UNITED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY v. COASTAL RADIOLOGY, LLC, A/A/O EDUARDO CEREJIDO ( 2022 )


Menu:
  •       Third District Court of Appeal
    State of Florida
    Opinion filed March 9, 2022.
    Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
    ________________
    Nos. 3D21-0288 and 3D21-0324
    Lower Tribunal Nos. 20-0253 AP; 14-11017 SP;
    20-0276 AP; 12-9945 SP
    ________________
    United Automobile Insurance Company,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    Coastal Radiology, LLC,
    a/a/o Caridad Romero and
    a/a/o Eduardo Cerejido,
    Appellees.
    Appeals from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Chiaka
    Ihekwaba, and Natalie Moore, Judges.
    Michael J. Neimand, for appellant.
    Law Offices of Joseph R. Dawson, and Joseph R. Dawson (Ft.
    Lauderdale), for appellees.
    Before LINDSEY, HENDON, and LOBREE, JJ.
    PER CURIAM.
    In these two consolidated appeals 1 Appellant, United Automobile
    Insurance Company (defendant below), appeals the trial court’s orders
    granting attorney’s fees in favor of Appellee, Coastal Radiology, LLC (plaintiff
    below).     Because the orders are supported by competent substantial
    evidence and because the trial court properly awarded pre-judgment
    interest, we affirm.
    In both cases Coastal Radiology filed a complaint for PIP benefits.
    United eventually filed confessions of judgment and stipulated that Coastal
    Radiology was entitled to attorney’s fees. After the trial court entered final
    judgment, five attorneys for Coastal Radiology filed motions for fees, which
    the trial court granted after an evidentiary hearing. United timely appealed.
    This Court reviews an awarded amount of attorney’s fees for abuse of
    discretion. Bateman v. Servs. Ins., 
    836 So. 2d 1109
    , 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA
    2003).     This Court reviews factual findings for competent substantial
    evidence. Babun v. Stok Kon + Braverman, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D2318a (Fla.
    3d DCA Oct. 27, 2021). But “[e]ntitlement to attorney’s fees is subject to de
    novo appellate review.” 
    Id.
    In both detailed orders on appeal, the trial court set forth “specific
    findings as to the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended,
    1
    On our own motion, we consolidate case nos. 3D21-0288 and 3D21-0324.
    2
    and the appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors as required by
    Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 
    472 So. 2d 1145
    , 1151 (Fla.
    1985).” See Parton v. Palomino Lakes Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 
    928 So. 2d 449
    , 453 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Baratta v. Valley Homeowners’ Ass’n
    at the Vineyards, Inc., 
    891 So. 2d 1063
    , 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)). And
    those findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. To find
    otherwise would require us to reweigh the evidence. See Shaw v. Shaw,
    
    334 So. 2d 13
    , 16 (Fla. 1976) (“It is not the function of the appellate court to
    substitute its judgment for that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the
    testimony and evidence from the record on appeal before it.”). Lastly, we
    conclude that the trial court properly awarded pre-judgment interest on those
    attorney’s fees. See Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley South,
    Inc., 
    670 So. 2d 929
    , 930-31 (Fla. 1996) (“[I]nterest accrues from the date
    the entitlement to attorney fees is fixed through agreement, arbitration
    award, or court determination . . . .”).
    Affirmed.
    3