Harris v. Harris , 205 So. 3d 873 ( 2016 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    GEORGE C. HARRIS,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                     Case No. 5D15-3993
    ANITA HARRIS,
    Appellee.
    ________________________________/
    Opinion filed December 2, 2016
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Marion County,
    Anthony M. Tatti, Judge.
    Barry P. Burnette, of Barry P. Burnette,
    P.A., Tavares, for Appellant.
    No Appearance for Appellee.
    EDWARDS, J.
    George C. Harris (“Former Husband”) appeals the final judgment of dissolution of
    marriage from Anita Harris (“Former Wife”). Former Husband raises two issues. First,
    he argues that the trial court erred by considering Former Wife’s voluntary support of her
    grandson and daughter from another relationship as part of Former Wife’s need for
    alimony. Second, Former Husband argues that the trial court erred by failing to properly
    consider the marital portion of the appreciation of Former Wife’s house. We find the
    issues raised by Former Husband have merit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
    First, the trial court erred by basing Former Wife’s alimony award on a statement
    of expenses that included the voluntary financial support Former Wife provided to her
    daughter, who was not Former Husband’s child, and grandchild. The daughter and minor
    grandchild lived with Former Wife, who paid all of the household expenses. The daughter
    was unemployed and did not contribute financially to the household expenses. Neither
    Former Wife nor Former Husband provided any evidence of the expenses attributable to
    Former Wife alone, rather than those attributable to her daughter and grandchild.
    The trial court correctly stated, at one point, that it could not consider voluntary
    payments made by Former Wife to support her adult daughter and grandchild. See
    Quinones v. Quinones, 
    84 So. 3d 1101
    , 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) (holding that the trial
    court erred in considering the former husband’s voluntary college tuition and car
    payments for the former couple’s adult son as an expense for former husband). However,
    the trial court later stated, incorrectly, that “some consideration must be given to the
    [Former Wife’s] voluntary support of her adult daughter and minor grandson in
    determining [her] needs.” We reverse the award of alimony and remand for the trial court
    to make a determination of Former Wife’s individual need, which must be based upon
    competent substantial evidence. See § 61.08(2), Fla. Stat. (2015); Zinovoy v. Zinovoy,
    
    50 So. 3d 763
    , 766 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Former Wife, as the party seeking alimony, bears
    the burden of proof. Demont v. Demont, 
    67 So. 3d 1096
    , 1101 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).
    Second, the trial court erred by considering one-half of the marital portion of the
    appreciation in value of Former Wife’s house as an asset of Former Husband, when
    2
    Former Wife was awarded sole ownership of the home.1 During their marriage, the
    parties lived in a house Former Wife purchased nine years before the marriage. Former
    Husband does not dispute that, in general terms, the house should be awarded to Former
    Wife as a nonmarital asset. Marital assets include “[t]he enhancement in value and
    appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of either party during
    the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other
    forms of marital assets, or both.” § 61.075(6)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2015). Here, evidence
    was presented that the parties used marital funds to pay a few mortgage payments and
    to make improvements to the house, including a new roof, an air conditioning system,
    new kitchen appliances, and a remodel of the garage.
    The trial court determined that the total appreciation of the house was $45,850.50.
    The trial court then assigned $35,000 of the passive appreciation as a nonmarital asset
    of Former Wife. The trial court found that the improvements discussed above, financed
    with marital funds, added $850.50 to the house’s value and assigned $10,000 in passive
    appreciation as a marital asset. Former Husband argues that the trial court erred in the
    equal distribution calculations because the court concluded that Former Husband and
    Former Wife benefitted equally, so that each was considered to have a $5,425.25 marital
    asset representing the marital portion of the house’s appreciated value, despite the fact
    that Former Wife was awarded sole ownership and possession of the house.
    1 The trial court repeatedly describes this appreciation as “passive.” While the
    majority of appreciated value was passive in nature, the court did find that a small portion
    of the increased value of the home was due to enhancements or improvements made to
    the house (non-passive).
    3
    In Kaaa v. Kaaa, 
    58 So. 3d 867
     (Fla. 2010), the Florida Supreme Court addressed
    a case with similar facts. In Kaaa, the former husband purchased a home prior to the
    couple’s marriage. 58 So. 3d at 869. The couple lived in the home throughout their
    twenty-seven-year marriage. Id. During the marriage, the couple used marital funds to
    pay the mortgage and undertake home improvements, thus, increasing the value of the
    home. Id. Upon the couple’s divorce, the trial court found that the total enhanced value
    of the home was $36,679 and ordered the former husband, the homeowner, to pay the
    former wife, the nonowner, half of that amount as an equalizing payment. Id. The former
    wife appealed, arguing that the trial court should also have awarded her a distribution for
    the passive appreciation of the home, not just the enhancement value. The Florida
    Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in not awarding the former wife one-half
    payment of passive appreciation, explaining that “principles of equity do not allow an
    owner spouse to receive the full benefit of the passive appreciation when the nonowner
    spouse contributed to the property.” Id. at 871.
    In the present case, Former Husband argues that the trial court did not equalize
    the parties’ marital assets and liabilities because it awarded sole ownership of the marital
    home to Former Wife but only credited her with one-half of the $10,850.50 marital portion
    of the appreciation. Husband is correct. As in Kaaa, the trial court should have either
    ordered Former Wife, the homeowner, to make a one-half payment of the marital portion
    of the appreciation of the house to Former Husband, the nonowner, or it should have
    credited the entire marital portion of the appreciation of the house to Former Wife when
    calculating equitable distribution. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the trial court to
    credit Former Wife with the entire marital portion of the appreciation of the house’s value
    4
    and to recalculate any equalizing payments between Former Wife and Former Husband.
    An amended final judgment shall be entered to reflect changes in alimony and equitable
    distribution.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    SAWAYA and BERGER, JJ., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 5D15-3993

Citation Numbers: 205 So. 3d 873

Filed Date: 11/28/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023