QUENTIN COOPER VS. ELIAS BALADI (L-10034-14, BERGEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) ( 2018 )


Menu:
  •                         NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-1507-16T2
    QUENTIN COOPER,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    ELIAS BALADI, individually
    and t/a E&S Auto,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _______________________________
    Submitted May 1, 2018 – Decided August 7, 2018
    Before Judges Sumners and Natali.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Bergen County, Docket No. L-
    10034-14.
    Elias Baladi, appellant pro se.
    The Wolf Law Firm, LLC, attorneys for
    respondent (Matthew S. Oorbeek, on the brief).
    PER CURIAM
    This appeal comes to us following a bench trial and a post-
    trial application before Judge James J. DeLuca that resulted in a
    judgment in favor of plaintiff, arising from the purchase of a
    used vehicle from defendant, for treble damages of $28,235.44,
    plus attorney's fees and costs of $28,903.50, for violations of
    the New Jersey Used Vehicle Lemon Law (Lemon Law), N.J.S.A. 56:8-
    67 to -80, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-
    1 to -20, and the New Jersey Truth In Consumer Contract Warranty
    and Notice Act (TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18.                    Because we
    conclude that the judge's rulings were supported by credible
    evidence    and   a   proper   application        of     the   law,   we    affirm
    substantially for the reasons he stated in his oral opinion on
    August 5, 2016, and his written decision dated November 2, 2016.
    In his merits brief,1 defendant contends Judge DeLuca made
    incorrect factual findings and misapplied the law.                Specifically,
    he argues that he did not violate the Lemon Law because plaintiff
    failed to allow him to repair the vehicle.             He further argues that
    he did not violate the CFA because plaintiff, an "experienced
    mechanic," waived his rights under the Lemon Law by negotiating
    the vehicle's purchase price.           We disagree.
    It is long settled that we do "not disturb the factual
    findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless we are
    convinced    that     they   are   so       manifestly    unsupported      by     or
    inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible
    1
    We note that defendant did not comply with Rule 2:6-2(a)(5) by
    citing to the transcript in his statement of facts. However, we
    are able to discern the substance of his contentions, which are
    minimal.
    2                                  A-1507-16T2
    evidence as to offend the interests of justice."                      Seidman v.
    Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 
    205 N.J. 150
    , 169 (2011) (citation
    omitted).    Thus, our review "does not consist of weighing evidence
    anew and making independent factual findings; rather, our function
    is to determine whether there is adequate evidence to support the
    judgment rendered at trial." Cannuscio v. Claridge Hotel & Casino,
    
    319 N.J. Super. 342
    , 347 (App. Div. 1999) (citation omitted).                     We
    owe particular deference to the judge's evaluation of witness
    credibility, Cesare v. Cesare, 
    154 N.J. 394
    , 412 (1998), and thus
    review the judge's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
    Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
    202 N.J. 369
    ,
    374   (2010).      However,      we   owe     no    deference   to   the   judge's
    "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
    from established facts."          Manalapan Realty, Ltd. P'ship v. Twp.
    Comm., 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378 (1995) (citations omitted).                   We review
    such decisions de novo.          30 River Court E. Urban Renewal Co. v.
    Capograsso, 
    383 N.J. Super. 470
    , 476 (App. Div. 2006) (citation
    omitted).
    During the half-day trial, plaintiff, defendant, and the
    operator of E&S Auto Sales Repairs, testified, revealing the
    following.      For $10,420, defendant sold plaintiff a six-year old
    Lincoln   MKZ    with   84,100    miles       and   an   expired   manufacturer's
    3                                A-1507-16T2
    warranty.    In the retail order for the vehicle, defendant checked
    the box titled "Vehicle Sold As Is," above the statement:
    THIS VEHICLE IS SOLD "AS IS", AND THE SELLING
    DEALER   HEREBY   EXPRESSLY    DISCLAIMS   ALL
    WARRANTIES,   EITHER   EXPRESS   OR   IMPLIED,
    INCLUDING    ANY   IMPLIED    WARRANTIES    OF
    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
    PURPOSE. ANY LIABILITY IN THE SELLING DEALER
    WITH RESPECT TO THE DEFECTS OR MALFUNCTIONS
    OF THIS VEHICLE INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION
    THOSE WHICH PERTAIN TO THE PERFORMANCE OR
    SAFETY WHETHER BY WAY OF "STRICT LIABILITY"
    BASED UPON THE SELLING DEALER'S NEGLIGENCE,
    OR OTHERWISE, IS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED, AND
    PURCHASER HEREBY ASSUMES ANY SUCH RISKS.
    Right below that box was another box, which defendant also checked,
    titled "Waiver of Dealer Obligations" above a statement identical
    to the "Vehicle Sold As Is" provision.      Plaintiff, however, did
    receive a warranty service contract covering the vehicle, which
    entitled him to a maximum reimbursement of up to $2000 less a $100
    deductible per authorized repair.
    Three days after the purchase, plaintiff noticed a smell
    coming from the vehicle, so he took the vehicle to defendant's
    mechanic at DMS Auto Repairs as directed by defendant.       Plaintiff
    testified that the mechanic stated the car's power transfer unit
    had "blown seals."     Plaintiff declined the offer to leave the
    4                            A-1507-16T2
    vehicle with the mechanic because there was a disagreement over
    who would pay for the repairs.2
    Twenty-nine days after the purchase, defendant received a
    letter from plaintiff stating that the vehicle was deficient – a
    material defect of the power train/transfer case – and referencing
    the Lemon Law, demanded that defendant make repairs at no cost
    other than the $50 deductible stated in the warranty service
    contract, or alternatively, take the vehicle back and refund him
    the purchase price minus sales tax, title and registration fees,
    and a reasonable allowance for the vehicle's use.          Plaintiff
    further advised defendant that the vehicle was available to him
    for whatever option defendant chose.   Defendant testified that he
    did not respond to the letter because under the warranty service
    contract plaintiff was obligated to contact a third party to make
    the repairs.
    In his reserved oral decision, Judge DeLuca determined that
    under N.J.S.A. 56:8-69,
    it shall be an unlawful practice for a dealer
    to sell a used motor vehicle [with 60,000
    miles or more] to a consumer without giving
    the consumer a written warranty which shall
    have at least . . . [a minimum warranty of]
    30 days or 1,000 miles, whichever comes first,
    except that a consumer may waive the right to
    2
    In addition, plaintiff obtained a second opinion from a Ford
    Lincoln Mercury dealership estimating repair costs of $2298.
    5                          A-1507-16T2
    a warranty as provided for in N.J.S.A. 56:8-
    73.
    The judge further stated that under N.J.S.A. 56:8-73,
    the waiver of a warranty shall be in writing
    and separately stated in the agreement of
    retail sale or in an attachment thereto, and
    shall be separately signed by the consumer.
    The waiver shall state that the dealer's
    obligation to provide a warranty on used motor
    vehicles, and shall indicate that the consumer
    having negotiated the purchase price of the
    used   motor   vehicle    obtained   a   price
    adjustment, and is electing to waive the
    dealer's obligation to provide the warranty,
    and is buying the vehicle as is.
    The judge found that since defendant did not comply with
    these requirements, he violated the Lemon Law.               Hence, defendant
    was   obligated   to   provide    plaintiff's      vehicle   with    a   limited
    warranty under N.J.S.A. 56:8-69.           The judge rejected defendant's
    assertion that plaintiff's refusal of his mechanic's offer to
    repair the vehicle satisfied the limited warranty requirements of
    N.J.S.A. 56:8-69.      The judge reasoned that since defendant refused
    to comply with plaintiff's demand letter, defendant violated his
    obligations under the statute.       Consequently, the judge determined
    plaintiff's   compensatory       damages    were   $9,378.48,3      which    were
    3
    The vehicle purchase price of $10,420 minus $225 for sale tax,
    $665 for registration fees, and $121.52 for a reasonable allowance
    for the 217 miles that plaintiff drove the vehicle.
    6                                  A-1507-16T2
    trebled under the CFA to $28,135.44.     He further added $100 for
    statutory damages under the TCCWNA.
    After defendant was found liable for damages under the Lemon
    Law, CFA, and TCCWNA, plaintiff made an application for attorney's
    fees and costs under the latter two statutes.    After argument, the
    judge rendered a written decision in which he declined plaintiff's
    attorney's fees demand of $45,256, but allowed fees of $27,559,
    plus costs of $1,344.50, for a total of $28,903.50. Final judgment
    was entered in the total amount of $57,138.94.
    After reviewing the record, we conclude there is no basis to
    disturb Judge DeLuca's factual findings.     Based on the facts as
    he found them to be, his legal conclusions on the issues of
    liability and damages are unassailable.4   We further conclude that
    defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
    discussion in a written opinion.    R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    4
    We do not address the reasoning behind the fees award because,
    despite defendant's Notice of Appeal stating that he is challenging
    the final judgment, he fails to present any argument contesting
    the award.   See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules,
    cmt. 4 on R. 2:6-2 (2018); see also Sklodowsky v. Lushis, 417 N.J.
    Super. 648, 657 (App. Div. 2011) ("An issue not briefed on appeal
    is deemed waived.").
    7                            A-1507-16T2