The City of Port St. Lucie v. Vallerie Follano , 177 So. 3d 301 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    THE CITY OF PORT ST. LUCIE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    VALLERIE FOLLANO,
    Respondent.
    No. 4D15-2642
    [October 7, 2015]
    Petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth
    Judicial Circuit, St. Lucie County; Janet Croom, Judge; L.T. Case No.
    562013CA000999.
    Carri S. Leininger and James O. Williams, Jr. of Williams, Leininger &
    Cosby, P.A., North Palm Beach, for petitioner.
    James L.S. Bowdish and Donna E. DeMarchi of Crary Buchanan, P.A.,
    Port St. Lucie, for respondent.
    PER CURIAM.
    Petitioner, the City of Port St. Lucie, seeks certiorari review of an order
    compelling production of certain photographs, which it claims are
    protected work product.         The trial court found the photographs
    discoverable under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4) but failed to
    conduct an in camera review before making that determination. We
    therefore grant the City’s petition, quash the trial court’s order, and
    remand for an in camera review and an evidentiary hearing.
    Respondent, Vallerie Follano, sued the City for negligence after stepping
    into an uncovered sewer valve access pipe up to her knee. The City took
    photographs of the area on the day of the incident, after Follano was
    extracted by the fire department. The photographs show the uncovered
    pipe, but the City claims the surrounding area had been altered
    significantly by the firefighters. Follano took photographs of the area the
    next day, but the pipe had been covered by that time.
    Follano moved to compel production of the City’s photographs over the
    City’s claim of work product privilege. She argued the City’s photographs
    are the only available evidence of how the pipe appeared on the day of the
    incident since the area was later completely reconstructed. The trial court
    granted the motion based on the testimony of Follano’s counsel, without
    reviewing the City’s photographs, simply finding that “the photographs
    cannot be obtained by any other measure.” The court denied the City’s
    request to review the photographs in camera.
    Certiorari review is appropriate when a discovery order departs from
    the essential requirements of law, causing material injury throughout the
    remainder of the proceedings below and effectively leaving no adequate
    remedy on appeal. See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
    Am. Educ. Enters., LLC, 
    99 So. 3d 450
    , 454-55 (Fla. 2012); Allstate Ins. Co.
    v. Langston, 
    655 So. 2d 91
    , 94 (Fla. 1995). “An order compelling
    production of privileged work product materials from a litigant’s file is
    exactly the type of discovery order properly reviewable by certiorari. Once
    a litigant is compelled to produce work product, the cat is out of the bag
    and the harm is done.” Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Kosakowski, 
    659 So. 2d
    455, 456 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (citations omitted). We therefore accept
    jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order in this case.
    Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(4) provides that a party may be
    ordered to produce privileged work product “only upon a showing that the
    party seeking discovery has need of the materials in the preparation of the
    case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial
    equivalent of the materials by other means.” In Snyder v. Value Rent-A-
    Car, 
    736 So. 2d 780
    (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), this Court held that when a work
    product privilege is asserted, the trial court must conduct an in camera
    inspection of the material at issue in order to determine whether the
    privilege applies. The court can then consider whether the material is
    discoverable under Rule 1.280. 
    Id. at 782;
    see also Lloyd’s Underwriters
    at London v. El-Ad Villagio Condo. Ass’n, 
    976 So. 2d 28
    , 29 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2008); Town Ctr. @ Boca Raton Trust v. Hirokawa, 
    789 So. 2d 1230
    , 1231-
    32 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).1
    The trial court in this case departed from the essential requirements of
    law by failing to conduct an in camera review before determining that the
    City’s photographs were discoverable under Rule 1.280. Such a review is
    1
    These cases refer to Rule 1.280(b)(3), but the subsection was renumbered as
    (b)(4) in 2012. See In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure—Elec.
    Discovery, 
    95 So. 3d 76
    , 79-80 (Fla. 2012).
    2
    necessary to determine whether the City’s photographs provide the
    evidentiary value Follano claims and whether Follano could obtain
    substantially equivalent photographs without undue hardship.
    We reject Follano’s argument that an in camera inspection is not
    required when, as here, the party seeking discovery concedes that the
    material at issue constitutes work product, but argues that it is
    nevertheless discoverable under Rule 1.280. The inspection is intended,
    in part, to assist the trial court in making the factual determinations
    required by the rule. See, e.g., Fla. E. Coast Ry., LLC v. Jones, 
    847 So. 2d 1118
    , 1119 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“[W]e direct the trial court to hold an
    evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiff could make the
    requisite showing of need and undue hardship. In doing so the trial court
    should review the materials in camera to determine whether [the plaintiff]
    can meet his burden under [the Rule].”).
    We therefore grant the City’s petition and quash the trial court’s order
    granting Follano’s motion to compel. On remand, the trial court is directed
    to conduct an in camera review of the City’s photographs and hold an
    evidentiary hearing to determine whether Follano has met her burden
    under Rule 1.280(b)(4).
    Petition for writ of certiorari granted; order quashed; remanded for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    GROSS, LEVINE and CONNER, JJ., concur.
    *         *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    3