Gilchrease v. State , 219 So. 3d 264 ( 2017 )


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  •        Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed May 24, 2017.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D16-1027
    Lower Tribunal No. 15-4346
    ________________
    Steven Gilchrease,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    The State of Florida,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Veronica A.
    Diaz, Judge.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Natasha Baker-Bradley, Assistant
    Public Defender, for appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES, and LUCK, JJ.
    LUCK, J.
    Steven Gilchrease appeals his conviction and sentence for battery of his 67-
    year-old landlady on February 28, 2015, alleging error in the admission at trial of
    evidence relating to a prior confrontation which occurred three days before the
    charged incident. We affirm.
    Gilchrease had rented an efficiency from Etta McKensie for about six
    months prior to the February 28 incident. Sometime in January, water to the
    efficiency was turned off.      On February 25, the electricity was turned off.
    Gilchrease confronted Ms. McKensie about the utilities, and, according to Ms.
    McKensie, Gilchrease threatened her and pulled out the chair she was sitting on.
    Subsequently, on February 28, Gilchrease again confronted Ms. McKensie, and
    pushed her, causing her to stumble backward. Gilchrease was arrested for the
    latter incident and charged with battery of a person sixty-five years or older.
    Prior to trial, defense counsel moved in limine to exclude evidence of the
    February 25 confrontation as irrelevant and prejudicial. The State argued the
    evidence was admissible to prove Gilchrease’s motive and an absence of mistake.
    The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible to prove “motive and any
    mistake and any other attempt to bring in the testimony for any other reasons,” and
    Ms. McKensie testified as to the incident at trial. The jury returned a verdict of
    guilty, and the trial court sentenced Gilchrease to 180 days in the county jail and
    two years of probation.
    2
    On appeal, Gilchrease contends admission of the objected to evidence was
    error because it constituted prejudicial evidence of an uncharged crime, the
    admission of which destroyed his right to a fair trial. We disagree.
    The State may introduce evidence of an uncharged crime where that
    evidence is relevant to an issue in dispute and is not being used solely to show the
    defendant’s propensity to commit a crime. § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). Here,
    evidence of the February 25 incident was relevant to Gilchrease’s motive and
    intent in confronting and pushing Ms. McKensie.
    As to motive, the testimony about the February 28 incident, the one that was
    charged, was that Gilchrease confronted Ms. McKenzie in her home, pushed her in
    the chest and forehead, and said, “You don’t know what I’ll do to you.”1
    Gilchrease’s words and actions on February 28, however, did not explain his
    motive for confronting and pushing Ms. McKenzie, in other words, why he did
    what he did. The February 25 incident, which happened three days earlier, after
    the electricity and water had been shut off, filled in the gap to explain Gilchrease’s
    motive for the February 28 battery.
    On February 25, after the lights went off, Gilchrease confronted Ms.
    McKenzie and said, “The light off, I’m not moving, and I’m not giving you any
    1A second witness, Ms. McKenzie’s friend, testified that Gilchrease pushed Ms.
    McKenzie in the forehead and said, “Do you know who you’re fooling with? I
    will put you down.”
    3
    money. . . . [Y]ou don’t know me. You don’t know me.” Gilchrease then pulled
    Ms. McKenzie’s chair out from under her. The February 25 incident explained
    that Gilchrease’s motive for pushing Ms. McKenzie, and saying what he said, was
    that he was upset about the water and electricity being turned off, and blamed Ms.
    McKenzie for it. The February 25 incident, therefore, was relevant and admissible
    as motive evidence under section 90.404(2)(a). See Jackson v. State, 
    522 So. 2d 802
    , 806 (Fla. 1988) (“The testimony of a prior assault on the victim McKay by
    Jackson during an argument over drugs was not so remote in time as to be
    irrelevant and supported the state’s theory that Jackson’s motive for killing Milton
    and McKay was his belief that they were stealing his drugs and taking advantage
    of him.”); Craig v. State, 
    510 So. 2d 857
    , 863 (Fla. 1987) (“We find that the
    evidence of appellant's thefts of cattle on several occasions was relevant to show
    his motive for killing Eubanks and Farmer. The cattle thefts were not wholly
    independent of the murders but rather were an integral part of the entire factual
    context in which the charged crimes took place. While evidence of motive is not
    necessary to a conviction, when it is available and would help the jury to
    understand the other evidence presented, it should not be kept from them merely
    because it reveals the commission of crimes not charged. The test for admissibility
    is not the necessity of evidence, but rather its relevancy.” (citations omitted)).
    4
    The February 25 incident also was relevant to prove Gilchrease had the
    intent to commit battery on Ms. McKenzie. The battery statute requires the state to
    prove that the defendant “intentionally touch[ed] or str[uck] another person against
    the will of the other.” § 784.03(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2015). The February 25
    incident, which involved Gilchrease confronting, and pulling the chair out from
    under, Ms. McKenzie was relevant to show that his push was willful and
    purposeful because of his continued anger about the utilities being turned off. See
    Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 404.14, at 255-56 (2006 ed.) (“Although
    motive itself is usually not an ultimate issue, it supplies the basis from which the
    jury may infer that the defendant intended to do the act.”); see also Beard v. State,
    
    842 So. 2d 174
    , 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (“Intent is a necessary element of battery,
    and must be determined by the surrounding circumstances.”). The prior incident
    showed Gilchrease’s state of mind when he went to Ms. McKenzie’s home on
    February 28.
    The trial court correctly determined that evidence of the first incident was
    relevant to prove an issue in dispute in Gilchrease’s battery trial. There being no
    error, we affirm the conviction and sentence entered below.
    Affirmed.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1027

Citation Numbers: 219 So. 3d 264

Filed Date: 5/24/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023