JOSEPH C. DOUGLAS v. KATHRYN ANN DOUGLAS , 252 So. 3d 791 ( 2018 )


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  •                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    JOSEPH C. DOUGLAS,                 )
    )
    Appellant,              )
    )
    v.                                 )                 Case No. 2D17-2175
    )
    KATHRYN ANN DOUGLAS,               )
    )
    Appellee.               )
    ___________________________________)
    Opinion filed August 1, 2018.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Pinellas
    County; Jack Helinger, Judge.
    Nancy S. Paikoff and O. George Bamis of
    MacFarlane, Ferguson & McMullen,
    Clearwater, for Appellant.
    J. Andrew Crawford of J. Andrew Crawford,
    P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellee.
    SILBERMAN, Judge.
    Joseph C. Douglas, the Husband, seeks review of a final judgment of
    injunction for protection against domestic violence in favor of Kathryn Ann Douglas, the
    Wife. We reverse because the final judgment is not supported by competent,
    substantial evidence that the Wife had an objectively reasonable fear of imminent
    domestic violence.
    Section 741.30(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2016), provides for the issuance of
    an injunction "when it appears to the court that the petitioner is either the victim of
    domestic violence as defined by s. 741.28 or has reasonable cause to believe he or she
    is in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence." "Although an act of
    domestic violence need not be completed before one may seek injunctive relief, if fear
    alone is the 'reasonable cause' alleged to support the injunction, then not only must the
    danger feared be imminent but the rationale for the fear must be objectively reasonable
    as well." Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 
    960 So. 2d 902
    , 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). This court
    reviews a finding of an objectively reasonable fear of imminent domestic violence for
    competent, substantial evidence. 
    Id. at 905
    .
    Domestic violence is defined as "any assault, aggravated assault, battery,
    aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking,
    kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or
    death of one family or household member by another family or household member." §
    741.28(2). This definition requires a threat or showing of violence, and general
    harassment is insufficient. Young v. Smith, 
    901 So. 2d 372
    , 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
    "An injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists at
    the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil
    behavior that causes distress or annoyance." Arnold v. Santana, 
    122 So. 3d 512
    , 514
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (quoting Young v. Young, 
    96 So. 3d 478
    , 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)).
    When the Wife filed the petition for injunction in March 2017, the parties
    were in the midst of divorce proceedings. They had been residing together in the
    marital home with their three minor children until just a few days before the petition for
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    injunction was filed. The Wife testified that the Husband had a history of alcohol abuse
    and losing his temper. She claimed that the Husband had injured her in 1998 and 2011
    by grabbing her arms hard enough to cause bruising. And the parties offered differing
    versions of four incidents in the week before the petition was filed.
    The trial court refused to grant the injunction based on the 1998 and 2011
    incidents because they were too remote in time. However, the court granted the
    injunction based on its conclusion that this history coupled with the Wife's version of the
    four incidents in March 2017 established an objectively reasonable fear of imminent
    domestic violence. We cannot second-guess the court's finding that the Wife's
    evidence was more credible than the Husband's, so we set forth the evidence as
    presented by the Wife. See Jeffries v. Jeffries, 
    133 So. 3d 1243
    , 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2014).
    The first incident occurred on March 13, 2017. The Wife informed the
    Husband that she would be working late at her clothing boutique due to a private event.
    The Husband texted her at 9:30 p.m. and asked where she was. She replied that she
    was still at the boutique. The Husband drove his truck to the boutique and arrived at
    around 10:30 p.m. As the Husband pulled into the parking lot, the Wife and her clients
    were exiting the building. The Husband parked but did not turn off or get out of the
    vehicle. After a few minutes, the Husband revved his engine and peeled out of the
    parking lot. The Wife assumed he was mad at her because he did not greet her or her
    clients. His actions made one of the women uncomfortable.
    Shortly thereafter, the Wife returned to the marital home that the pair were
    still sharing. She went to the master bedroom to retrieve some clothing, but the
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    Husband was inside with the door locked. He refused to open the door until the Wife
    knocked loudly enough to wake the children. The Wife asked the Husband if he was
    upset with her, but he did not want to talk to her. The Wife spent the night in the guest
    room.
    The second incident occurred three days later on March 16, 2017. The
    Wife went to a late lunch with a friend, and as the two were leaving the restaurant they
    ran into the Husband. The Wife asked the Husband what he was doing there, and he
    said he was going to get his glasses fixed at a store in the same plaza. The third
    incident occurred on the following day when the Husband showed up at the same bar
    as the Wife to celebrate St. Patrick's Day. There was no contact between the two.
    The fourth incident occurred two days later on March 19, 2017, at the
    marital home. When the Wife walked into the kitchen that morning, the Husband
    confronted her about not attending their child's basketball game. The Husband called
    her "mother of the year" and a narcissist. He came within two feet of her and pointed
    his finger at her face. When the Wife went upstairs, the Husband followed her into the
    master bathroom. The Husband demanded that she open the safe and show him her
    wedding ring. When she said there was nothing in the safe, the Husband called her a
    liar. He was standing inches away from her and pointing his finger in her face again.
    The Wife said she was going to call the police. The Husband responded
    that he was going to call the police and blocked her from leaving the room. During this
    argument, one of their sons was showering in the master bathroom. When he came out
    of the shower, the Husband stepped away from the door. The Wife ran downstairs,
    grabbed her cell phone, and called the police. The Husband also called the police.
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    Then the Wife ran back upstairs and locked herself in the bathroom with their son. The
    Husband got a coat hanger and unsuccessfully tried to unlock the bathroom door. He
    also asked their son to open the door, but the boy did not comply. The police arrived.
    They classified the matter as a simple verbal dispute and left without making an arrest.
    In this case, the Wife did not establish any threatened or actual violence
    during the four incidents the court relied upon to grant the injunction. The facts of this
    case are analogous to those the First District found insufficient to support an injunction
    against domestic violence in Arnold, 
    122 So. 3d 512
    . In Arnold, the wife testified that
    she locked herself in the bathroom during an argument with the husband and that he
    kicked the door down. 
    Id. at 513
    . She claimed that the husband texted her warnings
    that he was tracking her online transactions. He also said he was following her. The
    wife asserted that the husband had hit her three or four years earlier and that the
    marriage involved a great deal of verbal abuse. 
    Id.
    The First District concluded that the wife did not set forth competent,
    substantial evidence to establish that she reasonably believed she was in imminent
    danger of domestic violence. 
    Id. at 514
    . The court explained that the wife did not allege
    that the husband hurt her when he broke the bathroom door down or that he threatened
    violence in his texts. The only allegation of violence occurred several years prior to
    filing and was an isolated incident. And there was no allegation that the husband had
    since threatened to do violence to the wife. 
    Id.
    In this case, the only allegations of violence occurred even further in the
    past than that in Arnold. And the allegations that formed the basis for the injunction
    were essentially the same. The Wife asserted that the Husband's showing up at the
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    same locations meant he was following her like the husband in Arnold. And as in
    Arnold, the other incident was a verbal argument that resulted in the Wife locking herself
    in the bathroom. Unlike in Arnold, the Husband used no force to enter the bathroom.
    Also as in Arnold, the Husband made no threats to do violence to the
    Wife. Indeed, the Husband twice attempted to deescalate arguments with the Wife.
    The night of the incident at the boutique the Husband declined her offer to discuss the
    matter and sent her away from their bedroom. And when the Wife refused to open the
    parties' safe during the incident at the marital home, the Husband actually called the
    police to get them to intervene.
    As in Arnold, the Husband's actions were insufficient to establish that the
    Wife reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of domestic violence. See also
    Stone v. Stone, 
    128 So. 3d 239
    , 241-42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that evidence of
    the husband's abandoned attempt to have intercourse with the wife, numerous texts and
    phone calls that caused her mental anguish, and a few surprise appearances "was
    simply insufficient to establish a fear of imminent danger"). Indeed, the Husband's
    actions in this case were more akin to "mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or
    annoyance." Arnold, 
    122 So. 3d at 514
    . Accordingly, we reverse the final injunction.
    Reversed.
    CASANUEVA and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
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