Vega v. Tekoh ( 2022 )


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  • (Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2021                                       1
    Syllabus
    NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
    being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
    The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
    prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
    See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 
    200 U. S. 321
    , 337.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Syllabus
    VEGA v. TEKOH
    CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
    THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    No. 21–499.      Argued April 20, 2022—Decided June 23, 2022
    The case arose out of the interrogation of respondent, Terence Tekoh, by
    petitioner, Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Deputy Carlos Vega. Deputy
    Vega questioned Tekoh at the medical center where Tekoh worked re-
    garding the reported sexual assault of a patient. Vega did not inform
    Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U. S. 436
    . Tekoh
    eventually provided a written statement apologizing for inappropri-
    ately touching the patient’s genitals. Tekoh was prosecuted for unlaw-
    ful sexual penetration. His written statement was admitted against
    him at trial. After the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, Tekoh sued
    Vega under 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
    , seeking damages for alleged violations
    of his constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the use of an
    un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal proceed-
    ing violates the Fifth Amendment and may support a §1983 claim
    against the officer who obtained the statement.
    Held: A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a
    §1983 claim. Pp. 4–16.
    (a) Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person acting
    under color of state law who “subjects” a person “to the deprivation of
    any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
    laws.” Tekoh argues that a violation of Miranda constitutes a violation
    of the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
    That is wrong. Pp. 4–13.
    (1) In Miranda, the Court concluded that additional procedural pro-
    tections were necessary to prevent the violation of the Fifth Amend-
    ment right against self-incrimination when suspects who are in cus-
    tody are interrogated by the police. Miranda imposed a set of
    prophylactic rules requiring that custodial interrogation be preceded
    2                             VEGA v. TEKOH
    Syllabus
    by now-familiar warnings and disallowing the use of statements ob-
    tained in violation of these new rules by the prosecution in its case-in-
    chief. 
    384 U. S., at 444, 479
    . Miranda did not hold that a violation of
    the rules it established necessarily constitute a Fifth Amendment vio-
    lation. That makes sense, as an un-Mirandized suspect in custody may
    make self-incriminating statements without any hint of compulsion.
    The Miranda Court stated that the Constitution did not itself require
    “adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of
    the interrogation process” and that its decision “in no way create[d] a
    constitutional straitjacket.” 
    Id., at 467
    . Since Miranda, the Court has
    repeatedly described Miranda rules as “prophylactic.” Pp. 4–7.
    (2) After Miranda, the Court engaged in the process of charting the
    dimensions of these new prophylactic rules, and, in doing so, weighed
    the benefits and costs of any clarification of the prophylactic rules’
    scope. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 
    559 U. S. 98
    , 106. Some post-Mi-
    randa decisions found that the balance of interests justified re-
    strictions that would not have been possible if Miranda described the
    Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set of rules designed to protect
    that right. For example, in Harris v. New York, 
    401 U. S. 222
    , 224–
    226, the Court held that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
    could be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant, even though an
    involuntary statement obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment
    could not have been employed in this way. In Michigan v. Tucker, 
    417 U. S. 443
    , 450–452, n. 26, the Court held that the “fruits” of an un-
    Mirandized statement can be admitted. In doing so, the Court distin-
    guished police conduct that “abridge[s] [a person’s] constitutional priv-
    ilege against compulsory self-incrimination” from conduct that “de-
    part[s] only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this
    Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege.” 417 U. S., at 445–446.
    Similarly, in Oregon v. Elstad, 
    470 U. S. 298
    , the Court, following the
    reasoning in Tucker, refused to exclude a signed confession and em-
    phasized that an officer’s error “in administering the prophylactic Mi-
    randa procedures . . . should not breed the same irremediable conse-
    quences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.” 
    Id., at 309
    .
    While many of the Court’s decisions imposed limits on Miranda’s
    prophylactic rules, other decisions found that the balance of interests
    called for expansion. For example, in Doyle v. Ohio, 
    426 U. S. 610
    , the
    Court held that silence following a Miranda warning cannot be used
    to impeach. The Court acknowledged that Miranda warnings are
    “prophylactic,” 
    426 U. S., at 617
    , but it found that allowing the use of
    post-warning silence would undermine the warnings’ implicit promise
    that silence would not be used to convict. 
    Id., at 618
    . Likewise, in
    Withrow v. Williams, 
    507 U. S. 680
    , the Court rejected an attempt to
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)                      3
    Syllabus
    restrict Miranda’s application in collateral proceedings based on the
    reasoning in Stone v. Powell, 
    428 U. S. 465
     (1976). Once again ac-
    knowledging that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules, the Court bal-
    anced the competing interests and found that the costs of adopting a
    Stone-like rule outweighed any benefits. In sum, the Court’s post-Mi-
    randa cases acknowledge the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules
    and engage in cost-benefit analysis to define their scope. Pp. 7–11.
    (3) The Court’s decision in Dickerson v. United States, 
    530 U. S. 428
    ,
    did not upset the firmly established prior understanding of Miranda
    as a prophylactic decision. Dickerson involved a federal statute, 
    18 U. S. C. §3501
    , that effectively overruled Miranda by making the ad-
    missibility of a statement given during custodial interrogation turn
    solely on whether it was made voluntarily. 
    530 U. S., at
    431–432. The
    Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda by statute be-
    cause Miranda was a “constitutional decision” that adopted a “consti-
    tutional rule,” 
    530 U. S., at
    438–439, and the Court noted that these
    rules could not have been made applicable to the States if they did not
    have that status, see 
    ibid.
     At the same time, the Court made it clear
    that it was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with an out-
    right Fifth Amendment violation. Instead, the Dickerson Court de-
    scribed the Miranda rules as “constitutionally based” with “constitu-
    tional underpinnings,” 
    530 U. S., at 440
    , and n. 5. Those formulations
    obviously avoided saying that a Miranda violation is the same as a
    violation of the Fifth Amendment right. Miranda was a “constitutional
    decision” and it adopted a “constitutional rule” in the sense that the
    decision was based on the Court’s judgment about what is required to
    safeguard that constitutional right. And when the Court adopts a con-
    stitutional prophylactic rule of this nature, Dickerson concluded, the
    rule has the status of a “La[w] of the United States” that is binding on
    the States under the Supremacy Clause (as Miranda implicitly held,
    since three of the four decisions it reversed came from state court, 
    384 U. S., at
    491–494, 497–499), and the rule cannot be altered by ordinary
    legislation. Dickerson thus asserted a bold and controversial claim—
    that this Court has the authority to create constitutionally based
    prophylactic rules that bind both federal and state courts—but Dick-
    erson cannot be understood any other way consistent with the Court’s
    prior decisions. Subsequent cases confirm that Dickerson did not up-
    end the Court’s understanding of the Miranda rules as prophylactic.
    In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a viola-
    tion of the Constitution, and therefore such a violation does not consti-
    tute “the deprivation of [a] right . . . secured by the Constitution” for
    purposes of §1983. Pp. 11–13.
    (b) A §1983 claim may also be based on “the deprivation of any rights
    . . . secured by the . . . laws.” But the argument that Miranda rules
    4                             VEGA v. TEKOH
    Syllabus
    constitute federal “law” that can provide the ground for a §1983 claim
    cannot succeed unless Tekoh can persuade the Court that this “law”
    should be expanded to include the right to sue for damages under
    §1983. “A judicially crafted” prophylactic rule should apply “only
    where its benefits outweigh its costs,” Shatzer, 
    559 U. S., at 106
    . Here,
    while the benefits of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims under
    §1983 would be slight, the costs would be substantial. For example,
    allowing a claim like Tekoh’s would disserve “judicial economy,” Park-
    lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
    439 U. S. 322
    , 326, by requiring a federal
    judge or jury to adjudicate a factual question (whether Tekoh was in
    custody when questioned) that had already been decided by a state
    court. Allowing §1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also pre-
    sent many procedural issues. Miranda and its progeny provide suffi-
    cient protection for the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
    incrimination. Pp. 13–16.
    
    985 F. 3d 713
    , reversed and remanded.
    ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
    and THOMAS, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined. KAGAN,
    J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ.,
    joined.
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)                                 1
    Opinion of the Court
    NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
    notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
    ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
    corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 21–499
    _________________
    CARLOS VEGA, PETITIONER v. TERENCE B. TEKOH
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [June 23, 2022]
    JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
    This case presents the question whether a plaintiff may
    sue a police officer under Rev. Stat. §1979, 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
    , based on the allegedly improper admission of an “un-
    Mirandized”1 statement in a criminal prosecution. The case
    arose out of the interrogation of respondent, Terence Tekoh,
    by petitioner, Los Angeles County Sheriff ’s Deputy Carlos
    Vega. Deputy Vega questioned Tekoh at his place of em-
    ployment and did not give him a Miranda warning. Tekoh
    was prosecuted, and his confession was admitted into evi-
    dence, but the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Tekoh
    then sued Vega under §1983, and the United States Court
    of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the use of Tekoh’s
    un-Mirandized statement provided a valid basis for a §1983
    claim against Vega. We now reject this extension of our
    Miranda case law.
    I
    In March 2014, Tekoh was working as a certified nursing
    assistant at a Los Angeles medical center. When a female
    patient accused him of sexually assaulting her, the hospital
    ——————
    1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U. S. 436
     (1966).
    2                      VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    staff reported the accusation to the Los Angeles County
    Sheriff ’s Department, and Deputy Vega responded. Vega
    questioned Tekoh at length in the hospital, and Tekoh even-
    tually provided a written statement apologizing for inap-
    propriately touching the patient’s genitals. The parties dis-
    pute whether Vega used coercive investigatory techniques
    to extract the statement, but it is undisputed that he never
    informed Tekoh of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U. S. 436
     (1966), which held that during a custodial inter-
    rogation police officers must inform a suspect that “he has
    the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
    against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
    presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an at-
    torney one will be appointed for him prior to any question-
    ing.” 
    Id., at 479
    .
    Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court
    with unlawful sexual penetration. At Tekoh’s first trial, the
    judge held that Miranda had not been violated because
    Tekoh was not in custody when he provided the statement,
    but the trial resulted in a mistrial. When Tekoh was re-
    tried, a second judge again denied his request to exclude the
    confession. This trial resulted in acquittal, and Tekoh then
    brought this action under 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
     against Vega
    and several other defendants seeking damages for alleged
    violations of his constitutional rights, including his Fifth
    Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.
    When this §1983 case was first tried, the jury returned a
    verdict in favor of Vega, but the judge concluded that he had
    given an improper jury instruction and thus granted a new
    trial. Before the second trial, Tekoh asked the court to in-
    struct the jury that it was required to find that Vega vio-
    lated the Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-
    incrimination if it determined that he took a statement
    from Tekoh in violation of Miranda and that the statement
    was then improperly used against Tekoh at his criminal
    trial. The District Court declined, reasoning that Miranda
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)            3
    Opinion of the Court
    established a prophylactic rule and that such a rule could
    not alone provide a ground for §1983 liability. Instead, the
    jury was asked to decide whether Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment
    right had been violated. The court instructed the jury to
    determine, based on “the totality of all the surrounding cir-
    cumstances,” whether Tekoh’s statement had been “im-
    properly coerced or compelled,” and the court explained
    that “[a] confession is improperly coerced or compelled . . .
    if a police officer uses physical or psychological force or
    threats not permitted by law to undermine a person’s abil-
    ity to exercise his or her free will.” App. to Pet. for Cert.
    119a. The jury found in Vega’s favor, and Tekoh appealed.
    A Ninth Circuit panel reversed, holding that the “use of
    an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a crim-
    inal proceeding violates the Fifth Amendment and may
    support a §1983 claim” against the officer who obtained the
    statement. Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 
    985 F. 3d 713
    ,
    722 (2021). The panel acknowledged that this Court has
    repeatedly said that Miranda adopted prophylactic rules
    designed to protect against constitutional violations and
    that the decision did not hold that the contravention of
    those rules necessarily constitutes a constitutional viola-
    tion. See 985 F. 3d, at 719–720. But the panel thought that
    our decision in Dickerson v. United States, 
    530 U. S. 428
    (2000), “made clear that the right of a criminal defendant
    against having an un-Mirandized statement introduced in
    the prosecution’s case in chief is indeed a right secured by
    the Constitution.” 985 F. 3d, at 720. Therefore the panel
    concluded that Tekoh could establish a violation of his Fifth
    Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination
    simply by showing that Miranda had been violated. See
    985 F. 3d, at 720. The panel thus remanded the case for a
    new trial.
    Vega’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied, but
    Judge Bumatay, joined by six other judges, filed a dissent
    4                       VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    from the denial of rehearing. Tekoh v. County of Los Ange-
    les, 
    997 F. 3d 1260
    , 1261, 1264–1272 (CA9 2021). We then
    granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ___ (2022).
    II
    Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any per-
    son acting under color of state law who “subjects” a person
    or “causes [a person] to be subjected . . . to the deprivation
    of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
    stitution and laws.” The question we must decide is
    whether a violation of the Miranda rules provides a basis
    for a claim under §1983. We hold that it does not.
    A
    If a Miranda violation were tantamount to a violation of
    the Fifth Amendment, our answer would of course be differ-
    ent. The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States
    by the Fourteenth Amendment, Malloy v. Hogan, 
    378 U. S. 1
    , 6 (1964), provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled
    in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” This
    Clause “permits a person to refuse to testify against himself
    at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant” and “also
    ‘privileges him not to answer official questions put to him
    in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or infor-
    mal, where the answers might incriminate him in future
    criminal proceedings.’ ” Minnesota v. Murphy, 
    465 U. S. 420
    , 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 
    414 U. S. 70
    ,
    77 (1973)). In addition, the right bars the introduction
    against a criminal defendant of out-of-court statements ob-
    tained by compulsion. See, e.g., Bram v. United States, 
    168 U. S. 532
    , 565 (1897); Miranda, 
    384 U. S., at 466
    ; Michigan
    v. Tucker, 
    417 U. S. 433
    , 440–442 (1974).
    In Miranda, the Court concluded that additional proce-
    dural protections were necessary to prevent the violation of
    this important right when suspects who are in custody are
    interrogated by the police. To afford this protection, the
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)            5
    Opinion of the Court
    Court required that custodial interrogation be preceded by
    the now-familiar warnings mentioned above, and it directed
    that statements obtained in violation of these new rules
    may not be used by the prosecution in its case-in-chief. 
    384 U. S., at 444, 479
    .
    In this case, the Ninth Circuit held—and Tekoh now ar-
    gues, Brief for Respondent 20—that a violation of Miranda
    constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment right
    against compelled self-incrimination, but that is wrong.
    Miranda itself and our subsequent cases make clear that
    Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules. Those rules,
    to be sure, are “constitutionally based,” Dickerson, 
    530 U. S., at 440
    , but they are prophylactic rules nonetheless.
    B
    Miranda itself was clear on this point. Miranda did not
    hold that a violation of the rules it established necessarily
    constitute a Fifth Amendment violation, and it is difficult
    to see how it could have held otherwise. For one thing, it is
    easy to imagine many situations in which an un-
    Mirandized suspect in custody may make self-
    incriminating statements without any hint of compulsion.
    In addition, the warnings that the Court required included
    components, such as notification of the right to have re-
    tained or appointed counsel present during questioning,
    that do not concern self-incrimination per se but are instead
    plainly designed to safeguard that right. And the same is
    true of Miranda’s detailed rules about the waiver of the
    right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. 
    384 U. S., at
    474–479.
    At no point in the opinion did the Court state that a vio-
    lation of its new rules constituted a violation of the Fifth
    Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. In-
    stead, it claimed only that those rules were needed to safe-
    guard that right during custodial interrogation. See 
    id., at 439
     (describing its rules as “procedures which assure that
    6                      VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
    Amendment”); 
    id., at 444
     (describing rules as “procedural
    safeguards”); 
    id., at 457
     (“appropriate safeguards”); 
    id., at 458
     (“adequate protective devices”); 
    id., at 467
     (“safe-
    guards”).
    In accordance with this understanding of the nature of
    the rules it imposed, the Miranda Court stated quite clearly
    that the Constitution did not itself require “adherence to
    any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the
    interrogation process” and that its decision “in no way cre-
    ate[d] a constitutional straitjacket.” 
    Ibid.
     The opinion
    added that its new rules might not be needed if Congress or
    the States adopted “other procedures which are at least as
    effective,” ibid., and the opinion suggested that there might
    not have been any actual Fifth Amendment violations in
    the four cases that were before the Court. See 
    id., at 457
    (“In these cases, we might not find the defendants’ state-
    ments to have been involuntary in traditional terms”). The
    Court could not have said any of these things if a violation
    of the Miranda rules necessarily constituted a violation of
    the Fifth Amendment.
    Since Miranda, the Court has repeatedly described the
    rules it adopted as “prophylactic.” See Howes v. Fields, 
    565 U. S. 499
    , 507 (2012); J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 
    564 U. S. 261
    , 269 (2011); Maryland v. Shatzer, 
    559 U. S. 98
    , 103
    (2010); Montejo v. Louisiana, 
    556 U. S. 778
    , 794 (2009); Da-
    vis v. United States, 
    512 U. S. 452
    , 458 (1994); Brecht v.
    Abrahamson, 
    507 U. S. 619
    , 629 (1993); Withrow v. Wil-
    liams, 
    507 U. S. 680
    , 691 (1993); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 
    501 U. S. 171
    , 176 (1991); Michigan v. Harvey, 
    494 U. S. 344
    ,
    350 (1990); Duckworth v. Eagan, 
    492 U. S. 195
    , 203 (1989);
    Arizona v. Roberson, 
    486 U. S. 675
    , 681 (1988); Connecticut
    v. Barrett, 
    479 U. S. 523
    , 528 (1987); Oregon v. Elstad, 
    470 U. S. 298
    , 309 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U. S. 649
    ,
    654 (1984); South Dakota v. Neville, 
    459 U. S. 553
    , 564, n.
    15 (1983); United States v. Henry, 
    447 U. S. 264
    , 274 (1980);
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)                     7
    Opinion of the Court
    North Carolina v. Butler, 
    441 U. S. 369
    , 374 (1979); Brown
    v. Illinois, 
    422 U. S. 590
    , 600 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker,
    
    417 U. S., at 439
    ; and Michigan v. Payne, 
    412 U. S. 47
    , 53
    (1973).2
    C
    After Miranda was handed down, the Court engaged in
    the process of charting the dimensions of these new prophy-
    lactic rules. As we would later spell out, this process en-
    tailed a weighing of the benefits and costs of any clarifica-
    tion of the rules’ scope. See Shatzer, 
    559 U. S., at 106
     (“A
    judicially crafted rule is ‘justified only by reference to its
    prophylactic purpose,’ . . . and applies only where its bene-
    fits outweigh its costs”).
    Some post-Miranda decisions found that the balance of
    interests justified restrictions that would not have been
    possible if Miranda represented an explanation of the
    meaning of the Fifth Amendment right as opposed to a set
    of rules designed to protect that right. For example, in Har-
    ris v. New York, 
    401 U. S. 222
    , 224–226 (1971), the Court
    held that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda
    could be used to impeach the testimony of a defendant, even
    though an involuntary statement obtained in violation of
    the Fifth Amendment could not have been employed in this
    way. See Mincey v. Arizona, 
    437 U. S. 385
    , 398 (1978)
    ——————
    2 Tekoh cites Orozco v. Texas, 
    394 U. S. 324
     (1969), which characterized
    the admission of an unwarned statement in the prosecutor’s case-in-chief
    as a “flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amend-
    ment as construed in Miranda.” 
    Id., at 326
     (emphasis added); Brief for
    Respondent 21, 29. But the Court made this assertion in a three-para-
    graph opinion without any additional analysis, and did not purport to go
    beyond Miranda, which, as we have explained, does not support the prop-
    osition that a Miranda violation equates to a Fifth Amendment violation.
    See Orozco, 
    394 U. S., at 327
     (“We do not . . . expand or extend to the
    slightest extent our Miranda decision”). Likewise, the decision predates
    the subsequent case law defining the scope of the Miranda rules. See
    infra, this page and 8–11.
    8                      VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    (“[A]ny criminal trial use against a defendant of his invol-
    untary statement is a denial of due process of law” (empha-
    sis deleted)). Engaging in the process we described in
    Shatzer, the Harris Court considered the benefits of forbid-
    ding impeachment but dismissed “the speculative possibil-
    ity” that this would discourage “impermissible police con-
    duct,” and on the other side of the scale, it feared that
    barring impeachment would turn Miranda into “a license
    to use perjury by way of a defense.” 
    401 U. S., at
    225–226.
    A similar analysis was used in Michigan v. Tucker, 
    417 U. S. 443
    , 450–452, n. 26 (1974), where the Court held that
    the “fruits” of an un-Mirandized statement can be admit-
    ted. The Court noted that “the ‘fruits’ of police conduct
    which actually infringe[s]” a defendant’s constitutional
    rights must be suppressed. 
    Id., at 445
    ; see also Wong Sun
    v. United States, 
    371 U. S. 471
     (1963) (applying the rule in
    the context of a Fourth Amendment violation). But the
    Court distinguished police conduct that “abridge[s] [a per-
    son’s] constitutional privilege against compulsory self-
    incrimination” from conduct that “depart[s] only from the
    prophylactic standards later laid down by this Court in Mi-
    randa to safeguard that privilege.” 
    417 U. S., at
    445–446.
    Because there had been only a Miranda violation in that
    case, the Wong Sun rule of automatic exclusion was found
    to be inapplicable. See 
    417 U. S., at
    445–446. Instead, the
    Court asked whether the Miranda rules’ prophylactic pur-
    poses justified the exclusion of the fruits of the violation,
    and after “balancing the interests involved,” it held that ex-
    clusion was not required. 
    417 U. S., at
    447–452.
    In New York v. Quarles, 
    467 U. S. 649
    , 654–657 (1984),
    the Court held that statements obtained in violation of Mi-
    randa need not be suppressed when the questioning is con-
    ducted to address an ongoing “public safety” concern. The
    Court reasoned that Miranda warnings are “ ‘not them-
    selves rights protected by the Constitution’ ” and that “the
    need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)                      9
    Opinion of the Court
    to the public safety outweigh[ed] the need for the prophy-
    lactic rule.” 
    467 U. S., at 654, 657
    .
    Finally, in Elstad, 
    470 U. S. 298
    , the Court again distin-
    guished between a constitutional violation and a violation
    of Miranda. In that case, a suspect in custody was initially
    questioned without receiving a Miranda warning, and the
    statements made at that time were suppressed. 
    470 U. S., at
    301–302. But the suspect was later given Miranda warn-
    ings, chose to waive his Miranda rights, and signed a writ-
    ten confession. 
    470 U. S., at 301
    . Asked to decide whether
    this confession was admissible, the Court followed the rea-
    soning in Tucker and again held that the fruit-of-the-
    poisonous-tree rule that applies to constitutional violations
    does not apply to violations of Miranda. 
    470 U. S., at
    306–
    309, 318. The Court refused to exclude the signed confes-
    sion and emphasized that an officer’s error “in administer-
    ing the prophylactic Miranda procedures . . . should not
    breed the same irremediable consequences as police in-
    fringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.” 3 
    Id., at 309
    .
    ——————
    3 Two other decisions fall into this same category, but in both there was
    no opinion of the Court. In Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U. S. 760
     (2003), the
    suspect gave an un-Mirandized statement while in custody but was
    never charged with a crime. The Court held that the suspect could not
    bring a 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
     claim against the officer who questioned him,
    and Justice Souter, who cast the necessary fifth vote on the issue,
    reached that conclusion based on “a realistic assessment of costs and
    risks” of “expand[ing] protection of the privilege against compelled self-
    incrimination to the point of the civil liability” at issue. 
    538 U. S., at
    778–779 (opinion concurring in judgment).
    In United States v. Patane, 
    542 U. S. 630
     (2004), the Court once again
    held that Miranda does not require the suppression of the fruits of a un-
    Mirandized statement made during custodial questioning, and two of the
    five Justices in the majority engaged in the same type of balancing that
    was used in Michigan v. Tucker, 
    417 U. S. 433
     (1974), and Elstad. See
    Patane, 
    542 U. S., at
    644–645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see
    also 
    id.,
     at 641–644 (plurality opinion).
    10                     VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    It is hard to see how these decisions could stand if a vio-
    lation of Miranda constituted a violation of the Fifth
    Amendment.
    D
    While these decisions imposed limits on Miranda’s
    prophylactic rules, other decisions found that the balance of
    interests called for expansion. In Doyle v. Ohio, 
    426 U. S. 610
    , 617–619 (1976), the Court held that silence following a
    Miranda warning cannot be used to impeach. The Court
    acknowledged that Miranda warnings are “prophylactic,”
    
    426 U. S., at 617
    , and it recognized the prosecution’s need
    to test a defendant’s exculpatory story through cross-
    examination, 
    id.,
     at 616–618. But it found that allowing
    the use of post-warning silence would undermine the warn-
    ings’ implicit promise that silence would not be used to con-
    vict. 
    Id., at 618
    .
    Similarly, in Roberson, 
    486 U. S., at 682
    , the Court held
    that a suspect’s post-warning request for counsel with re-
    spect to one offense barred later interrogation without
    counsel regarding a different offense. Describing the Mi-
    randa rules as “prophylactic protections,” 
    486 U. S., at 681
    ,
    the Court concluded that both law enforcement and crimi-
    nal defendants would benefit from a bright-line, 
    id.,
     at 681–
    682.
    Finally, in Withrow v. Williams, 
    507 U. S. 680
    , the Court
    rejected an attempt to restrict Miranda’s application in col-
    lateral proceedings based on the reasoning in Stone v. Pow-
    ell, 
    428 U. S. 465
     (1976). In Stone, the Court had held that
    a defendant who has had a full and fair opportunity to seek
    suppression of evidence allegedly seized in violation of the
    Fourth Amendment may not obtain federal habeas relief on
    that ground, 
    id.,
     at 494–495, and in Withrow, a state prison
    warden argued that a similar rule should apply to a habeas
    petitioner who had been given an opportunity to litigate a
    Miranda claim at trial, see 507 U. S., at 688–690. Once
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)           11
    Opinion of the Court
    again acknowledging that Miranda adopted prophylactic
    rules, the Court balanced the competing interests and
    found that the costs of adopting the warden’s argument out-
    weighed any benefits. On the cost side, the Court noted
    that enforcing Miranda “safeguards ‘a fundamental trial
    right” and furthers “the correct ascertainment of guilt” at
    trial. 507 U. S., at 691–692. And on the other side, the
    Court found that the adoption of a Stone-like rule “would
    not significantly benefit the federal courts in their exercise
    of habeas jurisdiction, or advance the cause of federalism in
    any substantial way.” 507 U. S., at 693.
    Thus, all the post-Miranda cases we have discussed
    acknowledged the prophylactic nature of the Miranda rules
    and engaged in cost-benefit analysis to define the scope of
    these prophylactic rules.
    E
    Contrary to the decision below and Tekoh’s argument
    here, see Brief for Respondent 24, our decision in Dickerson,
    
    530 U. S. 428
    , did not upset the firmly established prior un-
    derstanding of Miranda as a prophylactic decision. Dicker-
    son involved a federal statute, 
    18 U. S. C. §3501
    , that effec-
    tively overruled Miranda by making the admissibility of a
    statement given during custodial interrogation turn solely
    on whether it was made voluntarily. 
    530 U. S., at
    431–432.
    The Court held that Congress could not abrogate Miranda
    by statute because Miranda was a “constitutional decision”
    that adopted a “constitutional rule,” 
    530 U. S., at
    438–439,
    and the Court noted that these rules could not have been
    made applicable to the States if it did not have that status,
    see 
    ibid.
    At the same time, however, the Court made it clear that
    it was not equating a violation of the Miranda rules with
    an outright Fifth Amendment violation. For one thing, it
    reiterated Miranda’s observation that “the Constitution
    would not preclude legislative solutions that differed from
    12                          VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were ‘at least
    as effective in apprising accused persons’ ” of their rights.
    
    530 U. S., at 440
     (quoting Miranda, 
    384 U. S., at 467
    ).
    Even more to the point, the Court rejected the dissent’s
    argument that §3501 could not be held unconstitutional un-
    less “Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution,
    in the sense that nothing else will suffice to satisfy consti-
    tutional requirements.” 
    530 U. S., at 442
    . The Court’s an-
    swer, in substance, was that the Miranda rules, though not
    an explication of the meaning of the Fifth Amendment
    right, are rules that are necessary to protect that right (at
    least until a better alternative is found and adopted). See
    
    530 U. S., at
    441–443. Thus, in the words of the Dickerson
    Court, the Miranda rules are “constitutionally based” and
    have “constitutional underpinnings.” 
    530 U. S., at 440
    , and
    n. 5. But the obvious point of these formulations was to
    avoid saying that a Miranda violation is the same as a vio-
    lation of the Fifth Amendment right.
    What all this boils down to is basically as follows. The
    Miranda rules are prophylactic rules that the Court found
    to be necessary to protect the Fifth Amendment right
    against compelled self-incrimination. In that sense, Mi-
    randa was a “constitutional decision” and it adopted a “con-
    stitutional rule” because the decision was based on the
    Court’s judgment about what is required to safeguard that
    constitutional right. And when the Court adopts a consti-
    tutional prophylactic rule of this nature, Dickerson con-
    cluded, the rule has the status of a “La[w] of the United
    States” that is binding on the States under the Supremacy
    Clause 4 (as Miranda implicitly held, since three of the four
    decisions it reversed came from state court, 
    384 U. S., at
    491–494, 497–499), and the rule cannot be altered by ordi-
    nary legislation.
    ——————
    4 U. S. Const., Art. VI, §2.
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)                    13
    Opinion of the Court
    This was a bold and controversial claim of authority,5 but
    we do not think that Dickerson can be understood any other
    way without (1) taking the insupportable position that a
    Miranda violation is tantamount to a violation of the Fifth
    Amendment, (2) calling into question the prior decisions
    that were predicated on the proposition that a Miranda vi-
    olation is not the same as a constitutional violation, and (3)
    excising from the United States Reports a mountain of
    statements describing the Miranda rules as prophylactic.
    Subsequent cases confirm that Dickerson did not upend
    the Court’s understanding of the Miranda rules as prophy-
    lactic. See, e.g., supra, at 6–7 (collecting post-Dickerson
    cases).
    In sum, a violation of Miranda does not necessarily con-
    stitute a violation of the Constitution, and therefore such a
    violation does not constitute “the deprivation of [a] right . . .
    secured by the Constitution.” 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
    .
    III
    This conclusion does not necessarily dictate reversal be-
    cause a §1983 claim may also be based on “the deprivation
    of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the . . .
    laws.” (Emphasis added.) It may thus be argued that the
    Miranda rules constitute federal “law” and that an abridg-
    ment of those rules can therefore provide the ground for a
    ——————
    5 Whether this Court has the authority to create constitutionally based
    prophylactic rules that bind both federal and state courts has been the
    subject of debate among jurists and commentators. See, e.g., Dickerson,
    
    530 U. S., at
    445–446, 457–461 (Scalia, J., joined by THOMAS, J., dissent-
    ing); D. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 
    55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 190
     (1988); J. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Ques-
    tion of Article III Legitimacy, 
    80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100
     (1985); H. Mona-
    ghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 
    89 Harv. L. Rev. 1
     (1975).
    But that is what the Court did in Miranda, and we do not disturb that
    decision in any way. Rather, we accept it on its own terms, and for the
    purpose of deciding this case, we follow its rationale.
    14                           VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    §1983 claim. But whatever else may be said about this ar-
    gument,6 it cannot succeed unless Tekoh can persuade us
    that this “law” should be expanded to include the right to
    sue for damages under §1983.
    As we have noted, “[a] judicially crafted” prophylactic
    rule should apply “only where its benefits outweigh its
    costs,” Shatzer, 
    559 U. S., at 106
    , and here, while the bene-
    fits of permitting the assertion of Miranda claims under
    §1983 would be slight, the costs would be substantial.
    Miranda rests on a pragmatic judgment about what is
    needed to stop the violation at trial of the Fifth Amendment
    right against compelled self-incrimination. That prophy-
    lactic purpose is served by the suppression at trial of state-
    ——————
    6 “[Section] 1983 does not provide an avenue for relief every time a state
    actor violates a federal law.” Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 
    544 U. S. 113
    , 119 (2005). If a §1983 plaintiff demonstrates that the federal stat-
    ute “creates an individually enforceable right in the class of beneficiaries
    to which he belongs,” this gives rise to “ ‘a rebuttable presumption that
    the right is enforceable under §1983,’ ” and “[t]he defendant may defeat
    this presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend that
    remedy for a newly created right.” Id., at 120 (quoting Blessing v. Free-
    stone, 
    520 U. S. 329
    , 341 (1997)). In this case, the “law” that could confer
    the right in question is not a statute but judicially created prophylactic
    rules. It could be argued that a judicially created prophylactic rule can-
    not be the basis for a §1983 suit, but we need not decide that question
    because, assuming that such rules can provide the basis for a §1983
    claim, we would be led back to a question that is very much like the one
    discussed supra, at 7–11, namely, whether the benefits of allowing such
    a claim outweigh the costs.
    The dissent, by contrast, would apparently hold that a prophylactic
    rule crafted by the Judiciary to protect a constitutional right, unlike a
    statute that confers a personal right, is always cognizable under §1983.
    There is no sound reason to give this preferred status to such prophylac-
    tic rules. The dissent contends that the Miranda rules merit this special
    treatment because they are “secured by” the Constitution, see post, at 5–
    6, but in fact, as we have shown, those rules differ from the right secured
    by the Fifth Amendment and are instead secured for prophylactic rea-
    sons by decisions of this Court.
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)           15
    Opinion of the Court
    ments obtained in violation of Miranda and by the applica-
    tion of that decision in other recognized contexts. Allowing
    the victim of a Miranda violation to sue a police officer for
    damages under §1983 would have little additional deter-
    rent value, and permitting such claims would cause many
    problems.
    Allowing a claim like Tekoh’s would disserve “judicial
    economy,” Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 
    439 U. S. 322
    , 326
    (1979), by requiring a federal judge or jury to adjudicate a
    factual question (whether Tekoh was in custody when ques-
    tioned) that had already been decided by a state court. This
    re-adjudication would not only be wasteful; it would under-
    cut the “ ‘strong judicial policy against the creation of two
    conflicting resolutions’ ” based on the same set of facts.
    Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U. S. 477
    , 484 (1994). And it could
    produce “unnecessary friction” between the federal and
    state court systems by requiring the federal court enter-
    taining the §1983 claim to pass judgment on legal and fac-
    tual issues already settled in state court. See Preiser v. Ro-
    driguez, 
    411 U. S. 475
    , 490–491 (1973).
    Allowing §1983 suits based on Miranda claims could also
    present many procedural issues, such as whether a federal
    court considering a §1983 claim would owe any deference to
    a trial court’s factual findings; whether forfeiture and plain
    error rules carry over from the criminal trial; whether
    harmless-error rules apply; and whether civil damages are
    available in instances where the unwarned statement had
    no impact on the outcome of the criminal case.
    We therefore refuse to extend Miranda in the way Tekoh
    requests. Miranda, Dickerson, and the other cases in that
    line provide sufficient protection for the Fifth Amendment
    right against compelled self-incrimination. “The identifica-
    tion of a Miranda violation and its consequences . . . ought
    to be determined at trial.” Chavez v. Martinez, 
    538 U. S. 760
    , 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
    senting in part). And except in unusual circumstances, the
    16                     VEGA v. TEKOH
    Opinion of the Court
    “exclusion of unwarned statements” should be “a complete
    and sufficient remedy.” 
    Ibid.
    *    *     *
    Because a violation of Miranda is not itself a violation of
    the Fifth Amendment, and because we see no justification
    for expanding Miranda to confer a right to sue under §1983,
    the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
    case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
    this opinion.
    It is so ordered.
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)             1
    KAGAN, J., dissenting
    SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    _________________
    No. 21–499
    _________________
    CARLOS VEGA, PETITIONER v. TERENCE B. TEKOH
    ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    [June 23, 2022]
    JUSTICE KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE BREYER and
    JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR join, dissenting.
    The Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U. S. 436
    (1966), affords well-known protections to suspects who are
    interrogated by police while in custody. Those protections
    derive from the Constitution: Dickerson v. United States
    tells us in no uncertain terms that Miranda is a “constitu-
    tional rule.” 
    530 U. S. 428
    , 444 (2000). And that rule grants
    a corresponding right: If police fail to provide the Miranda
    warnings to a suspect before interrogating him, then he is
    generally entitled to have any resulting confession excluded
    from his trial. See 
    384 U. S., at
    478–479. From those facts,
    only one conclusion can follow—that Miranda’s protections
    are a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution” under the fed-
    eral civil rights statute. Rev. Stat. §1979, 
    42 U. S. C. §1983
    .
    Yet the Court today says otherwise. It holds that Miranda
    is not a constitutional right enforceable through a §1983
    suit. And so it prevents individuals from obtaining any re-
    dress when police violate their rights under Miranda. I re-
    spectfully dissent.
    Miranda responded to problems stemming from the in-
    terrogation of suspects “incommunicado” and “in a police-
    dominated atmosphere.” Miranda, 
    384 U. S., at 445
    . In
    such an environment, Miranda said, there are “pressures”
    which may “compel [a suspect] to speak where he would not
    otherwise do so freely.” 
    Id., at 467
    . And so Miranda found
    2                       VEGA v. TEKOH
    KAGAN, J., dissenting
    a “necessity for procedures which assure that the individual
    is accorded his” Fifth Amendment privilege “not to be com-
    pelled to incriminate himself.” 
    Id., at 439
    . Miranda set out
    protocols (including the now-familiar warnings) that would
    safeguard the constitutional privilege against self-incrimi-
    nation. See 
    id.,
     at 478–479. And Miranda held that if po-
    lice failed to follow those requirements (without substitut-
    ing equally effective ones), the prosecution could not use at
    trial a statement obtained from the interrogation. See 
    id., at 479
    .
    The question in this case is whether Miranda’s protec-
    tions are a “right[ ]” that is “secured by the Constitution”
    within the meaning of §1983. If the answer is yes, then a
    person may sue a state actor who deprives him of the right.
    In past cases, the Court has given a broad construction to
    §1983’s broad language. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 
    498 U. S. 439
    , 443 (1991). Under §1983 (as elsewhere), a
    “right[ ]” is anything that creates specific “obligations bind-
    ing on [a] governmental unit” that an individual may ask
    the judiciary to enforce. Id., at 449; see id., at 447, and n. 7.
    And the phrase “secured by the Constitution” also has a ca-
    pacious meaning. It refers to any right that is “protect[ed]
    or ma[de] certain” by the country’s foundational charter.
    Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 
    307 U. S. 496
    , 527 (1939) (opinion of Stone, J.) (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Begin with whether Miranda is “secured by the Constitu-
    tion.” We know that it is, because the Court’s decision in
    Dickerson says so. Dickerson tells us again and again that
    Miranda is a “constitutional rule.” 
    530 U. S., at 444
    . It is
    a “constitutional decision” that sets forth “ ‘concrete consti-
    tutional guidelines.’ ” 
    Id., at 432, 435
     (quoting Miranda,
    
    384 U. S., at 442
    ). Miranda “is constitutionally based”; or
    again, it has a “constitutional basis.” 
    530 U. S., at 439, n. 3, 440
    . It is “of constitutional origin”; it has “constitutional
    underpinnings.” 
    Id., at 439, n. 3, 440, n. 5
    . And—one
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)                     3
    KAGAN, J., dissenting
    more—Miranda sets a “constitutional minimum.” 
    530 U. S., at 442
    . Over and over, Dickerson labels Miranda a
    rule stemming from the Constitution.
    Dickerson also makes plain that Miranda has all the sub-
    stance of a constitutional rule—including that it cannot be
    “abrogate[d]” by any “legislation.” Miranda, 
    384 U. S., at 491
    ; see Dickerson, 
    530 U. S., at 437
    . In Dickerson, the
    Court considered a federal statute whose obvious purpose
    was to override Miranda. Dickerson held that Miranda is
    a “constitutional decision” that cannot be “overruled by”
    any “Act of Congress.” 
    530 U. S., at 432
    . To be sure, Con-
    gress may devise “legislative solutions that differ[ ] from the
    prescribed Miranda warnings,” but only if those solutions
    are “ ‘at least as effective.’ ” 
    Id., at 440
     (quoting Miranda,
    
    384 U. S., at 467
    ). Dickerson therefore instructs (as noted
    above) that Miranda sets a “constitutional minimum.” 
    530 U. S., at 442
    . No statute may provide lesser protection than
    that baseline.*
    And Dickerson makes clear that the constitutional sub-
    stance of Miranda does not end there. Rules arising from
    “the United States Constitution” are applicable in state-
    court proceedings, but non-constitutional rules are not. See
    
    530 U. S., at 438
     (explaining that the Court “do[es] not hold
    a supervisory power over the courts of the several States”).
    Too, constitutional rules are enforceable in federal-court
    habeas proceedings, where a prisoner is entitled to claim he
    “is in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U. S. C.
    ——————
    *Other constitutional rules, like Miranda, leave room for States to ex-
    periment with procedures, so long as the procedures satisfy the constitu-
    tionally mandated baseline. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 
    500 U. S. 44
    , 58 (1991) (States may adopt different procedures for providing
    probable-cause determinations for persons arrested without a warrant,
    so long as those determinations are made promptly); Smith v. Robbins,
    
    528 U. S. 259
    , 276–277 (2000) (States may adopt different procedures to
    ensure effective appellate review for indigent defendants’ claims, “so long
    as [the State] reasonably ensures that an indigent’s appeal will be re-
    solved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal”).
    4                      VEGA v. TEKOH
    KAGAN, J., dissenting
    §2254(a). Miranda checks both boxes. The Court has “con-
    sistently applied Miranda’s rule to prosecutions arising in
    state courts.” Dickerson, 
    530 U. S., at 438
    . And prisoners
    may claim Miranda violations in federal-court habeas pro-
    ceedings. See 
    530 U. S., at 439, n. 3
    ; Thompson v. Keohane,
    
    516 U. S. 99
    , 107, n. 5 (1995). So Dickerson is unequivocal:
    Miranda is set in constitutional stone.
    Miranda’s constitutional rule gives suspects a correlative
    “right[ ].” §1983. Under Miranda, a suspect typically has a
    right to be tried without the prosecutor using his un-
    Mirandized statement. And we know how that right oper-
    ates in the real world. Suppose a defendant standing trial
    was able to show the court that he gave an un-Mirandized
    confession during a custodial interrogation. The court
    would have no choice but to exclude it from the prosecutor’s
    case. As one judge below put it: “Miranda indisputably cre-
    ates individual legal rights that are judicially enforceable.
    (Any prosecutor who doubts this can try to introduce an un-
    Mirandized confession and then watch what happens.)”
    Tekoh v. County of Los Angeles, 
    997 F. 3d 1260
    , 1263 (CA9
    2021) (Miller, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).
    The majority basically agrees with everything I’ve just
    explained.     It concurs that, per Dickerson, Miranda
    “adopted a ‘constitutional rule.’ ” Ante, at 11 (quoting Dick-
    erson, 
    530 U. S., at 439
    ); see ante, at 12. How could it not?
    That Miranda is a constitutional rule is what Dickerson
    said (and said and said). The majority also agrees that Mi-
    randa “directed that statements obtained in violation of
    [its] rules may not be used by the prosecution in its case-in-
    chief ”—which is simply another way of saying that Mi-
    randa grants suspects a right to the exclusion of those
    statements from the prosecutor’s case. Ante, at 5.
    So how does the majority hold that a violation of Miranda
    is not a “deprivation of [a] right[ ]” “secured by the Consti-
    tution”? §1983. How does it agree with my premises, but
    Cite as: 597 U. S. ____ (2022)            5
    KAGAN, J., dissenting
    not my conclusion? The majority’s argument is that “a vio-
    lation of Miranda does not necessarily constitute a violation
    of the Constitution,” because Miranda’s rules are “prophy-
    lactic.” Ante, at 13. The idea is that the Fifth Amendment
    prohibits the use only of statements obtained by compul-
    sion, whereas Miranda excludes non-compelled statements
    too. See ante, at 4–5. That is why, the majority says, the
    Court has been able to recognize exceptions permitting cer-
    tain uses of un-Mirandized statements at trial (when it
    could not do so for compelled statements). See ante, at 7–9.
    But none of that helps the majority’s case. Let’s assume,
    as the majority says, that Miranda extends beyond—in or-
    der to safeguard—the Fifth Amendment’s core guarantee.
    Still, Miranda is enforceable through §1983. It remains a
    constitutional rule, as Dickerson held (and the majority
    agrees). And it grants the defendant a legally enforceable
    entitlement—in a word, a right—to have his confession ex-
    cluded. So, to refer back to the language of §1983, Miranda
    grants a “right[ ]” “secured by the Constitution.” Whether
    that right to have evidence excluded safeguards a yet
    deeper constitutional commitment makes no difference to
    §1983. The majority has no response to that point—except
    to repeat what our argument assumes already. See ante, at
    14, n. 6 (describing Miranda as prophylactic).
    Compare the majority’s holding today to a prior decision,
    in which the Court “rejected [an] attempt[ ] to limit the
    types of constitutional rights that are encompassed within ”
    §1983. Dennis, 
    498 U. S., at 445
    . There, the Court held
    that a plaintiff could sue under §1983 for a violation of the
    so-called dormant Commerce Clause, which safeguards in-
    terstate commerce. To the Court, it did not matter that the
    Commerce Clause might be viewed as “merely allocat[ing]
    power between the Federal and State Governments” over
    interstate commerce, rather than as “confer[ring] ‘rights.’ ”
    Id., at 447. Nor did it matter that the dormant Commerce
    Clause’s protection is only “implied” by the constitutional
    6                      VEGA v. TEKOH
    KAGAN, J., dissenting
    text. Ibid., n. 7. The dormant Commerce Clause, the Court
    said, still provides a “right”—in the “ordinary” sense of be-
    ing “ ‘[a] legally enforceable claim of one person against an-
    other.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (6th ed.
    1990)). That describes Miranda to a tee. And if a right im-
    plied from Congress’s constitutional authority over inter-
    state commerce is enforceable under §1983, how could it be
    that Miranda—which the Court has found necessary to
    safeguard the personal protections of the Fifth Amend-
    ment—is not also enforceable? The majority again has no
    answer.
    *     *    *
    Today, the Court strips individuals of the ability to seek
    a remedy for violations of the right recognized in Miranda.
    The majority observes that defendants may still seek “the
    suppression at trial of statements obtained” in violation of
    Miranda’s procedures. Ante, at 14–15. But sometimes,
    such a statement will not be suppressed. And sometimes,
    as a result, a defendant will be wrongly convicted and spend
    years in prison. He may succeed, on appeal or in habeas, in
    getting the conviction reversed. But then, what remedy
    does he have for all the harm he has suffered? The point of
    §1983 is to provide such redress—because a remedy “is a
    vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished
    constitutional guarantees.” Gomez v. Toledo, 
    446 U. S. 635
    ,
    639 (1980). The majority here, as elsewhere, injures the
    right by denying the remedy. See, e.g., Egbert v. Boule, 596
    U. S. ___ (2022). I respectfully dissent.