Michael Lawrence Woodbury v. State of Florida ( 2021 )

Supreme Court of Florida
____________
No. SC19-8
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MICHAEL LAWRENCE WOODBURY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
April 15, 2021
PER CURIAM.
Michael Lawrence Woodbury appeals his conviction of first-
degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See
art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In March 2018, Woodbury was indicted on one count of first-
degree murder for killing his cellmate, Antoneeze Haynes. At the
time of the offense, Woodbury was serving life sentences for killing
three people in New Hampshire during a 2007 robbery.
The evidence presented at trial showed that on September 22,
2017, Woodbury barricaded the door to the cell he shared with
Haynes and then proceeded to brutally assault Haynes for hours,
using his fists, boots, and makeshift weapons Woodbury had
gathered in preparation for the attack. Woodbury appeared to
delight in torturing Haynes, at one point telling the victim: “I know
it hurts, I know. You deserved that one, you know you did. It’s
called torture. Welcome to the house of pain. Welcome to the
house of pain. The house of pain actually exists. It’s in the ninth
level of hell. I used to run it.” The assault lasted about four hours,
and it involved what Woodbury admitted was a hostage situation,
with Woodbury threatening to further harm Haynes if officers on
the scene failed to meet Woodbury’s demands. At one point,
Woodbury instructed the correctional officers to take away medical
equipment that had been brought in to treat the victim, saying:
“You’re probably going to need a body bag, but not medical
equipment. You can take that stuff with you.” Woodbury only
stopped assaulting Haynes and surrendered when he realized a
forcible extraction was imminent.
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At his first appearance in court, Woodbury invoked his right to
represent himself at trial, which prompted the court to conduct a
Faretta 1 inquiry. Woodbury indicated that he understood every
question asked and informed the court that he was taking
medication for treatment of bipolar disorder. The next time
Woodbury appeared in court, he remained adamant about wanting
to represent himself at trial, and when the court explained the
advantages of counsel and the disadvantages of self-representation,
Woodbury said he understood. He expressed frustration when told
to expect renewed offers of counsel and Faretta inquiries
throughout the proceedings.
The court asked Woodbury about his history of bipolar
disorder and Woodbury told the court that he had experienced
“[m]ood swings, just stuff like that.” The court also asked about the
treatment Woodbury was undergoing for his disorder and asked if
there were any physical issues that would impair Woodbury’s ability
to represent himself, and Woodbury said he had no other issues.
The court granted Woodbury’s request to proceed pro se, finding
1. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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that Woodbury’s waiver of counsel was made freely and voluntarily
with a full understanding of his rights, and that Woodbury was
competent to make that decision. With Woodbury’s agreement, the
court appointed standby counsel for Woodbury and told him that
counsel would be appointed to represent him if, at any point in the
proceedings, he ever decided that he wanted an attorney.
At a subsequent pretrial hearing, the trial court conducted
another Faretta inquiry and again found Woodbury competent to
waive counsel and that he had done so knowingly and intelligently.
The State asked the court to conduct new Faretta inquiries each
day of the trial to perfect the record. Woodbury objected to having
to endure so many inquiries, saying he had read more than 105
cases and failure to conduct repeated Faretta inquiries was not a
basis for appeal.
Woodbury’s trial began on May 14, 2018. On the first day of
trial, the court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted another
lengthy Faretta inquiry. Woodbury maintained his decision to
proceed pro se, explaining that he would want an attorney to
handle his appeal if he were to be convicted but that he did not
want counsel for the trial. Woodbury answered more questions
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about his bipolar disorder and other issues that might affect his
ability to proceed pro se. The court again found that Woodbury
understood the charges against him and the consequences of
waiving counsel, and found that he had voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his right to counsel.
During jury selection that same day, Woodbury conducted voir
dire on the potential jurors and occasionally consulted with his
standby counsel. The State asked for a finding on Woodbury’s
competence and demeanor, and the court said:
I think you’ve done actually very well for somebody in
your circumstance with what you’re charged with, the
seriousness of it . . . . I actually will compliment you on
your behavior. It’s a little more laid back than an
attorney is going to do, there’s no question about that,
you know what I mean. But overall I think you’ve
complied with the general courtroom demeanor that’s
necessary and I appreciate that for what it’s worth.
....
. . . You’d be surprised, some people come here unrepresented
and you can’t figure what their focus is. Yours I think is
pretty clear. So I’ll leave the record at that and I think it’s
actually . . . quite impressive.
The following day, the court renewed the offer of counsel and
Woodbury maintained his insistence on representing himself. The
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trial court found that Woodbury was competent to waive his right to
counsel and that he had done so knowingly and voluntarily.
In his opening statement to the jury, Woodbury claimed that
the victim had tried to sexually assault him and that the assault
and killing of the victim was in response to that attempted sexual
assault. Woodbury admitted, however, that he “went berserk” and
that he kicked the victim in the face “like a 50-yard field goal that
would have been good from 60.”
During the State’s case-in-chief, law enforcement officers and
prison staff provided gruesome details about Woodbury’s four-hour
assault on the victim. Correctional officers testified that they were
unable to enter the cell because Woodbury had barricaded the door,
but that they could see Woodbury through a window and could see
another inmate lying face down on a bunk with blood “all over the
place.” The State introduced photographs of the victim’s extensive
injuries, and the medical examiner testified that by the time officers
got into Woodbury’s cell, the victim had died from severe blunt force
trauma, and that he died experiencing a “great, great, great deal of
suffering.”
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During a brief recess to discuss time to call defense witnesses,
Woodbury told the court that he was planning to change his plea to
guilty. He said, “I know, it’s crazy, but that’s what I’m doing
tomorrow. I’ll be changing my plea to guilty of first-degree murder
tomorrow after I get done testifying.” The next day of trial, the court
renewed the offer of counsel and conducted a truncated Faretta
inquiry. The court stated that a full inquiry was unnecessary
because one had already been conducted during the same stage of
the proceeding. The State called Major Frank Gatto, who testified
that Woodbury was “very malicious . . . in his intent on what he
was trying to do” and appeared “methodical” with his actions, which
“seemed to be almost planned out, like he had a plan in mind.” The
State played a lengthy video recording filmed during Woodbury’s
assault on the victim, in which Woodbury could be heard
assaulting, torturing, and tormenting the victim.
The next day of trial began with another renewed offer of
counsel, and Woodbury said he understood the disadvantages of
representing himself and rejected the offer. The trial court found
that Woodbury was competent to waive counsel and had done so
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. When the State rested, the
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court began yet another Faretta inquiry, but Woodbury objected,
declaring: “I have a constitutional right to represent myself, and
this has rose to the level of harassment.” The court replied:
You know what. For the record, I don’t disagree. I think
the fact is you’ve understood this the multiple times I’ve
done it. That doing it again, if an appellate court were to
think that it’s a good idea to do this as often as we have, I
think that I would disagree with them and you’d be in
agreement with me. However, the above trial level courts
have a different way of viewing things. They’re not as
worried about practicality as they are about structural
integrity of the system. So I’m going to go through them
relatively quickly, you can answer them yes or no. If at
any point, though, you do have a question, please let me
know. So, again, I’m going to do it relatively quickly.
Woodbury asked the court: “[H]ow long do I got to answer? We’re
going to play the game now. . . . Do I got five minutes, ten minutes?
I might want to think about each question and consider it.”
Woodbury insisted that his right to represent himself superseded
the need for constant Faretta inquiries, and he threatened to stall
the proceedings. The court asked, “[A]m I right to conclude you are
requesting the Court not to ask you these questions at this time?”
Woodbury stated that this was exactly what he was requesting and
declared that in all the cases he had read, “every time they only did
the Faretta hearing one time and that was enough.” Woodbury
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acknowledged that a new Faretta inquiry would be required before
moving to the penalty phase, and he said he would cooperate fully
with that inquiry when the time came. The court found that
Woodbury validly requested to forgo a Faretta inquiry before the
defense case-in-chief, and that Woodbury had knowingly and
voluntarily waived counsel and was competent to do so.
During the defense case-in-chief, Woodbury briefly called two
defense witnesses and then took the stand on his own behalf. He
testified that he woke up on the morning in question to find the
victim attempting to sexually assault him. Woodbury admitted he
had a weapon at the ready but he claimed the victim’s death was
not premeditated, saying: “[I]f I was planning on killing my
roommate before I went to bed, I would have at least put a point on
my knife.” He also admitted to holding the victim hostage but
claimed he only did so to stall for time until a tactical team with
cameras arrived. He insisted he did not wish to keep hurting the
victim but that the victim kept sitting up, and so “every time he sat
up, [Woodbury] refreshed him with the business.”
After giving the jury his version of events, Woodbury declared
in open court: “So in the eyes of the law, you know, what the
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prosecution has charged me with is true. And at this time, I’d like
to plead guilty to first-degree premeditated murder, your Honor.
What you got?”
The trial court quickly excused the jury and then went
through the plea form line-by-line, with Woodbury’s input. The
court conducted a colloquy on the voluntariness of Woodbury’s
plea, and Woodbury indicated that he understood that the death
sentence was still a possibility. Before it accepted Woodbury’s plea,
the court renewed the offer of counsel, conducted another Faretta
inquiry, and found that Woodbury was competent to waive his right
to counsel. The court then complimented Woodbury again, stating:
[Y]our ability to understand, you’re obviously intelligent
and you have been able to handle yourself in court,
whether it’s questioning or just behavior or being -- being
able to ask your standby counsel. Even asking to do so,
you’ve been polite, you’ve been courteous, and I think
your behavior has been, compared to all the other pro se
people in the past, actually better than all of them
combined.
Woodbury told the court that his standby counsel had provided
excellent assistance with all legal questions, and the trial court
accepted Woodbury’s guilty plea. Woodbury then asked to be
permitted to represent himself at the penalty phase trial and said
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he had consulted with standby counsel about that decision. The
court ordered a presentencing investigation, and the State asked
the court to appoint a mental health expert for potential mitigation.
Three days later, the court appointed Dr. Joseph Sesta to conduct a
mental health evaluation for mitigation.
Woodbury’s penalty phase trial began on July 23, 2018. The
proceeding began with another renewed offer of counsel and Faretta
inquiry, and with the court taking judicial notice of Woodbury’s
previous statements about his bipolar disorder. Woodbury
indicated that he understood the rights he was waiving and the
disadvantages of self-representation, and the court granted his
request to proceed pro se after finding him competent to waive his
right to counsel.
Woodbury asked the court to read either of two special jury
instructions Woodbury had prepared that would have informed the
jurors that even if they found death to be justifiable, they could still
recommend life in prison as an act of mercy. Following a recess
and an abridged Faretta inquiry, the court rejected Woodbury’s
instructions. Woodbury did not object to the final instructions
read.
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The State presented penalty phase testimony from law
enforcement officers and victims of Woodbury’s prior crimes,
introduced fingerprint evidence and a judgment from another case
to show that Woodbury had prior convictions for robbery and three
other murders, and presented evidence to show that Woodbury
killed his cellmate while serving a sentence of imprisonment and
that the killing was particularly heinous and cruel. The State also
played portions of an interview given shortly after the murder, in
which Woodbury made no mention of the victim attempting to
sexually assault him but did describe how he had sharpened a
piece of metal, taken a lock from his locker, waited until an inept
correctional officer was on duty, put on and laced up his boots, and
barricaded his cell door to prevent entry by responding officers.
Woodbury testified on his own behalf. He admitted that his assault
on the victim constituted torture, but he claimed that the victim
had tried to rape him and that “it was getback time. . . . It was just
getback, it was just vengeance, it was just wanting to hurt you for
what you tried to do to me, for what you thought you could do. . . .
That’s really why I did what I did.”
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The court instructed the jury that in order to recommend the
death penalty, it must unanimously find that at least one
aggravating factor had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court read instructions on the four aggravators alleged by the
State: (1) Woodbury was previously convicted of a felony and under
sentence of imprisonment; (2) he was previously convicted of
another capital felony or a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to another person; (3) the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the murder was committed in a cold,
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral
or legal justification. The court then instructed the jury to consider
mitigation, such as whether the crime was committed while
Woodbury was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance or
any other factors that mitigate against the death penalty. The jury
unanimously recommended the death penalty after unanimously
finding that the State had proved all four aggravators alleged and
that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and were sufficient
to impose death.
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A Spencer 2 hearing was held on September 21, 2018. It began
with a Faretta inquiry that included asking Woodbury if he
understood that the State was in possession of mental health
mitigation evidence. Woodbury said he understood all questions
asked. The court asked Woodbury about his bipolar disorder and
treatment for it. Woodbury said he began taking Tegretol shortly
after the murder, that he took it consistently during the trial, and
that it did not affect his ability to understand the proceedings. The
court asked Woodbury if he had been diagnosed with any other
mental illnesses. When he said no, the court replied: “You had
hesitation. It’s fine with me if you answer it. I mean, now–look, it’s
for your benefit.” Woodbury said: “None that I believe.” The court
found that Woodbury knowingly and intelligently waived counsel
and was competent to do so.
Standby counsel testified at the hearing that Woodbury knew
there was a factual basis for mental health mitigation, including
opinions contained in the report written by Dr. Sesta, but that
Woodbury elected not to present any such mitigation. When
2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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pressed on that issue by Woodbury, standby counsel agreed with
Woodbury that the decision was strategic in nature—that Woodbury
already had a penalty phase strategy and never intended to present
mental health mitigation. After Woodbury explained why he did not
wish to present mental health mitigation on his own behalf, the
State offered Dr. Sesta’s report into evidence, and the court
admitted the report for potential mitigation.
Woodbury was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to death. In
the sentencing order, the court found that all four aggravators
alleged by the State had been proved and assigned great weight to
each aggravator. The court then examined whether the murder was
committed while Woodbury was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional disturbance. The court found that although
there was no competent evidence to support that mitigator, it could
not say there was no evidence whatsoever in the record, and so
assigned the mitigator minimal weight. The court then examined
whether Woodbury’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
substantially impaired, finding that this mitigator was never raised
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and that any applicability would be covered by the findings on
mental or emotional disturbance.
The court also found that although the facts cast doubt on
Woodbury’s version of the incident, there was at least some
mitigation on that issue in the record, but only worthy of minimal
weight. In addition, the court found that although Woodbury did
not present any mental health mitigation on his own behalf, there
was mental health mitigation in the record because Dr. Sesta’s
report mentioned bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. The court
assigned little weight to Woodbury’s diagnosis and history of bipolar
disorder and assigned minimal weight to Dr. Sesta’s mention of
schizophrenia. After making findings on each aggravator and
mitigator, the court sentenced Woodbury to death.
ANALYSIS
In this direct appeal of the judgment of conviction and
sentence of death, Woodbury argues that the trial court erred by: (1)
granting Woodbury’s waiver of counsel and request to proceed pro
se without first ordering a mental health evaluation; (2) failing to
sua sponte order a competency hearing to determine if Woodbury
was competent to stand trial; (3) accepting a guilty plea that was
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not entered intelligently and voluntarily and had no factual basis;
(4) failing to renew the offer of counsel at the start of the defense
case-in-chief and when Woodbury announced his change of plea; (5)
accepting Woodbury’s waiver of mental health mitigation without
appointing special counsel to present mitigation evidence; (6)
finding that the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner, and instructing the jury on that aggravator;
(7) admitting a noncomprehensive presentence investigation report
that contained impermissible sentencing recommendations; (8)
assigning minimal weight to the mitigator of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance; (9) rejecting a requested special jury
instruction on mercy; and (10) failing to instruct the jury that it
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravators
outweighed the mitigators and were sufficient for the death
penalty. 3 We address each claim in turn, and for the reasons set
forth below, we affirm Woodbury’s conviction and sentence of death.
3. Woodbury also asserts that the court’s failure to consider
mitigators precludes us from conducting proportionality review. In
light of our recent decision in Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544(Fla. 2020), we need not address this claim.
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1. Competency to Stand Trial and the Right to Self-
Representation
Woodbury insists that the record shows that the trial court
knew of Woodbury’s history of bipolar disorder and observed
instances of erratic behavior from Woodbury in court. Thus,
Woodbury argues that the trial court knew he suffered from a
severe mental illness to the point of being incompetent to conduct
the proceedings without assistance and should therefore have
denied his request to proceed pro se at trial. Even more
fundamentally, Woodbury argues that his bipolar disorder diagnosis
and erratic behavior gave the trial court reasonable ground to
believe Woodbury was not mentally competent to stand trial, and
that the court should therefore have ordered a competency hearing
before proceeding.
A. Whether a Competency Hearing was Required
An accused has a right to adequate process to ensure he is not
tried or sentenced while mentally incompetent to stand trial. Pate
v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.210(b) provides:
If, at any material stage of a criminal proceeding, the
court of its own motion, or on motion of counsel for the
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defendant or for the state, has reasonable ground to
believe that the defendant is not mentally competent to
proceed, the court shall immediately enter its order
setting a time for a hearing to determine the defendant’s
mental condition . . . .
When a defendant claims a trial court failed to order a competency
hearing, either sua sponte or on request from a party, we will
uphold the court’s determination absent an abuse of discretion.
Rodgers v. State, 3 So. 3d 1127, 1132 (Fla. 2009).
Woodbury argues that his admission of bipolar disorder gave
the court reasonable ground to believe he was not mentally
competent, but “[n]ot every manifestation of mental illness
demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence
must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand
the charges.” Barnes v. State, 124 So. 3d 904, 913 (Fla. 2013)
(defendant’s disclosure of mental illness did not require the trial
court to order a competency hearing because nothing about the
defendant’s behavior during the proceedings created grounds to
believe he was incompetent) (quoting Card v. Singletary, 981 F.2d
481, 487-88 (11th Cir. 1992)); see also Nelson v. State, 43 So. 3d
20, 29 (Fla. 2010) (defendant’s suicide attempt and treatment with
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antipsychotic medication did not raise doubts about his
competency to stand trial).
Like the defendant in Barnes, Woodbury disclosed a history
and diagnosis of bipolar disorder, but nothing about his behavior in
court indicated a present inability to understand the proceedings
against him or an inability to consult with his standby counsel (or
with counsel, had an attorney been appointed). Woodbury filed
motions on his own behalf, was consistently alert, demonstrated
knowledge of legal issues, behaved appropriately, and stated
multiple times that he understood the proceedings. At no time did
the trial court, Woodbury’s standby counsel, or the attorneys for the
State express any concerns about Woodbury’s competency. Rather,
the trial court outright praised Woodbury more than once for his
ability to conduct himself appropriately and properly engage with
the court, jury, and standby counsel. The court went so far as to
call Woodbury’s behavior better than all other pro se defendants the
court had seen, combined.
Woodbury invokes Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 179
(1975), where the Supreme Court held that a trial court ignored
details that raised doubts about the defendant’s competency. But
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the defendant in Drope did not merely disclose a history of mental
illness and demonstrate attention problems; he attempted suicide
during the trial. Id. at 180. That suicide attempt plus uncontested
testimony about the defendant’s wildly irrational recent behavior—
including trying to choke his wife to death just before trial—created
sufficient grounds to doubt the defendant’s competency to stand
trial. Id.Here, by contrast, Woodbury did nothing so extreme as
attempting suicide during the trial, and the trial court was given no
evidence of wildly irrational recent behavior. 4 Woodbury points to
moments from trial that supposedly show erratic and irrational
behavior, but at most, the cited conduct suggests attention span
problems or overconfidence; nothing put the court on notice that
Woodbury had a present inability to understand the proceedings or
to consult with counsel.5
4. Certainly, Woodbury’s behavior during the assault of the
victim could be described as irrational, but that was not as recent
as the pretrial behavior in Drope, and the court here conducted in-
depth inquiries into the mental health treatment and medication
Woodbury had received following the murder.
5. Woodbury further argues that the side effects of his
medication created reasonable ground to doubt his competency to
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Likewise, although Dr. Sesta’s psychological report, which was
entered for potential mitigation, described Woodbury as having a
fluctuating attention span, the report never suggested that
Woodbury’s behavior during the examination indicated an inability
to understand the charges or consult with counsel. Thus, even
though the trial court knew that Woodbury had been diagnosed
with (and treated for) bipolar disorder, nothing about his behavior
in court, and nothing presented to the trial court, created a
reasonable ground to believe Woodbury was not mentally competent
to stand trial. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to sua
sponte order a competency hearing.
B. Whether the Court Erred in Granting Woodbury’s Request to
Represent Himself at Trial
Woodbury argues that even if he was competent to stand trial,
the trial court knew he had a severe mental illness that rendered
him incompetent to represent himself, and that the trial court
therefore erred in granting his request to proceed pro se. Trial
stand trial. But the side effects he said he had experienced were
sleepiness, nervousness, blurry vision, and trouble urinating.
Woodbury points to no authority declaring that these side effects
create grounds to doubt one’s ability to understand the trial
proceedings or assist counsel.
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court rulings regarding competency to waive counsel are reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Trease v. State, 41 So. 3d 119, 124 (Fla.
2010).
An accused has a Sixth Amendment right to represent himself
at trial. Tennis v. State, 997 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2008). And while
an accused also has a right to the assistance of counsel, that right
confers just what it says—assistance. “To thrust counsel upon the
accused, against his considered wish . . . violates the logic of the
[Sixth] Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant,
but a master . . . .” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820. Therefore, each
defendant “must be free personally to decide whether in his
particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may
conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice
must be honored out of ‘that respect for the individual which is the
lifeblood of the law.’ ” Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Given the constitutional right to self-representation, “once an
unequivocal request for self-representation is made, the trial court
is obligated to hold a hearing, to determine whether the defendant
is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed
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counsel.” Tennis, 997 So. 2d at 378. The purpose of this inquiry
(often called a Faretta inquiry) is not to assess whether the
defendant possesses a degree of technical skill at trial advocacy, but
whether his waiver of counsel is knowing and intelligent. McKenzie
v. State, 29 So. 3d 272, 281 (Fla. 2010); see also Faretta, 422 U.S.
at 835 (“Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to
choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers
and disadvantages of self-representation . . . .”).
That said, while technical skill is not part of the Faretta
calculus, “the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and
efficiency of the trial at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in
acting as his own lawyer.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177
(2008) (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162
(2000)). Thus, after conducting a Faretta inquiry, a trial court may
preclude a defendant from exercising his right to proceed pro se if
the court finds that the defendant is “unable to carry out the basic
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tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of
counsel.” Id. at 175-76. 6
In Florida, Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(3) addresses
the right to self-representation. It accounts for the aforementioned
bases by which a court may lawfully force counsel on an unwilling
defendant, stating:
Regardless of the defendant’s legal skills or the
complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a
defendant’s unequivocal request to represent himself or
herself, if the court makes a determination of record that
the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel, and does not suffer from severe
mental illness to the point where the defendant is not
competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself or
herself.
Fla. R. Crim P. 3.111(d)(3). Thus, a Florida trial court may deny a
defendant’s request to proceed pro se if: (1) the defendant’s waiver
of his right to counsel was not made knowingly and intelligently; or
(2) the defendant suffers from severe mental illness to the point of
being incompetent to conduct trial proceedings without assistance.
6. In Edwards, the Supreme Court did not define these “basic
tasks,” but it did cite a case declaring that basic trial tasks included
“organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law,
participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the
court and jury.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176 (citing McKaskle v.
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984)).
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The competency standard to waive one’s right to counsel is the
same as the competency standard to stand trial, whereas the
competency standard to conduct trial proceedings without
assistance is somewhat higher. See Wall v. State, 238 So. 3d 127,
140 (Fla. 2018) (“[D]efendants may be competent to waive counsel
yet incompetent to represent themselves.”).
Here, starting from his first appearance, Woodbury never
wavered in his insistence on representing himself at trial. As it was
required to do upon receiving an unequivocal request for self-
representation, the trial court explained the benefits of counsel and
the pitfalls of self-representation and conducted a full Faretta
inquiry. The court renewed the offer of counsel and conducted
additional Faretta inquiries approximately a dozen times over the
course of the proceedings. 7 At the conclusion of each inquiry, the
court found that Woodbury’s rejection of the offer of counsel was
7. We do not suggest that all of these offers and Faretta
inquiries were legally required. The record indicates that the trial
court conducted so many inquiries to ensure that the offer of
counsel was renewed at all critical stages of the proceedings.
Nothing in the record suggests that any of the inquiries were
prompted by new concerns about Woodbury’s behavior or
competency.
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knowing and intelligent and that Woodbury was competent to make
his decision. We agree. Woodbury responded appropriately to the
court’s questions and indicated that he understood both the
proceedings against him and the rights he was giving up by
proceeding pro se.
That leaves the question whether Woodbury’s behavior in
court, together with his bipolar disorder diagnosis, required the trial
court to find that Woodbury suffered from severe mental illness to
the point of being incompetent to conduct the proceedings by
himself. To that end, Woodbury filed pro se discovery motions and
a demand for speedy trial, conducted voir dire examination of the
potential jurors by himself, cross-examined witnesses, argued
evidentiary objections, and even requested a special jury instruction
derived from the federal standard instructions. In fact, the record
reveals several instances where Woodbury’s pro se representation
could easily be mistaken for the work of a veteran trial attorney.
Take for example this excerpt from voir dire of Woodbury
questioning a potential juror’s ability to set aside biases and
consider mitigation:
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MR. WOODBURY: Sir, just three minutes ago you
said you have a very biblical view of the Bible, that it
should be an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for
a life. With respect to what he just said, do you still feel
like that now?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: I have to say yes, but you
still have to take each situation, you know, you have to
take each case, case by case.
MR. WOODBURY: So would -- so I am to
understand that you can look past the Bible and obey
Florida law and give consideration to mitigators such as
self-defense, a bad childhood, level of involvement, all the
mitigators that may be out there, you can give due
consideration even though now the Florida law has
trumped your Bible law, you’re not going to have a
problem with that?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR: No. I can – that’s tough.
Thus, Woodbury’s behavior in court defeats any claim that he
was not competent to conduct the proceedings on his own. And
Woodbury cites no authority—and we are aware of none—where a
bipolar disorder diagnosis, without more, established that a
defendant suffered from severe mental illness to the point of being
incompetent to conduct trial proceedings without assistance.
Woodbury’s own arguments on appeal describe bipolar disorder as
a broad spectrum of mental conditions, with varying degrees of
symptoms and severity, including “hypomania,” which Woodbury
- 28 -
describes as a less severe form of mania in which individuals are
able to function well in social situations or at work and can retain
the ability to act rationally on subjects beyond the sphere of the
controlling delusion. Given that certain people with bipolar
disorder function well and act rationally, we see no logic in creating
a per se rule or presumption that all individuals with bipolar
disorder suffer so severely from mental illness that they are unable
to carry out basic trial tasks without assistance.
Woodbury points out that some individuals with bipolar
disorder exhibit “confusion and poor judgment” and “potential
disordered thinking,” but these are only possible symptoms of
bipolar disorder. When asked how bipolar disorder affected him
personally, Woodbury told the trial court that prior to taking
Tegretol (which he claimed was very effective at treating his
symptoms), he experienced “[m]ood swings, just stuff like that.”
Mood swings, without more, do not indicate that a defendant is
suffering from a severe mental illness to the point of incompetency.
Accordingly, on this record, knowledge of Woodbury’s bipolar
disorder did not require the court to go beyond a Faretta inquiry
before granting Woodbury’s request to proceed pro se.
- 29 -
Woodbury argues that in addition to his history of bipolar
disorder, his erratic courtroom behavior created reasonable ground
to doubt his competence. Woodbury points out that he: (1) filed a
demand for speedy trial before receiving any discovery; (2)
announced he was ready to start trial just a month after being
arrested; (3) indicated that he was unconcerned about the guilt
phase; (4) compared the likelihood of a death penalty
recommendation to getting struck by lightning; (5) said his prison
outfit and handcuffs made for “excellent” courtroom attire; (6) told
the jury he had chosen to represent himself because it was simple;
(7) admitted his guilt during his guilt phase testimony; and (8)
goaded the jurors by telling them to sentence him to death if it
would make them feel better.
Even without any context, most of these purportedly erratic
moments merely suggest a lack of technical skill. They can be
considered “irrational” only insofar as they imply a nonchalant
attitude from Woodbury about being found guilty. But Woodbury
was already serving life sentences for three prior murders; the only
way this trial could have affected him in any meaningful sense was
in the penalty phase. In fact, Woodbury told the court that he
- 30 -
expected to be found guilty and that his focus was on sentencing.
Thus, the cited behavior suggesting a blasé attitude toward a guilty
verdict did not create grounds to doubt his competence.
As to the “lightning strike” comment, although Woodbury’s
appellate counsel frames this remark as a manic rant showing that
Woodbury believed he was more likely to get struck by lightning
than get the death penalty, Woodbury was not raving about the
likelihood of weather phenomena. He was explaining to the court
that while he was confident a jury would recommend a life
sentence, he wanted a guilt phase trial “in case lightning strikes
and somehow you find 12 people to agree and I get the death
penalty, I want appeal issues for the guilt phase.” If this comment
demonstrates anything, it is not that Woodbury had erratic
outbursts in court; it is that he was cognizant of the fact that a
death penalty recommendation was possible notwithstanding his
confidence in his penalty phase case, and that an appellate record
would be helpful should he need to appeal.
Woodbury further argues that Dr. Sesta’s psychological report
created doubts about Woodbury’s competence to proceed pro se. In
that report, Dr. Sesta opined that Woodbury was experiencing an
- 31 -
active manic episode during the examination, had a fluctuating
attention span, made some inappropriate comments, and was
undermedicated. But Woodbury points to no case where
inattentiveness or overenthusiasm rendered a defendant
incompetent to represent himself at trial.
In sum, nothing in the record shows that the court abused its
discretion by finding that Woodbury knowingly and intelligently
rejected the court’s offer of counsel, or that the court was required
to find that Woodbury suffered from severe mental illness to the
point of incompetency. Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing
Woodbury to invoke his constitutional right to conduct his own
defense.
2. Woodbury’s Guilty Plea
Woodbury argues that the trial court erred in accepting his
guilty plea. He insists that his decision to change his plea to guilty
in open court, in front of the jury, gave the trial court reasonable
ground to believe he was not mentally competent to enter the plea.
Woodbury further argues that the trial court erred in finding that
there was a factual basis for the plea. We find no error on either
basis.
- 32 -
A. Whether the Court Erred in Finding Woodbury Competent to
Plead Guilty
The competency standard to plead guilty is the same as the
competency standard to stand trial, Wall, 238 So. 3d at 140, and
so, “[d]uring ‘any material stage’ of a criminal proceeding, a
defendant must immediately be examined for competence if the trial
court ‘has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is not
mentally competent to proceed.’ ” Id. (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.210(b)). “If that sufficient basis exists, the trial court ‘shall
immediately enter its order setting a time for a [competency]
hearing . . . and may order the defendant to be examined by no
more than 3 experts, as needed, prior to the date of the hearing.’ ”
Id. (modifications in original) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210(b)).
“Due process requires a court accepting a guilty plea to carefully
inquire into the defendant’s understanding of the plea, so that the
record contains an affirmative showing that the plea was intelligent
and voluntary.” Sanchez-Torres v. State, 130 So. 3d 661, 668 (Fla.
2013) (quoting Koenig v. State, 597 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1992)).
Woodbury points out that when he initially told the court that
he was planning to change his plea to guilty, he himself called the
- 33 -
decision “crazy.” But while the decision to change one’s plea in
open court may be unorthodox, and while Woodbury may have
believed at the time that he was doing something crazy, he points to
no authority declaring that announcing a change of plea in front of
a jury creates reasonable ground to believe the defendant is not
mentally competent.
In any event, the trial court did not simply accept Woodbury’s
plea without question. It went through a colloquy with Woodbury
to determine if his plea was being entered intelligently and
voluntarily, and it explained to Woodbury that first-degree murder
has only two possible sentences: life in prison and the death
penalty. The court also told Woodbury that the plea form would
indicate that there was no agreement for his open plea, meaning
Woodbury could still be sentenced to death. Woodbury said he
understood. The court then went through the plea form line-by-line
with Woodbury to make sure he understood what he was doing,
and at no time did Woodbury say anything that suggested he did
not understand the plea or the consequences of pleading guilty. 8
8. The State argues that Woodbury’s decision to change his
plea in open court was an attempt to game the system by
- 34 -
On this record, we find no error in finding Woodbury competent to
enter a guilty plea.
B. Whether There Was a Factual Basis for the Plea
Woodbury argues that the trial court erred in finding that
there was a factual basis for his guilty plea. “[I]n order to challenge
a guilty plea for lack of a factual basis determination by the trial
judge, a defendant must show prejudice or manifest injustice.”
State v. Kendrick, 336 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1976). The inquiry to
determine if a plea has a factual basis “need not be a ‘mini-trial’ ”; a
court may be satisfied from “statements and admissions made by
the defendant, or by his counsel, or by the prosecutor.” Farr v.
State, 124 So. 3d 766, 778 (Fla. 2012) (quoting Monroe v. State, 318
So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)); see also Santiago-Gonzalez v.
presenting a sympathetic explanation for his actions and then avoid
a damning cross-examination that would have impeached him with
prior inconsistent statements and convictions for felonies and
crimes of dishonesty. It is true that Woodbury objected when told
he might still be cross-examined, and that he said his plea change
was “110 percent my idea to spin a circle around you like I said I
was going to.” But it matters not why Woodbury chose to change
his plea the way he did; what matters is that his actions did not
establish reasonable grounds to believe his plea was not being
entered voluntarily and intelligently. See Brant v. State, 21 So. 3d
1276 (Fla. 2009).
- 35 -
State, 301 So. 3d 157, 180 (Fla. 2020) (“The State provided a factual
basis for the murder, to which the defense conceded for the purpose
of the guilty plea.”). However, when the defendant raises the
possibility of a defense to his guilty plea during the plea colloquy,
“the potential prejudice is apparent” and so the trial judge “should
make extensive inquiry into factual basis before accepting the guilty
plea.” Kendrick, 336 So. 2d at 355.
Here, the trial court did not err in finding a factual basis for
Woodbury’s guilty plea to premeditated first-degree murder. During
the trial, law enforcement and correctional officers who responded
to the incident described Woodbury’s assault on the victim as
“methodical” and planned out. And video played at trial showed
that Woodbury had weapons on hand and that he brutally attacked
the victim several times after the victim had been completely
incapacitated.
Woodbury also said nothing during the plea colloquy
suggesting a defense to premeditated murder. Although he testified
on the stand that he had no intent to kill the victim when he went
to bed the night before, this does not establish a defense to the
charged offense such that an extensive inquiry into factual basis
- 36 -
was required, for “[p]remeditation can be formed in a moment and
need only exist ‘for such time as will allow the accused to be
conscious of the nature of the act he is about to commit and the
probable result of that act.’ ” DeAngelo v. State, 616 So. 2d 440,
441 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Asay v. State, 580 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla.
1991)).
Because the guilty plea to premeditated first-degree murder in
this case was entered intelligently and voluntarily and there was a
factual basis for the plea, we affirm the trial court’s acceptance of
Woodbury’s plea.
3. Renewed Offer of Counsel
Woodbury’s next claim is that the court failed to renew the
offer of counsel at all critical stages of the proceedings. Specifically,
Woodbury argues that the trial court was required to, but did not,
offer counsel at the start of the defense case-in-chief and at the
time Woodbury announced his change of plea.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(5) provides that if
a waiver of counsel is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, “the
offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each
subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant
- 37 -
appears without counsel.” This rule does not require a renewed
offer of counsel each time the defendant appears in court; rather, a
court must renew the offer of counsel at “critical” stages of the
proceedings. Knight v. State, 770 So. 2d 663, 670 n.6 (Fla. 2000);
see Muehleman v. State, 3 So. 3d 1149, 1156 (Fla. 2009) (“[T]he
waiver applies only to the present stage and must be renewed at
each subsequent crucial stage where the defendant is
unrepresented.” (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla.
1992)).
Woodbury points to no case holding that the transition from
the State’s case-in-chief to the defense’s case-in-chief marks a new
critical stage of the proceedings such as to require a new offer of
counsel and new Faretta inquiry. To the contrary, in Knight, we
held that a renewed offer of counsel was not required “during the
same stage of the proceeding where Knight waived his right to
counsel, the trial portion.” Knight, 770 So. 2d at 669.
As to whether a new offer of counsel was required at the time
Woodbury announced his change of plea, there was no intervening
stage of the proceeding that separated the court’s previous Faretta
inquiry from Woodbury’s announcement of his change of plea. See
- 38 -
id. at 669-70 (holding that a Faretta inquiry conducted at a pretrial
hearing satisfied the requirement to offer counsel at the start of trial
because the pretrial hearing was held to discuss the upcoming trial
and there were no intervening proceedings). On the previous day of
trial, Woodbury told the court that he intended to change his plea
to guilty when he finished testifying, and the court held a Faretta
inquiry at the start of the next day of trial. The court also
conducted a full Faretta inquiry and made a renewed offer of
counsel before accepting Woodbury’s plea. These inquiries and
offers of counsel were sufficient to satisfy the obligations imposed
by rule 3.111(d)(5).
4. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Woodbury makes a series of claims related to the trial court’s
findings on the statutory aggravators alleged by the State, and on
certain statutory and nonstatutory mitigators. Woodbury argues
that the trial court erred by allowing him to waive his right to
mental health mitigation, by failing to consider mental illness
mitigation that was in the record, and by not appointing special
counsel to argue mitigation. Woodbury further argues that the trial
court erred in assessing the “extreme mental or emotional
- 39 -
disturbance” statutory mitigator. Finally, Woodbury asserts that
the court erred in instructing the jury on the “cold, calculated, and
premeditated” aggravator and in finding its existence.
A. Mental Health Mitigation
A competent defendant may waive his right to present
mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of his first-degree murder
trial. Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 854 (Fla. 2003). We review
for abuse of discretion a trial court’s determination on a defendant’s
competence to waive mitigation. Id.When a defendant does not challenge the imposition of the
death penalty and refuses to present mitigation evidence on his own
behalf, the trial court has an obligation “to require the preparation
of a meaningful, comprehensive presentence investigation report
(PSI).” Marquardt v. State, 156 So. 3d 464, 491 (Fla. 2015). In such
circumstances, the trial court should require the State to place into
the record all evidence of a mitigating nature that the State has in
its possession. Id. Then, “[i]f the PSI and the accompanying
records alert the trial court to the probability of significant
mitigation, the trial court has the discretion either to call its own
- 40 -
witnesses or . . . appoint an independent, special counsel, who can
call witnesses to present mitigation evidence.” Id.Woodbury argues that the trial court erred in this case when it
let Woodbury waive his right to present mental health mitigation.
Woodbury insists that “severe mental illness prevented him from
entering a knowing, voluntarily [sic], and intelligent waiver” of his
right to present mitigation. Woodbury also argues that a report
discussing his mental health revealed an aspect of his character
that mitigated against imposition of the death penalty, and that
notwithstanding his waiver of mental health mitigation, the trial
court should have considered the information in that report and
should have appointed special counsel to argue the evidence.
As to whether Woodbury was competent to waive his right to
present mitigating evidence, the trial court conducted a Faretta
inquiry at the start of the penalty phase, advised Woodbury about
the aggravators being alleged by the State, went over possible
mitigating circumstances with Woodbury, and explained to
Woodbury his right to present mental health mitigation.
Woodbury’s history of bipolar disorder did not in itself create a
reasonable ground for the court to believe Woodbury was not
- 41 -
competent to waive his right to present mitigation, and Woodbury’s
responses to the court’s inquiries created no such ground.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that Woodbury’s waiver of
mental health mitigation was not a product of mania, but of
strategy. Woodbury told the court that his penalty phase strategy
was to emphasize his alleged sexual assault by the victim, and he
said, “I don’t want to really mess that up with oh, he was a bad
kid.” And Woodbury’s standby counsel testified that he and
Woodbury discussed how Woodbury might avoid a mental health
evaluation by the State and that Woodbury chose not to present
mental health mitigation. Under these circumstances, we find that
the trial court had no reasonable ground to doubt Woodbury’s
competency to waive his right to present mental health mitigation,
and we therefore find no abuse of discretion in allowing the waiver.
As to whether the court failed to consider mitigating evidence
in the record, particularly information mentioned in Dr. Sesta’s
psychological report, we note that the trial court properly ordered a
PSI report after Woodbury waived his right to present mitigation.
The State then introduced Dr. Sesta’s report as potential mitigation.
Later, in its sentencing order, the court found that “Dr. Sesta
- 42 -
diagnosed [Woodbury] with bi-polar disorder and some degree of
Schizophrenia.” And ultimately, the court found: “[T]here is proof in
the record that [Woodbury] has been diagnosed with and is
medicated for [bipolar] disorder. The Court will find that the
mitigation is reasonably established and will assign little weight to
the mitigation.” Given that the trial court found the existence of
mental health mitigation in the record and assigned it weight, at
least in part based on information in Dr. Sesta’s report, and given
the weighty aggravation and minimal mitigation in this case, any
error in the trial court’s characterization or assessment of aspects
of Dr. Sesta’s report was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.9
To the extent Woodbury is asserting that the trial court should
have given more weight to the mental health mitigation, Woodbury
has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining the degree of weight to assign to this mitigator. See
Covington v. State, 228 So. 3d 49, 66 (Fla. 2017) (finding no abuse
9. We also find no merit in Woodbury’s claim that the trial
court was required to appoint special counsel to argue mitigation on
Woodbury’s behalf. See Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69, 74 (Fla.
1995).
- 43 -
of discretion in the trial court affording moderate weight to a
mitigator, given the court’s findings on that mitigator).
Moreover, “HAC, CCP, and prior violent felony are three of the
weightiest aggravating circumstances.” Damas v. State, 260 So. 3d
200, 216 (Fla. 2018). Given that all those aggravators (and more)
were found in this case and assigned great weight, there is no
reasonable possibility that affording too little weight to mental
health mitigation affected Woodbury’s sentence. See, e.g., Tanzi v.
State, 964 So. 2d 106, 119-20 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]he trial court [made] a
finding that is contrary to this Court’s precedent. However, any
error present was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of
the following: (a) the trial court recognized and gave weight to
numerous other mitigating circumstances; (b) this case involves
substantial aggravation, including the HAC and CCP aggravating
circumstances; and (c) the . . . proposed mitigator is minor and
tangential with respect to the record in this case.”). 10
10. Woodbury also asserts a procedural defect, insisting that
after the Spencer hearing, the trial court should have ordered a
recess and convened a separate proceeding for imposition of the
sentence. However, Woodbury himself expressly objected to the
court delaying the pronouncement of sentence and told the court to
proceed directly to sentencing. Thus, the asserted error was
- 44 -
B. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance Mitigation
Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes (2017) lists the statutory
mitigators that, if applicable, can weigh against imposition of the
death penalty. One such statutory mitigator is when the capital
felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See § 921.141(7)(b),
Fla. Stat. (2017). Another statutory mitigator—addressed in a
separate subsection—is when the defendant’s capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law, was substantially impaired. § 921.141(7)(f),
Fla. Stat. (2017). Woodbury argues that the trial court conflated
the tests for these two distinct mitigators when it assessed whether
Woodbury was under the effect of mental or emotional disturbance.
It does appear from the sentencing order that the court
applied the wrong test for determining the existence of the extreme
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator. Specifically, when
evaluating in the sentencing order whether Woodbury was under
invited, and Woodbury may not be heard to complain of it on
appeal. See Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d 23, 53 (Fla. 2018). And even
if we were to consider this claim, Woodbury has not shown that the
asserted procedural defect rose to the level of fundamental error.
- 45 -
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, the trial court stated that
“[t]here is no evidence that [Woodbury]’s emotional state was
anywhere close to the level of obviating his knowledge of right and
wrong.” But while the degree to which a defendant knows right
from wrong is relevant to assess whether the section 921.141(7)(f)
mitigator applies (i.e., that defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law was substantially impaired), see Duncan v.
State, 619 So. 2d 279, 283 (Fla. 1993), the section 921.141(7)(b)
mitigator (i.e., that the capital felony was committed while the
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance) does not speak to a defendant’s knowledge of right and
wrong.
Nonetheless, the court ultimately assigned weight to the
mitigator, remarking that “the Court cannot say there is no
evidence of emotional disturbance.” Thus, Woodbury cannot
complain that the court’s incorrect method of analysis resulted in a
viable mitigator going unconsidered. Because the mitigator was
considered, even if the path to get there was incorrect, and because
extremely weighty aggravators were proved in this case, there is no
- 46 -
reasonable possibility that Woodbury would have received a
different sentence had the trial court engaged in the proper analysis
or had given more weight to the mitigator. See Covington, 228 So.
3d at 66. Accordingly, we find no reversible error as to the extreme
mental or emotional disturbance mitigator.
C. Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravation
Woodbury next argues that the trial court erred in instructing
the jury on the cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP)
aggravating factor and erred in finding the existence of the
aggravator. We disagree.
Competent and substantial evidence from the penalty phase
supports the trial court’s instruction to the jury and its finding as to
the CCP aggravator. Although Woodbury had told the jury that the
victim attempted to rape him, Woodbury’s testimony on the stand
during the sentencing phase trial described the killing as an act of
retribution, not self-defense. Woodbury said that the murder of his
cellmate “was just getback [sic], it was just vengeance, it was just
wanting to hurt you for what you tried to do to me, for what you
thought you could do.” This evidence supports the conclusion that
Woodbury had no moral or legal justification for his actions. See
- 47 -
Williamson v. State, 511 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1987) (affirming a
finding of CCP where the defendant’s explanation that the victim
posed a danger to others was not held to be a pretense of moral
justification).
The penalty phase jury was also informed that Woodbury had
admitted to procuring in advance the lock that he later used to beat
the victim to death, to sharpening a blade prior to the murder, to
waiting until a correctional officer whom Woodbury viewed as
particularly inept came on duty, and to barricading his cell door to
prevent officers from entering the cell during the assault. All this
evidence, taken together, supports a conclusion that Woodbury
made calculated and highly premeditated plans to carry out the
killing of his victim.
Moreover, the jury watched a video played during the penalty
phase, in which Woodbury said that he “was so happy to kill
someone again” and that he “enjoyed torturing” the victim. Cf.
Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485, 498 (Fla. 2011) (affirming a CCP
finding where the defendant had obtained the murder weapon to
commit the killing and then committed the murder as “a matter of
course”).
- 48 -
Because evidence introduced during the penalty phase
supports each aspect of the proof required for the CCP statutory
aggravator, we find no error in the trial court finding the existence
of the CCP aggravator or instructing the jury on the aggravator.11
5. Presentence Investigation Report
Woodbury’s next claim is that the trial court erred in admitting
a presentence investigation report that allegedly violated the
requirements of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710. Because
Woodbury never brought any concerns with the report to the trial
court’s attention, this claim is reviewed for fundamental error.
Rule 3.710(b) provides that when a criminal defendant refuses
to present mitigation evidence, the trial court shall refer the case to
the Department of Corrections for the preparation of a presentence
11. Because Woodbury failed to preserve his claim that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury on the CCP aggravator, we
would have corrected the asserted error only if it rose to the level of
fundamental error. See Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 887 (Fla.
2019). Moreover, given the other weighty aggravators found in this
case, even if the CCP aggravator were invalid, there is no reasonable
possibility that an absence of this one aggravator would have
resulted in a different sentence. See Hall v. State, 246 So. 3d 210,
215 (Fla. 2018) (an error in finding the existence of CCP was
harmless because “Hall has significant and weighty aggravation
beyond the invalidated CCP aggravator.”).
- 49 -
investigation report. That report “shall be comprehensive and
should include information such as previous mental health
problems (including hospitalizations), school records, and relevant
family background.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.710(b).
Woodbury argues that the PSI report prepared for this case
was inadmissible because it lacked a comprehensive summary of
his mental health history. But the trial court had ample
information about Woodbury’s mental health issues at the time it
evaluated the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. At trial,
Woodbury described his long history of bipolar disorder during
numerous Faretta inquiries, and he gave the court documentation
describing his treatment and medication. And Dr. Sesta’s report,
which was placed into evidence for mitigation purposes, addressed
Woodbury’s mental health issues and included additional
diagnoses. Because the trial court had the relevant information
and found the existence of mental health mitigation in the record,
the absence of a summary of that information in the PSI report does
not constitute fundamental error.
Woodbury also argues that the PSI report included an
improper sentencing recommendation in favor of the death penalty.
- 50 -
Woodbury relies upon Robertson v. State, 187 So. 3d 1207 (Fla.
2016), where we held that although the governing statute provides
that the Department of Corrections must include a disposition
recommendation based on several factors in noncapital cases, those
factors do not apply to capital sentencing matters. Id. at 1215.
However, in Robertson, the recommendation for death did not
render the PSI report invalid, for “the sentencing order show[ed]
that while the court relied upon the PSI for information about
Robertson’s background, the officer’s recommendation of a death
sentence did not influence the judge’s sentencing decision.” Id. at
1215-16.
In this case, the sentencing order contains the trial court’s
findings on each aggravating and mitigating circumstance,
including four weighty aggravators, and the sentencing order never
mentions any “recommendation” from the Department of
Corrections. Thus, as in Robertson, the sentencing order shows
that the trial court’s decision on whether to impose a life sentence
or the death penalty was not influenced by any recommendation in
the PSI report. See id.; see also Barnes v. State, 29 So. 3d 1010,
1028 (Fla. 2010) (holding that an unpreserved challenge to a PSI
- 51 -
report was barred, but that if preserved, there was “no basis to find
that had the trial court not considered the PSI, Barnes would have
received a life sentence”). Accordingly, we find that any error in this
case in the inclusion of a sentencing recommendation in the PSI
report does not rise to the level of fundamental error.
6. Special Jury Instruction on Mercy
Next, Woodbury argues that the trial court erred by rejecting
his requested special jury instructions on mercy, and by reading
the standard jury instruction instead. Standard Jury Instruction
7.11 (criminal), which the trial court read to the jury, informs jurors
that “[r]egardless of the results of each juror’s individual weighing
process—even if you find that the sufficient aggravators outweigh
the mitigators—the law neither compels nor requires you to
determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death.” In re
Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital Cases, 214 So. 3d
1236, 1263 (Fla. 2017). Woodbury proposed a special instruction
derived from the federal standard instructions, which added: “You
may always consider mercy in making this determination.” He
proposed an alternate instruction that he claimed came from “the
ether,” which added: “Mercy itself is sufficient to justify a sentence
- 52 -
other than death.” He now claims that the court erred by rejecting
his proposed instructions.
We affirm the trial court’s ruling because the instruction that
was read to the jury adequately informed the jurors of the
applicable legal standard. See Coday v. State, 946 So. 2d 988, 994
(Fla. 2006) (“[F]ailure to give special instructions does not constitute
error where the instructions given adequately address the
applicable legal standards.” (quoting Stephens v. State, 787 So. 2d
747, 755 (Fla. 2001)). When a juror votes for a life sentence despite
finding that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and were
sufficient to impose death, this decision is often referred to as a
mercy vote. In fact, we have referred to the relevant provision of
Standard Instruction 7.11 as the “mercy instruction.” Reynolds v.
State, 251 So. 3d 811, 816 n.5 (Fla. 2018). Thus, the court did
read an instruction on mercy, and although Woodbury might have
preferred the wording of his proposed instruction, Standard Jury
Instruction 7.11 is not ambiguous when it comes to addressing the
jurors’ options.
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7. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard for Sentencing
Considerations
Woodbury next argues that the trial court reversibly erred by
failing to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances and were sufficient to justify the death penalty. We
affirm because Woodbury did not preserve this claim for appeal and
because (as Woodbury acknowledges) we have already determined
that “these determinations are not subject to the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886.
CONCLUSION
Because Woodbury has not demonstrated any reversible error,
we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, and COURIEL,
JJ., concur.
LABARGA, J., concurs in result with an opinion.
GROSSHANS, J., did not participate.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
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LABARGA, J., concurring in result.
While I agree that Woodbury is not entitled to relief, I write to
emphasize the importance of ensuring that a defendant—especially
one who is facing the death penalty—is competent to conduct the
basic tasks necessary to represent one’s self at trial. Here, where
the defendant had a significant mental health history, a competency
evaluation would have been in order.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Okeechobee County,
Sherwood Bauer, Judge – Case No. 472018CF000164CFAXMX
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Mara C. Herbert and Paul
Edward Petillo, Assistant Public Defenders, Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Rhonda
Giger, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
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