R.J., a Child v. State , 142 So. 3d 907 ( 2014 )


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  •         DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    January Term 2014
    R.J., a child,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    No. 4D13-635
    [July 2, 2014]
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
    Broward County; Michael Orlando, Judge; L.T. Case No. 12-
    006079DL00A.
    Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ellen Griffin, Assistant Public
    Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Matthew Steven
    Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
    GROSS, J.
    The State is not required to prove a juvenile’s age to vest subject matter
    jurisdiction in the juvenile division of the circuit court.
    After a trial, appellant was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated
    assault with a deadly weapon. There was ample evidence of the offense.
    During the trial, the State elicited testimony from the arresting officer that
    appellant said his birthday was February 13, 1996, making him sixteen
    years old at the time of the crime. The officer made no other attempt to
    confirm appellant’s age.
    Following up on an objection made in the circuit court, appellant
    argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of dismissal since the State failed to establish he was under
    eighteen at the time of the offense, leaving the circuit court without
    jurisdiction.1 We disagree.
    The circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over felony charges
    and misdemeanor and felony charges committed by juveniles. Article V,
    section 5(b) of the Florida Constitution imbues circuit courts with original
    jurisdiction over all cases “not vested in the county courts.” Circuit courts
    thus function as “tribunals of plenary jurisdiction,” Dep’t of Revenue v.
    Kuhnlein, 
    646 So. 2d 717
    , 720 (Fla. 1994), such that “nothing is intended
    to be outside their jurisdiction except that which clearly and specially
    appears so to be.” Dep’t of Children & Families v. J.J.E., 
    901 So. 2d 215
    ,
    216 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (citing English v. McCrary, 
    348 So. 2d 293
    , 297
    (Fla. 1977)).
    In the criminal context, this means circuit courts may hear all cases
    except adult misdemeanor offenses. See § 34.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012)
    (providing county courts with original jurisdiction “[i]n all misdemeanor
    cases not cognizable by the circuit courts”). Section 985.0301(1), Florida
    Statutes (2012), states that “[t]he circuit court has exclusive original
    jurisdiction of proceedings in which a child is alleged to have committed a
    delinquent act or violation of law.” Jurisdiction of juvenile proceedings
    thus “is not limited by the nature of the act, as the court may deal with
    misdemeanors or felonies. Instead, its jurisdiction is limited by the age of
    the participant.” Cesaire v. State, 
    811 So. 2d 816
    , 817 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2002).
    To avoid pandemonium, Florida’s circuit courts are “divided into
    divisions, with each division handling certain types of cases.” In re
    Guardianship of Bentley, 
    342 So. 2d 1045
    , 1046-47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
    This fractioning, however, is strictly for efficiency purposes and has no
    effect on a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction. As we have
    explained, “[a]ll circuit court judges have the same jurisdiction within their
    respective circuits. . . . The internal operation of the court system and the
    assignment of judges to various divisions does not limit a particular
    judge’s jurisdiction.” In the Interest of Peterson, 
    364 So. 2d 98
    , 99 (Fla.
    4th DCA 1978).
    Juvenile courts are one such “division” of the circuit court. Upon this
    backdrop, whether a “child” falls within the “age” requirements of a
    juvenile court is not a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, but one of
    “divisional” jurisdiction—i.e., whether the juvenile is in the correct circuit
    court “division.” Williams v. State, 
    737 So. 2d 1141
    , 1142 & n.1 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 1999); Partridge v. Partridge, 
    790 So. 2d 1280
    , 1284 (Fla. 4th DCA
    1
    We note that the juvenile’s admission of his birthdate was competent proof of his
    age.
    -2-
    2001). If a juvenile is charged with committing a misdemeanor or a felony
    then the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. For
    example, where a juvenile’s case has been assigned to criminal court, but
    the juvenile does not object, any mistake in the assignment is waived. See
    State v. Griffith, 
    675 So. 2d 911
    , 913 (Fla. 1996) (“While the age of the
    defendant when the offense was committed rather than when the charges
    are filed controls whether the charges should be filed in juvenile court or
    criminal court, Griffith’s convictions must stand because he failed to object
    to being tried in adult court.”); State v. King, 
    426 So. 2d 12
    , 14 (Fla. 1982)
    (“[A] juvenile charged with an offense not punishable by death or life
    imprisonment has a right not to be charged by an indictment. However,
    this right, as with all other rights, may be waived if not asserted in a timely
    and proper fashion.”). Here, appellant was charged with a felony so the
    circuit court was the right place for him.
    Matters of juvenile “divisional” jurisdiction within the circuit court do
    not need to be proven at trial. In this case, the petition for delinquency
    alleged appellant was under eighteen years old at the time he committed
    the offense. If appellant disputed this fact, it was incumbent upon him to
    have the case transferred to criminal court.              The situation is
    distinguishable from the requirement that the State establish “venue,”
    since criminal defendants have a constitutional right to “be tried in the
    county where the crime took place.” State v. Stephens, 
    608 So. 2d 905
    ,
    906 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (citing Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const.); see, e.g., State v.
    Crider, 
    625 So. 2d 957
    , 959 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“[I]n order for Crider to
    have been properly tried in the correct venue, the record must support the
    jury’s conclusion that Crider dealt in stolen property in Volusia County.”).
    Affirmed.
    GERBER and FORST, JJ., concur.
    *        *         *
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    -3-