Teitelbaum v. South Fl Water Management , 176 So. 3d 998 ( 2015 )

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed September 30, 2015.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D14-963
Lower Tribunal No. 04-21282
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Ann Teitelbaum, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
South Florida Water Management District, an Agency of the State
of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Peter R. Lopez,
Judge.
Moore Bowman & Rix, P.A., and Gregory S. Rix and S. William Moore
(Tampa), for appellants.
James E. Nutt (West Palm Beach), and Francisco J. Pines, for appellee.
Alachua County Attorney’s Office, and Sylvia E. Torres (Gainesville); and
Bay County Attorney’s Office, and Terrel K. Arline (Panama City), for The
Florida Association of County Attorneys, as amicus curiae.
Anna H. Upton (Tallahassee), for National Audubon Society and Florida
Audubon Society, as amici curiae.
Before ROTHENBERG, SALTER, and SCALES, JJ.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROTHENBERG, J.
We grant the appellants’ motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion filed
June 24, 2015, and issue the following opinion in its stead.
Ann Teitelbaum and a group of private property owners (“the Plaintiffs”)
appeal the trial court’s order granting final summary judgment against their claims
for inverse condemnation and de facto constitutional takings in violation of their
due process rights, which they pursued under a theory of “condemnation blight.”
However, Florida law is quite clear that condemnation blight, while relevant to the
valuation of property that has actually been taken under existing constitutional
standards, does not independently give rise to a de facto takings claim. Because
we see no reason to deviate from that principle, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiffs are all owners of property in the Bird Drive Basin area of
western Miami-Dade County. The Bird Drive Basin comprises 3550 acres of
partially reclaimed swamp and wetlands along the eastern edge of the Florida
Everglades. The land has been subject to various county zoning requirements
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since 1938 and has been zoned exclusively for agricultural use since 1965. The
Plaintiffs all acquired their property in the Bird Drive Basin between 1971 and
2003, apparently hoping that the land would eventually be rezoned for commercial
or residential use.
The South Florida Water Management District (“the Water District”), which
was created by the Florida legislature in 1972 to oversee the use and conservation
of Florida waters, designated the Bird Drive Basin as part of the “East Coast
Buffer” to the Florida Everglades in 1994. The East Coast Buffer runs from Palm
Beach to Homestead along the eastern edge of the Florida Everglades. According
to the Water District, the East Coast Buffer is necessary to prevent massive
flooding throughout Miami-Dade County and also to prevent saltwater intrusion
from contaminating the freshwater wellfields responsible for supplying Miami and
other outlying areas. The property at issue is obviously crucial to the Water
District’s plan to preserve the East Coast Buffer, and the Water District passed
resolutions in 1995 and 1998 publicly announcing its intent to oppose any attempts
to rezone the land or allow further development of the property in the East Coast
Buffer.
The Water District, as part of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration
Project (“CERP”) approved by the United States Congress, began attempting to
acquire all the property in the East Coast Buffer, including the Bird Drive Basin
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area, by purchasing the property from willing landowners. The Water District was
able to purchase much of the land from willing sellers over the following two
years, and then, in June 2002, it passed a condemnation resolution to acquire the
remaining land (approximately 410 acres of property) from the Plaintiffs through
eminent domain. Despite passing the resolution, the Water District did not attempt
to formally acquire any of the land.
The Plaintiffs filed suit in October 2004, alleging “coercive acquisition
policies” and “illicit actions” by the Water District that deprived the Plaintiffs of
substantial use and enjoyment of their land. The gist of the Plaintiffs’ complaint is
that the Water District artificially depressed their property values through
governmental action as part of its plan to acquire the Plaintiffs’ land on the cheap.
More specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that the Water District has prevented the
development of the land in and around the Bird Drive Basin in order to keep the
cost of the property artificially low. The Plaintiffs aver that the property has
remained agricultural in nature rather than urban or residential because the Water
District has actively prevented Miami-Dade County from rezoning the area by
moving the urban development boundary (“UDB”), despite public demand for
development, at least partially because the Water District needed the land for its
buffer zone. Property within the UDB can accommodate six residential units per
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acre, while property outside the UDB can only accommodate one residential unit
per five acres.
Miami-Dade County meeting minutes and an affidavit from the Miami-Dade
County Director of Planning and Zoning (from 1992-2001) arguably reflect that
the County would have at least considered rezoning the area for further
development if not for the actions of the Water District. Further, during the
“voluntary acquisition” process, the Water District acquired land in the Bird Drive
Basin area in a “checkerboard fashion” such that the Plaintiffs’ properties were
interspersed with government land.
In April 2008, four years after the Plaintiffs filed this case, the Water
District officially withdrew its condemnation resolution and abandoned its plan to
acquire the Plaintiffs’ properties because various studies showed that the Bird
Drive Basin recharge plan was no longer feasible. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs
amended their complaint to allege that the Water District’s “voluntary
acquisitions” left the area checkered with largely unusable, undevelopable, and
unsellable property. There is no evidence, however, that the Plaintiffs’ property
values have been substantially diminished or that their rights have been altered
since purchasing the property; and as previously stated, the Plaintiffs’ land and
surrounding property were zoned for agricultural use only at the time the Plaintiffs
purchased the property, and that agricultural zoning designation has not changed.
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Despite the fact that there has been no change to the permitted use of,
intrusion onto, or interference with the Plaintiffs’ property, the Plaintiffs claim
that, based on the Water District’s actions, the Water District has taken their
property in violation of the Takings and Due Process Clauses in both the Florida
and United States Constitutions and that they are entitled to full compensation via
inverse condemnation. The Plaintiffs premise their takings claims upon a theory of
“condemnation blight,” which they argue should be considered a de facto taking
under the law. After denying several motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims and
an initial summary judgment motion, the trial court granted summary judgment in
the Water District’s favor on all claims on March 27, 2014, specifically finding
that “condemnation blight” is merely a factor to be considered during the valuation
phase of condemnation (or inverse condemnation) proceedings assuming that a
taking has already occurred, not an independent cause of action for a constitutional
taking under Florida law, and the defendants have therefore not “taken” the
property in question. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Both the Florida and the United States Constitutions protect against
unbridled state seizures of private property by requiring a governmental entity
wishing to acquire such land to (1) demonstrate that the appropriation is for a
public use or purpose and (2) pay a full and fair amount for the appropriation.
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Specifically, the United States Constitution provides, “private property [shall not]
be taken for public use, without just compensation,” U.S. Const. amend. V, while
the Florida Constitution mandates, “No private property shall be taken except for a
public purpose and with full compensation therefor paid to each owner or secured
by deposit in the registry of the court and available to the owner.” Art. X, § 6, Fla.
Const.
In typical takings cases, the state entity files a petition of condemnation, §
73.021, Fla. Stat. (2004), a twelve-person jury determines what amount is equal to
“full compensation” for the property, § 73.071, Fla. Stat. (2004), the state entity
pays the amount the jury has determined, and the condemning authority takes title
to the property it sought to acquire, § 71.111, Fla. Stat. (2004).1 In such cases, the
state takes full title to the condemned property, and there can be no doubt that the
property has in fact been taken and that the owner is entitled to full compensation.
Such takings are lawful, de jure takings.
However, a taking can also occur when the state or one of its agents, through
certain actions or regulations, exercises domain over private property so as to
deprive the rightful owner of his or her use and enjoyment without going through
the proper procedures. In such cases, a de facto taking occurs, and the property
1 There is also a “quick-taking” option outlined in Chapter 74 of the Florida
Statutes that allows the State to deposit a reasonable sum into the court registry and
immediately take title to the property, with the jury valuation phase occurring after
the condemning authority has acquired the land. See § 74.061, Fla. Stat. (2004).
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owner is entitled to full compensation just as if the state had lawfully condemned
the property. Indeed, as this Court recently held: “Where no formal exercise of
eminent domain power is undertaken, a property owner may file an inverse
condemnation claim to recover the value of property that has been de facto taken.”
Fla. Dep’t of Env. Prot. ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund v. West,
21 So. 3d 96, 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). Thus, a property owner must demonstrate
that the property has in fact been “taken” by a governmental entity before being
entitled to full compensation via inverse condemnation.
Whether or not governmental action results in a de facto taking has been a
thorny area for both state and federal courts. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“[O]ur regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be
characterized as unified . . . .”). However, the United States Supreme Court
summarized the existing jurisprudence on this issue by holding that a per se taking
occurs “where government requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical
invasion of her property,” or where the government passes and applies “regulations
[that] completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her
property.’” Id. at 538 (quoting Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1019 (1992)) (emphasis and alteration in original). If a court finds that
either of these two conditions has occurred, the governmental action necessarily
constitutes a taking, and full compensation must be paid for the property. Id.8
Alternatively, if a plaintiff alleges that a governmental regulation has
substantially devalued the property in question without creating a physical invasion
or depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use, the regulation will be
analyzed under the ad hoc test established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The Penn Central test requires a court to
examine the totality of the deprivation, but with special emphasis on
[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant . . . ,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations . . . . [as well as] the character
of the governmental action. . . . [which is more likely to be construed
as a taking] when the interference with property can be characterized
as a physical invasion by government than when interference arises
from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.
Id. at 124 (citations omitted). Whether a takings claim is analyzed as a per se
taking under one of the two categories specified in Lingle or an ad hoc taking
under Penn Central, the core question is whether the “actions . . . are functionally
equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private
property or ousts the owner from his domain.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.
Likely recognizing that the Water District’s conduct would not constitute a
taking under the traditional takings formulations,2 the Plaintiffs have not argued
2 Indeed, the Plaintiffs have never alleged the Water District’s conduct to be a
physical taking, and they have argued many times that they were NOT claiming
that a regulatory taking had occurred so that they could circumvent the trial court’s
ruling that any potential regulatory taking claim was not ripe under Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
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their claims under any of these three well-established standards. Rather, the
Plaintiffs urge this Court to recognize a new cause of action and adopt a new
category of governmental activity that will result in a per se taking: condemnation
blight. Under the Plaintiffs’ proposed formulation for a condemnation blight
claim, a constitutional taking would occur when: (1) the government makes an
official, publicly-announced declaration of its intent to condemn the property that
goes beyond mere planning; (2) the government engages in some post-
announcement unreasonable conduct, such as protracted delay in actual
condemnation proceedings or interference with the property owner’s rights; and (3)
the property suffers impairment of value or the property owner’s use and
enjoyment of the property is disrupted. We decline to adopt this proposed standard
as a per se taking.
Florida cases have routinely referred to “condemnation blight” as the
depreciation of property value that occurs when the government announces its
intentions to condemn a property, and Florida law addresses this diminution in
value by requiring the condemning authority to pay full compensation for the
property as of the date of the condemnation announcement rather than at some
U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985) (reversing a takings clause claim award by holding that
the plaintiff’s claims were not ripe because it had not applied to the proper zoning
authority for a ruling or variance to determine the actual impact of the regulation
before filing suit). The Plaintiffs in this case concede that they have not applied
for a variance or sought a final ruling regarding permitted uses of their allegedly
taken property.
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later point after the property has depreciated due to the impending condemnation.
E.g., Dade Cnty. v. Still, 377 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1979); State Road Dep’t of Fla.
v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 757-58 (Fla. 1963); West, 21 So. 3d at 98; Savage v.
Palm Beach Cnty., 912 So. 2d 48, 51-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Brown v. Dep’t of
Transp., 884 So. 2d 116, 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). However, no Florida case has
found condemnation blight itself to be an actionable claim for a constitutional
taking. See Florio v. City of Miami Beach, 425 So. 2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983) (per curiam) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for
condemnation blight). Thus, under current Florida law, condemnation blight is
only relevant to the valuation of the taken property after a plaintiff has already
established that a taking has occurred either by de jure condemnation via eminent
domain proceedings or de facto condemnation via one of the three established
tests; it is not itself an independent grounds for a de facto taking. We believe these
holdings to be fair and correct.
The Plaintiffs would have us focus on the alleged unreasonableness of the
Water District’s conduct to justify this new cause of action rather than on the effect
on their property. This perspective confuses the aim of the Takings Clause, as the
cases uniformly analyze the effect of the governmental actions and regulations on
the property to determine whether they are so onerous as to constitute an ouster.
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539.3 That is not to say that the government can never
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“take” land by declaring its intent to condemn and then engaging in unreasonable
activities. Such governmental behavior will still be actionable if it satisfies one of
the per se takings tests from Lingle or the ad hoc takings test from Penn Central.
There may well be a case in the future where governmental conduct similar to the
type alleged in this case could satisfy one of these existing tests; however, the
Plaintiffs in this case have not even attempted to establish those facts, and we
refuse to recognize a novel takings theory to fit the facts of this case.
3 One of the appellants’ primary arguments in their motion for rehearing is that this
Court should have analyzed their Due Process Clause claims as a distinct cause of
action separate and apart from their Takings Clause claims under the authority of
Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Authority v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So. 2d
54, 57-58 (Fla. 1994). While there is an interplay between these two constitutional
clauses and many takings claims are analyzed coextensively with due process
claims, the appellants are correct that these claims can be pled as distinct causes of
action when the allegations involve governmental actions or regulations on private
property. Id. The alleged unreasonableness of the Water District’s actions, while
irrelevant for a takings analysis, would certainly have been germane to the
Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, and their argument would likely require
further consideration had it been raised prior to the Plaintiffs’ motion for rehearing.
In this case, however, the trial court treated both causes of action as coextensive
and made no separate findings or rulings regarding the Plaintiffs’ due process
claim. The appellants did not challenge that aspect of the trial court’s decision
below, did not brief or argue that issue before this court—indeed, they did not even
independently cite the A.G.W.S. decision in their initial or reply brief—and now
raise this point of error for the first time in their motion for rehearing. As such, the
appellants have waived that issue, Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(a) (“A motion for
rehearing . . . shall not present issues not previously raised in the proceeding.”); see
also Caldwell v. Fla. Dep’t of Elder Affairs, 121 So. 3d 1062, 1064 (Fla. 1st DCA
2013) (citing numerous cases holding that an issue not raised in a party’s initial
brief is deemed waived), and we do not comment on the merits of that claim.
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The Plaintiffs purchased undeveloped wetland on the border of the
Everglades when that land was already zoned exclusively for agricultural use. No
further restrictions were ever placed on the property; its zoning was simply never
increased to allow greater residential or business use as the Plaintiffs may have
expected. The Water District simply announced its intention to someday acquire
the land for the general public welfare and then eventually decided the plan was
unfeasible. It is undisputed that the Plaintiffs’ property rights have not been
substantially diminished. In fact, the Plaintiffs still have the same rights and
interests in their respective properties now as when they purchased them. The fact
that the property did not ultimately get rezoned and appreciate into land that could
be developed for residential use is irrelevant; the State of Florida is not an insurer
for the risk individuals take when they purchase property with the expectation or
hope that the property may someday increase in value. The Plaintiffs have not
alleged a taking under any of the three recognized takings tests, and we decline to
recognize an alternative per se taking claim based on condemnation blight.
Affirmed.
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