Marchman v. St. Anthony's Hospital, Inc. , 152 So. 3d 830 ( 2014 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
ALBERT MARCHMAN, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D13-3827
)
ST. ANTHONY'S HOSPITAL, INC., )
)
Appellee. )
)
Opinion filed December 12, 2014.
Appeal from the Commission on Human
Relations.
Matthew W. Dietz of Law Offices of
Matthew W. Dietz, P.L., Miami, for
Appellant.
Scott T. Silverman of Akerman, LLP,
Tampa, for Appellee.
CRENSHAW, Judge.
Albert Marchman is a deaf man who does not speak. He was admitted to
St. Anthony's Hospital for heart problems but at no point was he provided a sign
language interpreter. Subsequently, Marchman filed an action with the Florida
Commission on Human Relations alleging discrimination based on physical disability in
contravention of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, §§ 760.01-.11; § 509.092, Fla.
Stat. (2012) (FCRA). Because we conclude that the Commission did not err in holding
that it lacked jurisdiction over hospitals even if they had coffee shops, vending
machines, and cafeterias within them, we affirm.
In this case, the action was abated as a similar case was then pending in
the First District Court of Appeal. See Mena v. Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 109 So. 3d
787 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (unpublished table decision) (Mena II). In Mena v. Lifemark
Hospitals of Florida, Inc., 50 So. 3d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (Mena I), Ms. Mena, also a
deaf person to whom a sign language interpreter was not assigned, recognized that the
hospital, as a hospital, was not regulated under FCRA. Instead she argued that
because within the hospital there was an establishment covered by FCRA, namely the
hospital cafeteria, the hospital was transformed into a covered establishment. Id. She
relied on section 760.02(11), Florida Statutes,1 which defines as a public
accommodation "any establishment . . . within the premises of which is physically
located any such covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons
of such covered establishment." Id. at 761. The First District concluded that the
Commission failed to make findings of fact as to whether the hospital held itself out as
serving patrons of the cafeteria and remanded for the Commission to do so. Id.
Ultimately, on remand, the Commission found that the hospital was not holding itself out
as serving patrons of the cafeteria, thus leaving the hospital outside the ambit of FCRA.
On subsequent appeal to the First District, the court affirmed without a written opinion.
Mena II, 109 So. 3d 787.
1
Mena did not refer to the statute year but the statute has not been
amended since 2003.
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FCRA is largely based on Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 829 So. 2d 891, 895 (Fla. 2002); cf.
§ 760.11 ("It is the intent of the Legislature that this provision for attorney's fees be
interpreted in a manner consistent with federal case law involving a Title VII action.").
We "recognize[] that if a state law is patterned after a federal law on the same subject,
the Florida law will be accorded the same construction as in federal courts to the extent
the construction is harmonious with the spirit of the Florida legislation." Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc. v. Reddick, 954 So. 2d 723, 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (quoting O'Loughlin v.
Pinchback, 579 So. 2d 788, 791 (Fla. 1st DCA 1911)). However, the Florida Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed that
[t]o discern legislative intent, a court must look first and
foremost at the actual language used in the statute.
Moreover, a statute should be interpreted to give effect to
every clause in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all
of its parts. When reconciling statutes that may appear to
conflict, the rules of statutory construction provide that a
specific statute will control over a general statute . . . .
Fla. Virtual Sch. v. K12, Inc., 148 So. 3d 97, 101-02 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Doe v. Dep't of Health,
948 So. 2d 803, 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) ("Where possible, courts must give full effect to
all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one
another." (citing Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452,
455 (Fla. 1992))).
Under FCRA:
"Public accommodations" means places of public
accommodation, lodgings, facilities principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises, . . . and other
covered establishments. Each of the following
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establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this section:
....
(b) Any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch
counter, soda fountain, or other facility principally engaged in
selling food for consumption on the premises. . . .
....
(d) Any establishment which is physically located
within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered
by this subsection, or within the premises of which is
physically located any such covered establishment, and
which holds itself out as serving patrons of such covered
establishment.
§ 760.02 (emphases added). Section 509.013 reads:
(5)(a) "Public food service establishment" means any
building, vehicle, place, or structure, or any room or division
in a building, vehicle, place, or structure where food is
prepared, served, or sold for immediate consumption on or
in the vicinity of the premises; called for or taken out by
customers; or prepared prior to being delivered to another
location for consumption.
(b) The following are excluded from the definition in
paragraph (a):
....
4. Any eating place maintained by a facility
certified or licensed and regulated by the Agency for
Health Care Administration or the Department of Children
and Family Services or other similar place that is
regulated under s. 381.0072.
(Emphasis added). Marchman argues that based on section 760.02, particularly as
discussed by Mena I, we should hold that because St. Anthony's has an onsite
cafeteria, coffee shop, and vending machines covered by FCRA, St. Anthony's itself is
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governed by FCRA.2 But to read section 760.02 in the way that Marchman beseeches
requires that we turn a blind eye to the text of section 509.013. The latter section
specifically excludes from its definition eating places maintained by facilities certified or
licensed and regulated by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). §
509.013(5)(b)(4). And because the latter provision is more specific, to give it effect
does not do harm to the remainder of the statute. True, section 760.02 is written to cast
a wide net, as is its federal counterpart. But we must still give effect to the Legislature's
other dictates. Moreover, to the extent public policy is a factor, giving effect to the latter
provision effectuates a policy of not having hospitals doubly regulated: first by AHCA
and second by the Commission. We note that our decision is in accord with the Third
District's recent opinion on like facts and based on similar reasoning. See Crane v.
Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 39 Fla. L. Weekly D2185, D2185 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 15,
2014).
Because the Commission correctly dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, we affirm.
ALTENBERND and NORTHCUTT, JJ., Concur.
2
Like the Third District in Crane v. Lifemark Hospital of Florida, Inc., 39
Fla. L. Weekly D2185, D2185 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA Oct. 15, 2014), we do not reach the
issue of whether "a covered cafeteria within a hospital would cause the hospital to
qualify as a 'covered establishment.' "
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