LUIS ANGEL SERRANO, CENTRAL FLORIDA EQUIPMENT RENTALS, INC., and TARA LYNN CLARK v. ADDISON GRACE DICKINSON, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, and BIOMET 31, LLC d/b/a ZIMMER BIOMET DENTAL ( 2023 )

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FOURTH DISTRICT
LUIS ANGEL SERRANO, CENTRAL FLORIDA EQUIPMENT RENTALS,
INC., and TARA LYNN CLARK,
Appellants,
v.
ADDISON GRACE DICKINSON, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, and
BIOMET 31, LLC d/b/a ZIMMER BIOMET DENTAL,
Appellees.
No. 4D22-742
[June 14, 2023]
Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, St.
Lucie County; Laurie E. Buchanan, Judge; L.T. Case No.
562020CA001533.
Charles M-P “Chip” George of Law Offices of Charles M-P George, Coral
Gables, and Maria Dalmanieras of Boyd Richards Parker Colonnelli,
Miami, for appellants Luis Angel Serrano and Central Florida Equipment
Rentals, Inc.
Nichole J. Segal of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach,
and Christopher W. Kellam of Keller, Melchiorre & Walsh, Jupiter, for
appellant Tara Clark.
Sharon C. Degnan of Kubicki Draper, Orlando, for appellee Addison
Grace Dickinson.
Raymond A. Haas and Gabriella Lopez of HD Law Partners, Tampa, for
appellee Biomet 31, LLC.
GROSS, J.
The plaintiff and two defendants involved in a multi-vehicle accident
appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Addison
Dickinson and Biomet 31, LLC. We reverse, concluding that the circuit
court erred in ruling that an intervening cause relieved Dickinson and
Biomet of all liability for Dickinson’s negligence.
Facts
This case arises out of two accidents that occurred within a short time
on a rainy afternoon on the Florida Turnpike.
Dickinson lost control of her Jeep, which collided with the median
barrier and came to rest in the middle of the two southbound lanes,
partially blocking each lane. An off-duty police officer pulled his SUV onto
the right shoulder of the highway, just south of the Jeep.
After the Jeep came to a stop, Dickinson got out because it was filled
with smoke and smelled of oil. Her first thought was “to get off the
roadway,” so she went to the center median. Then she noticed the officer
on the right shoulder, so she crossed the road, believing that it “would be
a safer place to go.”
Plaintiff Tara Clark drove a Camaro in the left southbound lane,
traveling behind Dickinson. The plaintiff slowed down her car to avoid a
collision with Dickinson’s Jeep, ultimately coming to a stop or a near stop.
She saw Dickinson get out of her vehicle and walk to the middle of the
Turnpike.
Meanwhile, Briana Bruning was driving a semi-truck in the right
southbound lane. She had been traveling about 50-55 mph because of
the rain, but she started braking when she saw the Jeep stopped in the
middle of the highway. Bruning was “quite a way[] back” and did not need
to slam on her brakes. She also turned on her hazard lights. She braked
in a normal fashion and came to a complete stop. She estimated that the
braking process took at least a minute. The plaintiff’s reconstruction
expert estimated that Bruning decelerated for at least 15 or 16 seconds
before coming to a stop.
Less than two seconds after Bruning came to a complete stop, a semi-
truck driven by defendant Luis Serrano ran into the back of the Bruning
truck at between 60 and 65 mph. Serrano did not apply his brakes until
less than a second before impact; he had been traveling between 68 and
73 mph for the previous 86 seconds before braking.
The crash impact caused Serrano’s truck to jackknife. A backhoe
loader that had been on the flatbed of Serrano’s truck dislodged and
landed on top of the plaintiff’s Camaro. The plaintiff suffered a shattered
ankle and other injuries as a result of the collision.
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The forward-facing dash camera on Bruning’s truck captured two
videos related to the accident. One video is a 20-second clip of Bruning
approaching Dickinson’s stopped Jeep, coming to a complete stop at about
the 9 second mark, being jolted forward at the 10 or 11 second mark, and
coming to a final rest at the 17 second mark. The beginning of this video
also shows Dickinson crossing from the median of the Turnpike over to
the off-duty officer’s SUV on the right shoulder.
About one to one-and-a-half minutes elapsed between Dickinson’s
accident and Serrano’s accident.
The Lawsuit
The plaintiff sued Dickinson and her employer, Biomet, alleging that
Dickinson negligently operated the Jeep and that Biomet was vicariously
liable for her negligence. The plaintiff also sued Serrano and his employer
Central Florida Equipment Rentals, Inc. (“CFER”), alleging that Serrano
negligently operated his vehicle and that CFER was vicariously liable for
his negligence. The plaintiff also alleged that CFER was independently
negligent for various reasons, including a failure to maintain the truck.
Biomet moved for summary judgment, contending that the “negligent
repair, maintenance, and driving” of the Serrano truck was the
superseding cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Dickinson joined in Biomet’s motion. She argued that Serrano’s
negligent actions in colliding with Bruning’s truck “constituted [an]
intervening cause, breaking the chain of causation between the alleged
negligence of Defendant Dickinson and Plaintiff’s injuries.”
The circuit court granted summary final judgment in favor of Dickinson
and Biomet. Relying upon the video, the court concluded that the “Plaintiff
and the semi-truck in the right lane were stopped for a significant period
of time, prior to the semi-truck of Defendant Serrano coming into contact
with the fully-stopped vehicles.” The court reasoned in part that Serrano’s
failure to stop was an intervening cause, superseding any negligence of
Dickinson and Biomet. This appeal ensued.
Standard of Review and Summary Judgment Standard
The standard of review for orders granting summary judgment is de
novo. Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126,
130 (Fla. 2000).
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Under the new version of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a),
summary judgment must be granted if “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). “[T]he correct test for the existence of a
genuine factual dispute is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” In re Amends. to Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those
of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for
a directed verdict.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). “[S]ummary judgment is highly unusual in a negligence action
where the assessment of reasonableness generally is a factual question to
be addressed by the jury.” King v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 111 F.3d 251,
259 (2d Cir. 1997).
Proximate Cause and Intervening Cause
The notion of an intervening cause that absolves a negligent actor of
liability is conceptually tied into the proximate cause element of
negligence.
A negligence claim consists of four elements: (1) a duty recognized by
law; (2) breach of the duty; (3) proximate causation; and (4) damages. Clay
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Fla. 2003).
The element of proximate causation “is concerned with whether and to
what extent the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused
the specific injury that actually occurred.” McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593
So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992).
“[H]arm is ‘proximate’ in a legal sense if prudent human foresight would
lead one to expect that similar harm is likely to be substantially caused by
the specific act or omission in question.” Id. at 503. “[I]t is not necessary
that the initial tortfeasor be able to foresee the exact nature and extent of
the injuries or the precise manner in which the injuries occur.” Crislip v.
Holland, 401 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
“[T]he question of foreseeability as it relates to proximate causation
generally must be left to the fact-finder to resolve.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at
504. “The judge is free to take this matter from the fact-finder only where
the facts are unequivocal, such as where the evidence supports no more
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than a single reasonable inference.” Id. “Circumstances under which a
court may resolve proximate cause as a matter of law are extremely
limited.” St. Fort ex rel. St. Fort v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, 902 So.
2d 244, 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “[W]here reasonable persons could differ
as to whether the facts establish proximate causation—i.e., whether the
specific injury was genuinely foreseeable or merely an improbable freak—
then the resolution of the issue must be left to the fact-finder.” McCain,
593 So. 2d at 504.
“A person who has been negligent, however, is not liable for the
damages suffered by another when some separate force or action is ‘the
active and efficient intervening cause,’ the ‘sole proximate cause,’ or an
‘independent’ cause.” Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 386 So. 2d 520,
522 (Fla. 1980) (internal citations omitted). “[O]nly when an intervening
cause is completely independent of, and not in any way set in motion by,
the tortfeasor’s negligence [does] the intervening cause relieve[] a tortfeasor
from liability.” Deese v. McKinnonville Hunting Club, Inc., 874 So. 2d 1282,
1287–88 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).
“If an intervening cause is foreseeable the original negligent actor may
still be held liable. The question of whether an intervening cause is
foreseeable is for the trier of fact.” Gibson, 386 So. 2d at 522. The
foreseeability of an intervening cause turns on “whether the harm that
occurred was within the scope of the danger attributable to the defendant’s
negligent conduct.” Id.In this case, whether the Serrano crash was within the scope of the
danger caused by Dickinson’s negligent conduct is answered by the
following question: Is the subsequent accident the type of harm that may
be expected from a stationary vehicle blocking lanes on an expressway or
an interstate highway? Id. at 522–23. The answer, well-established by
case law, is yes.
Gibson and Later Cases
This case is controlled by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Gibson.
In Gibson, the plaintiff sued Arata, McNealy, and Avis Rent-A-Car for
damages resulting from a multiple car collision on an interstate highway.
Id. at 521. Arata, who was intoxicated, stopped his Avis rental car in an
inner lane for no apparent reason, causing a second car to stop behind
him. Id. The driver of the second car got out and began directing traffic
around the stationary cars. Id. The plaintiff stopped his car a few feet
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from the second car but was immediately struck from behind by McNealy’s
vehicle, with the force of the impact propelling the plaintiff’s car into the
second car. Id. The district court affirmed a directed verdict in favor of
Arata and Avis on the ground that McNealy’s negligence was an efficient
intervening cause of the plaintiff’s damages. Id.On review, the Florida Supreme Court quashed the district court’s
decision, holding that “Arata’s stopping his car in the middle of an
interstate highway is the type of negligence which ‘in the field of human
experience’ may result in the type of harm that occurred here” because “a
reasonable person would have to conclude that stopping a car in the
middle of an interstate creates a risk that other cars may collide as a result
of trying to avoid hitting the stopped vehicle.” Id. at 523.
The court reasoned that “the question of whether to absolve a negligent
actor of liability is more a question of responsibility” than of physical
causation. Id. at 522. “If an intervening cause is foreseeable the original
negligent actor may still be held liable. The question of whether an
intervening cause is foreseeable is for the trier of fact.” Id. Therefore, “[i]n
such multiple car accidents the jury may find more than one driver
responsible.” Id. at 523.
Gibson involved the common situation where an inattentive driver
crashes into a plaintiff who stopped to avoid hitting a stationary vehicle
blocking a lane on an interstate highway. The Florida Supreme Court later
distinguished the Gibson scenario from a “materially different factual
situation” in Department of Transportation v. Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896, 897
(Fla. 1987), a case upon which Dickinson and Biomet heavily rely.
In Anglin, Mrs. Anglin and two family members were driving on a rural
highway when their truck’s engine died after crossing a railroad track and
going through a deep puddle. Id. They first pushed the vehicle to the side
of the road but later tried to restart it on the roadway. Id. About 15
minutes after the Anglin truck stalled out, a truck driven by DuBose
passed them heading in the opposite direction, and someone in DuBose’s
vehicle yelled they would return to help. Id. DuBose then traveled a short
distance, slammed on his brakes, spun around and headed back towards
Anglin’s vehicle. Id. “With the engine roaring and at a speed approaching
forty miles per hour, DuBose failed to stop and slammed into the back of
the [Anglins’] truck.” Id.The Anglins sued the railroad company and the Department of
Transportation, “alleging negligence in the design of the railroad tracks
and the roadway by allowing the accumulation of water on the roadway
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immediately adjacent to the tracks.” Id. at 898. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, but the district court reversed. Id.On review, the Florida Supreme Court held that “as a matter of law, the
actions of DuBose constituted an independent, efficient, intervening cause
of the Anglins’ injuries.” Id. The court reasoned:
[E]ven assuming that petitioners had created a dangerous
situation, the actions of DuBose were so far beyond the
realm of foreseeability that, as a matter of law and
policy, the petitioners cannot be held liable for the
respondents’ injuries. While it may be arguable that
petitioners, by creating a dangerous situation which caused
the respondents to require assistance, could have reasonably
foreseen that someone may attempt to provide such
assistance, it was not reasonably foreseeable that DuBose
would act in such a bizarre and reckless manner.
Petitioners’ negligent conduct did not set in motion a chain of
events resulting in injuries to respondents; it simply provided
the occasion for DuBose’s gross negligence.
Id. at 899–900 (emphasis added). Anglin is a case where a tortfeasor knew
all about the stalled vehicle and inexplicably disregarded such knowledge
by turning around and crashing into it.
In two cases involving a subsequent rear-end collision following an
initial accident, other district courts of appeal found that the facts were
more closely aligned with Gibson than Anglin.
In Zwinge v. Hettinger, 530 So. 2d 318, 321–23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), the
Second District held that the evidence was sufficient to present a jury
question as to whether the driver who allegedly caused the first automobile
accident on I-275 created a situation of danger rendering the plaintiff’s
accident—which occurred three to ten minutes later when he was rear-
ended as he was stopping to render aid—a foreseeable result of that peril.
In Cooke v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 14 So. 3d 1192, 1193,
1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the First District confronted a case arising from
an accident on I-75. The court applied Gibson, holding that the negligence
of the plaintiff’s decedent in failing to brake when the vehicle in front of
him slowed—an accident which occurred when the plaintiff’s decedent
“failed to heed, or perhaps to even notice, the warning flares set out by the
deputy”—was not an intervening and superseding cause acting to break
the chain of causation stemming from the defendant’s negligence in a prior
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accident that had occurred over an hour earlier and had slowed traffic on
the interstate. Id. at 1193, 1197. The court concluded that a reasonable
fact-finder could find that the chain of events, including the decedent’s
actions in the second accident, was foreseeable. Id. at 1197.
Gibson, Zwinge, and Cooke compel the conclusion that the
foreseeability of Serrano’s conduct from the standpoint of Dickinson’s
negligence was, at the very least, a jury question.
Dickinson and Biomet rely upon cases which are distinguishable
because they involve different theories of negligent conduct and stem from
accidents on streets and in locations that present different driving
scenarios than a stopped car blocking a lane on an interstate highway.
See Seminole Lakes Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Esnard, 263 So. 3d 56, 57–
59 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (involving a homeowner association’s failure to
enforce a rule prohibiting street parking); Las Olas Holding Co. v. Demella,
228 So. 3d 97, 106 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (where claim of negligence involved
a hotel’s placement of a pool cabana that collapsed after an intoxicated
driver drove into the cabana’s wall); Pope v. Cruise Boat Co., 380 So. 2d
1151, 1152–53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that defendant’s conduct in
allowing a boat on a trailer to be parked on the shoulder of the street was
not the proximate cause of a pedestrian’s injuries, where the pedestrian
was walking along the shoulder rather than a sidewalk and was struck by
a truck when trying to navigate around the boat).
This Case
The trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of
Dickinson and Biomet. Viewing the facts of this case in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that
Dickinson’s negligence proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
The trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that Serrano’s
negligent operation of his semi-truck was an intervening cause of the harm
to the plaintiff, breaking the chain of causation and relieving Dickinson
and Biomet from liability.
Serrano’s negligent conduct was a foreseeable byproduct of Dickinson’s
negligence. On an expressway or interstate highway, with no stop lights
or stop signs and the potential for highway hypnosis, a driver’s inattention
can arise from a multitude of causes, including using a cell phone,
changing radio stations, falling asleep, or dealing with children fighting in
the backseat. Because such inattention is a foreseeable cause of a
collision with a stopped vehicle on an expressway, the law permits the
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conclusion that Dickinson’s conduct set in motion a chain of events
resulting in injury to the plaintiff.
The test of foreseeability does not require one to foresee exactly how an
accident will unfold. The law does not require an absurd degree of
specificity. As our supreme court has explained, “it is immaterial that the
defendant could not foresee the precise manner in which the injury
occurred or its exact extent.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at 503.
This case is materially indistinguishable from Gibson—Dickinson lost
control of her Jeep and stopped in the middle of the Turnpike, the plaintiff
came to a stop or near stop to avoid hitting the Jeep, and Serrano rear-
ended Bruning’s semi-truck that had stopped next to the plaintiff, injuring
the plaintiff when his cargo fell on top of the plaintiff’s vehicle. Unlike
Anglin and similar cases, there was nothing extraordinary, freakish, or
bizarre about this accident. It was a garden-variety highway accident.
We reverse the summary final judgment and remand to the circuit
court for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
CIKLIN, J., concurs.
KLINGENSMITH, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
KLINGENSMITH, C.J., concurring specially.
I concur in the majority opinion but write to note that I question the
viability of Cooke under the new summary judgment standard. A long time
interval between an initial roadway accident and a subsequent mishap
might well justify a judicial finding of the existence of an intervening cause.
* * *
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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