whether it is legally sufficient
to state a cause of action for which the court has jurisdiction and may grant relief.”
Under this subsection, a court is required to dismiss all or part of a claim which:
(a) Fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted;
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(b) Seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief;
(c) Seeks relief for mental or emotional injury where there has
been no related allegation of a physical injury; or
(d) Is frivolous, malicious, or reasonably appears to be
intended to harass one or more named defendants.
§ 57.085(6), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature chose to treat
claims of physical injury differently from claims where a prisoner alleges mental
or emotional injury alone, in that they are not subject to mandatory dismissal.
Based upon the foregoing, we hold that where, as here, a prisoner files an
action alleging that he suffered physical injury due to the negligent or wrongful
acts or omissions of the employees of a government entity, the one-year statute of
limitations period in section 95.11(5)(g)—a provision enacted as part of a chapter
law that was intended to curb frivolous filings by prisoners—does not apply.
Instead, the four-year statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) governs.
Accordingly, we conclude that the First District erroneously affirmed the dismissal
of Green’s state law claims as untimely.
Calhoun v. Nienhuis
Unlike the First District in Green, the Fifth District in Calhoun held that the
four-year statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) applied to the plaintiff’s
negligence action against a sheriff rather than the one-year time limit in section
95.11(5)(g). 110 So. 3d at 26. However, despite this apparent conflict with the
decision below, Calhoun is factually distinguishable. The Fifth District expressly
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noted that the plaintiff in Calhoun was a pretrial detainee. Id. at 25. As previously
discussed, section 95.11(5)(g) only applies to prisoners as that term is defined in
section 57.085. See § 57.085(1), Fla. Stat. (defining a prisoner as “a person who
has been convicted of a crime and is incarcerated for that crime or who is being
held in custody pending extradition or sentencing”). Because the plaintiff in
Calhoun presumably had not yet been convicted of a crime, she could not be a
prisoner pursuant to section 57.085(1), and the one-year statute of limitations in
section 95.11(5)(g) would not apply to her action. Instead, the four-year statute of
limitations in section 768.28(14) governed. Thus, the Fifth District in Calhoun
reached the right conclusion as to which statute of limitations applied to the action
in that case, but for the incorrect reason. Therefore, we disapprove the analysis of
the Fifth District without further discussion.
Exhaustion of Remedies Claim
Green additionally contends that the circuit court erred when it dismissed his
federal law claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although the
First District affirmed the dismissal of these claims without elaboration, once this
Court accepts jurisdiction over a case to resolve a legal issue in conflict, it may
consider any other issue that is properly raised and argued. See Savoie v. State,
422 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 1982). As previously discussed, the standard of review
for the dismissal of a complaint is de novo. See Mlinar, 186 So. 3d at 1004.
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Under the PLRA, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2012). The
United States Supreme Court has explained that under the PLRA:
Prisoners must now exhaust all “available” remedies, not just those
that meet federal standards. Indeed . . . a prisoner must now exhaust
administrative remedies even where the relief sought—monetary
damages—cannot be granted by the administrative process.
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (citation omitted). Further, the Supreme
Court has noted that in cases where state prisoners raise federal law claims, it is the
correctional facility’s grievance process that must be exhausted. See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (“Compliance with prison grievance procedures
. . . is all that is required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The level of detail
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures will vary from
system to system and claim to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the
PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.”). The Supreme Court has
also held that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and
prisoners are not required to plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.
Id. at 216; see also Bailey v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 958 So. 2d 986, 987 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2007) (relying on Bock in a prisoner’s section 1983 action to conclude that
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the failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense to be pled by the defendant, and the
prisoner had no obligation to plead exhaustion).
Thus, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the PLRA, Green was not
required to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies at the Santa Rosa County
Jail. The fact that he pled exhaustion did not place the burden on him to
demonstrate that he had actually exhausted whatever administrative remedies had
been implemented by the jail. Rather, the burden of proof with regard to
establishing an affirmative defense lies with a defendant; here, the jail employees.
See Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So. 3d 1086, 1096 (Fla. 2010).
Florida district courts have reversed dismissals for failure to exhaust where the
prisoner alleged that administrative remedies had been exhausted. See Miller v.
Dep’t of Corr., 172 So. 3d 574, 574 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (reversing dismissal of
petition for writ of mandamus where prisoner asserted that “he had ‘exhausted all
available avenues of administrative review via the inmate grievance procedure,’
and . . . his exhaustion of administrative remedies [was] reflected in ‘inmate appeal
grievance log number 13-6-15500’ ”); Bailey, 958 So. 2d at 987-88 (reversing
dismissal of complaint where the prisoner alleged that he had “exhausted all
administrative remedies”).
Further, issues of fact can arise as to whether there were administrative
remedies available to a prisoner, and if so, whether he exhausted them. The district
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courts have reversed dismissals for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
where factual questions as to such matters existed. For example, in Owens v.
Crews, 131 So. 3d 799, 799-800 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013), the First District reversed a
circuit court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where “a
disputed issue of fact exist[ed] concerning whether Department officials timely
provided the responses to [Owens], and the court did not take competent,
substantial evidence to reach its determination that the door to review in the circuit
court is closed.” See also Adlington v. Mosley, 757 So. 2d 573, 574 (Fla. 4th DCA
2000) (reversing dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
remanding for a determination as to whether there was an inmate grievance
procedure available to the prisoner, who was housed at a privately run correctional
facility).
The review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is confined to the four
corners of the complaint. See Mlinar, 186 So. 3d at 1004.3 Further, “[t]he
‘allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true and all reasonable inferences
arising therefrom are allowed in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” Id. (quoting Wallace v.
Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1042-43 (Fla. 2009)). Here, the circuit court recognized that
3. It is not clear whether a motion to dismiss was made with regard to the
federal law claims. In his motion for rehearing of the circuit court’s order, Green
referenced an oral motion to dismiss by the jail employees. However, the answer
brief filed with this Court suggests that the circuit court’s dismissal was sua sponte.
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it was bound by the “four corners” rule; however, the court then violated this rule
by making assumptions about what administrative remedies were available to
Green after his transfer from the jail to a state correctional facility approximately
eight days after the alleged attack. The circuit court referenced Green’s statement
that, because of his transfer, he “was unable to receive a response or submit his
grievance to the next level.” Instead of accepting this allegation as true, as
required by Mlinar, 186 So. 3d at 1004, the circuit court assumed that (1) the
transfer of Green did not extinguish his grievance or render it moot; (2) Green had
an available mechanism to follow up on the grievance when he did not receive a
response from the jail; and (3) even if he had received an adverse decision, the jail
had an appeal process available for inmates who filed grievances, but are no longer
housed at the facility. Thus, factual issues remain as to what administrative
procedures were in place at the Santa Rosa County Jail in 2008 and to what extent
Green was capable of complying with them once he was transferred to a different
facility.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erroneously dismissed Green’s
federal law claims. Although its conclusion that Green had not exhausted
administrative remedies may ultimately be correct, the burden fell on the jail
employees to demonstrate that he failed to do so. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 216
(under the PLRA, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and prisoners are not
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required to demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints); Custer, 62 So. 3d at 1096
(stating that the defendant has the burden of proving an affirmative defense).
Therefore, the First District’s affirmance of the circuit court’s dismissal was
similarly in error.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the First District Court of Appeal
in Green is quashed, and this matter is remanded to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We disapprove the reasoning of the Fifth
District Court of Appeal in Calhoun, but not the court’s ultimate holding that the
four-year statute of limitations in section 768.28(14) applied to the action in that
case.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
POLSTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which
CANADY, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
POLSTON, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Petitioner’s suit arises from alleged injuries received from other inmates
housed in the same dormitory, who Petitioner believed were considered as high
risk because of their aggressive and violent tendencies. His state law claims
alleging negligent housing assignment and emotional distress relate to the
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conditions of his confinement and are, therefore, subject to the one-year statute of
limitation in section 95.11(5)(g), Florida Statutes. However, his allegations of
personnel intentionally failing to act during the altercation in violation of the
constitution relate to his federal law claims. I agree with the majority that
Petitioner’s federal law claims should not have been dismissed.
CANADY, J., concurs.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct
Conflict of Decisions
First District - Case No. 1D14-4052
(Santa Rosa County)
Charles Morris Auslander, John Granville Crabtree, and Brian Carson Tackenberg
of Crabtree & Auslander, P.A., Key Biscayne, Florida,
for Petitioner
Carl Raymond Peterson, Jr. of Jolly, Peterson & Truckenbrod, P.A., Tallahassee,
Florida,
for Respondents Sergeant D. Bryant, Danny E. Cook and Calvin Cottrell
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