Ivey v. State , 199 So. 3d 378 ( 2016 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed August 17, 2016.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D15-1981
    Lower Tribunal No. 06-2197
    ________________
    Mark David Ivey,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    The State of Florida,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the
    Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Stephen T. Millan, Judge.
    Mark David Ivey, in proper person.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Arlisa Certain, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Before ROTHENBERG, LAGOA, and LOGUE, JJ.
    ON MOTION TO DISMISS
    LAGOA, J.
    Appellant, Mark David Ivey (“Ivey”), seeks review of the trial court’s order
    denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 3.800. Appellee, the State of Florida (the “State”), moves to dismiss
    this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely
    filed.    Because Ivey filed his notice of appeal eight days after the deadline
    prescribed in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(k) and Florida Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 9.110(b), we grant the State’s motion to dismiss.
    In Ivey v. State, 
    47 So. 3d 908
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), this Court vacated
    Ivey’s conviction for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of a fatal accident
    based on double jeopardy grounds, and affirmed his DUI manslaughter conviction
    and sentence. The mandate issued on December 9, 2010. On April 3, 2015, Ivey
    filed a Rule 3.800 motion to correct the illegal sentence, which the trial court
    denied. This order, now challenged by Ivey, was rendered on July 10, 2015, when
    it was filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.020(i)
    (defining “rendition”). The deadline for filing the notice of appeal was thirty days
    after the date the order was rendered, which was August 10, 2015.1 See Fla. R.
    Crim. P. 3.850(k); Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(b). Ivey’s notice of appeal was not filed
    until August 18, 2015, when he tendered a copy of the notice to a corrections
    official pursuant to the “mailbox rule.” See Fla. R. App. P. 9.420(a)(2)(A) (“The
    1Because the thirtieth day fell on Sunday, August 9, 2015, the notice was due on
    Monday, August 10, 2015.
    2
    document shall be presumed to be filed on the date the inmate places it in the
    hands of an institutional official for mailing . . . .”).
    As the Supreme Court of Florida explained in Haag v. State, 
    591 So. 2d 614
    (Fla. 1992),
    [u]nder the mailbox rule, a petition or notice of appeal filed by a pro
    se inmate is deemed filed at the moment in time when the inmate
    loses control over the document by entrusting its further delivery or
    processing to agents of the state. Usually, this point occurs when the
    inmate places the document in the hands of prison officials.
    
    Id. at 617
    ; accord Joseph v. State, 
    157 So. 3d 546
    , 547-48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015);
    Raysor v. Raysor, 
    706 So. 2d 400
    , 401 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). This version of the
    mailbox rule applies only to pro se petitioners, like Ivey, who are incarcerated.
    See Haag, 
    591 So. 2d at 617
    . At the time his notice of appeal was filed, Ivey was
    an inmate at the Dade Correctional Institution, which maintains a system for
    outgoing inmate mail. When an inmate presents a document for mailing to a
    corrections officer, that officer places a stamp on the document, and the inmate is
    required to initial the stamp in order to verify the date the document was tendered
    to the corrections officer. Here, the stamp on Ivey’s notice of appeal bears his
    initials, “MDI,” and the date of August 18, 2015, which was eight days after the
    deadline for filing his notice of appeal. Because the certificate of service on Ivey’s
    notice of appeal demonstrates it was tendered to a corrections officer more than
    thirty days following rendition of the order, we dismiss the appeal as untimely
    3
    filed. See Jackson v. State, 
    64 So. 3d 684
     (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (dismissing appeal
    as untimely where defendant in postconviction proceedings served notice of appeal
    on thirty-first day following rendition of order).
    DISMISSED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1981

Citation Numbers: 199 So. 3d 378

Filed Date: 8/17/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023