DAVID A. STREET v. ELYSSA STREET ( 2020 )


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  •        IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, LAKELAND, FLORIDA
    September 30, 2020
    DAVID A. STREET,                           )
    )
    Appellant,                   )
    )
    v.                                         )             Case No. 2D18-283
    )
    ELYSSA A. STREET,                          )
    )
    Appellee.                    )
    )
    BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
    Appellee's motion for rehearing is granted, and the prior opinion dated
    May 1, 2020, is withdrawn and the attached opinion is issued in its place. Appellee's
    request for appellate attorney's fees for the motion for rehearing is remanded to the trial
    court. If Appellee establishes her entitlement thereto, the trial court is authorized to
    award all or a portion of her reasonable appellate attorney's fees.
    I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING IS A
    TRUE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL COURT ORDER.
    MARY ELIZABETH KUENZEL
    CLERK
    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
    MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
    IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    OF FLORIDA
    SECOND DISTRICT
    DAVID A. STREET,                            )
    )
    Appellant,                    )
    )
    v.                                          )            Case No. 2D18-283
    )
    ELYSSA A. STREET,                           )
    )
    Appellee.                     )
    )
    Opinion filed September 30, 2020.
    Appeal from the Circuit Court for Collier
    County; Joseph G. Foster, Judge.
    Mark V. Silverio and Cynthia B. Hall,
    of Silverio & Hall, P.A., Naples, for
    Appellant.
    Cynthia L. Greene of Young, Berman,
    Karpf & Gonzalez, P.A. Miami, for
    Appellee.
    ATKINSON, Judge.
    David A. Street, the husband, appeals from a final judgment dissolving his
    marriage to Elyssa A. Street, the wife. Because the trial court erred in its classification
    of certain assets as marital, we reverse the final judgment in part and remand for the
    entry of an amended final judgment consistent with this opinion.
    The parties were married on December 28, 2006. Neither party was
    employed or earned a wage income during the marriage. Instead, the husband
    supported the family by passive income and funds from his nonmarital accounts as well
    as loans from his father. The wife filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on October
    14, 2014. The case was tried over three days in February 2016, and a fourth hearing
    took place in June 2016. Both parties presented accounting experts at the hearings.
    In its final judgment, the trial court found that, with the exception of two
    accounts (First Bank Trust No. 5852 and Raymond James No. 4228), the husband
    failed to prove that the remaining disputed assets were nonmarital. As such, the
    remaining assets pertinent to this appeal were equitably distributed as follows: (1) the
    bank accounts and brokerage accounts were divided utilizing the husband's valuations
    of each; (2) the boat slip was distributed to the husband; (3) the stocks purchased by
    the husband were distributed to him in accordance with the husband's valuations of
    each; and (4) the vehicles were distributed to the husband using the husband's
    valuations of each. The court ordered the husband to pay the wife an equalizer
    payment in the amount of $952,962.00 within sixty days of the entry of its final
    judgment.
    This court reviews a trial court's classification "of an asset as marital or
    nonmarital de novo and any factual findings necessary to make this legal conclusion for
    competent, substantial evidence." Dravis v. Dravis, 
    170 So. 3d 849
    , 852 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2015) (citing Tradler v. Tradler, 
    100 So. 3d 735
    , 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)). Florida's
    equitable distribution statute provides the following in pertinent part:
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    (a) 1. "Marital assets and liabilities" include:
    a. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the
    marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them.
    b. The enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital
    assets resulting either from the efforts of either party during
    the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure
    thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or
    both.
    c. Interspousal gifts during the marriage.
    ....
    (b) "Nonmarital assets and liabilities" include:
    1. Assets acquired and liabilities incurred by either party
    prior to the marriage, and assets acquired and liabilities
    incurred in exchange for such assets and liabilities;
    2. Assets acquired separately by either party by
    noninterspousal gift, bequest, devise, or descent, and assets
    acquired in exchange for such assets.
    § 61.075(6), Fla. Stat. (2014). In classifying assets as marital or nonmarital, "the trial
    court will consider numerous factors including title, commingling of marital and
    nonmarital funds, increases in value because of marital efforts, control of the funds, the
    length of the marriage, and the parties' intent concerning the marital or nonmarital status
    of the funds." Grieco v. Grieco, 
    917 So. 2d 1052
    , 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
    Accounts
    The trial court erred in classifying the following accounts as marital assets:
    (1) First Bank No. 4649; (2) Charles Schwab No. 9688; (3) Raymond James No. 0443;
    (4) JP Morgan No. 8001; and (5) JP Morgan No. 9009.
    Both First Bank No. 4649 and Raymond James No. 0443 were opened
    prior to the marriage and were only listed in the husband's name. There was no
    evidence that these accounts had been commingled with marital funds. See Pinder v.
    Pinder, 
    750 So. 2d 651
    , 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that the trial court erred in
    concluding that the wife's investment account was a marital asset because the evidence
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    showed that the money came from an inheritance and there was no evidence of
    commingling); Gromet v. Jensen, 
    201 So. 3d 132
    , 134-35 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)
    (reversing portion of the final judgment finding that the husband's three accounts lost
    their character as nonmarital assets due to commingling because the wife failed to
    introduce any evidence to support that marital funds were deposited into the accounts).
    As such, these accounts should have been classified as nonmarital.
    Although Charles Schwab No. 9688, JP Morgan No. 8001, and JP Morgan
    No. 9009 were opened during the marriage, these accounts were funded by the
    husband's nonmarital accounts. The wife admitted that she did not put any marital
    funds into any of these accounts. Additionally, the husband's expert did a full tracing of
    JP Morgan No. 8001 and JP Morgan No. 9009 and testified that no marital deposits
    were made into these accounts. Because these accounts only contained assets that
    were acquired by the husband prior to the marriage and there was no evidence of
    commingling, these accounts should have been classified as nonmarital. See Alvarez
    v. Plana, 
    974 So. 2d 1126
    , 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that the trial court erred in
    determining that a joint account was a marital asset because the account only contained
    assets that were acquired by the husband prior to the marriage, the assets were never
    commingled with marital assets, and the husband managed the account exclusively
    throughout the marriage).
    However, the trial court properly concluded that the husband failed to
    meet his burden in proving that First Bank No. 0878 was a nonmarital asset. The
    husband testified that this account was opened prior to the marriage. However, his
    expert testified that it was opened during the marriage and that it was fully funded by
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    one of the husband's nonmarital accounts. The wife's expert was unsure whether to
    classify this account as marital or nonmarital because no statement was provided for
    this account. Given the conflicting testimony between the husband and his expert as to
    when the account was opened, the husband failed to meet his burden to prove that this
    account was nonmarital. See Smith v. Smith, 
    971 So. 2d 191
    , 193 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    (noting that the spouse claiming that an asset is nonmarital has the burden of proof).
    Stocks
    The trial court erred in classifying the husband's stock in First Bancorp,
    AIG, AmerisourceBergen, Western Union, First Horizon, Host Hotels, and Yum Brands
    as marital assets. The husband acquired stock in these companies prior to the
    marriage, and there was no evidence of enhancement or commingling or that they were
    given to the wife as a gift. See Farrior v. Farrior, 
    736 So. 2d 1177
    , 1178 (Fla. 1999)
    (holding that where stock is not sold, intermingled with other assets, and remained titled
    in the wife's name, the stock was nonmarital); Doerr v. Doerr, 
    751 So. 2d 154
    , 155 (Fla
    2d DCA 2000) (holding that the trial court erred in classifying the husband's General
    Electric stock as marital because the husband inherited the stock during the marriage,
    the stock grew by passive appreciation, and the wife did nothing to enhance its value);
    Robinson v. Robinson, 
    10 So. 3d 196
    , 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that the trial
    court erred in finding that shares of stock that the husband acquired prior to the
    marriage was marital because there was no evidence of enhancement, commingling, or
    a gift to the wife).
    Vehicles
    -5-
    The trial court erred in classifying the 2016 Jaguar, the 2014 Mercedes
    Benz, the BMW Motorcycle, and the Harley Davidson Motorcycle as marital assets.
    Although the 2016 Jaguar, the 2014 Mercedes Benz, and the BMW Motorcycle were
    acquired during the marriage, they were purchased with funds from the husband's First
    Bank Trust 5852 account, which the trial court properly found was nonmarital. Because
    the husband purchased these vehicles with nonmarital funds, they are nonmarital
    assets not subject to equitable distribution. See § 61.075(6)(b)1. (providing that assets
    acquired by either party prior to the marriage and assets acquired in exchange for such
    assets are nonmarital); cf. Distefano v. Distefano, 
    253 So. 3d 1178
    , 1182 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2018) (holding that the trial court erred in classifying a 2014 Toyota Camry as the wife's
    nonmarital asset because the vehicle was purchased during the marriage, in part, with
    commingled money held in the wife's checking account that contained marital funds).
    Because the husband received the Harley Davidson Motorcycle as a gift from his father,
    it is a nonmarital asset. See § 61.075(6)(b)2. (declaring assets acquired separately by
    either party by noninterspousal gift to be nonmarital).
    However, the trial court properly concluded that the husband failed to
    meet his burden to prove that the 2012 Mini Cooper, the 2012 Ford, and the 2010
    Greyhawk Mini were nonmarital assets. These vehicles were acquired during the
    marriage, and there was either no testimony or inconclusive testimony as to what
    account was used to purchase these vehicles. See § 61.075(6)(a)1.a. (declaring assets
    acquired during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them, to be
    marital).
    Boat Slip
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    The trial court erred in classifying the boat slip as marital. Although it was
    obtained during the marriage, it was purchased with funds from the husband's JP
    Morgan No. 8001 account, which was a nonmarital asset. See § 61.075(6)(b)1.
    Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing, we reverse the final judgment in part and remand
    for the trial court to correct the equitable distribution schedule consistent with this
    opinion. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to consider whether an award of
    alimony or a change in child support is necessary in light of the corrections to the
    equitable distribution. See Santiago v. Santiago, 
    51 So. 3d 637
    , 639 (Fla. 2d DCA
    2011) ("The trial court may revisit other interrelated financial issues, such as alimony
    and attorneys’ fees, to the extent they are affected by any changes in the equitable
    distribution scheme." (citing Noah v. Noah, 
    491 So. 2d 1124
    , 1128 (Fla. 1986))); Bailey
    v. Bailey, 
    617 So. 2d 815
    , 816–17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Colino v. Colino, 
    198 So. 3d 1137
    , 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016).
    Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
    CASANUEVA and SLEET, JJ., Concur.
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