Kenneth Lynn Mason v. State of Florida , 153 So. 3d 335 ( 2014 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
KENNETH LYNN MASON, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
v. CASE NO. 1D13-6187
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________/
Opinion filed December 5, 2014.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Clay County.
John H. Skinner, Judge.
Kenneth Lynn Mason, pro se, Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charles R. McCoy, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
MARSTILLER, J.
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Kenneth Lynn Mason
(“Appellant”) in 2009 pled guilty to lewd and lascivious molestation and received
a prison sentence of 17 years followed by 15 years’ sex offender probation. Three
years later, Appellant filed a postconviction motion under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.850 claiming ineffective assistance of defense counsel and seeking to
vacate his plea as involuntarily entered. A subsequently-filed amended motion
raised three claims: (1) counsel failed to investigate whether law enforcement
officers read Appellant his Miranda 1 rights before he confessed, orally and in
writing, to the molestation during an interview he voluntarily participated in; (2)
counsel failed to file a motion to suppress Appellant’s inculpatory statements; and
(3) the sentence the trial court imposed was not the agreed-upon sentence set forth
in the negotiated plea agreement. The post-conviction court summarily denied all
three claims.
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel motion, a defendant must
show that (1) counsel’s performance was so deficient that he or she did not provide
the representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and that (2) counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). To satisfy the deficient-performance prong of the Strickland test,
a defendant “must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to
have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690. The
prejudice prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. In the context of a guilty plea,
the prejudice prong requires the defendant to show “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985);
see also Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176, 1179 (Fla. 2004). “[A] defendant is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief motion unless (1) the
motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled
to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient.”
Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000).
We reverse the denial of Appellant’s first and second claims related to
defense counsel’s asserted failure to investigate grounds to suppress Appellant’s
confession, and remand the claims for an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction
court largely relied on a pre-sentencing filing in the record entitled, “Defendant’s
List of Mitigating Factors,” in which Appellant, through counsel, stated that he
“fully cooperated” with law enforcement, and “voluntarily” attended and
participated in the “interview” with officers during which he admitted committing
the unlawful acts for which he later was arrested and charged. Based on these
factual assertions, the postconviction court determined Appellant was not under
custodial interrogation, and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required. We
conclude, however, Appellant’s statements provided insufficient information upon
3
which to base so conclusive a determination. See Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568,
574 (Fla. 1999) (setting forth factors for determining whether a reasonable person
would have believed he was in custody), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1131 (2000).
Neither do the statements conclusively refute Appellant’s postconviction claims or
permit a conclusion, without more information, that defense counsel acted
reasonably under the circumstances. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“The
reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced
by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based,
quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on
information supplied by the defendant.”).
We affirm the denial of Appellant’s third claim for it is fully refuted by the
record. The written plea agreement states that in return for his guilty plea to lewd
and lascivious molestation, Appellant would be sentenced to between 10 and 30
years’ imprisonment followed by 15 years of sex offender probation, and that the
actual prison sentence would be determined by the court at the time of sentencing.
Furthermore, the transcript of Appellant’s plea colloquy demonstrates that
Appellant fully understood the maximum sentence he was facing.
AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED.
BENTON and WETHERELL, JJ., CONCUR.
4