Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 13, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D19-2204
Lower Tribunal No. 19-16891
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Carlos Enrique Luna Lam, et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Univision Communications, Inc., et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Daryl E.
Trawick, Judge.
Nelson Mullins Broad and Cassel, and Beverly A. Pohl (Ft.
Lauderdale), and Mark F. Raymond, and Amy Steele Donner; Harder LLP,
and Charles J. Harder, and Dilan Esper, and Lan P. Vu, and Ryan J.
Stonerock (Beverly Hills, CA), for appellants.
Podhurst Orseck, P.A., and Stephen F. Rosenthal, and Peter Prieto,
and Alissa Del Riego; Ballard Spahr LLP, and Leita Walker (Minneapolis,
MN), Seth D. Berlin, and Lauren Russell (Washington, DC), for appellees.
Before LINDSEY, HENDON, and BOKOR, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.
Appellants Carlos Enrique Luna Lam and Iglesia Cristiana Casa de
Dios (Plaintiffs below) appeal from a final order dismissing their defamation
action with prejudice pursuant to Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute, section
768.295, Florida Statutes (2021). Though we agree with Appellants that
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute does not create a different motion to dismiss
standard, we nevertheless affirm the trial court’s dismissal because
Appellants failed to plead facts that, if proven, would establish actual malice.
However, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice, and we
remand without prejudice to amend the Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Carlos Enrique Luna Lam is a pastor and co-founder of Iglesia
Cristiana Casa de Dios in Guatemala. In December 2018, Appellee
Univision Communications, Inc. aired a television special that profiled
several Latin American megachurches and pastors, including Luna (the
“Original Broadcast”).1 Univision also published several related articles
1
The special was entitled “Los Magnates de Dios” (Magnates of the Lord).
Luna’s segment was called “Todo por Cash” (Everything for Cash), a
reference to Luna’s nickname, “Cash Luna.” According to Luna, this
nickname came from his inability to pronounce his name “Carlos” when he
was a child.
2
online. The Original Broadcast and the written articles include statements
from Jorge Mauricio Herrera Bernal, a pilot who has admitted to transporting
cocaine for a Columbian cartel and who claimed to be a United States Drug
Enforcement Administration informant. 2 Herrera Bernal asserted that Luna
accepted money to build his church complex from his next-door neighbor,
Marllory Chacón, a convicted drug trafficking cartel boss known as the
“Queen of the South.”
Luna and Casa de Dios (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought the underlying
defamation action against three Univision entities and two journalists who
worked on the report (collectively, “Univision”). 3 According to the Complaint,
“Univision falsely accused Pastor Luna of, among other things, accepting
and laundering large amounts of money from a convicted drug trafficker,
[Chacón], and using that money to build a new church for Casa de Dios.”
The Complaint goes on to specifically identify many alleged defamatory
statements having to do with Luna’s ties to Chacón. The Complaint further
alleges that Univision’s primary source, Herrera Bernal, was not reliable and
2
Univision also interviewed a second, corroborating source, who appeared
anonymously.
3
There are three Univision entities: Univision Communications, Inc.;
Univision Interactive Media, Inc.; and The Univision Network Limited
Partnership. The two journalists are Gerardo Reyes and Peniley Ramírez.
Ramírez was not served below and is therefore not a party to this appeal.
3
provided false information and that Univision “knew the statements were
false, had serious doubts as to their truth, or published them with reckless
disregard for, and in purposeful avoidance of, the truth.”
Univision moved to dismiss the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute, section 768.295. In its motion, Univision
argued that Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute imposed a “materially higher
burden” on Plaintiffs than a typical motion to dismiss. Univision also argued
that because Plaintiffs are public figures, the “actual malice” standard for
defamation applied and that the alleged facts, even if true, were insufficient
as a matter of law to establish actual malice.
In their Response, Plaintiffs argued that the Anti-SLAPP statute does
not create a new, separate Anti-SLAPP motion with different substantive
standards. With respect to the actual malice standard for defamation,
Plaintiffs did not dispute the standard applied, but they asserted the
allegations in the Complaint were sufficient to allege actual malice.
Plaintiffs served over 230 discovery requests, and Univision moved to
stay discovery while its motion to dismiss was pending. The parties
ultimately stipulated to stay discovery. The stipulated order recognized that
the parties “do not agree as to their respective burdens for a motion to
4
dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP Statute.” The parties agreed to limit their
submissions to the following:
(a) Defendants’ motion, (b) the Parties’ respective
memoranda of law, (c) the Complaint and its exhibits,
(d) the news articles, broadcasts, and/or publications
referenced in the Complaint and their certified
translations, and (e) items capable of judicial notice.
The Parties further agree that the Court may consider
only these items in deciding the Motion to Dismiss.
(Emphasis added).
At the conclusion of the hearing on Univision’s motion to dismiss, the
judge asked each side to submit proposed orders. The trial court adopted
Univision’s proposed order, which concludes that Florida’s Anti-SLAPP
statute places the burden on Plaintiffs—not on Univision—to prove their
claims are not without merit. The order also concludes that Plaintiffs did not
adequately plead facts that, if proven, would establish actual malice. Finally,
the order dismisses the Complaint with prejudice “[b]ecause amendment to
the Complaint would be futile . . . .” Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
The order on appeal has two components. First, it determines that
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute shifts the burden to Plaintiffs to prove their
claims are not “without merit.” And second, the order concludes that
5
Plaintiffs did not adequately plead facts that, if proven, would establish actual
malice.
A. Florida’s Anti-SLAPP Statute
According to the order on appeal, Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute
imposes a heightened burden on Plaintiffs by requiring “Plaintiffs—not
Defendants—to prove their claims are not ‘without merit.’” Plaintiffs argue
that a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to the Anti-SLAPP statute is governed
by the same standards as an ordinary motion to dismiss under the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. That is, “upon a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, all material allegations of the complaint are
taken as true. Those allegations are then reviewed in light of the applicable
substantive law to determine the existence of a cause of action.” Peeler v.
Indep. Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
206 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (citations
omitted); see also United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Michael I. Libman,
46 So. 3d 1101, 1103–04 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“A motion to dismiss under
rule 1.140(b) tests whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action, not
whether the plaintiff will prevail at trial. Therefore, ‘[a]ll allegations of the
complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom must be construed in favor of the non-moving party.’” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
6
This is an issue of first impression for this Court, the resolution of which
depends on the interpretation of section 768.295. We review the trial court’s
interpretation of the statute de novo and begin, as always, with the text of
the statute. See, e.g., Page v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas,
308 So. 3d
953, 958 (Fla. 2020).
In 2000, the Florida Legislature enacted section 768.295 for the
purpose of prohibiting government entities from engaging in “Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” or “SLAPP” suits. In 2015, the statute
was amended to extend this prohibition to “persons.” The 2015 amendment
also expanded protections to “free speech in connection with public issues.”
The statute’s stated purpose is as follows:
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to protect the right
in Florida to exercise the rights of free speech in
connection with public issues, and the rights to
peacefully assemble, instruct representatives, and
petition for redress of grievances before the various
governmental entities of this state as protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
and s. 5, Art. I of the State Constitution. It is the public
policy of this state that a person or governmental
entity not engage in SLAPP suits because such
actions are inconsistent with the right of persons to
exercise such constitutional rights of free speech in
connection with public issues. Therefore, the
Legislature finds and declares that prohibiting such
lawsuits as herein described will preserve this
fundamental state policy, preserve the constitutional
7
rights of persons in Florida, and assure the
continuation of representative government in this
state. It is the intent of the Legislature that such
lawsuits be expeditiously disposed of by the courts.
§ 768.295(1), Fla. Stat. (2021).
The statute further provides for the expeditious resolution of a lawsuit
in violation of the statute as follows:
(4) A person or entity sued by a governmental entity
or another person in violation of this section has a
right to an expeditious resolution of a claim that the
suit is in violation of this section. A person or entity
may move the court for an order dismissing the
action or granting final judgment in favor of that
person or entity. The person or entity may file a
motion for summary judgment, together with
supplemental affidavits, seeking a determination that
the claimant’s or governmental entity’s lawsuit has
been brought in violation of this section. The claimant
or governmental entity shall thereafter file a response
and any supplemental affidavits. As soon as
practicable, the court shall set a hearing on the
motion, which shall be held at the earliest possible
time after the filing of the claimant’s or governmental
entity’s response. The court may award, subject to
the limitations in s. 768.28, the party sued by a
governmental entity actual damages arising from a
governmental entity’s violation of this section. The
court shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred in connection with a
claim that an action was filed in violation of this
section.
§ 768.295(4), Fla. Stat. (2021)
8
As set forth above, the statute explicitly states that a defendant “may
move the court for an order dismissing the action or granting final judgment
. . . .” Id. However, the statute is silent as to any heightened burden on the
plaintiff that differs from the ordinary motion to dismiss standard. This alone
prevents us from agreeing with Univision’s position that the statue imposes
a heightened burden on plaintiffs. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012) (“Nothing is to be
added to what the text states or reasonably implies (casus omissus pro
omisso habendus est). That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not
covered.”).
In the order on appeal, the trial court concluded that Plaintiffs’
argument that the ordinary motion to dismiss standard applied contravened
the plain language, not of the statute, but of Gundel v. AV Homes, Inc.,
264
So. 3d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). 4 In Gundel, the Second District discussed
the dismissal standard applicable under Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute. The
court recognized, as we have, that “the statute is silent as to the burden or
procedure for considering a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 314. However, the
4
We recognize that Gundel was the only district court decision interpreting
Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute and was therefore binding on the trial court.
See Pardo v. State,
596 So. 2d 665, 666 (“[I]n the absence of interdistrict
conflict, district court decisions bind all Florida trial courts.”).
9
court proceeded to adopt a two-step burden-shifting analysis that is similar
to the test used in states with explicit burden-shifting provisions, specifically
using Maine as an example:
In considering motions to dismiss as to its anti-
SLAPP statute, the Maine Supreme Court has stated
that “the defendant carries the initial burden to show
that the suit was based on some activity that would
qualify as an exercise of the defendant’s First
Amendment right to petition the government” such
that the anti-SLAPP statute applies and then “the
burden falls on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant’s activity” is actionable.
Id. (quoting Schelling v. Lindell,
942 A.2d 1226, 1229 (Me. 2008)).
Unlike Florida’s statute, however, Maine’s statute provides for a
“special motion to dismiss” and explicitly sets forth the burden-shifting in the
statute. See Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 556 (“The court shall grant the special
motion, unless the party against whom the special motion is made shows
that the moving party’s exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any
reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that the moving
party’s acts caused actual injury to the responding party. In making its
determination, the court shall consider the pleading and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is
10
based.”). 5 Because the language in Maine’s statute is materially different
from the language in Florida’s statute—which does not contain a burden-
shifting provision—we do not consider the case law from Maine applicable
here.
Most states have some form of anti-SLAPP legislation, which varies
greatly in scope and strength.6 Many state statutes require the movant to
bear the initial burden of establishing that the anti-SLAPP statute applies. If
this initial burden is met, some statutes, like Maine’s, explicitly shift the
burden to the plaintiff. For example, in California, “[a] cause of action against
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s
right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
5
In at least one state, anti-SLAPP legislation that shifted the burden to the
plaintiff has been found to be unconstitutional. See Davis v. Cox,
351 P.3d
862, 874–75 (Wash. 2015) (“The legislature may enact anti-SLAPP laws to
prevent vexatious litigants from abusing the judicial process by filing frivolous
lawsuits for improper purposes. But the constitutional conundrum that RCW
4.24.525 creates is that it seeks to protect one group of citizen’s
constitutional rights of expression and petition—by cutting off another
group’s constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. This the legislature
cannot do.”), abrogated on other grounds, Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC v.
Thurston County,
423 P.3d 223 (2018).
6
According to the Public Participation Project, which tracks anti-SLAPP
legislation, 33 states and the District of Columbia have anti-SLAPP laws.
See State Anti-SLAPP Laws—Public Participation Project, http://www.anti-
slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection (last visited October 12, 2021).
11
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1) (emphasis added); see also
Samuel J. Morley, Florida’s Expanded Anti-SLAPP Law: More Protection for
Targeted Speakers, Fla. B.J., Nov. 2016 (describing the two-step analysis in
California, Texas, and other states with similar burden shifting anti-SLAPP
legislation). Many of these statutes predate Florida’s. If our Legislature had
intended to adopt this burden-shifting approach, it no doubt would have
enacted a statute with similar language.
Federal courts interpreting Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute have likewise
concluded that the statute does not impose a heightened burden on the
plaintiff. Because a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction cannot
apply a state statute if it conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
federal courts must sometimes interpret state anti-SLAPP statutes to
determine whether they contain a burden-shifting provision. See Carbone v.
Cable News Network, Inc.,
910 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2018). In
Carbone, for example, the Eleventh Circuit considered Georgia’s Anti-
SLAPP statute. Because Georgia’s statute requires the plaintiff to establish
“a probability” of prevailing, it imposed a burden that conflicted with the
12
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, therefore, could not be applied in
federal court. Id. at 1350-51. 7
7
More specifically, the Carbone court explained as follows:
The Georgia anti-SLAPP statute also compromises
the joint operation of Rules 8, 12, and 56. Taken
together, these Rules provide a comprehensive
framework governing pretrial dismissal and
judgment. Under Rule 12(d), a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a
motion for judgment on the pleadings “must be
treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56”
if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court....” In other words, the
Rules contemplate that a claim will be assessed on
the pleadings alone or under the summary judgment
standard; there is no room for any other device for
determining whether a valid claim supported by
sufficient evidence to avoid pretrial dismissal.
In short, Rules 8, 12, and 56 express “with
unmistakable clarity” that proof of probability of
success on the merits “is not required in federal
courts” to avoid pretrial dismissal, and that the
evidentiary sufficiency of a claim should not be tested
before discovery. [Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460,
470 (1965)]. But the relevant provisions of the
Georgia anti-SLAPP statute explicitly require proof of
a probability of success on the merits without the
benefit of discovery. The result is a “direct collision”
between the Federal Rules and the motion-to-strike
provision of the Georgia statute. [Id. at 472].
Id.
13
In Bongino v. Daily Beast Co., LLC,
477 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1323 (S.D.
Fla. 2020), the Southern District considered whether Florida’s Anti-SLAPP
statute conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court
recognized that “[t]he Eleventh, Fifth, D.C., and now Second Circuits agree:
certain states’ iterations of the anti-SLAPP statute . . . conflict with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because they raise the bar for a plaintiff to
overcome a pretrial dismissal motion.”
Id. at 1322–23. But this is “[n]ot so
for Florida’s anti-SLAPP statute” because “it does not require the plaintiff to
establish a probability that he will prevail on the claim asserted in the
complaint. Nor does Florida’s statute contemplate a substantive, evidentiary
determination of the plaintiff’s probability of prevailing on his claim. At bottom,
Florida’s statute is a garden variety fee shifting provision, which the Florida
legislature enacted to accomplish a fundamental state policy—deterring
SLAPP suits.” Id. at 1323 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Corsi v. Newsmax Media, Inc.,
519 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1128 (S.D.
Fla. 2021) (“Florida’s statute does not conflict with any Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure.”); Isaac v. Twitter, Inc., 21-CV-20684,
2021 WL 3860654, at *6
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2021) (“At bottom, Florida’s statute is a garden variety
fee shifting provision, which the Florida legislature enacted to accomplish a
14
‘fundamental state policy’—deterring SLAPP suits.” (quoting Bongino, 477 F.
Supp. 3d at 1323). 8
In short, because the plain language of Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute
does not shift the burden to Plaintiffs to establish that their claims have merit,
we decline to follow the approach in Gundel and add to the statue that which
is not in its text.
B. Actual Malice
Having established that Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute does not impose
a heightened burden on the Plaintiffs in this case, we turn now to the merits
of Univision’s motion. “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action is an issue of law, and therefore, our standard of
review is de novo.” Schilling v. Herrera,
952 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA
2007).
It is undisputed that the actual malice standard for defamation applies
because Plaintiffs are public figures. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
8
In Wentz v. Project Veritas, No: 617CV1164ORL18GJK,
2019 WL 910099,
at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Wentz v. Veritas, No:
617CV1164ORL18GJK,
2019 WL 11504451 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2019), the
court quoted Gundel’s burden-shifting language. The issue before the court
was whether the defendants’ discovery request was relevant to their
potential anti-SLAPP defense. The court held that the discovery request was
relevant based on the language in the statute. The court did not address
whether Gundel’s burden-shifting analysis applied as that issue was not
before the court.
15
376 U.S. 254 (1964). Actual malice occurs when a statement is made “with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.”
Id. at 280. “[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a
reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless
disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.” Readon v.
WPLG, LLC,
317 So. 3d 1229, 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021), review denied,
SC21-893,
2021 WL 3523557 (Fla. Aug. 11, 2021) (quoting St. Amant v.
Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
Plaintiffs contend Univision published with actual malice because it
should have been aware that its primary source, Herrera Bernal, is a criminal
whose competency was questioned in a separate criminal case. Moreover,
Plaintiffs further argue that Univision should have been aware of certain
“outrageous” allegations Herrera Bernal made in a series of pro se lawsuits.
In short, Plaintiffs’ allegations concern Univision’s failure to adequately
investigate Herrera Bernal’s background.
We agree with the trial court that Plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts
to show that Univision published with sufficient doubts as to the truth of its
16
publication. As this Court recently explained, “‘[a]ctual malice requires more
than a departure from reasonable journalistic standards . . . [t]hus, a failure
to investigate, standing on its own, does not indicate the presence of actual
malice.’ Instead, ‘there must be some showing that the defendant
purposefully avoided further investigation with the intent to avoid the truth.’”
Readon, 317 So. 3d at 1235 (quoting Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc.,
816 F.
3d 686, 701–02 (11th Cir. 2016)).
While it is true that Herrera Bernal’s competency was questioned in a
separate criminal case, the judge in that proceeding found Bernal competent
in two separate rulings.9 And it is also true that Herrera Bernal filed several
pro se complaints with some implausible allegations. But even assuming
Univision knew about Herrera Bernal’s pro se filings, nothing in these
complaints contradict Herrera Bernal’s account that Chacón gave money to
Luna. In fact, the complaints consistently allege that she did. See Talley v.
Time, Inc.,
923 F.3d 878, 903 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Sources need not be
paragons of virtue for journalists safely to rely on them.” (quoting 1 Robert
9
Though this information is outside of the Complaint, the parties stipulated
the trial court could consider it in deciding the motion to dismiss. Cf. Corsi
519 F. Supp. 3d at 1118–19 (“[W]hen considering a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss, the court’s review is generally ‘limited to the four corners of the
complaint.’ However, the court may also consider ‘documents incorporated
into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.’” (citations omitted)).
17
D. Sack, Sack on Defamation: Libel, Slander, and Related Problems §
5:5.2(C) at 5-109 (5th ed. 2017))).
Plaintiffs’ allegations simply do not satisfy the actual malice standard.
In Readon, this Court recognized a limited set of circumstances in which
actual malice might arise from a failure to investigate. 317 So.3d at 1236.
The allegations here, even if true, do not establish that Univision’s Original
Broadcast and online publications “were fabricated, wholly imaginary, based
on an unverified anonymous phone call, inherently improbable, or obviously
worthy of doubt.” See id. (quoting Michel, 816 F. 3d at 705). Because the
Complaint fails to satisfy the actual malice standard, we affirm the trial court’s
dismissal. However, we remand to permit Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
their complaint. See id. at 1238 (“Generally, refusal to allow amendment of
a pleading constitutes an abuse of discretion unless it clearly appears that
allowing the amendment would prejudice the opposing party; the privilege to
amend has been abused; or the amendment would be futile.”). 10
10
“[A]s an action progresses, the privilege of amendment progressively
decreases to the point that the trial judge does not abuse his [or her]
discretion in dismissing with prejudice.” Readon, 317 So. 3d at 1238 (quoting
Kohn v. City of Miami Beach,
611 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)). In
Readon, this Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the
third amended complaint, explaining that “with amendments beyond the third
attempt, dismissal with prejudice is generally not an abuse of discretion.”
Id.
(quoting Kohn,
611 So. 2d at 539). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs have not yet
amended their original complaint.
18
III. CONCLUSION
As set forth above, we decline to follow the Second District’s decision
in Gundel because the plain text of Florida’s Anti-SLAPP statute does not
impose a heightened burden on Plaintiffs. We nevertheless affirm the trial
court’s dismissal because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the actual malice
standard. We reverse only with respect to the trial court’s dismissal with
prejudice. Moreover, to the extent this decision is in direct conflict with
Gundel, we certify conflict. See Art. 5, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded without prejudice to
amend.
19
