DIOGENES SANTANA v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA ( 2022 )


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  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed August 31, 2022.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    No. 3D22-813
    Lower Tribunal No. F18-20697
    ________________
    Diogenes Santana,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    The State of Florida,
    Appellee.
    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jose L.
    Fernandez, Judge.
    Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Maria E. Lauredo, Chief
    Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Katryna Santa Cruz, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee.
    Before EMAS, SCALES and HENDON, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    Affirmed. See Gonzalez v. State, 
    306 So. 3d 1124
    , 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2020) (“The standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine
    is abuse of discretion. Such discretion is limited by the rules of evidence, and
    a trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an ‘erroneous view
    of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence’”) (quoting
    Patrick v. State, 
    104 So. 3d 1046
    , 1056 (Fla. 2012)). See also §
    90.803(18)(b), Fla. Stat. (2022) (“The provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary
    notwithstanding, the following are not inadmissible as evidence, even though
    the declarant is available as a witness: A statement that is offered against a
    party and is . . . (b) A statement of which the party has manifested an
    adoption or belief in its truth”); Tresvant v. State, 
    396 So. 2d 733
    , 738 (Fla.
    3d DCA 1981) (observing that the admissibility of admissions by silence “is
    based on the rule that a person’s silence can constitute an admission where
    the circumstances and nature of the statement are such that it would be
    expected that the person would protest the statement if untrue”); Privett v.
    State, 
    417 So. 2d 805
    , 806-07 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (“If a party is silent, when
    he ought to have denied a statement that was made in his presence and that
    he was aware of, a presumption of acquiescence arises. Not all statements
    made in the presence of a party require denial. The hearsay statement can
    only be admitted when it can be shown that in the context in which the
    2
    statement was made it was so accusatory in nature that the defendant’s
    silence may be inferred to have been assent to its truth. To determine
    whether the person’s silence does constitute an admission, the
    circumstances and the nature of the statement must be considered to see if
    it would be expected that the person would protest if the statement were
    untrue. . . . The essential inquiry thus becomes whether a reasonable person
    would have denied the statements under the circumstances.”) (citations
    omitted); Nelson v. State, 
    748 So. 2d 237
    , 242-43 (Fla. 1999) (adopting the
    factors, enumerated in Privett, 
    417 So. 2d at 806-07
    , to be considered in
    determining whether acquiescence to the other person’s statement did in
    fact occur: “1. The statement must have been heard by the party claimed to
    have acquiesced; 2. The statement must have been understood by him; 3.
    The subject matter of the statement is within the knowledge of the person;
    4. There were no physical or emotional impediments to the person
    responding; 5. The personal make-up of the speaker or his relationship to
    the party or event are not such as to make it unreasonable to expect a denial;
    6. The statement itself must be such as would, if untrue, call for a denial
    under the circumstances.”)
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Document Info

Docket Number: 22-0813

Filed Date: 8/31/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2022