TRAFALGAR WOODS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. THE CITY OF CAPE CORAL, FLORIDA , 248 So. 3d 282 ( 2018 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
TRAFALGAR WOODS HOMEOWNERS)
ASSOCIATION, INC., )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D17-1349
)
THE CITY OF CAPE CORAL, )
FLORIDA, )
)
Appellee. )
________________________________ )
Opinion filed June 8, 2018.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee
County; Elizabeth V. Krier, Judge.
W. Gus Belcher, II, of Belcher &
Epstein, P.A., Fort Myers, for Appellant.
Dolores D. Menendez, City Attorney,
and Steven D. Griffin, Assistant City
Attorney, Cape Coral, for Appellee.
NORTHCUTT, Judge.
The Trafalgar Woods Homeowners Association, Inc., sued the City of
Cape Coral in a dispute over credits against special assessments for irrigation water.
The circuit court posited that the Trafalgar Woods planned development ordinance
provided for the award of irrigation credits only to the project developer, and it dismissed
the homeowners' action with prejudice. We reverse because the court misinterpreted
the ordinance.
The city approved the planned Trafalgar Woods project in 1992 by
adopting Ordinance 88-92. Section III(G)(5) of the ordinance provides:
The developer shall receive a credit for the installation of
irrigation lines throughout the project. The credit shall
reduce any proposed special assessment when irrigation
water becomes available from the City of Cape Coral. The
credit shall be applied against any special assessment to be
levied against individual lots in the development. Property
owners will only be assessed for "off site" improvements
such as transmission mains and pumping stations.
In 2016 the homeowners' association filed a complaint against Cape Coral
for declaratory judgment, promissory estoppel, and breach of contract. It recounted that
although the city had not yet provided irrigation water when Trafalgar Woods was built,
the developer had installed on-site irrigation systems and appurtenances as
contemplated in the development ordinance. Then, between 1993 and 1995, the
developer turned over control of the community to the homeowners pursuant to the
subdivision by-laws. Ultimately, the city's irrigation water system was made available to
the development. The homeowners' complaint alleged that the parties were in a dispute
over the valuation of the credits against special assessments associated with municipal
irrigation water.
Cape Coral moved to dismiss, arguing among other things that the
homeowners have no claim to the credit. The city based this assertion on the interplay
between the above-quoted section III(G)(5) of the development ordinance and section
IV(B). The latter states:
This Development Order shall be binding on the developer
and its heirs, assignees, or successors in interest. Those
portions of this Development Order which clearly apply only
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to the project developer, shall not be construed to be binding
upon future owners of the project lots. It shall be binding
upon any builder/developer who acquires any tract of land
within the Trafalgar Woods Subdivision.
The city maintained that the first sentence of section III(G)(5) clearly indicates that only
the developer may receive a credit for the irrigation improvements and argued that
section IV(B) therefore "specifically excludes any such right for the benefit of a lot
owner." The circuit court agreed, holding in its order of dismissal that "[a]s a matter of
law . . . in accordance with Section IV(B) of . . . Ordinance 88-92, the Irrigation Water
Special Assessment Credit referenced in Section III(G)(5) clearly applies only to the
Developer of the Trafalgar Woods . . . ."
We review the dismissal of the homeowners' action de novo. Ruiz v.
Brink's Home Sec., Inc., 777 So. 2d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). On a motion to
dismiss, the court's consideration is confined to the four corners of the complaint; it
accepts all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and draws every reasonable inference
arising from those allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Green v. Cottrell, 204 So. 3d 22,
30-31 (Fla. 2016). For purposes of the motion, all facts properly pleaded are deemed
admitted. Fearick v. Smugglers Cove, Inc., 379 So. 2d 400, 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
The issue before the circuit court was whether under section IV(B) the
credit provided in section III(G)(5) inured only to the benefit of the developer or whether
it extends as well to the developer's successors in interest. When resolving this
question, the court mistakenly relied solely on the first sentence of section III(G)(5). To
be sure, in isolation that sentence describes only a credit to the developer. But under a
longstanding fundamental principle applicable to statutes and ordinances, "words,
phrases, clauses, sentences and paragraphs of a statute may not be construed in
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isolation[.]" Weitzel v. State, 306 So. 2d 188, 192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). Rather, the
sentence must be read in the context of the entire provision. Id.; see also Fla. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot. v. ContractPoint Florida Parks, LLC, 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008)
(stating that every statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every
portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between
its parts); Angelo's Aggregate Materials, Ltd. v. Pasco County, 118 So. 3d 971, 975
(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (observing that ordinances are subject to the rules of construction
applicable to statutes).
Thus, under section III(G)(5) the credit is to reduce any proposed special
assessment when irrigation water becomes available. The credit is to apply to special
assessments levied against individual lots. And property owners are to be assessed
only for off-site improvements. In context, then, the credit referred to in section III(G)(5)
does not "clearly apply only to the project developer." It applies as well to the property
owners of the individual lots. At the very least, section III(G)(5) cannot form the basis
for dismissal of the homeowners' association's complaint.
Accordingly, we reverse the order dismissing the action and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
CRENSHAW and SALARIO, JJ., Concur.
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