Valdes v. Valdes , 154 So. 3d 1165 ( 2015 )


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  •               NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    JOSEPH O. VALDES,                            )
    )
    Appellant/Cross-Appellee,       )
    )
    v.                                           )       Case No. 2D13-5509
    )
    JULIE ANN PALMERMO VALDES,                   )
    )
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.       )
    )
    Opinion filed January 7, 2015.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for
    Hillsborough County; Paul L. Huey, Judge.
    Jose C. Gonzalez of Jose C. Gonzalez,
    P.A., Tampa, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
    Ingrid Anderson, Clearwater, for
    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
    DAVIS, Chief Judge.
    Joseph Valdes, the Former Husband, challenges the final judgment of
    dissolution of his marriage to Julie Ann Palmero Valdes, the Former Wife. He also
    challenges the order resolving the Former Wife's motion for rehearing and the Former
    Husband's motion for reconsideration and the amended final judgment of dissolution.
    The Former Wife cross-appeals from the same orders. For the reasons set forth in this
    opinion, we reverse those portions of the final judgment and amended final judgment
    related to the calculations of child support and retroactive child support based on a
    mathematical miscalculation identified by the Former Wife. Both the Former Husband's
    claim of mathematical error in the amended retroactive child support amount and the
    Former Wife's claim of further entitlement to a credit on the retroactive child support
    amount are rendered moot by this reversal. We affirm the final judgment in all other
    respects without further comment.
    As recognized in the final judgment of dissolution, the calculations for the
    determination of child support were complicated by the fact that one child was spending
    equal amounts of time with both parents while the other was spending time only with the
    Former Husband. In the original final judgment, the trial court set forth a basis for its
    child support calculations, including its reliance on section 61.30(11)(b), Florida Statutes
    (2010). The trial court also included its mathematical calculations, the final portion of
    which appears to be an application of the formula included in section 61.30(11)(b). The
    court wrote:
    [B]ecause the younger child spends more than 20% of his nights
    with both parents, the substantial time sharing or Gross Up method
    also applies. To apply the Gross Up method, the original basic
    monthly obligation of $1,762 is multiplied by 1.5, which gives a new
    basic obligation of $2,643. Applying the same percentages based
    on their earnings, the Father is responsible for 54% of that amount,
    which is $1[,]427, and the Mother is responsible for 46% of that
    amount, which is $1,216. The percentages based on the number of
    resident children of each parent then apply, which results in
    obligations of $304 for the Father and $1,070 for the Mother. The
    difference in these two numbers results in the Mother owing the
    Father $766 per month in child support (excluding health
    insurance).
    -2-
    (Emphasis added.)
    Section 61.30(11)(b) provides in part as follows:
    Whenever a particular parenting plan, a court-ordered time-
    sharing schedule, or a time-sharing arrangement exercised by
    agreement of the parties provides that each child spend a
    substantial amount of time with each parent, the court shall adjust
    any award of child support, as follows:
    1. In accordance with subsections (9) and (10), calculate the
    amount of support obligation apportioned to each parent without
    including day care and health insurance costs in the calculation and
    multiply the amount by 1.5.
    2. Calculate the percentage of overnight stays the child
    spends with each parent.
    3. Multiply each parent's support obligation as calculated in
    subparagraph 1. by the percentage of the other parent's overnight
    stays with the child as calculated in subparagraph 2.
    4. The difference between the amounts calculated in
    subparagraph 3. shall be the monetary transfer necessary between
    the parents for the care of the child, subject to an adjustment for
    day care and health insurance expenses.
    The Former Wife does not disagree with the trial court's methods of
    calculation.1 She merely argues that when the trial court applied its calculated
    percentages of responsibility for each parent based on their respective amounts of
    overnight time-sharing to both the retroactive and the current child support obligations
    pursuant to section 61.30(11)(b)(3), it inadvertently failed to cross-multiply each parent's
    1
    Neither party challenges—nor do we further address—whether the time-
    sharing percentages used by the trial court in its section 61.30(11)(b) calculations are
    correct.
    -3-
    percentage with the other parent's obligation as required by the statute, instead
    multiplying each parent's percentage with that same parent's obligation.2 We agree.
    We offer no opinion on the correctness of the Former Wife's ultimate
    determination of the correct support obligation amount because other factors may also
    be considered in reaching the child support award under section 61.30(11)(b)(7).
    Nevertheless, use of the formula set forth in section 61.30(11)(b) does identify a
    mathematical error apparent in the amount of the child support obligation reached in the
    final judgment. We therefore reverse solely on the basis that applying the formula set
    forth in section 61.30(11)(b)(3) to the numbers provided in the final judgment yields a
    number that is different than the award amount reached in the final judgment. See
    Smith v. Smith, 
    39 So. 3d 458
    , 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). This error applies to both the
    current and retroactive child support awards. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court
    to recalculate the child support and retroactive child support obligations using the
    correct multiplication procedures.
    Based on this reversal, the parties' remaining claims related to the
    reduction in the amount of retroactive alimony owed in the amended final judgment and
    the entitlement to an additional setoff amount on top of the reduction in the retroactive
    2
    Specifically, the Former Wife argues that in applying section
    61.30(11)(b)(3), the correct calculations are represented by the following two equations:
    $1427 (the Former Husband's obligation) x .25 (the Former Wife's time-
    sharing percentage for both children) = $356.75; and
    $1216 (the Former Wife's obligation) x .75 (the Former Husband's time-
    sharing percentage) = $912.
    The smaller result is then to be subtracted from the larger pursuant to
    section 61.30(11)(b)(4), resulting in the Former Wife's argument that she owes only
    $555.25 in child support. According to the partial calculations set forth in the final
    judgment, the trial court instead errantly multiplied $1427 by .75 and $1216 by .25. This
    resulted in the incorrect conclusion that the Former Wife owed $766 in child support per
    month.
    -4-
    award are moot. Because the recalculation in the child support amount on remand will
    necessarily require the trial court's recalculation of the amount owed in retroactive child
    support, we note that the trial court may again opt to exercise its statutory discretion in
    determining the retroactive amount. Sections 61.30(2) and (11)(a)(11) anticipate that a
    trial court can consider the matter of the Former Husband living rent-free during a
    certain period in determining sources of parental income or setting a child support
    amount—including to achieve an equitable result. Section 61.30(17), applying
    specifically to the award of retroactive alimony, defines such a determination as
    discretionary and indicates that the trial court should consider the factors listed in
    section 61.30(2) as part of the determination.
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    LaROSE and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2D13-5509

Citation Numbers: 154 So. 3d 1165

Filed Date: 1/7/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023