Terrance Jarod Hartley v. State of Florida , 206 So. 3d 836 ( 2016 )


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  •                                         IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    TERRANCE JAROD HARTLEY,                 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Appellant,                        DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                      CASE NO. 1D15-3209
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed December 21, 2016.
    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
    Terry D. Terrell, Judge.
    Philip J. Massa, West Palm Beach, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Virginia Chester Harris, Assistant Attorney
    General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    B.L. THOMAS, J.
    Appellant, convicted of first-degree murder with a firearm, raises two issues
    on appeal. First, although the issue was not preserved, Appellant contends that the
    State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Second, based
    on this lack of preservation, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
    failing to move for a judgment of acquittal, which would have preserved the issue
    for appellate review. Because we find there was competent, substantial evidence
    to support the conviction below, we affirm the conviction and write only to address
    Appellant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.
    We hold Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails on the merits.             Trial
    counsel’s failure to make a motion for a judgment of acquittal could not have
    prejudiced Appellant, as the motion could not have been granted as a matter of
    law. See Tibbs v. State, 
    397 So. 2d 1120
    , 1123 (Fla. 1981) (holding that appellate
    courts “should not retry a case or reweigh conflicting evidence submitted to a jury”
    and a trial court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal should be affirmed
    so long as “after all conflicts in the evidence and all reasonable inferences
    therefrom have been resolved in favor of the verdict on appeal, there is substantial,
    competent evidence to support the verdict and judgment.”). Further, “[i]f, after
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact
    could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,
    sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.” Pagan v. State, 
    830 So. 2d 792
    ,
    803 (Fla. 2002). Where the State introduces direct and circumstantial evidence of
    a defendant’s guilt, “it is unnecessary to apply the special standard of review
    applicable to circumstantial evidence cases.” 
    Id.
     (citing Wilson v. State, 
    493 So. 2d 1019
    , 1022 (Fla. 1986)).
    2
    During its case in chief, the State called several eyewitnesses and law-
    enforcement officers whose testimony was sufficient to support a guilty verdict.
    Their testimony showed that Appellant’s motivation to shoot the victim resulted
    from the robbery of Appellant’s associate the night before the shooting; Appellant
    had shown a photo of the victim to someone else to confirm the victim’s identity;
    Appellant was at the scene of the shooting; Appellant fired several shots into the
    car in which the victim was a passenger; Appellant later fled when officers
    attempted to pull him over; and Appellant gave conflicting stories to a police
    investigator when initially interviewed about the incident. All of this evidence,
    when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was legally sufficient to
    submit the evidence to the jury. See Morales v. State, 
    170 So. 3d 63
    , 66-67 (Fla.
    1st DCA 2015) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to support a guilty verdict
    for attempted first-degree murder where eyewitnesses identified the defendant as
    the shooter and testified that the shooter pulled up next to the victim in a car and
    then “‘fired, fired, fired[,] and then one more shot was fired and then they sped
    off[.]’”).
    Appellant nevertheless argues that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
    move for a judgment of acquittal. Generally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
    claims are not reviewable on direct appeal and should be raised by a motion for
    postconviction relief. Latson v. State, 
    193 So. 3d 1070
    , 1073 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)
    3
    (Winokur, J., concurring) (“The trial court is the more appropriate forum to present
    such claims where evidence might be necessary to explain why certain actions
    were taken or omitted by counsel.” (quoting McKinney v. State, 
    579 So. 2d 80
    , 82
    (Fla. 1991))). However, where “the facts on which [the] claim is based are evident
    on the record,” such claims are cognizable on appeal. Stewart v. State, 
    420 So. 2d 862
    , 864 (Fla. 1982). In Monroe v. State, 
    191 So. 3d 395
    , 402-03 (Fla. 2016), the
    Florida Supreme Court held that defense counsel’s failure “to preserve the
    sufficiency of the evidence issue for appellate review constitute[d] ineffective
    assistance of counsel that is apparent from the face of this record.” Id. at 402. The
    court noted that “[a]n appellate court initially reviewing a conviction will only
    grant relief for ineffective assistance of counsel where the ineffectiveness of
    counsel is apparent from the face of the record before the appellate court and a
    waste of judicial resources would result from remanding the matter to the lower
    court for further litigation.” Id. at 403 (emphasis in original).
    Logically, based on the reasoning in Monroe and Stewart, appellate courts
    may also deny an ineffectiveness claim raised on direct appeal, if, as here, it is
    apparent from the record that trial counsel was not ineffective as a matter of law.
    Furthermore, deferring a ruling on this claim to the trial court would only waste
    judicial resources. Here, we can address the merits because, assuming arguendo
    that counsel was deficient, Appellant cannot show prejudice, as any motion for
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    judgment of acquittal would have been necessarily denied.              Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 692 (1984) (requiring “any deficiencies in counsel’s
    performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective
    assistance under the Constitution.”); Tibbs, 
    397 So. 2d at 1123
    ; Pagan, 
    830 So. 2d at 803
    .
    It is well settled that counsel is not required to make futile objections or
    motions. Willacy v. State, 
    967 So. 2d 131
    , 140 (Fla. 2007) (holding counsel was
    not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection); see also Lynch v. Crosby,
    
    2006 WL 741555
    , 11-12 (N.D. Fla. 2006) (holding counsel was not deficient for
    failing to make fruitless motions for judgment of acquittal). Because no prejudice
    can be demonstrated here, as the State submitted legally sufficient evidence to the
    jury, we hold that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim fails on the merits.
    AFFIRMED.
    ROWE and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
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