Daniel Kelley v. J. Buscher , 702 F. App'x 236 ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 16-60694      Document: 00514241420         Page: 1    Date Filed: 11/17/2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 16-60694                                   FILED
    Summary Calendar                         November 17, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    DANIEL KELLEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    J. BUSCHER, sued in his Individual and Official capacities; INVESTIGATOR
    ALEXANDER; LIEUTENANT JONES, Disciplinary Hearing Officer (D.H.O.);
    CORRECTIONS OFFICER WOODALL; JOHN DOE, Unit Administrator,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:14-CV-82
    Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Daniel Kelley initiated a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action challenging his prison
    disciplinary proceedings and conviction for escape. He further challenged
    certain conditions occurring during his confinement in administrative
    segregation following the disciplinary conviction. The parties consented to
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 16-60694     Document: 00514241420      Page: 2    Date Filed: 11/17/2017
    No. 16-60694
    proceed before a magistrate judge, who granted summary judgment dismissal
    of Kelley’s action.
    Kelley contends that the magistrate judge erred in failing to rule on his
    various letters and discovery motions, compare certain defense exhibits, pay
    attention to the facts and legal theories in his filings, address numerous claims,
    scrutinize the record, and take notice of genuine disputes of material facts. He
    identifies only two issues with specificity, namely two discovery requests,
    which the magistrate judge did, in fact, address.         Accordingly, his claims
    concerning these two requests are misplaced. As to the remaining claims,
    Kelley’s conclusory assertions constitute inadequate briefing; therefore, the
    claims are abandoned. See Mapes v. Bishop, 
    541 F.3d 582
    , 584 (5th Cir. 2008);
    Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc., 
    519 F.3d 239
    , 255 (5th Cir. 2008).
    Next, regarding his disciplinary proceedings and conviction, Kelley
    argues that his due process rights were violated. His brief challenges the
    adequacy of the process he received during his disciplinary proceeding but fails
    to identify any error in the magistrate judge’s finding that he had no protected
    liberty interest at stake. This constitutes a failure to brief; therefore, the claim
    is effectively abandoned. See Brinkman v. Dallas Cty. Deputy Sheriff Abner,
    
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987); Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 
    774 F.3d 845
    , 851-52,
    859 (5th Cir. 2014).
    Finally, Kelley challenges the magistrate judge’s dismissal of his
    conditions-of-confinement claims. He argues that his constitutional rights
    were violated where, for 126 days, he was denied out-of-cell recreation; other
    inmates flooded his cell nearly every day with human waste and raw sewerage;
    and he was denied sanitizer and cleaning supplies. Additionally, Kelley argues
    that the defendants violated his constitutional rights where, for over 90 days,
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    Case: 16-60694   Document: 00514241420    Page: 3   Date Filed: 11/17/2017
    No. 16-60694
    he was denied light in his cell. For these claims, Kelley sought declaratory
    relief and both compensatory and punitive damages.
    Kelley discusses no direct involvement of James Alexander and Simone
    Jones in his conditions-of-confinement claims.        Regarding Warden Jerry
    Buscher, he observed during an Omnibus Hearing that Buscher’s role in
    addressing grievance appeals gave him the authority to investigate and fix
    problems and that Buscher came to his unit to investigate issues related to the
    flooding claim. Furthermore, during the hearing, Kelley conceded that he was
    no longer housed on the units where the challenged conditions took place, he
    did not assert a significant possibility of future harm, and he conceded that he
    suffered no injuries related to his claims concerning out-of-cell recreation,
    flooding, and lack of cleaning supplies. Regarding his claim concerning the
    light in his cell, Kelley asserted that he sustained eye problems and must now
    wear glasses.
    In light of the foregoing, we discern no genuine dispute of material fact
    prohibiting summary judgment as a matter of law in favor of Jones and
    Alexander. See Coleman v. Sweetin, 
    745 F.3d 756
    , 764 (5th Cir. 2014); Haverda
    v. Hays Cty., 
    723 F.3d 586
    , 591 (5th Cir. 2013). Likewise, we discern no
    genuine dispute of material fact prohibiting summary judgment as a matter of
    law in favor of Buscher. See Heaney v. Roberts, 
    846 F.3d 795
    , 803 (5th Cir.
    2017); Hutchins v. McDaniels, 
    512 F.3d 193
    , 196-98 (5th Cir. 2007); Bauer v.
    Texas, 
    341 F.3d 352
    , 357-58 (5th Cir. 2003). To the extent that Kelley raised
    other conditions-of-confinement claims in the district court, he has abandoned
    them by failing to discuss them in his appellate brief. See Mapes, 
    541 F.3d at 584
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    3