Shamar Lavone McCullum v. State of Florida , 263 So. 3d 276 ( 2019 )


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  •          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-3928
    _____________________________
    SHAMAR LAVONE MCCULLUM,
    Appellant,
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    Steven B. Whittington, Judge.
    February 5, 2019
    WINSOR, J.
    Shamar McCullum appeals the denial of his motion to correct
    illegal sentence. We affirm.
    In 2006, McCullum pleaded guilty to armed robbery and
    attempted second-degree murder. The court sentenced
    McCullum—a juvenile at the time of the crime—to concurrent
    terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
    McCullum appealed his sentence, and this court affirmed without
    opinion. McCullum v. State, 
    41 So. 3d 896
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    (table).
    Later, McCullum filed a motion under Florida Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), arguing his life sentences were
    unconstitutional under Graham v. Florida, 
    560 U.S. 48
     (2010). The
    trial court denied the motion, but this court reversed and
    remanded for resentencing. McCullum v. State, 
    60 So. 3d 502
     (Fla.
    1st DCA 2011). On resentencing, McCullum got concurrent fifty-
    year sentences, and he again appealed. While that appeal was
    pending, McCullum was resentenced yet again (on an unrelated
    basis), receiving the sentence he is currently serving: fifty years for
    armed robbery and twenty-five years (concurrent) for attempted
    second-degree murder.
    In 2015, this court affirmed McCullum’s current sentences.
    McCullum v. State, 
    173 So. 3d 1056
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
    McCullum had argued that his sentence still violated Graham
    because it precluded any possibility of release for fifty years. He
    also argued that he should be eligible for sentence review under
    section 921.1402—Florida’s post-Graham juvenile sentencing
    statute. He acknowledged that the statute said it would apply
    prospectively only and that it was enacted after his crime. But he
    nonetheless argued the statutory process should apply to his
    sentence.
    This court affirmed through a citation PCA. McCullum, 
    173 So. 3d at 1056
    . We cited two cases: Abrakata v. State, 
    168 So. 3d 251
     (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) and Thomas v. State, 
    78 So. 3d 644
     (Fla.
    1st DCA 2011). 
    Id.
     The first case (Abrakata) held that “absent a
    violation of Graham, there is no legal basis to retroactively apply
    section 921.1402.” 
    168 So. 3d at 252
    . The second case (Thomas)
    concluded that a fifty-year sentence was not a life sentence under
    Graham. 
    78 So. 3d at 646-47
    .
    More than a year after we affirmed McCullum’s sentences, the
    Florida Supreme Court decided Kelsey v. State, 
    206 So. 3d 5
     (2017).
    The court held that for “a narrow class of juvenile offenders, those
    resentenced from life to term-of-years sentences after Graham, for
    crimes committed before [section 921.1402]’s July 1, 2014, effective
    date,” resentencing is appropriate. Id. at 11. Before Kelsey,
    McCullum had petitioned the Florida Supreme Court for review of
    our decision in his case. After the supreme court decided Kelsey, it
    denied McCullum’s petition. McCullum v. State, SC15-1770, 
    2017 WL 24756
    , at *1 (Fla. Jan. 3, 2017). Two Justices dissented, citing
    Kelsey and other cases and concluding that this court’s decision
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    conflicted with supreme court precedent and that McCullum was
    entitled to another resentencing.
    After all of that, McCullum filed another motion to correct
    illegal sentence. Again, McCullum argues that he is entitled to
    resentencing under Graham, and he now further argues that he is
    entitled to relief under Kelsey. But the law-of-the-case doctrine
    precludes our readdressing issues McCullum already pursued
    unsuccessfully, including his argument about Kelsey. See State v.
    McBride, 
    848 So. 2d 287
    , 290-91 (Fla. 2003) (explaining law-of-case
    doctrine). We find that the law-of-the-case’s manifest-injustice
    exception is inapplicable here, so we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    ROBERTS and RAY, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Shamar Lavone McCullum, pro se, Appellant.
    Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, and Barbara Debelius,
    Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee for Appellee.
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