Seraphin v. State , 192 So. 3d 675 ( 2016 )

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
CORNELIUS SERAPHIN, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D15-2638
)
STATE OF FLORIDA )
)
Appellee. )
___________________________________)
Opinion filed June 1, 2016.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P.
9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
Pinellas County; Chris Helinger, Judge.
Cornelius Seraphin, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
Cornelius Seraphin appeals the dismissal of his motion for postconviction
relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In his motion,
Seraphin alleged that the terms of his plea agreement had been violated because he
did not receive the full amount of jail credit contemplated by the parties. The
postconviction court dismissed his motion as untimely. Because it is not clear on the
face of the record that his motion was untimely, we must reverse.
On June 27, 2002, Seraphin was arrested on fifteen charges and held in
the Pinellas County jail until July 20, 2002, when he was released on bond. While on
bond, he was arrested on "federal criminal charges on or about" November 21, 2002.
He was sentenced to twelve years' incarceration in federal prison, where he remained
until February 15, 2004, when he was transferred to Florida custody and formally
charged with failure to appear for a pretrial hearing in his Pinellas County case.
In 2006, Seraphin entered negotiated no contest pleas to all fifteen
charges, and the trial court sentenced him pursuant to the plea agreement to fifteen
years' imprisonment as a prison releasee reoffender on count one for aggravated
battery, to fifteen years on each of the two other second-degree-felony counts, to five
years on each of the third-degree-felony counts, and to time served on the
misdemeanor counts, with all sentences to run concurrently. The sentencing order also
allowed Seraphin 880 days as credit for time incarcerated before his sentences were
imposed and also provided that the sentences in this case were to run concurrently with
his federal sentence. According to Seraphin, the trial court orally pronounced that as
part of his plea agreement, he would receive additional credit for the time he served in
federal and state custody. Seraphin was then returned to federal custody.
Apparently on April 19, 2013, Seraphin was released from federal custody
and returned to Florida to continue serving his sentences imposed in this case.
Seraphin learned then that contrary to his plea agreement, he did not receive credit for
the 441 days he served in federal custody.
On June 17, 2013, Seraphin filed a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800 to allow credit for time he served in federal prison until he was
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returned to Florida. On March 31, 2014, the postconviction court denied his motion for
jail credit because the documents in the record did not support his claim. This court
affirmed the summary denial of Seraphin's rule 3.800(a) motion. See Seraphin v. State,
156 So. 3d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (table decision).
Seraphin then filed this rule 3.850 motion on April 10, 2015, which is within
two years of his release from federal prison and return to Florida custody on April 19,
2013. The postconviction court ruled that Seraphin's motion was untimely and did not
raise any exceptions to the two-year limitation period found in rule 3.850(b). This ruling
overlooked Seraphin's claim that the time for filing his rule 3.850 motion was tolled while
he was in federal prison because he "was deprived access to Florida courts, statutes,
rules and forms."
His timeliness claim has arguable merit. It appears from Seraphin's
motion that he was sentenced on the Florida criminal charges in July 2006 and was
released from federal prison and returned to Florida in April 2013. The postconviction
record does not conclusively refute Seraphin's allegations, which if true would toll the
time for filing his motion. See Ramsey v. State, 965 So. 2d 854, 855 (Fla. 2d DCA
2007) (adopting Demps v. State, 696 So. 2d 1296, 1298-99 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)).
Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal and remand for the postconviction court to
determine whether Seraphin's time for filing a rule 3.850 motion was tolled during his
incarceration in federal prison. See Starling v. State, 137 So. 3d 568, 569 (Fla. 2d DCA
2014) (reversing summary denial of an unsworn rule 3.850 motion and remanding for
the postconviction court to provide an opportunity to amend and to determine whether
the time for the movant to file a rule 3.850 motion was tolled during his incarceration in
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federal prison); see also Piggott v. State, 14 So. 3d 298, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
(reversing summary denial of a rule 3.850 motion and remanding for the postconviction
court to determine whether the movant had access, including electronic access, to
Florida law while incarcerated in Massachusetts).
The postconviction court also concluded that Seraphin's rule 3.850 motion
was successive because it raised the same jail credit issue that the court denied in the
prior rule 3.800(a) motion. The postconviction court was correct that Seraphin sought
credit for time served in both motions. But it failed to recognize that rule 3.850, and not
rule 3.800(a), is the appropriate method for challenging an unrealized term of a plea
agreement after a judgment and sentence are final. See Blake v. State, 807 So. 2d
772, 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (affirming denial of rule 3.800(a) motion without prejudice
to appellant filing a rule 3.850 motion and explaining that "[j]ail credit issues are
appropriately brought in a rule 3.850 motion 'if the defendant is requesting additional jail
credit due to factual matters not ascertainable from the trial court's records' " (quoting
Thomas v. State, 611 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993))). Accordingly, the
postconviction court erred in concluding that Seraphin's rule 3.850 motion was
successive.
On the merits of his motion, Seraphin claimed that his plea agreement
was violated when he was not given credit for the time spent in federal custody, as the
parties contemplated when he entered his plea. His claim is cognizable under rule
3.850 and is facially sufficient. See, e.g., Currelly v. State, 801 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2001) (concluding that a rule 3.850 motion alleging the plea agreement was
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violated when the movant was not given jail credit was facially sufficient and that the
attachments to the order did not conclusively refute the claim).
We reverse the dismissal of Seraphin's rule 3.850 motion on procedural
grounds and remand for the postconviction court to determine whether the time for filing
the rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief was tolled while Seraphin was in federal
prison. If so, the postconviction court must then determine the merits of Seraphin's
motion and either attach portions of the trial record that conclusively refute his claim or
hold an evidentiary hearing.
Reversed and remanded.
NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
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