Irving Himmelberg v. Kristina Himmelberg and Kimberly Himmelberg , 244 So. 3d 1192 ( 2018 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-2829
    _____________________________
    IRVING HIMMELBERG,
    Appellant,
    v.
    KRISTINA HIMMELBERG and
    KIMBERLY HIMMELBERG,
    Appellees.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.
    William F. Stone, Judge.
    May 3, 2018
    PER CURIAM.
    Appellant seeks review of the final judgment awarding more
    than $200,000 to Appellees. We affirm.
    Appellant is Appellees’ paternal grandfather. He set up
    custodial accounts under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act for
    Appellees when they were infants. Appellant deposited money
    into the accounts, but he subsequently withdrew the money to
    reimburse his son for child support and other expenses that the
    son was ordered to pay to Appellees’ mother in their divorce
    proceeding. After Appellees turned 18 and learned of the
    withdrawals, they sent letters to Appellant demanding that he
    return the money taken from their accounts. When Appellant did
    not respond to the letters, Appellees filed a complaint seeking
    damages for (among other claims) civil theft under section
    772.11, Florida Statutes. When Appellant did not respond to the
    complaint, a clerk’s default and a “final default judgment” 1 were
    entered. Appellant filed a motion to set aside the default
    judgment, which the trial court denied after a hearing. Then,
    after an evidentiary hearing on damages, see Fla. R. Civ. P.
    1.500(e), the trial court entered a final judgment awarding
    Appellees more than $200,000, which included treble damages for
    the civil theft and attorneys’ fees. This appeal followed.
    Appellant raises four issues on appeal: (1) the final judgment
    was an untimely amendment to the default judgment; (2)
    Appellees failed to establish their entitlement to treble damages;
    (3) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; and (4)
    the damage award was excessive. We affirm the first and third
    issues without discussion; we affirm the second issue because the
    default—which Appellant does not challenge on appeal—
    precluded Appellant from contesting the well-pled allegations in
    the complaint, including the allegations of civil theft from which
    the award of treble damages legally flowed, see Florida Bar v.
    Porter, 
    684 So. 2d 810
    , 813 n.4 (Fla. 1996) (“[T]he entry of a
    default precludes a party from contesting the existence of a
    plaintiff’s claim and liability thereon.”); Rich v. Spivey, 
    922 So. 2d 326
    , 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (“A default admits liability as
    claimed in the pleading by the party seeking affirmative relief
    against the party in default.” (quoting Sec. Bank, N.A. v.
    BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., 
    679 So. 2d 795
    , 803 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 1996)); and, we affirm the fourth issue because although
    there was conflicting evidence of the amount of money Appellant
    withdrew from Appellees’ accounts and the purposes for which
    some of the money was used, the total damage award in the final
    1  Despite its title, this judgment was not a “final” judgment
    because it merely determined Appellant’s liability for the claims
    alleged in Appellees’ complaint. The judgment did not award a
    specific amount of damages, nor could it because the damages
    sought in the complaint were unliquidated.
    2
    judgment is supported by competent substantial evidence, see
    Pearce & Pearce Inc. v. Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 
    474 So. 2d 369
    , 371
    (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“The general rule is that the extent of
    damages determined by a trial court is a question of fact which
    will be affirmed on appeal if supported by competent, substantial
    evidence.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    WETHERELL, RAY, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Parker B. Smith of Parker B. Smith, P.A., Destin, for Appellant.
    Timothy M. Chiasson of Law Office of Daniel C. Perri, Shalimar,
    for Appellees.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2829

Citation Numbers: 244 So. 3d 1192

Filed Date: 5/3/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021