Ashraf v. Adventist Health System , 200 So. 3d 173 ( 2016 )


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  •          IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
    FIFTH DISTRICT
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    DR. SUALEH KAMAL ASHRAF,
    Appellant,
    v.                                                            Case No. 5D15-2415
    ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM/ SUNBELT, INC.,
    a Florida Corporation, d/b/a FLORIDA HOSPITAL APOPKA,
    Appellee.
    __________________________________________________/
    Opinion filed July 1, 2016
    Appeal from the Circuit Court
    for Seminole County,
    Jessica J. Recksiedler, Judge.
    Troy J. Webber and Sarah S. Hussein, of
    Hussein & Webber, P.L., Jacksonville, for
    Appellant.
    Mason H. Grower, III, Samantha L.
    Aylward, and Emily R. Katz, of Grower,
    Ketcham, Rutherford, Bronson, Eide &
    Telan, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.
    WALLIS, J.
    Dr. Sualeh Kamal Ashraf ("Dr. Ashraf") appeals the trial court's dismissal of his
    complaint for defamation against Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc., d/b/a Florida
    Hospital Apopka ("Appellee"). We agree that the two-year statute of limitations under the
    single publication rule bars Dr. Ashraf's claim. We affirm in all respects and certify a
    question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court.
    In 2006, Dr. Ashraf began working as a physician in the cardiology department at
    Florida Hospital Apopka ("Florida Hospital"). In June 2007, Florida Hospital's Medical
    Executive Committee ("MEC") notified Dr. Ashraf of the suspension of his clinical
    privileges. The MEC voted to continue the temporary suspension of privileges while the
    Investigative Review Committee ("IRC") conducted a formal investigation. In November
    2007, the IRC completed its investigation, issuing 22 factual findings and recommending
    permanent revocation of Dr. Ashraf's clinical privileges. The MEC convened for a meeting
    at which it adopted verbatim the IRC's findings. Dr. Ashraf disputed the accuracy of those
    findings and requested review by a Fair Hearing Panel ("FHP"). The FHP upheld the IRC's
    findings and forwarded its recommendation to Florida Hospital's Board of Directors for
    final approval. Florida Hospital's Board of Directors approved the recommendation and
    permanently revoked Dr. Ashraf's clinical privileges.
    On December 17, 2008, Florida Hospital reported the revocation of Dr. Ashraf's
    clinical privileges to the National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"), an information
    repository formed under federal law containing information regarding healthcare
    practitioners and providers. Federal law requires Florida Hospital to report their adverse
    actions and findings to the NPDB. The NPDB then generates a confidential report
    available upon request by a select group of legally authorized entities. Florida Hospital's
    report to the NPDB contained verbatim the 22 factual findings issued by the IRC.
    In October 2014, Dr. Ashraf filed a two-count complaint against Appellee for
    defamation and permanent injunctive relief. Dr. Ashraf alleged his NPDB report contained
    2
    false and defamatory material, directly resulting in loss of employment opportunities as
    recently as September 2014. Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the two-
    year statute of limitations under the single publication rule barred his claim. The trial court
    agreed and granted Appellee's motion to dismiss.
    Florida law establishes a two-year statute of limitations for actions for "libel and
    slander." § 95.11(4)(g), Fla. Stat. (2014). The statute of limitations begins to run at the
    time of publication, not when the plaintiff discovers the alleged defamatory material.
    Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Erikson & Kupfer, P.A. v. Flanagan, 
    629 So. 2d
    113, 114 (Fla. 1993). "It is the general rule that each communication of the same
    defamatory matter by the same defamer, whether to a new person or to the same person,
    is a separate and distinct publication, for which a separate cause of action arises."
    Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577A cmt. a (1977). Thus, "every repetition of a
    defamatory statement is considered a publication." Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 
    783 So. 2d 1010
    , 1017 (Fla. 2001) (citation omitted). "This general rule is referred to as the 'multiple
    publication rule.'" Musto v. Bell S. Telecomms. Corp., 
    748 So. 2d 296
    , 297 (Fla. 4th DCA
    1999).
    An exception to the general rule, known as the single publication rule, provides
    that a "cause of action for damages founded upon a single publication or exhibition or
    utterance, as described in s. 770.05, shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the
    first publication or exhibition or utterance thereof in this state." § 770.07, Fla. Stat. (2014).
    The single publication rule is "merely a convenient tool to express the rule that all causes
    of action for widely circulated libel must be litigated in one trial, and that each [publication]
    3
    need not be separately pleaded and provided." Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp. v.
    Firstamerica Dev. Corp., 
    181 So. 2d 565
    , 568 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (citation omitted).
    Although no Florida appellate court has addressed whether the single or multiple
    publication rule applies to defamation claims stemming from NPDB reports, and other
    jurisdictions have decided differently on this issue,1 we choose to follow Judge Antoon's
    well-reasoned decision in Pierson v. Orlando Regional Healthcare Systems, Inc., No.
    6:08-cv-466-Orl-28GJK, 
    2010 WL 1408391
    , at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2010), aff'd, 451 Fed.
    App'x 862 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 940
    (2013) (Mem). In Pierson, the
    defendant suspended the plaintiff's emergency and trauma call privileges and reported
    its findings to the NPDB in February 2004. 
    Id. at *12.
    The plaintiff brought an action for
    defamation, among other claims, in August 2009. 
    Id. In determining
    that the statute of
    limitations barred the plaintiff's defamation claim, the court distinguished Musto, 
    748 So. 2d
    296, where the Fourth District Court held that the single publication rule does not apply
    to the common law tort of credit slander. 
    Id. The Pierson
    court reasoned that, unlike in
    Musto, the plaintiff "knew of the contents of the Adverse Action Report at the time it was
    issued to the NPDB; thus, the potential pitfall of credit report subjects not knowing of a
    defamatory credit statement until the statute of limitations has run is not present." 
    Id. Importantly, the
    court also cautioned that, were it to agree with the plaintiff's interpretation,
    he "could apply for employment over and over again and create a new defamation claim
    based on reissuances of the NPDB report at his whim." 
    Id. Accordingly, the
    Pierson court
    1
    See Williams v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., No. 2:09-cv-00554-PMP-PAL, 
    2010 WL 3001707
    , at *1 (D. Nev. July 28, 2010); Stephan v. Baylor Med. Ctr. at Garland, 
    20 S.W.3d 880
    (Tex. App. 2000); Swafford v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass'n, No. 02A01-
    9612-CV-00311, 
    1998 WL 281935
    , at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998).
    4
    concluded that the two-year limitations period began to run when the defendant first
    issued the Adverse Action report to the NPDB, thus time-barring the plaintiff's claim
    brought nearly four years later. 
    Id. We adopt
    Pierson and hold that the two-year statute of limitations begins to run
    when a report is issued to the NPDB; any subsequent issuance of that report to legally
    authorized entities does not accrue a new limitations period. We note that the NPDB
    establishes internal procedural safeguards whereby the subject of a report can file an
    exception disputing the accuracy of the report's contents, in addition to the challenge
    procedures available to Dr. Ashraf during the course of Florida Hospital's investigation.
    See 45 C.F.R. § 60.21 (2014). Moreover, unlike in the credit report context, where a
    plaintiff may not know of the contents of their report until after the limitations period runs,
    the NPDB sends the subject a copy of his or her report. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.6 (2014).
    Thus, all plaintiffs will have actual knowledge of the contents of their NPDB report well
    before the limitations period expires. See Pierson, 
    2010 WL 1408391
    , at *12. Based on
    the foregoing, we affirm and certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court
    as one of great public importance:
    DOES THE SINGLE PUBLICATION RULE BAR ANY
    DEFAMATION CLAIM BASED UPON INFORMATION
    REPORTED TO THE NPDB IF NOT COMMENCED WITHIN
    TWO YEARS OF THE DATE OF THE REPORT?
    AFFIRMED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
    LAMBERT and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 5D15-2415

Citation Numbers: 200 So. 3d 173

Filed Date: 6/27/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023