Crane v. Lifemark , 149 So. 3d 718 ( 2014 )

Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed October 15, 2014.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D13-2510
Lower Tribunal No. 12-2253
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Harold Crane,
Appellant,
vs.
Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., etc.,
Appellee.
An Appeal from the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Matthew W. Dietz, for appellant.
Lash & Goldberg LLP and Martin B. Goldberg and Lorelei J. Van Wey, for
appellee.
Before SHEHERD, C.J., and LAGOA and LOGUE, JJ.
LOGUE, J.
We review the decision of the Florida Commission on Human Relations
which held that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a complaint filed by Harold
Crane, who is deaf, against Lifemark Hospital of Florida, Inc., for failure to
provide an American Sign Language interpreter. The issue on appeal is whether a
private hospital in Florida constitutes a “public accommodation” under the Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992 by virtue of having a cafeteria within its premises. Based
on express language in the Act that excludes cafeterias in hospitals from the
provisions of the Act, we agree with the Commission that it does not have
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s determination that it lacked
jurisdiction of this dispute.
FACTS AND PROCDEDURAL BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Crane alleged he is deaf, does not speak, and that his
primary language is American Sign Language. During his four-day admission to
the Hospital, Crane alleges, the telecommunications device for the deaf provided to
him by the Hospital was inadequate, and although he requested an interpreter, the
Hospital failed to provide one until an hour before he was discharged. As a result,
at various points during his stay, he was unable to understand or communicate with
the doctors and nurses who treated him. Particularly pertinent to the legal issue on
appeal, Crane alleged the Hospital “is a covered accommodation by the presence
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of a food service establishment including the hospital cafeteria, and snack bar on
the first floor called Out Takes, as well as vending machines.”
After his discharge, Crane filed the complaint at issue. The Commission
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. It determined that a private
hospital is not a public accommodation covered by the Act. Crane timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 prohibits discrimination based on
handicap in places of public accommodation. In this regards, it reads:
All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this chapter, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, national origin, sex, handicap, familial status, or religion.
§ 760.08, Fla. Stat. (2011).
As the language quoted above indicates, however, the provisions of the act
extend only to a “place of public accommodation.” The Act defines “public
accommodation” by listing specific types of establishments and by including a
general category at the end of its definition. The establishments specifically listed
do not include hospitals. Crane, however, relies on the general provision at the end
of the definition. The definition reads, in pertinent part:
“Public accommodations” means places of public accommodation,
lodgings, facilities principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, gasoline stations, places of exhibition
or entertainment, and other covered establishments. Each of the
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following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this section:
...
(d) Any establishment which is physically located within the premises
of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or within
the premises of which is physically located any such covered
establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons of such
covered establishment.
§ 760.02(11), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added).
Crane contends that the existence of the cafeteria on the grounds of the
Hospital causes the Hospital to qualify as a public accommodation because the
cafeteria, a covered establishment, is located within the Hospital and the Hospital
holds itself out as serving the patrons of the cafeteria. The Florida Civil Rights Act,
however, includes specific language that excludes from its provisions food service
establishments located in private hospitals.
Section 509.092 of the Florida Civil Rights Act expressly prohibits
discrimination in public food service establishments.1 It reads:
Public lodging establishments and public food service establishments
are private enterprises, and the operator has the right to refuse
accommodations or service to any person who is objectionable or
undesirable to the operator, but such refusal may not be based upon
race, creed, color, sex, physical disability, or national origin. A person
1 The Legislature has expressly indicated twice that the Florida Civil Rights Act
includes specific statutory sections in both chapters 760 and 509, Florida Statutes.
§ 760.01(1), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“Sections 760.01-760.11 and 509.092 shall be cited
as the ‘Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992’”); § 760.02(1) (“‘Florida Civil Rights Act
of 1992’ means ss. 760.01-760.11 and 509.092”).
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aggrieved by a violation of this section or a violation of a rule adopted
under this section has a right of action pursuant to s. 760.11.
The Act, however, goes on to define public food service establishments in a
manner that expressly excludes from its provisions food service establishments in
facilities certified or regulated by the Florida Agency for Health Care
Administration. The definition with this exclusion reads:
(5)(a) “Public food service establishment” means any building,
vehicle, place, or structure, or any room or division in a building,
vehicle, place, or structure where food is prepared, served, or sold for
immediate consumption on or in the vicinity of the premises; called
for or taken out by customers; or prepared prior to being delivered to
another location for consumption.
(b) The following are excluded from the definition in paragraph
(a):
....
4. Any eating place maintained by a facility certified or licensed
and regulated by the Agency for Health Care Administration or the
Department of Children and Families or other similar place that is
regulated under s. 381.0072.
§ 509.013(5)(a)-(b)(4), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added).
The Hospital is a facility that is certified, licensed, and regulated by the
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration; among other things, it is required
to have a license issued by the Agency for Health Care Administration in order to
operate as a hospital. § 395.003(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). The cafeteria within its
premises is therefore excluded from the definition of “public food service
establishments” covered by the Florida Civil Rights Act. Because the cafeteria in
the Hospital is not a covered establishment, the cafeteria’s location within the
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premises of the Hospital does not cause the Hospital to become a covered
establishment.2
The identical interpretation of the statutes was reached by the federal district
court in Martin v. Halifax Healthcare Systems, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-1268-Orl-
31DAB, 2014 WL 1415647, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2014). The Court reasoned:
The [Act’s] definition of “public accommodations” includes the
following: “Any establishment which is physically located within the
premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection,
or within the premises of which is physically located any such
covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving patrons
of such covered establishment.” Fla. Stat. § 760.02(11)(d) (emphasis
added). . . . [T]he Defendants point out that the statutory definition of
“public food service establishment,” found at Fla. Stat. §
509.013(5)(b)(4) excludes eating places that are maintained by a
facility certified or licensed and regulated by the Agency for Health
Care Administration (henceforth, the “AHCA”), which licenses
Halifax Hospital. . . . In response, the Plaintiffs cite to cases under
federal law in which the existence of hospital cafeterias turned
hospitals into places of public accommodation, but fail to point to any
evidence supporting the same result in this case or offer any argument
2 Because we rely on an express exclusion that exists in Florida Statutes and not
federal statutes, we are not reaching the issue of whether a covered cafeteria within
a hospital would cause the hospital to qualify as a “covered establishment.” In the
context of federal statutes, courts are divided on this issue. Compare
Goonewardena v. N. Shore Long Island Health Sys., No. 11 CV 2456, 2012 WL
7802351, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2012) (“[T]he case law in this Circuit is clear that
a private hospital is not a place of public accommodation under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act . . . .”), and Foster v. Howard Univ. Hosp., No. Civ. A. 06-244, 2006
WL 2938701, *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 2006) (holding Howard University Hospital is
not a place of public accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights Act), with
U.S. v. Med. Soc’y of S.C., 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969) (holding that where a
hospital included a snack bar and cafeteria that held themselves out to serve
patrons of the hospital, the hospital itself was a place of public accommodation
under the federal Civil Rights Act).
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that would overcome the exclusion, under Florida law, for eateries
operated by AHCA-licensed entities. Summary judgment will be
entered in favor of the Defendants . . . .
Most importantly, this interpretation of the Act was adopted by the Florida
Commission on Human Relations in deciding it had no jurisdiction in this case.
Crane v. Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., Final Order No. 13-058 (FCHR Sept. 12,
2013); see also Mena v. Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., Final Order No. 12-023, at 3
(FCHR May 16, 2012) (“[T]he presence of a cafeteria maintained by a hospital and
located in the hospital cannot turn the hospital into a ‘a place of public
accommodation’ as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act.”), aff’d, Mena v.
Lifemark Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 109 So. 3d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Because the
Commission is charged by the Legislature to investigate complaints of
discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act, section 760.06(5), Florida
Statutes (2011), its interpretation of the Act is entitled to due deference from this
court. Verizon Fla., Inc. v. Jacobs, 810 So. 2d 906, 908 (Fla. 2002) (“An agency’s
interpretation of the statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to great
deference,” and “a court will not depart from the contemporaneous construction of
a statute by a state agency charged with its enforcement unless the construction is
‘clearly erroneous.’”) (citations omitted). The interpretation by the Florida
Commission on Human Relations is far from clearly erroneous: indeed, we find it
persuasive.
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Crane notes, however, that the Florida Civil Rights Act provides that its
purposes “are to secure for all individuals within the state freedom from
discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap,
or marital status . . . .” §760.01(3). The Act then expressly requires that its terms
“shall be construed according to the fair import of its terms and purposes stated in
this section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.” Id.
Based on this language, Crane suggests that the court should go beyond the literal
meaning of the Act in order to effectuate its broad, remedial purpose.
The language of the Act requiring that it be interpreted broadly to fulfill its
remedial purpose, however, does not displace the fundamental canons of statutory
interpretation that (1) “legislative intent is the polestar that guides this Court’s
interpretation” and (2) “[t]o discern legislative intent, we look ‘primarily’ to the
actual language used in the statute.” Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d
587, 595 (Fla. 2006); see also Delva v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 137 So. 3d 371 (Fla.
2014) (interpreting the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, holding “[w]hen
construing a statute, this Court attempts to give effect to the Legislature’s intent,
looking first to the actual language used in the statute and its plain meaning”)
(citations and quotations omitted). Applying these fundamental canons of statutory
construction, we find that the broad statement in the Act that it should be
interpreted to accomplish its remedial purposes does not authorize a court to ignore
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the Legislature’s clear, unambiguous, and express exclusion of cafeterias in
hospitals from the statutory definition of “public food service establishments.”
CONCLUSION
Because the eating establishments are not covered under the Florida Civil
Rights Act, they do not turn the Hospital into a “place of public accommodation”
under section 760.02(11)(d). Accordingly, the Commission was correct when it
determined it had no jurisdiction.
Affirmed.
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