Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed November 10, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-1741
Lower Tribunal No. 21-5837
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Kyle Roche, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
Jason Cyrulnik,
Respondent.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William
Thomas, Judge.
Leto Law Firm, and Matthew P. Leto; Roche Freedman LLP, and
Colleen L. Smeryage, for petitioners.
Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, and Maria H. Ruiz, for respondent.
Before LOGUE, SCALES and LINDSEY, JJ.
SCALES, J.
Petitioners Kyle Roche, Devin Freedman, Amos Friedland, Nathan
Holcomb, Edward Normand, and Roche Cyrulnik Freedman LLP (a/k/a
Roche Freedman LLP), the defendants below, petition this Court for
certiorari review of the trial court’s July 27, 2021 order denying their motion
to stay proceedings in the lower tribunal pending disposition of the related
federal action filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York.1 “We have certiorari jurisdiction to review orders determining
motions to stay a cause pending the disposition of another case.” REJWB
Gas Invs. v. Land O’Sun Realty, Ltd.,
645 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 4th DCA
1994). Because the record does not reveal “extraordinary circumstances”
warranting an exception to the general rule requiring a stay of the
subsequently filed action, we grant the petition, quash the July 27, 2021
order, and direct the circuit court to enter a stay pending disposition of the
federal action.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On December 27, 2019, respondent Jason Cyrulnik signed a
memorandum of understanding to form the law firm Roche Cyrulnik
Freedman LLP (“the Firm”). In the ensuing months, the working relationship
1
Roche Cyrulnik Freedman LLP v. Jason Cyrulnik, SDNY, Case No. 1:21-
cv-1746 (JGK).
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between Cyrulnik and the Firm’s partners deteriorated, resulting in the Firm’s
February 27, 2021 filing of a declaratory judgment action against Cyrulnik in
the federal district court. The Firm’s lawsuit seeks determinations that,
pursuant to the memorandum of understanding, (i) the Firm’s partners validly
removed Cyrulnik from the Firm for cause, and (ii) Cyrulnik is entitled only to
certain compensation delineated upon his removal from the Firm. Cyrulnik
was served in the federal action on March 3, 2021.
On March 9, 2021, Cyrulnik filed the instant state court action against
the Firm and the Firm’s partners (i.e., the petitioners herein) in the complex
business litigation division of the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court. Although
the claims asserted in the two actions are not identical, each of the claims
asserted in Cyrulnik’s state court action arise from the same nucleus of facts
upon which the Firm’s federal action is premised, to wit: the Firm’s purported
removal of Cyrulnik from the Firm and Cyrulnik’s entitlement to
compensation under the memorandum of understanding.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The General Rule Requiring a Stay of the Subsequently Filed State
Court Action
Generally, when a state lawsuit is filed that involves the same nucleus
of facts as a previously filed federal lawsuit, principles of comity and the
desire to avoid inconsistent results require the stay of the subsequently filed
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state action until the prior filed federal action has been adjudicated. See
OPKO Health, Inc. v. Lipsius,
279 So. 3d 787, 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019)
(“Although a trial court has broad discretion to order or refuse a stay of an
action pending before it, it is nonetheless an abuse of discretion to refuse to
stay a subsequent filed state court action in favor of a previously filed federal
action which involves the same parties and the same or substantially similar
issues. This rule is based on principles of comity.” (quoting Fla. Crushed
Stone Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
632 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
(citations omitted))). For this general rule to apply the causes of action
asserted in the two cases need not be identical, see Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC v. 21 Asset Mgmt. Holding, LLC,
307 So. 3d 923, 926 (Fla. 3d DCA
2020), nor must the two actions have identical parties. See Pilevsky v.
Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt., LLC,
961 So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)
(“Although only PSB is named as a plaintiff in the New York action, the only
additional parties named as defendants in the Florida action are PSB’s
individual investors and officers.”). Rather, the rule is applicable if both
actions involve “substantially similar parties and substantially similar issues,”
Id., on a “single set of facts [such] that resolution of the one case will resolve
many of the issues involved in the subsequently filed case.”
Id. (quoting Fla.
Crushed Stone Co.,
632 So. 2d at 220). Application of comity principles
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under these circumstances serves both to avoid wasting judicial resources
and the risk of inconsistent judgments in the two tribunals; thus, certiorari is
an appropriate remedy because “the denial of . . . [a] motion to stay the court
action is error that cannot be remedied on appeal.” Ocwen Loan Servicing,
LLC, 307 So. 3d at 926.
B. The “Extraordinary Circumstances” Exception to the General Rule
Courts have recognized an exception to the general rule requiring a
stay of the subsequently filed state court action when the party opposing the
stay has made a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. While Florida
decisional law provides little guidance on what constitutes such
“extraordinary circumstances,” the Florida Supreme Court has explained that
“[t]here may well be circumstances under which the denial of a stay could be
justified upon a showing of the prospects for undue delay in the disposition
of a prior action.” Siegel v. Siegel,
575 So. 2d 1267, 1272 (Fla. 1991) (quoting
Schwartz v. DeLoach,
453 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984)).
C. Application in this Case
In the challenged order, the trial court made the express, albeit
conclusory, finding that “litigation in the federal court will cause undue delay
if the state action is stayed.” This determination, though, is without any
evidentiary basis in the record. Indeed, the only suggestion that there will be
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any delay – undue or otherwise – in adjudicating the Firm’s federal action is
the mere supposition of Cyrulnik’s counsel at the hearing on the petitioners’
motion for stay; such supposition alone constitutes an insufficient showing.
See Schwartz,
453 So. 2d at 455 (“There may well be circumstances under
which the denial of a stay could be justified upon a showing of the prospects
for undue delay in the disposition of a prior action. Here, however, without
taking any testimony, counsel simply debated the progress of the federal
case which had only been pending in the federal court for slightly more than
four months.”) (emphasis added).
There being no showing of extraordinary circumstances on this or any
other basis in the lower proceeding, we conclude that, based on the record
now before us, the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to the general
rule requiring a stay of the subsequently filed state court action is
inapplicable, and that the trial court should have granted petitioners’ motion
to stay Cyrulnik’s state court action.
Id.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the July 27, 2021 order
denying the petitioners’ motion to stay, and remand to the circuit court with
directions to stay Cyrulnik’s state court action pending disposition of the
Firm’s federal action. Our ruling is without prejudice to Cyrulnik later seeking
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to lift the stay “upon a showing of interminable delay in the federal case,”
Id.
at 456, or other extraordinary circumstances.
Petition granted, order quashed, and cause remanded with directions.
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