Liberty New v. Charles Bennett , 249 So. 3d 704 ( 2018 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-3196
    _____________________________
    LIBERTY NEW,
    Appellant,
    v.
    CHARLES BENNETT,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County.
    Shonna Young Gay, Judge.
    June 4, 2018
    M.K. THOMAS, J.
    Liberty New appeals the Florida trial court’s denial of her
    Petition for Domestication of a final order entered in Georgia. The
    Georgia order holds Charles Bennett, her former spouse, in
    contempt of court and orders his immediate incarceration until
    payment of child support arrearages. New argues that pursuant
    to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a sister state’s judgment must
    be recognized in the absence of jurisdictional invalidity or extrinsic
    fraud, neither of which were proven by Bennett. We agree and
    reverse and remand the case for domestication of the Georgia
    order.
    I.
    The parties were divorced in Okaloosa County, Florida, on
    October 23, 2008. The divorce decree requires Bennett to pay child
    support and provide health and dental insurance, among other
    financial obligations. Shortly after the parties divorced, New and
    the children relocated to Georgia. In December of 2013, New filed
    a complaint in Georgia requesting that the 2008 divorce decree
    entered in Florida be registered and enforced by the court in
    Coweta County, Georgia. The complaint, which was properly
    served upon Bennett, alleged Bennett’s failure to comply with the
    divorce decree. A hearing was scheduled in Georgia for March 24,
    2015, to address temporary relief. Prior to the hearing, Bennett
    filed a responsive pleading. Neither Bennett nor his attorney
    appeared for the hearing despite receiving notice. The Georgia
    trial court noted that upon review of Bennett’s response it was
    unable to determine either the relief requested or the defenses
    asserted. As a result of the March hearing, a contempt order was
    entered on April 17, 2015. A final hearing was scheduled for
    December 7, 2015. Despite notice of the final hearing to all parties,
    Bennett and his attorney were again no-shows. As a result of the
    hearing, the Georgia trial court determined both that: 1) New had
    complied with the requirements to register the Florida divorce
    decree for enforcement in Georgia; and 2) the pleading filed by
    Bennett was intended as an objection to registration of the Florida
    divorce decree in Georgia. The Georgia trial court denied Bennett’s
    objection to registration, held him in contempt and ordered his
    immediate incarceration until payment of $23,417.85 in support
    arrearages and previously awarded attorney’s fees.
    As of late 2016, Bennett had apparently not returned to
    Coweta County, Georgia, or had done so unbeknownst to law
    enforcement. Accordingly, he had not been incarcerated nor had
    he paid the outstanding child support. In further effort to obtain
    relief and to enforce the Georgia order, New filed in Florida a
    Petition for Domestication of Foreign Order in accordance with
    sections 55.503 and 55.505, Florida Statutes. New filed the
    petition in Bay County, Florida, where Bennett was living. In
    response, Bennett filed a Motion to Strike. A hearing was
    scheduled, and this time, Bennett and his attorney appeared.
    Ultimately, the Florida trial court denied New’s request for
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    domestication of the Georgia order, concluding the Georgia court
    lacked proper jurisdiction to find Bennett in willful contempt and
    subject to imprisonment - as the contempt order was issued
    without a jury trial. The trial court further concluded that the
    Georgia order lacked the requisite findings to order Bennett’s
    incarceration, even if jurisdiction was proper, because the Georgia
    court did not find Bennett had the present ability to pay the
    amount awarded. * This appeal followed.
    II.
    “Florida enacted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
    Judgments Act, or Florida Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
    (FEFJA), in 1984.” Patrick v. Hess, 
    212 So. 3d 1039
    , 1042 (Fla.
    2017); see also §§ 55.501–509, Fla. Stat. (2016). FEFJA was
    intended to provide an efficient method of enforcing foreign
    judgments without the undue cost and difficulty associated with
    filing a new, separate action to domesticate a foreign judgment.
    Pratt v. Equity Bank, N.A., 
    124 So. 3d 313
    , 315 (Fla. 5th DCA
    2013). A foreign judgment domesticated under FEFJA has the
    same effect as a Florida judgment and is subject to the same legal
    and equitable defenses and rules of procedure. Desert Palace, Inc.
    v. Wiley, 
    145 So. 3d 946
    , 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
    FEFJA stems from the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
    United States Constitution, which states: “Full Faith and Credit
    shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
    proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. In the
    Full Faith and Credit context, if the first state had jurisdiction over
    the parties and the subject matter, “’the validity of the claim on
    which the foreign judgment was entered is not open to inquiry.”’
    M & R Invs. Co. v. Hacker, 
    511 So. 2d 1099
    , 1101 (Fla. 5th DCA
    1987) (quoting Trauger v. A.J. Spagnol Lumber Co.,Inc., 
    442 So. 2d
    182, 183 (Fla.1983). “A foreign order of contempt is entitled to
    full faith and credit in Florida if it is valid in the state in which it
    *The  trial court’s reasoning for denial of the Petition for
    Domestication is limited to the order on appeal. No transcript of
    the hearing in Bay County, Florida, was provided as part of the
    record.
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    was issued.” Roosa v. Roosa, 
    519 So. 2d 1108
    , 1109 (Fla. 4th DCA
    1988).
    Pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a sister state’s
    judgment must be recognized, but it may be attacked for either
    lack of jurisdiction or extrinsic fraud. Hinchee v. Golden Oak
    Bank, 
    540 So. 2d 262
    , 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). “[T]he validity of
    the foreign judgment must be analyzed under the law of the foreign
    state.” 
    Id. at 263.
    If a Florida litigant shows that a sister state’s
    judgment is valid and final and that subject matter and personal
    jurisdiction existed in the foreign state, the judgment is properly
    authenticated. See Robinson v. Robinson, 
    487 So. 2d 67
    , 68 (Fla.
    1st DCA 1986). A Florida court should not “attempt to determine
    the validity of a judgment or decree of a sister or foreign country
    unless something appears on the face of the record which discloses
    its invalidity.” The Cadle Co. v. Jay, 
    907 So. 2d 634
    , 639 (Fla. 3d
    DCA 2005).
    III.
    Whether the trial court erred in its denial of New’s Petition
    for Domestication of the Georgia order is reviewed de novo. Spano
    v. Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., 
    165 So. 3d 834
    , 836 (Fla. 4th DCA
    2015).
    In the order on appeal, the Florida trial court briefly
    addressed jurisdiction, stating, “the Georgia Court did not have
    proper jurisdiction to find Respondent/Former Husband in willful
    contempt subject to imprisonment. (See Ga. Code Ann. § 15-1-4.)”
    Correctly, the Florida trial court applied the laws of the foreign
    state in analyzing jurisdiction. However, it erred in finding the
    Georgia court lacked jurisdiction, as nothing on the face of the
    Georgia order indicates any form of jurisdictional invalidity.
    Furthermore, the Florida trial court’s citation of section 15-1-4 in
    relation to its analysis of the personal jurisdiction was misplaced.
    The statute is not jurisdictional in nature, but rather addresses a
    court’s power to punish contempt based on specified acts. The
    Georgia court specifically found it “ha[d] personal jurisdiction over
    Former Husband and to enforce the terms of the Final Decree.”
    Georgia’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides that
    “[i]n a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order . . . a
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    tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
    nonresident individual . . . if . . . (2) [t]he individual submits to the
    jurisdiction of Georgia by . . . filing a responsive document having
    the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction” or if there
    is any other basis consistent with the Constitutions of Georgia and
    the United States. Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-110(a)(2),(8). Here, the
    Georgia court specifically referenced Bennett filing a pleading in
    the Georgia proceeding prior to issuance of the Georgia order. The
    burden was on Bennett to prove lack of personal jurisdiction. By
    failing to appear at the Georgia final hearing to assert said
    defenses, the registration of the Florida decree was confirmed,
    which precluded further contest of the registration in Georgia with
    respect to jurisdiction or any other defense which could have been
    raised in the Georgia proceeding. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 19-11-166(a),
    19-11-167.
    The Florida trial court supported its denial of the Petition for
    Domestication by finding the Georgia order “lacks the requisite
    findings to order [Bennett’s] immediate incarceration even if
    jurisdiction was proper.” Specifically, the trial court held that the
    Georgia order did not find Bennett had the present ability to pay
    the arrearage, so a finding of willful and “criminal” contempt was
    improper. However, where a petition is made to register and
    enforce a foreign judgment pursuant to section 55.501, Florida law
    only permits the judgment debtor to contest the jurisdiction of the
    foreign court. The registering court is not entitled to retry the
    foreign court’s findings of fact. See § 55.509, Fla. Stat.
    Here, the trial court initiated an improper substantive review
    of the Georgia judgment. The Cadle 
    Co., 907 So. 2d at 639
    . “The
    courts of Florida cannot be empowered by the legislature to review
    the underlying cause of action when a person seeks to enforce a
    foreign judgment in this state.” Trauger, 
    442 So. 2d
    at 183-84. The
    validity of New’s claim upon which the Georgia judgment was
    entered was not “open to inquiry” by the Florida trial court. See
    Stern v. Dejong, 
    462 So. 2d 41
    , 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Consistent
    with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Georgia order is
    impeachable in Florida only if the judgment is susceptible to
    collateral attack under the foreign state’s jurisprudence. See
    Johnson v. Muelberger, 
    340 U.S. 581
    , 589 (1951). These collateral
    attacks against judgments involve parties who have had their day
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    in court. Where there has been participation by the parties in the
    foreign divorce proceedings and the parties have been given full
    opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, any further attack
    on the judgment is barred by res judicata. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 
    334 U.S. 343
    , 351 (1948).
    Florida courts have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment
    for arrearages in alimony or child support by equitable remedies,
    including contempt. See Gibson v. Bennett, 
    561 So. 2d 565
    (Fla.
    1990). As Bennett failed to satisfy his burden of proof that the
    Georgia trial court lacked personal jurisdiction or that the foreign
    order was obtained as a result of extrinsic fraud, the Florida trial
    court erred in not providing full faith and credit to the Georgia
    order. Accordingly, the order on appeal is reversed, and the matter
    remanded for domestication of the Georgia order.
    REVERSED and REMANDED with directions.
    OSTERHAUS AND WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    Rachel R. Seaton of Seaton Law Offices, P.A., Panama City, for
    Appellant.
    Robert L. Sirianni, Jr., of Brownstone, P.A., Winter Park, for
    Appellee.
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