Willie Seth Crain, Jr. v. State of Florida , 246 So. 3d 206 ( 2018 )

Supreme Court of Florida
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No. SC17-1475
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WILLIE SETH CRAIN, JR.,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[April 5, 2018]
PER CURIAM.
Willie Seth Crain, Jr., appeals the postconviction court’s denial of his
successive motion for postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, §
3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Crain’s motion sought relief based on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this
Court’s opinions in Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017), and Perry v. State, 210 So. 3d 630 (Fla. 2016). For the
reasons fully explained below, we affirm the postconviction court’s denial of relief.
BACKGROUND
In 1999, a jury convicted Crain of first-degree murder and kidnapping with
intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a homicide. Crain v. State, 894
So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 829 (2005). On direct appeal, this
Court explained the facts underlying Crain’s crimes:
Willie Seth Crain, a then fifty-two-year-old Hillsborough
County fisherman and crabber, was charged with the September 1998
kidnapping and first-degree murder of seven-year-old Amanda
Brown. At the time, Amanda was three feet, ten inches tall and
weighed approximately forty-five pounds.
....
[On the night of the crimes,] Crain mentioned that he had a
large videotape collection and invited [the victim’s mother,] Hartman
and Amanda to his trailer to watch a movie. Amanda asked if he had
“Titanic,” which she stated was her favorite movie. Crain stated that
he did have “Titanic” and Amanda pleaded with her mother to allow
them to watch the movie. Hartman was initially reluctant because it
was a school night, but she finally agreed. Crain drove Hartman and
Amanda approximately one mile to his trailer in his white pickup
truck.
....
At [one] point in the evening, Hartman asked Crain if he had
any medication for pain. Crain offered her Elavil and Valium. . . .
Hartman elected to take five, five-milligram Valium tablets. Crain
took one Valium tablet.
Eventually, Hartman decided that it was time to leave. Crain
drove Hartman and Amanda back to their residence and accompanied
them inside. . . .
According to Hartman, she told Crain, who appeared to be
intoxicated at that time, that he could lie down and sober up but she
was going to bed. The time was approximately 2:30 a.m. Within five
minutes of Hartman going to bed, Crain entered Hartman’s bedroom
and lay down on the bed with Hartman and Amanda. Hartman
testified that she neither invited Crain to lie in her bed nor asked him
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to leave. Crain was fully clothed and Amanda was wearing a
nightgown. Amanda was lying between Hartman and Crain.
Penny Probst, a neighbor of Hartman, testified that at
approximately 12 midnight on September 10-11, 1998, she saw a
white truck parked immediately behind Hartman’s car in Hartman’s
driveway. In the early morning hours of September 11, Probst
observed the truck parked at the side of Hartman’s residence with
lights on and the engine running. Probst heard the truck leave after
about five minutes.
Hartman slept soundly through the night. When she woke in
her bed alone the next morning, she discovered that Amanda was
missing. Hartman testified her alarm clock read 6:12 a.m. when she
awoke. Hartman immediately called Crain on his cell phone. At that
time, he was at the Courtney Campbell boat ramp in Hillsborough
County loading his boat. He told Hartman he did not know where
Amanda was. Hartman then called the police and reported Amanda’s
disappearance.
Id. at 62-64 (footnotes omitted).
Following the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death, the trial court
sentenced Crain to death, finding three aggravating factors and assigning each the
noted weight: “(1) prior violent felonies (great weight), (2) the murder was
committed during the course of a kidnapping (great weight), and (3) the victim was
under the age of twelve (great weight).” Id. at 67. The trial court “found no
statutory mitigators and eight nonstatutory” mitigating circumstances. Id.
On direct appeal in 2004, this Court affirmed Crain’s first-degree murder
conviction, finding sufficient evidence “to establish first-degree felony murder
based on kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm.” Id. at 73. As to
Crain’s kidnapping conviction, this Court concluded that “competent, substantial
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evidence [did] not exist to support the jury verdict of kidnapping with intent to
commit homicide.” Id. at 76. Therefore, this Court “reverse[d] the judgment of
guilt of kidnapping and direct[ed] the trial court on remand to enter judgment for
false imprisonment, and to resentence Crain accordingly.” Id. Crain’s sentence of
death became final in 2005.
In 2011, this Court explained its holding on direct appeal with respect to
Crain’s kidnapping conviction:
In contrast to the jury instruction on count I, which related to
the murder charge and instructed the jury on alternative theories of
kidnapping, on count II, the jury was not instructed on the unpled
alternative of kidnapping with intent to inflict body [sic] harm. Thus,
on appeal, when examining whether the evidence was legally
sufficient to support a separate conviction for kidnapping as charged
in count II of the indictment, this Court concluded that competent,
substantial evidence did not exist to support the jury verdict of
kidnapping with the intent to commit homicide. As to count I,
however, we held that there was sufficient evidence to support a
felony murder conviction under the alternative theory of kidnapping
with the intent to inflict bodily harm.
Crain v. State, 78 So. 3d 1025, 1032 n.3 (Fla. 2011) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
In this case, Crain argues that, despite this Court consistently holding that
Hurst errors are harmless in cases where the jury unanimously recommended
death, his case is different because: (1) the kidnapping aggravating factor was
invalidated; (2) there was no finding that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or
cruel (HAC) or cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP); (3) the jury was given
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inaccurate instructions regarding its sentencing responsibility;1 and (4) the jury was
not instructed on mercy. As we explain below, we reject Crain’s arguments and
conclude that the Hurst error in Crain’s case was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida, this
Court held in Hurst:
[A]ll the critical findings necessary before the trial court may consider
imposing a sentence of death must be found unanimously by the jury.
We reach this holding based on the mandate of Hurst v. Florida and
on Florida’s constitutional right to jury trial, considered in conjunction
with our precedent concerning the requirement of jury unanimity as to
the elements of a criminal offense. In capital cases in Florida, these
specific findings required to be made by the jury include the existence
of each aggravating factor that has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, then finding that the aggravating factors are sufficient, and the
finding that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating
circumstances. We also hold, based on Florida’s requirement for
unanimity in jury verdicts, and under the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, that in order for the trial court to impose a
sentence of death, the jury’s recommended sentence of death must be
unanimous.
202 So. 3d at 44. Hurst applies retroactively to Crain’s sentence of death, which
became final in 2005. See Mosley v. State, 209 So. 3d 1248, 1283 (Fla. 2016).
This Court also determined that Hurst errors are subject to harmless error
review. 202 So. 3d at 67. In Davis v. State, 207 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016), this Court
explained that “it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury
1. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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would have unanimously found that there were sufficient aggravating factors that
outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Id. at 174. In Davis, emphasizing the
jury’s unanimous recommendation for death, this Court concluded that the Hurst
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, explaining:
Even though the jury was not informed that the finding that
sufficient aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances must be unanimous, and even though it was instructed
that it was not required to recommend death even if the aggravators
outweighed the mitigators, the jury did, in fact, unanimously
recommend death. From these instructions, we can conclude that the
jury unanimously made the requisite factual findings to impose death
before it issued the unanimous recommendations.
Id. at 174-75 (citation omitted). Since Davis, this Court has held in several cases
that the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death rendered the Hurst error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2
The kidnapping aggravating factor in Crain’s case remains valid because
kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily harm underlies Crain’s first-degree
felony murder conviction. See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997) (including “any:
. . . kidnapping”). Therefore, the jury properly considered this aggravating factor
2. See, e.g., Guardado v. Jones, 226 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied,
Nos. 17-7171, 17-7545, 2018 WL 1568519 (U.S. April 2, 2018); Middleton v.
State, 220 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 829 (2018); Jones v.
State, 212 So. 3d 321 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 175 (2017); Hall v. State, 212
So. 3d 1001 (Fla. 2017); Knight v. State, 225 So. 3d 661 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied,
No. 17-7099, 2018 WL 1369193 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2018); Kaczmar v. State, 228 So.
3d 1 (Fla. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-8148 (U.S. Mar. 14, 2018).
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in making its sentencing recommendation. See Davis, 207 So. 3d at 175. Thus,
the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death renders the Hurst error harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Finally, we have previously rejected Crain’s other claims that the jury’s
unanimous recommendation for death is unreliable and the Hurst error is,
therefore, not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State,
No. SC17-793 (Fla. Apr. 5, 2018) (denying Caldwell claim); Morris v. State, 219
So. 3d 33 (Fla.) (no CCP or HAC aggravating factor), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 452
(2017). Thus, this Court can rely on the jury’s unanimous recommendation for
death to conclude that the Hurst error in Crain’s case was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION
Based on the jury’s unanimous recommendation for death, we conclude that
the Hurst error in Crain’s case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court’s order denying his successive
motion for postconviction relief.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,
Michelle Sisco, Judge - Case No. 291998CF017084000AHC
James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Ann Marie
Mirialakis and Ali A. Shakoor, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel,
Middle Region, Temple Terrace, Florida,
for Appellant
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Scott A. Browne,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,
for Appellee
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