Citizens Property v. Ernesto & Rebecca Bascuas , 178 So. 3d 902 ( 2015 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed October 14, 2015.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    Nos. 3D14-2434, 3D14-1549
    Lower Tribunal No. 12-36797
    ________________
    Citizens Property Insurance Corp.,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Ernesto and Rebecca Bascuas,
    Appellees.
    Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Marc Schumacher,
    Judge.
    Methe & Rockenbach and Kara Berard Rockenbach and Lauren J. Smith
    (West Palm Beach); Quintairos, Prieto, Wood & Boyer and David Tarlow Asika
    Patel and Michelle Grosser., for appellant.
    Knecht & Knecht and Harold C. Knecht, Jr.; Jorge C. Borron; Margaret B.
    Reeder (Hobe Sound), for appellees.
    Before LAGOA, EMAS and FERNANDEZ, JJ.
    EMAS, J.
    In this consolidated appeal Appellant, Citizens Property Insurance Company
    (“Citizens”) seeks review of two orders: (1) an order granting attorney’s fees and
    costs in favor of the insureds, Appellees Ernesto and Rebecca Bascuas
    (“Bascuas”); and (2) an order denying Citizens’ motion for costs.          Because
    Bascuas was entitled to attorney’s fees under the express and non-discretionary
    language of the statute, we affirm the order granting fees and costs to Bascuas. We
    further hold (and Bascuas properly concedes) that the trial court erred in its order
    denying costs to Citizens, and reverse that order.
    FACTS
    Bascuas was insured by Citizens in May 25, 2012, when their home was
    damaged by water escaping from a broken plumbing system. Bascuas notified
    Citizens of the loss within a few days and Citizens arranged an inspection on May
    31. When Citizens’ adjuster arrived, Bascuas’ driveway and interior flooring had
    been trenched and the underground plumbing system removed by Arko Plumbing
    Corporation (“Arko”). After taking a recorded statement from Bascuas, Citizens
    paid Bascuas approximately $28,000.
    In September 2012, Bascuas filed a complaint against Citizens for breach of
    contract, alleging that the total amount of the loss was more than $330,000 and that
    Citizens refused to pay all covered losses. Citizens answered the complaint and
    asserted fraud as one of several affirmative defenses.      Citizens also asserted
    2
    counterclaims for fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, and
    unjust enrichment, seeking recoupment of the $28,000 already paid to Bascuas.
    Although both insureds testified under oath that they had no plumbing problems
    prior to May 25, 2012 and did not know Arko until the alleged date of loss,
    Citizens alleged that Arko had actually been to the Bascuas’ home prior to May 25.
    Citizens further alleged that Bascuas met with Arko the day before the reported
    date of loss to discuss a staged loss.
    Immediately prior to trial, Citizens dismissed those counts of its
    counterclaim alleging fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraud in the
    inducement. The case thus proceeded to trial only on Bascuas’ breach of contract
    claim (to which Citizens pleaded an affirmative defense of fraud) and Citizens’
    counterclaim for unjust enrichment.
    The jury returned the following verdicts as to Bascuas’ breach of contract
    claim (for Citizens’ failure to pay the total loss of $330,000) and Citizens’ unjust
    enrichment counterclaim (for recoupment of the $28,000 it already paid Bascuas):
    AS TO BASCUAS’ CLAIM (BREACH OF CONTRACT):
    1. Did Plaintiffs prove by the greater weight of the evidence that there was an
    accidental loss that caused water damage to the Property?
    _√___YES                         _____NO
    2. Did Citizens prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Plaintiffs
    intentionally concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance
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    and/or made false statements to Citizens when reporting that an alleged loss
    occurred on 5/25/2012?
    __√___YES                       _____NO
    AS TO CITIZENS’ COUNTERCLAIM (UNJUST ENRICHMENT):
    1. Did Citizens prove by the greater weight of the evidence that it conferred a
    benefit on the Bascuases by making payment in the amount of $25,278.43 for
    the dwelling and $2,200 for additional living expenses and did the Bascuases
    knowingly accept the benefit?
    __√___YES                       _____NO
    2. Did Citizens prove by the greater weight of the evidence that it would be
    unjust for the Bascuases to retain the insurance proceeds Citizens paid prior to
    suit being filed?
    _____YES                        __√___NO
    Following the verdict, the trial court entered final judgment in favor of
    Citizens on Bascuas’ complaint for breach of contract and in favor of Bascuas on
    Citizens’ counterclaim for unjust enrichment. Neither party appealed the final
    judgments; however, both parties moved to tax fees and costs. Citizens sought
    fees under the offer of judgment statute (section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2012))
    and costs under section 57.041, Florida Statutes (2012). Bascuas sought fees under
    section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (2012) and costs under section 57.041.
    4
    The trial court granted Bascuas’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs, and
    denied Citizens’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Citizens appeals the order
    denying its costs1 and the order granting Bascuas’ fees and costs. Citizens did not
    appeal that portion of the order which denied its motion for attorney’s fees.
    Citizens contends that, in light of the jury’s determination that Bascuas
    intentionally concealed or misrepresented a material fact or made a false statement
    when reporting the loss, the trial court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Bascuas
    under section 627.428(1), because such an award is contrary to public policy.2
    We review the issues on appeal de novo. Do v. GEICO General Ins. Co.,
    
    137 So. 3d 1039
     (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).
    ANALYSIS
    Section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (2014) provides:
    Upon the rendition of a judgment or decree by any of the
    courts of this state against an insurer and in favor of any
    named or omnibus insured . . . under a policy or contract
    executed by the insurer, the trial court or, in the event of
    an appeal in which the insured or beneficiary prevails,
    the appellate court shall adjudge or decree against the
    insurer and in favor of the insured . . . a reasonable sum
    as fees or compensation for the insured’s or beneficiary’s
    attorney prosecuting the suit in which the recovery is
    had.
    1Bascuas properly concedes error in the trial court’s denial of costs to Citizens.
    2 Citizens’ other argument on this issue is without merit and warrants no further
    discussion.
    5
    The basis for Bascuas’ claim of entitlement to fees under section 627.428(1)
    is not that it was successful on its breach of contract claim, but rather that it
    successfully defended against Citizens’ counterclaim.            Citizens alleged in its
    counterclaim that Bascuas had been unjustly enriched by keeping the $28,000
    already paid on the claim. Given the jury determinations, Bascuas was entitled to
    its attorney’s fees under section 627.428(1).
    The plain language of section 627.428(1) and the case law applying it,
    supports Bascuas’ position: “Upon the rendition of a judgment . . . against an
    insurer and in favor of any . . . insured . . . under a policy or contract executed by
    the insurer . . . the trial court . . . shall adjudge . . . against the insurer and in favor
    of the insured . . . a reasonable sum as fees . . . .” § 627.428(1) (emphasis added).
    The final order entered upon that jury determination was a judgment against an
    insurer and in favor of an insured, triggering Bascuas’ entitlement to a reasonable
    attorney’s fee in defending against Citizens’ counterclaim. The fact that Bascuas
    did not obtain a money judgment in its favor does not preclude their entitlement to
    fees.    Rodriguez v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 
    80 So. 3d 1042
    , 1044 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2011). The failure to award fees under these circumstances would have been
    “directly contrary to the mandatory, non-discretionary requirements of law as
    provided by section 627.428. . . .” Ramirez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 
    67 So. 3d 1174
    , 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).
    6
    The jury determined, contrary to Citizens’ counterclaim, that Bascuas had
    not been unjustly enriched and that Citizens was not entitled to recoup the $28,000
    it had already paid Bascuas on the claim. We do not and cannot know why the
    jury found Bascuas had not been unjustly enriched, but the jury nevertheless made
    such a determination in its verdict interrogatory, together with its determination
    (on Bascuas’ breach of contract claim) that Bascuas intentionally concealed or
    misrepresented a material fact or circumstance, or made false statements to
    Citizens when reporting that a loss occurred on May 25, 2012.3 Citizens contends
    that, notwithstanding the existence of a judgment in favor of Bascuas on the
    counterclaim, the trial court erred in awarding fees to Bascuas under section
    627.428(1) because such an award of fees is contrary to public policy, namely: (1)
    3 Though not explicit, Citizens’ argument at the very least implies that these two
    jury determinations are inconsistent and cannot legally co-exist. Citizens
    necessarily contends that, given the jury’s breach of contract verdict finding that
    Bascuas made a false statement or material misrepresentation, Citizens was entitled
    as a matter of law to a judgment in its favor on its unjust enrichment counterclaim
    as well. In other words, the argument goes, a finding that Bascuas made a material
    misrepresentation or false statement should have resulted in a judgment in
    Citizens’ favor not only on Bascuas’ complaint for breach of contract, but also on
    Citizens’ counterclaim for unjust enrichment. If this be so (and we do not reach
    the merits of such a contention), it was incumbent upon Citizens to raise and
    properly preserve this issue by an objection to the verdicts before the jury was
    discharged to give the jury, upon proper additional instructions, an opportunity to
    cure any claimed error. See Coba v. Tricam Indus. Inc., 
    164 So. 3d 637
     (Fla.
    2015); J.T.A. Factors, Inc. v. Philcon Servs., Inc., 
    820 So. 2d 367
     (Fla. 3d DCA
    2002). Citizens did not object to the jury the verdicts as inconsistent. And, as
    noted earlier, Citizens dismissed the three fraud counts of its counterclaim prior to
    trial.
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    Florida’s public policy against material misrepresentations during the claims
    process; and (2) the public policy behind section 627.428, which is to discourage
    insurers from contesting valid claims.
    This Court has already spoken to this issue and has made clear that “we
    believe that modification of [section 627.428] to address false statements by an
    insured is best left to the legislature.” Mercury Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Cooper, 
    919 So. 2d 491
    , 493 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). Citizens seeks the very same remedy requested
    by the appellant in Cooper and rejected by our opinion in that case: “a judicially
    crafted exemption to section 627.428(1) in cases where there is insurance fraud.”
    
    Id.
     While Citizens’ argument may be persuasive to support a change in this area of
    the law (to allow for a fraud exception), we reaffirm that such a change must be
    effectuated legislatively, not judicially.
    Regardless of what we might surmise as the reasons for the jury’s
    determinations, this much is clear: A judgment was entered in favor of Bascuas on
    Citizens’ counterclaim, satisfying the provisions of section 627.428(1) that there be
    a “rendition of a judgment . . . against an insurer and in favor of any . . . insured . .
    . under a policy or contract executed by the insurer. . . .” Bascuas was therefore
    entitled to attorney’s fees for the successful defense of, and favorable judgment on,
    Citizens’ counterclaim, and the trial court properly awarded attorney’s fees and
    costs to Bascuas.
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    Finally, and as Bascuas properly concedes, the trial court erred in failing to
    grant Citizens its costs under section 57.041 because Citizens prevailed on
    Bascuas’ breach of contract claim.4
    We affirm the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to Bascuas based
    upon the judgment rendered in Bascuas’ favor on the unjust enrichment
    counterclaim. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Citizens’ motion for costs
    based on the judgment in Citizens’ favor on the breach of contract claim, and
    remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    4 Section 57.041(1), Florida Statutes (2012) provides in pertinent part: “The party
    recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall
    be included in the judgment. . . .” A trial court has no discretion to deny lawful
    court costs to the party recovering judgment. Higgs v. Klock, 
    873 So. 2d 591
     (Fla.
    3d DCA 2004).
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