Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 17, 2021.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-0240
Lower Tribunal Nos. 18-35066, 18-35069
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Monica Samara,
Appellant,
vs.
Tenet Florida Physician Services, LLC, etc., et al.,
Appellees.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mavel Ruiz,
Judge.
Solnick Law, P.A., and Peter J. Solnick, for appellant.
Richard D. Tuschman, P.A., and Richard D. Tuschman (Davie); Lash
& Goldberg, LLP, and Martin B. Goldberg, and David R. Ruffner, for
appellees.
Before LINDSEY, HENDON, and BOKOR, JJ.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS
LINDSEY, J.
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration
and rehearing. 1 Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. Because the order on appeal is not an appealable order and
does not suspend rendition of an appealable order, we grant the motion to
dismiss.
Appellant, Plaintiff below, Monica Samara is a former employee of
Appellee, Defendant below, Tenet Florida Physician Services, LLC. While
employed at Tenet, Samara worked with Appellee, Defendant below, Dr.
1
“Motions for rehearing and motions for reconsideration are two distinct
motions and, though they are often confused, they do not overlap.” Seigler
v. Bell,
148 So. 3d 473, 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014). As the Fifth District in
Seigler further explained:
Motions for “rehearing” pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.530 apply only to final judgments
and “those orders that partake of the character of a
final judgment, i.e., orders that complete the judicial
labor on a portion of the cause.” Francisco v. Victoria
Marine Shipping, Inc.,
486 So. 2d 1386, 1390 n.6
(Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (citations omitted). Motions for
“reconsideration” apply to nonfinal, interlocutory
orders, and are based on a trial court’s “inherent
authority to reconsider and, if deemed appropriate,
alter or retract any of its nonfinal rulings prior to entry
of the final judgment or order terminating an action .
. . .” Silvestrone v. Edell,
721 So.2d 1173, 1175
(Fla.1998) (citations omitted).
Id. at 478-79.
2
Adrian Legaspi. The underlying action stems from allegations of sexual
harassment and retaliation. 2 On September 13, 2019, following an
evidentiary hearing, the court granted Tenet’s and Legaspi’s motions to
compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Samara had signed as
an employee. Samara did not appeal the non-final order compelling
arbitration. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) (authorizing appellate
review of non-final orders that determine “the entitlement of a party to
arbitration”).
Over a year later, on September 16, 2020, Samara filed a motion for
reconsideration and rehearing directed at the September 13, 2019 order
compelling arbitration. In her motion, Samara asserted she had amended
her complaint in arbitration and abandoned her claims for negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress and substituted a claim for
malicious prosecution. She argued that because the remaining claims for
malicious prosecution and defamation do not arise out of her employment,
they do not belong in arbitration. The court denied Samara’s motion on
January 6, 2021, and Samara appealed.
2
Samara filed separate lawsuits against Dr. Legaspi and Tenet. The two
cases were subsequently consolidated.
3
An order on a motion for rehearing is not an appealable order. Fla. R.
App. P. 9.130(4) (“Orders disposing of motions for rehearing or motions that
suspend rendition are not reviewable separately from a review of the final
order . . . .”). “Moreover, an order that simply denies a motion for
reconsideration or rehearing of an underlying non-final order, such as the
one sought to be appealed in this case, is not in itself an appealable order.”
Agere Sys. Inc. v. All Am. Crating, Inc.,
931 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006).
In some instances, a motion for rehearing can toll rendition of an
appealable order, but that is not the case here. This is because motions for
rehearing are not authorized for non-final orders. See Fla. R. App. P.
9.130(a)(5) (“Motions for rehearing directed to these orders [appealable non-
final orders] are not authorized under these rules and therefore will not toll
the time for filing a notice of appeal.”); Philip J. Padovano, 2 Fla. Prac.,
Appellate Practice § 2:4 (2019 ed.) (“A motion can suspend rendition of an
order only if the motion is authorized under the rules governing the
proceeding in which the order was entered. For example, a motion for
rehearing does not suspend rendition of a nonfinal order because rehearing
is not authorized as to nonfinal orders.” (footnotes omitted)).
4
We therefore grant Appellees’ motion to dismiss and dismiss the
appeal.
Dismissed.
5
