Keystone Airpark Authority v. Pipeline Contractors, Inc., a Florida etc. , 266 So. 3d 1219 ( 2019 )


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  •            FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-2897
    _____________________________
    KEYSTONE AIRPARK AUTHORITY,
    Appellant,
    v.
    PIPELINE CONTRACTORS, INC., a
    Florida corporation; THE
    HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY,
    a New Hampshire corporation;
    and PASSERO ASSOCIATES, LLC,
    a Florida limited liability
    company,
    Appellees.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County.
    Don H. Lester, Judge.
    January 25, 2019
    WOLF, J.
    On consideration of appellee’s motion for clarification and
    appellant’s response, this Court grants the motion, withdraws the
    opinion filed on November 27, 2018, and substitutes the following
    opinion in its place.
    Keystone Airpark Authority, appellant, challenges a partial
    final summary judgment entered in favor of Passero Associates,
    LLC, appellee. The Airpark argues the trial court erred in
    determining that the damages it sought to repair an airplane
    hangar and taxiways that deteriorated after Passero allegedly
    failed to meet its obligations under a construction contract were
    consequential damages, which were excluded by the parties’
    contract. We affirm but certify a question of great public
    importance.
    FACTS
    The Airpark brought causes of action against Passero, an
    engineering firm, for breach of contract and negligence. The
    Airpark entered into an agreement with a contractor to construct
    airplane hangars and taxiways, and it contracted separately with
    Passero to provide engineering services that included “part-time
    resident engineering and inspection, [and] material testing.”
    Specifically, the contract required Passero to “inspect,” “observe”
    and “monitor” the construction work to ensure compliance with
    the plans and to ascertain the need for correction or rejection of
    the work, including determining the suitability of materials used
    by the contractor:
    Observe the work to determine conformance to the
    contract documents and to ascertain the need for
    correction or rejection of the work.
    ....
    Arrange for, conduct, or witness field, laboratory or shop
    tests of construction materials as required by the plans
    and specifications.
    Determine the suitability of materials on the site, and
    brought to the site, to be used in construction.
    Interpret the contract plans and specifications and
    monitor the construction activities to maintain
    compliance with the intent.
    Prepare and submit inspection reports of construction
    activity and problems encountered . . . .
    2
    ....
    [M]onitor[] periodic construction activities on the project
    and document[] their observations in a formal project
    record . . . .
    The Airpark alleged that the contractor used substandard
    material for stabilization underneath the structures, which
    Passero failed to detect, causing the concrete hangar slabs and
    asphalt taxiways to prematurely deteriorate. The Airpark sought
    to recover from Passero the cost to remove, repair, and replace
    the hangars, taxiways, and underlying subgrade. It sought the
    same relief from the contractor.
    Passero moved for summary judgment, arguing the damages
    the Airpark sought to recover were not a direct result of Passero’s
    alleged failure to perform under the contract. Instead, Passero
    argued the need for repair resulted from a combination of
    Passero’s alleged failure to perform construction inspection
    services under the contract and the contractor preparing the
    subgrade improperly. Thus, Passero argued the repair costs were
    not direct or general damages, but instead were consequential
    damages, which were excluded by a provision in the parties’
    contract that stated, “Passero shall have no liability for indirect,
    special, incidental, punitive, or consequential damages of any
    kind.” Passero argued the only direct or general damages that the
    Airpark could seek to recover against Passero were the costs of
    the services provided by Passero. The trial court agreed and
    entered partial final summary judgment in favor of Passero.
    ANALYSIS
    The Airpark argues the cost of repair to the hangars and
    taxiways constitutes general damages and not consequential
    damages because those damages were foreseeable. It relies on an
    English case from 1854 called Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,
    156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), which defined the general measure of
    damages as those damages “arising naturally . . . from such
    breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed
    to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time
    they made the contract.” However, if there were “special
    circumstances” that were “communicated by the plaintiffs to the
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    defendants, and thus known to both parties,” the plaintiff could
    recover for “injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of
    contract under these special circumstances.” 
    Id. Here, the
    Airpark argues it was foreseeable that Passero’s
    failure to perform under the contract could have resulted in
    construction defects going undetected, which could later require
    repair. It reasons these damages arose naturally from the breach
    of its contract with Passero and did not involve special
    circumstances about which it would have been required to give
    Passero actual notice. Thus, the Airpark argues these damages
    are general and not special or consequential.
    Foreseeability is not at issue here. Passero does not dispute
    it was foreseeable that if it failed to perform its duties under the
    contract, that could result in the need for repairs. It is thus
    necessary for us to explore the definition of general, special, and
    consequential damages and how the question of foreseeability
    affects the nature of the damages incurred in this case.
    “General damages are ‘those damages which naturally and
    necessarily flow or result from the injuries alleged. . . .’”
    Hardwick Properties, Inc. v. Newbern, 
    711 So. 2d 35
    , 39 (Fla. 1st
    DCA 1998) (quoting Hutchison v. Tompkins, 
    259 So. 2d 129
    , 132
    (Fla. 1972)). General damages “‘may fairly and reasonably be
    considered as arising in the usual course of events from the
    breach of contract itself.’” 
    Id. (quoting Fla.
    E. Coast Ry. v. Beaver
    St. Fisheries, Inc., 
    537 So. 2d 1065
    , 1068 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)).
    Stated differently, “[g]eneral damages are commonly defined as
    those damages which are the direct, natural, logical and
    necessary consequences of the injury.” Fla. Power Corp. v. Zenith
    Indus. Co., 
    377 So. 2d 203
    , 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (emphasis
    added).
    “In contrast, special damages are not likely to occur in the
    usual course of events, but ‘may reasonably be supposed to have
    been in contemplation of the parties at the time they made the
    contract.’” 
    Hardwick, 711 So. 2d at 40
    (quoting Fla. E. Coast 
    Ry., 537 So. 2d at 1068
    ). They “consist of items of loss which are
    peculiar to the party against whom the breach was committed
    and would not be expected to occur regularly to others in similar
    4
    circumstances.” 
    Id. (citing Johnson
    v. Monsanto Co., 
    303 N.W.2d 86
    (N.D. 1981)). “In other words, ‘general damages are awarded
    only if injury were foreseeable to a reasonable man and . . .
    special damages are awarded only if actual notice were given to
    the carrier of the possibility of injury. Damage is foreseeable by
    the carrier if it is the proximate and usual consequence of the
    carrier’s action.’” Fla. E. Coast 
    Ry., 537 So. 2d at 1068
    (quoting
    Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 
    606 F.2d 106
    , 109
    (5th Cir. 1979)).
    “[C]onsequential damages ‘do not arise within the scope of the
    immediate buyer-seller transaction, but rather stem from losses
    incurred by the non-breaching party in its dealings, often with
    third parties, which were a proximate result of the breach, and
    which were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party at the
    time of contracting.’” 
    Hardwick, 711 So. 2d at 40
    (emphasis
    added) (quoting Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., Petrobras v. Ameropan
    Oil Corp., 
    372 F. Supp. 503
    , 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)). “The
    consequential nature of loss . . . is not based on the damages being
    unforeseeable by the parties. What makes a loss consequential is
    that it stems from relationships with third parties, while still
    reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting.” Bartram, LLC
    v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 
    864 F. Supp. 2d 1229
    , 1240 (N.D. Fla.
    2012) (emphasis added) (citing Hardwick Properties, Inc. v.
    
    Newbern, 711 So. 2d at 40
    ).
    We agree with the Airpark that the damages in this case
    were not special damages. The contract required Passero to
    inspect, observe and monitor the construction work, including
    determining the suitability of materials used by the contractor,
    and to report any problems. It cannot be said that repairs
    stemming from improperly inspected and monitored construction
    work are unlikely to occur in the usual course of business. The
    damages in this case were not particular to the Airpark and did
    not involve special circumstances for which the Airpark would
    have been required to give Passero actual notice. Instead, these
    types of damages would be expected to occur to other parties in
    similar circumstances. Thus, they were not special damages.
    However, the cost of repair here did not constitute general
    damages, either, because the damages were not the direct or
    5
    necessary consequence of Passero’s alleged failure to properly
    inspect, observe, monitor, and report problems with the
    construction work. The contractor could have completed the job
    correctly without Passero performing its duties under the
    contract. Thus, the need for repair did not arise within the scope
    of the immediate transaction between Passero and the Airpark.
    Instead, the need for repair stemmed from loss incurred by the
    Airpark in its dealings with a third party – the contractor. While
    these damages “were reasonably foreseeable,” they are
    consequential and not general or direct damages.
    The parties agree there is no case law directly on point
    involving damages stemming from the failure to inspect and
    monitor construction work; however, we find this case is
    analogous to others that have found the cost to repair or replace
    property damaged following deficient inspections or other
    services constituted consequential damages. See Urling v. Helms
    Exterminators, Inc., 
    468 So. 2d 451
    , 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)
    (finding the cost to repair extensive termite damage to a home
    purchased after a termite inspection company erroneously
    certified that the home was free of damage constituted
    consequential damages, whereas the cost of the termite
    inspection constituted actual damages); Rollins, Inc. v. Heller,
    
    454 So. 2d 580
    , 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (finding where a home
    was burglarized following the installation of a deficient security
    system, the actual damages constituted the cost of the defective
    system, not the value of the items stolen during the burglary).
    See also Mosteller Mansion, LLC v. Mactec Eng’g & Consulting of
    Georgia, Inc., 
    661 S.E.2d 788
    , n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (finding a
    builder’s claim for damages to repair and recondition soil after an
    engineering firm erroneously conducted soil testing were
    consequential and indirect damages because they “do not flow
    directly and immediately from any action of” the engineering
    firm); Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond v. Wright, 
    392 F. Supp. 1126
    , 1131 (E.D. Va. 1975) (finding a property owner’s cost to
    correct structural defects that resulted from defective plans
    prepared by an architect constituted indirect damages);
    McCloskey & Co., Inc. v. Wright, 
    363 F. Supp. 223
    , 226 n. 1, 230
    (E.D. Va. 1973) (finding the cost to repair a leaking roof caused
    by an architect’s defective plans constituted consequential or
    incidental damages); Richmond Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v.
    6
    Laburnum Const. Corp., 
    80 S.E.2d 574
    , 579-80 (1954), superseded
    by statute on other grounds (finding damages caused by the
    explosion of a faulty gas line were consequential).
    We acknowledge the case at hand is distinguishable because
    here, the contract between the Airpark and Passero expressly
    required Passero to inspect, observe, and monitor the
    construction work and to determine the suitability of the
    materials used by the contractor. Thus, we certify the following
    question as one of great public importance:
    WHERE A CONTRACT EXPRESSLY REQUIRES A PARTY TO
    INSPECT, MONITOR, AND OBSERVE CONSTRUCTION WORK
    AND TO DETERMINE THE SUITABILITY OF MATERIALS USED
    IN THE CONSTRUCTION, BUT THE PARTY FAILS TO DO SO
    AND INFERIOR MATERIALS ARE USED, ARE THE COSTS TO
    REPAIR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE USE OF THE IMPROPER
    MATERIALS GENERAL, SPECIAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
    DAMAGES?
    Finally, we reject the Airpark’s argument that all limitations
    on liability for special or consequential damages in contracts
    involving professional service corporations such as Passero
    should be declared void pursuant to public policy. There is no
    public policy that would prohibit sophisticated parties such as
    Passero and the Airpark, which is a governmental entity, from
    negotiating a contract that limits liability for consequential
    damages. Thus, we AFFIRM but CERTIFY a question of great
    public importance.
    LEWIS, J., concurs; ROWE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part
    with opinion.
    _____________________________
    ROWE, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
    I concur in affirmance of the partial final summary judgment
    appealed. However, I dissent from the decision to certify a
    question to the supreme court.
    7
    _____________________________
    James J. Taylor Jr. and Katelyn J. Taylor of Taylor Law Firm,
    P.A., Keystone Heights, for Appellant.
    Curtis L. Brown and Mark T. Snelson of Wright, Fulford,
    Moorhead & Brown, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for Passero
    Associates, LLC, Appellee.
    John E. Oramas of Oramas & Associates, P.A., Miami, Amici
    Curiae in support of Appellee, Passero Associates, LLC.
    8