Carlos Manuel Russell v. State of Florida , 269 So. 3d 621 ( 2019 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-4925
    _____________________________
    CARLOS MANUEL RUSSELL,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
    Michael C. Overstreet, Judge.
    April 16, 2019
    PER CURIAM.
    In this direct appeal from Appellant’s conviction and sentence
    for aggravated stalking, we affirm in all respects and write only to
    explain why the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
    admitting Appellant’s text messages to the victim as impeachment
    evidence.
    At the beginning of trial, the parties discussed the
    admissibility of various text communications between Appellant
    and his wife, the victim in this case. The court ruled that the text
    messages could not be admitted during the State’s case-in-chief
    because the State failed to file a timely notice to admit the text
    messages as collateral crime evidence. However, the court further
    ruled that this would not prohibit the defense from offering the
    text messages as impeachment evidence or the State from offering
    them as evidence during rebuttal.
    During its case-in-chief, the State presented testimony that
    after the victim separated from Appellant and obtained an
    injunction against him for protection against domestic violence,
    Appellant threatened the victim and her family with death or great
    bodily harm, showed up unannounced at the victim’s workplace,
    made over 100 phone calls to the victim’s office in a single
    afternoon, and attacked the victim in a pharmacy parking lot.
    During the defense’s case, Appellant took the stand and
    testified that the victim called him from work every day and
    invited him to visit her at work without her boss’s knowledge. He
    further testified that he and the victim went back and forth in their
    relationship and that the victim never stopped texting and calling
    him the entire time the injunction was in place. Although he
    acknowledged calling the victim at work repeatedly, he claimed he
    was desperate to get her on the phone to calm her down because
    she was upset about his involvement with other women.
    On cross-examination, the State was allowed to introduce,
    over defense objection, text messages sent by Appellant to the
    victim as impeachment evidence. In those messages, Appellant
    demanded to know why the victim would not answer the phone at
    work when he called and threatened to call her office nonstop
    regardless of any restraining order, come over to her office, and
    beat her like she was a man. Defense counsel subsequently moved
    for a mistrial on the ground that those text messages were sent
    prior to the entry of the injunction. The trial court denied the
    motion on the ground that the text messages were proper
    impeachment evidence.
    “A witness may open the door during the direct testimony to
    impeachment concerning matters that would not otherwise be
    permissible.” Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.1 (2018
    ed.). “Under this concept, the adverse party may be able to
    introduce extrinsic evidence to contradict a specific factual
    assertion made during the testimony of the witness, even if it
    pertains to an otherwise collateral matter.” Id. Thus, “a testifying
    defendant may open the door to impeachment with otherwise
    inadmissible collateral crime evidence by ‘inaccurately testifying
    2
    to material facts.’” Brookins v. State, 
    228 So. 3d 31
    , 37 (Fla. 2017).
    To do so, “the defense must first offer misleading testimony or
    make a specific factual assertion which the state has the right to
    correct so that the jury will not be misled.” Robertson v. State, 
    829 So. 2d 901
    , 913 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Bozeman v. State, 
    698 So. 2d 629
    , 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). “The standard of review of a
    determination of whether a party has opened the door is abuse of
    discretion as limited by the rules of evidence.” Maharaj v. State, 
    78 So. 3d 63
    , 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
    Here, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its
    discretion by admitting Appellant’s text messages to the victim as
    impeachment evidence because those messages did not contradict
    his testimony and were sent before the entry of the injunction. The
    State correctly responds that Appellant opened the door to cross-
    examination about those text messages because they contradicted
    Appellant’s testimony that the victim repeatedly initiated contact
    with him because she wanted them to get back together. The texts
    showed it was Appellant who insisted on communicating with the
    victim despite her efforts to avoid any further contact with him.
    The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to
    introduce this evidence to correct Appellant’s inaccurate and
    misleading testimony regarding the nature of his relationship with
    the victim.
    AFFIRMED.
    WOLF, WINOKUR, and JAY, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Megan Long, Assistant Public
    Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    3
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Jennifer J. Moore, Assistant
    Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-4925

Citation Numbers: 269 So. 3d 621

Filed Date: 4/16/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/16/2019