Quintae Davouris Hudson v. State of Florida ( 2019 )


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  •             FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-3593
    _____________________________
    QUINTAE DAVOURIS HUDSON,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    James Daniel, Judge.
    August 14, 2019
    PER CURIAM.
    While Appellant, Quintae Davouris Hudson, was in jail
    awaiting trial on a charge of shooting or throwing a deadly missile
    into a vehicle, an eyewitness to the crime gave deposition
    testimony identifying Hudson as the perpetrator. After the
    deposition, but before trial, the eyewitness was shot and killed.
    The State subsequently charged Hudson with first degree
    murder as a principal, conspiracy to commit first degree murder,
    four counts of witness tampering, and directing the activities of a
    criminal gang, all in addition to the original charge of shooting or
    throwing a deadly missile into a vehicle. The jury convicted
    Hudson as charged, less one count of witness tampering that was
    dismissed by the State, and the court sentenced him accordingly.
    Hudson now challenges his convictions, raising four issues.
    The first concerns the trial court’s denial of his motion for
    judgment of acquittal on the first degree murder charge on the
    basis that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he
    aided and abetted the actual perpetrator of the crime. The
    remaining issues address the trial court’s rejection of Hudson’s
    hearsay objections to certain witness statements. We affirm as to
    the hearsay issues without additional comment. For the reasons
    explained below, we also affirm the conviction.
    I.
    The investigation into the victim’s murder revealed the
    significance of his testimony in the underlying missile-throwing
    case against Hudson. The State’s theory of the case on the murder
    charge was that Hudson arranged for the victim’s death by
    soliciting and assisting his fellow gang members to prevent the
    victim from testifying. The State established this through
    jailhouse phone recordings and recording transcripts (the source of
    the hearsay objections), phone records, and testimony from two of
    Hudson’s girlfriends and other witnesses (including investigators
    and law enforcement gang experts).
    At the close of the State’s case, Hudson moved for a judgment
    of acquittal “based on the State’s failure to prove a prima facie
    case” as to all counts, and at the trial’s end, Hudson renewed the
    motion, stating “I would renew my motion for judgment of
    acquittal” arguing that the State “has failed to prove . . . all of the
    elements contained in each of the counts charged.” The trial court
    denied both motions.
    II.
    In this appeal, Hudson for the first time argues he was
    entitled to a judgment of acquittal because the State’s
    circumstantial evidence fell short of proving its theory of the case
    beyond a reasonable doubt, and that his conviction as a principal
    must therefore be reversed because a person cannot be convicted
    of aiding and abetting an unknown perpetrator of a crime. Hudson
    also argues (again for the first time) that a conviction for a crime
    totally unsupported by evidence constitutes fundamental error.
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    Hudson asserts further that the State failed to prove who actually
    killed the victim, or that the victim was in contact with the shooter,
    much less that Hudson assisted in committing the crime.
    Appellate courts review a trial court’s denial of a motion for
    judgment of acquittal de novo. Rasley v. State, 
    878 So. 2d 473
    , 476
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). “[I]n moving for a judgment of acquittal, a
    defendant admits not only the facts stated in the evidence, but also
    every reasonable conclusion favorable to the state that the trier of
    fact might fairly infer from the evidence.” 
    Id. (quoting Sutton
    v.
    State, 
    834 So. 2d 332
    , 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)).
    We agree with the State that Hudson failed to preserve his
    arguments on appeal as to why the trial court should have granted
    his motions for judgment of acquittal. “[I]n moving for a judgment
    of acquittal, a defendant must identify the element, or elements, of
    a crime for which he or she contends the evidence is lacking, and,
    if the evidence is purely circumstantial, outline his or her theory
    of defense and explain why it is not inconsistent with the
    circumstantial evidence.” Newsome v. State, 
    199 So. 3d 510
    , 513
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Here, Hudson’s boilerplate motions were
    insufficient to preserve his points on appeal as they did not fully
    set forth the grounds on which they were based. See Cornwell v.
    State, 
    425 So. 2d 1189
    , 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that a
    defendant’s motion alleging “the State had failed to prove a prima
    facie case” was “deficient to preserve the point on appeal”); see also
    Charles v. State, 
    253 So. 3d 1230
    , 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)
    (“[A]ppellant cannot raise for the first time on appeal an argument
    that the special circumstantial evidence standard applies.”).
    Accordingly, this Court’s review is only for fundamental error.
    Relying on F.B. v State, 
    852 So. 2d 226
    (Fla. 2003), Hudson
    argues that fundamental error occurred because the evidence is
    insufficient to show that a crime was committed at all. We
    disagree. There was ample evidence that, at the very least, Hudson
    committed the crime of criminal solicitation, which section 777.04,
    Florida Statutes, defines as:
    [A] person who solicits another to commit an offense
    prohibited by law and in the course of such solicitation
    commands, encourages, hires, or requests another person
    to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such
    3
    offense or an attempt to commit such offense commits the
    offense of criminal solicitation, ranked for purposes of
    sentencing as provided in subsection (4).
    The Florida Supreme Court explained that the elements of
    this crime are:
    (1) commanding, hiring, requesting, or encouraging
    another person to commit a crime and (2) the intent that
    the other person commit the crime. No agreement is
    needed, and the fact that the person solicited has no
    intention of committing the crime is irrelevant as long as
    the command, request, or encouragement is made with
    the requisite intent.
    The Florida Bar v. Marable, 
    645 So. 2d 438
    , 442 (Fla. 1994).
    Here, the State presented evidence in the form of jailhouse
    phone recordings that Hudson was in frequent direct and indirect
    contact with fellow gang members complaining about how the
    victim’s testimony was likely to result in Hudson’s conviction and
    how his fellow gang members were doing nothing to “handle” the
    situation, alternatively pleading and insisting that the victim be
    “handled” and telling the gang’s leader that he would not mind if
    the victim failed to testify. In one instance, the gang leader
    promised to “go by [the victim’s] house tonight.” The State also
    presented evidence that Hudson either directly or indirectly
    furnished the gang with the victim’s address. Finally, the evidence
    showed that Hudson was informed of the victim’s death very
    shortly after it happened and expressed his relief that it meant
    he’d be going home.
    Such evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to find
    that Hudson solicited the victim’s murder. Because there was
    sufficient evidence that Hudson committed a crime, even if not the
    crime charged, Hudson’s conviction is not fundamental error.
    AFFIRMED.
    RAY, C.J., and B.L. THOMAS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
    4
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Maria Ines Suber, Assistant
    Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant
    Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-3593

Filed Date: 8/14/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/14/2019