Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed May 10, 2023.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D23-0367
Lower Tribunal No. F22-6696
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The State of Florida,
Petitioner,
vs.
Jalyn A. Delancy,
Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Sandra Lipman, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner.
The Law Offices of Scott Miller, P.A., and Scott R. Miller, for
respondent.
Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LOGUE, and LINDSEY, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida petitions this Court for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the trial court from compelling mediation. Because the trial court did
not have authority to command the parties into mediation against their will,
we grant the petition.
Respondent Jalyn Delancy was charged with one count of fleeing and
eluding, two counts of causing personal or property damage from driving
under the influence, and one count of driving under the influence. The trial
court sua sponte entered an order mandating that both parties participate in
mediation, with the end goal of resolving the case via a plea bargain. The
trial court referred the case to mediation before a retired judge, who offered
to serve pro bono. The trial court also expressed its desire for the facilitated
plea bargaining to be completed within 45 days.
The issue before us is whether compelling the State to participate in a
plea-bargaining process against its wishes is an improper intrusion into the
executive branch. A writ of prohibition is the applicable remedy for instances
when a trial court interferes with the State’s prosecutorial discretion, because
“[u]nder Florida’s constitution, the decision to charge and prosecute is an
executive responsibility, and the state attorney has complete discretion in
deciding whether and how to prosecute.” See State v. Bloom,
497 So. 2d 2,
3 (Fla. 1986); see also Art. II, § 3, Fla. Const. (“The powers of the state
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government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches.
No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining
to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein.”);
Cleveland v. State,
417 So. 2d 653, 654 (Fla. 1982) (“The state attorney has
complete discretion in making the decision to charge and prosecute.”).
A United States District Court in Utah addressed a similar issue and
concluded that “courts are precluded by rule and the doctrine of Separation
of Powers from ordering the United States and a criminal defendant to
engage in plea negotiations to settle a pending prosecution.” See United
States v. Ridley’s Fam. Markets, Inc.,
525 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1358 (D. Utah
2021). The court further concluded that compelling “the United States and a
criminal defendant to sit down with or without a private mediator and discuss
whether they can ‘work something out’ would be an improper intrusion of the
Article III branch of government into the exclusive prerogative of the Article
II branch of government to enforce the law.” Id.; see also People v. Justice,
524 P.3d 1178, 1186 (Colo. 2023) (“In sum, compulsory mediation is a
square peg, and squeeze it as a trial court might, it does not fit in the round
hole of criminal litigation. The district court, though well-intentioned, erred in
ordering mediation in this criminal case.”).
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We agree with the District Court in Ridley’s and hold that compelling
the State to participate in a plea-bargaining process against its stated
objections constitutes an improper intrusion into the executive branch. See
also Justice, 524 P.3d at 1180 (“No two ways about it—mediation is one of
the most effective tools for conflict resolution in American jurisprudence. But
may a state trial court in Colorado properly order mediation in a criminal
case? In a word, no.”). Accordingly, we grant the petition but withhold formal
issuance of the writ of prohibition as we are confident the trial court will
adhere to the decision of this Court.
Petition granted.
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