EMPIRE PRO RESTORATION, INC. A/A/O LAMBERT BOWDEN & ELAINE BOWDEN v. CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION ( 2021 )


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  •        DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    EMPIRE PRO RESTORATION, INC. A/A/O LAMBERT BOWDEN &
    ELAINE BOWDEN,
    Appellant,
    v.
    CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D21-237
    [May 26, 2021]
    Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Giuseppina Miranda, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. COCE17-
    20678 and CACE18-25444.
    Frantz C. Nelson of Font & Nelson, PLLC, Fort Lauderdale, for
    appellant.
    Maureen G. Pearcy of Paul R. Pearcy, P.A., Miami, for appellee.
    FORST, J.
    Appellant Empire Pro Restoration, Inc. seeks review of the trial court’s
    order granting Appellee Citizens Property Insurance Corporation’s
    (“Insurer”) motion for summary judgment. Appellant raises two issues on
    appeal. We affirm on both issues but write only to address Appellant’s
    first argument—that the trial court erred in its application of the burden-
    shifting framework applicable to “all-risk” insurance policies.
    Background
    The home of Lambert Bowden (“Insured”) was covered by a
    homeowner’s policy issued by Insurer. The policy contained an exclusion
    for damage caused by “rain . . . to the interior of a building[.]” This
    exclusion contained an exception if “a covered peril first damages the
    building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain . . . enters
    through this opening.”
    In 2017, Insured sustained a roof leak causing water damage interior
    to the home’s ceiling and walls. Appellant performed the remediation
    services for the damages in exchange for assignment of Insured’s rights to
    recover for the cost of the work under the insurance policy. Insurer denied
    Appellant’s claim for benefits, maintaining that the policy at issue did not
    cover damage caused by wear and tear, and that a “covered peril” did not
    cause the opening in which the rain entered.
    Following Insurer’s denial of the claim, Appellant filed a breach of
    contract lawsuit. Neither party offered any evidence to establish what
    caused the roof leak leading to the interior water damage. The trial court
    observed that “[Appellant] failed to present any sworn evidence to support
    a factual basis for finding that the damage was caused by rain entering
    through an opening caused by a covered peril. . . . Furthermore,
    [Appellant] agrees that they do not know what caused the roof to leak.”
    (emphasis omitted). Based on Appellant’s failure to offer evidence
    demonstrating the cause of the interior water damage, the trial court
    granted Insurer’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
    Analysis
    “The standard of review of an order granting summary judgment is de
    novo.” Bogatov v. City of Hallandale Beach, 
    192 So. 3d 600
    , 601 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2016) (quoting Patten v. Winderman, 
    965 So. 2d 1222
    , 1224 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2007)). Likewise, “[t]he construction of an insurance contract
    involves a question of law, and an appellate court applies a de novo
    standard of review.” Arias v. Affirmative Ins. Co., 
    944 So. 2d 1195
    , 1197
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (citation and italics omitted).
    “An all-risks policy provides coverage for all losses not resulting from
    misconduct or fraud unless the policy contains a specific provision
    expressly excluding the loss from coverage.” Kokhan v. Auto Club Ins. Co.
    of Fla., 
    297 So. 3d 570
    , 572 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Mejia v. Citizens
    Prop. Ins. Corp., 
    161 So. 3d 576
    , 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (emphasis
    omitted)). “[A]n insured claiming under an all-risks policy has the burden
    of proving that the insured property suffered a loss while the policy was in
    effect. The burden then shifts to the insurer to prove that the cause of the
    loss was excluded from coverage under the policy’s terms.” 
    Id.
     (alteration
    in original) (quoting Jones v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 
    235 So. 3d 936
    , 941
    (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)). “If there is an exception to the exclusion, the burden
    once again is placed on the insured to demonstrate the exception to the
    exclusion.” E. Fla. Hauling, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 
    913 So. 2d 673
    , 678
    (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (citation omitted); see also Deshazior v. Safepoint Ins.
    Co., 
    305 So. 3d 752
    , 755 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (to survive summary
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    judgment, the insured bears the burden of introducing evidence to create
    a genuine issue of material fact after the insurer shows that the damage
    falls under an exclusion to the insurance policy); Fla. Windstorm
    Underwriting v. Gajwani, 
    934 So. 2d 501
    , 506 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (“[T]he
    insured has the burden to prove an exception to an exclusion contained
    within an insurance policy[.]”).
    Here, Appellant met its initial burden of demonstrating that the policy
    was in effect when the loss was incurred. Insurer then established that
    an exclusion applied as the loss occurred due to rain causing water
    damage to the interior of the home. The burden then shifted back to
    Appellant to offer evidence that an exception—an opening in the roof
    and/or wall(s) that was caused by a covered peril (such as hail) and not
    the result of wear and tear of the roof and/or wall(s)—precipitated the
    interior rain damage. Appellant offered no such evidence (as noted above,
    the trial court observed that “[Appellant] agrees that they do not know what
    caused the roof to leak”). Unlike in Jones where the parties offered
    competing and conflicting evidence and theories as to the cause of the roof
    damage, 235 So. 3d at 941, no such conflicting evidence was presented
    here to create a genuine issue of material fact. Appellant failed to offer an
    explanation as to what caused the entry points for the rain to come into
    the home. Accordingly, in the absence of evidence as to the cause of the
    roof damage, the trial court properly relied on Gajwani in granting
    Insurer’s motion for summary judgment.
    Affirmed.
    WARNER, and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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