Evans v. United States ( 2018 )


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  •        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Federal Circuit
    ______________________
    DAVID O. EVANS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Defendant-Appellee
    ______________________
    2017-2319
    ______________________
    Appeal from the United States Court of Federal
    Claims in No. 1:16-cv-00717-EJD, Senior Judge Edward
    J. Damich.
    ______________________
    Decided: August 29, 2018
    ______________________
    LOUISE PARIS, Louise Paris Attorney at Law, Canton,
    MI, for plaintiff-appellant.
    SONIA MARIE ORFIELD, Commercial Litigation Branch,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represent-
    ed by ROBERT EDWARD KIRSCHMAN, JR., DOUGLAS K.
    MICKLE, CHAD A. READLER.
    ______________________
    2                                    EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.
    WALLACH, Circuit Judge.
    Appellant David O. Evans appeals an order of the
    U.S. Court of Federal Claims dismissing his claims for
    military back pay, disability retirement benefits, and
    review of an Army Board for Correction of Military Rec-
    ords (“ABCMR”) decision for lack of jurisdiction. See
    Evans v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-00717-EJD (Fed. Cl.
    May 31, 2017) (“May 31 Order”) (J.A. 2–4). Mr. Evans
    also contends that the Court of Federal Claims erred
    when it issued three orders that: (1) denied his motions
    to reconsider or modify the judgment (“the Post-Judgment
    Motions”); (2) precluded him from filing further motions
    for reconsideration; and (3) threatened sanctions if addi-
    tional motions were filed in contradiction of its order. See
    Evans v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-00717-EJD (Fed. Cl.
    June 5, 2017) (“June 5 Order”) (J.A. 55); Evans v. United
    States, No. 1:16-cv-00717-EJD (Fed. Cl. June 8, 2017)
    (“June 8 Order”) (J.A. 57); Evans v. United States, No.
    1:16-cv-00717-EJD (Fed. Cl. July 5, 2017) (“July 5 Order”)
    (J.A. 58) (collectively, “the Orders on Appeal”). We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1295
    (a)(3) (2012). We
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Mr. Evans enlisted in the U.S. Army on December 17,
    1958. Suppl. App. 1–3. After being court-martialed three
    times, 
    id. at 6
    , and receiving non-judicial punishment
    three times, 
    id. at 7
    , he was separated from the service
    due to “undesirable habits or traits of character” with an
    “undesirable discharge” on April 21, 1960, 
    id. at 32
    ; see 
    id. at 3
     (stating the date of discharge). Between 1962 and
    2015, Mr. Evans submitted four applications for a dis-
    charge upgrade and two requests for reconsideration of
    previous determinations to the Army Discharge Review
    Board (“ADRB”) and ABCMR, all of which were denied.
    See 
    id.
     at 43–195. The ABCMR issued its most recent
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                   3
    denial of a request for discharge upgrade on January 12,
    2016 (“the 2016 ABCMR Decision”). 
    Id. at 179
    .
    On June 20, 2016, Mr. Evans filed a complaint with
    the Court of Federal Claims seeking, for the first time,
    military back pay, disability retirement benefits, and
    Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) benefits, and
    challenging the 2016 ABCMR Decision denying his re-
    quest for a discharge upgrade. J.A. 2, 32–37. In granting
    the Government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
    tion, J.A. 4–5, the Court of Federal Claims found that
    (1) Mr. Evans’s claim for military back pay was filed well
    beyond the applicable statute of limitations, J.A. 2–3;
    (2) Mr. Evans failed to bring his request for retirement
    disability benefits to a proper military board of review
    prior to initiating action at the Court of Federal Claims,
    J.A. 3; and (3) Mr. Evans’s VA benefits claim must pro-
    ceed through a separate adjudicative channel involving
    the Board of Veterans Appeals and the U.S. Court of
    Appeals for Veterans Claims, J.A. 3. With regard to the
    2016 ABCMR Decision, the Court of Federal Claims found
    that a request for a discharge upgrade is not a money-
    mandating action, and is therefore not within its jurisdic-
    tion. J.A. 3–4.
    Following the Order dismissing his Complaint, Mr.
    Evans filed three motions for reconsideration, see Pl.’s
    Mot. for Recons., Evans v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-
    00717-EJD (Fed. Cl. June 4, 2017), ECF No. 61 (“First
    Mot. for Recons.”); Pl.’s 2nd Mot. for Recons., Evans v.
    United States, No. 1:16-cv-00717-EJD (Fed. Cl. June 6,
    2017), ECF No. 63 (“Second Mot. for Recons.”); Pl’s 3rd
    Mot. for Recons., Evans v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-
    00717-EJD (Fed. Cl. June 7, 2017), ECF No. 65 (“Third
    Mot. for Recons.”), all of which were denied, J.A. 55–58.
    Following the Third Motion for Reconsideration, the
    Court of Federal Claims precluded Mr. Evans “from filing
    any further motions for reconsideration.” J.A. 57. Mr.
    Evans subsequently filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the
    4                                    EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    Judgment. Pl.’s Mot. to Alter or Amend J., Evans v.
    United States, No. 1:16-cv-00717-EJD (Fed. Cl. June 21,
    2017), ECF No. 67 (“Mot. to Alter or Amend”). In its
    denial of this motion, the Court of Federal Claims “pre-
    cluded [Mr. Evans] from filing any further motions of any
    kind” and “directed [the Clerk’s Office] to strike any
    further filings, other than a notice of appeal,” stating that
    “[the Court of Federal Claims] may enter appropriate
    sanctions if any additional filings are made in contradic-
    tion of this order.” J.A. 58.
    DISCUSSION
    I. The Court of Federal Claims Lacked Jurisdiction
    Mr. Evans argues that the Court of Federal Claims
    had jurisdiction to hear his claims for military back pay,
    claims for disability retirement benefits, and challenge to
    the 2016 ABCMR Decision. Appellant’s Br. 14–18. 1 After
    stating the applicable standard of review, we consider
    each contention in turn.
    A. Standard of Review
    “We review a Court of Federal Claims decision to dis-
    miss for lack of jurisdiction de novo,” and “[t]he [appel-
    lant] bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” Diaz v. United States,
    
    853 F.3d 1355
    , 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
    We review jurisdictional findings of fact for clear error.
    See Banks v. United States, 
    314 F.3d 1304
    , 1308 (Fed. Cir.
    2003). “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
    there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
    entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
    1  Mr. Evans does not challenge on appeal the Court
    of Federal Claims’ determination regarding his claim for
    VA benefits. See generally Appellant’s Br.
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                   5
    tion that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
    U.S. Gypsum Co., 
    333 U.S. 364
    , 395 (1948).
    B. Military Back Pay
    The Court of Federal Claims found it lacked jurisdic-
    tion over Mr. Evans’s claim for military back pay because
    the relevant six-year statute of limitations had run over
    fifty years prior. See J.A. 3. Mr. Evans, however, argues
    he is entitled to military back pay under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1) 2 (“the Tucker Act”) because the Army
    “breached” its “express contract” between himself and the
    Army as a result of what he considers an improper “han-
    dling” of his “less than honorable discharge” in 1960.
    Appellant’s Br. 13. He asserts that the Court of Federal
    Claims possessed jurisdiction to hear his back pay claim
    because it “identif[ies] a substantive right for money
    damages separate from the Tucker Act.” 
    Id. at 12
    ; see 
    id.
    at 12–18 (presenting no source of substantive law upon
    which to base his back pay claim other than the Tucker
    Act); Reply Br. 6 (citing 
    37 U.S.C. § 204
     (2013) (“the
    Military Pay Act”) following a mention of Mr. Evans’s
    claim for military back pay). We disagree with Mr. Ev-
    ans.
    “In a military discharge case, this court and the Court
    of [Federal] Claims have long held that the plaintiff’s
    cause of action for back pay accrues at the time of the
    plaintiff’s discharge.” Martinez v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1295
    , 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Furthermore, “[e]very claim
    of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has
    jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is
    2   Section 1491(a)(1) states that “[t]he United States
    Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render
    judgment upon any claim against the United States
    founded . . . upon any express or implied contract with the
    United States.”
    6                                   EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2501
    ; see John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
    States, 
    457 F.3d 1345
    , 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The six-year
    statute of limitations set forth in [§] 2501 is a jurisdic-
    tional requirement for a suit in the Court of Federal
    Claims.” (citation omitted)).
    Mr. Evans’s military back pay claim is barred by the
    six-year statute of limitations. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2501
    ; see
    also 
    37 U.S.C. § 204
     (stating the conditions under which a
    service member is entitled to payment). The relevant
    date for jurisdictional purposes is April 21, 1960, the day
    Mr. Evans was discharged. Suppl. App. 3 (documenting
    the discharge date in U.S. Army Service Record). For
    decades, he has repeatedly petitioned the ADRB and
    ABCMR for a discharge upgrade to honorable discharge,
    but never sought back pay until the June 20, 2016 Com-
    plaint filed with the Court of Federal Claims. See J.A. 2–
    3. However, the statute of limitations for the Court of
    Federal Claims has run; Mr. Evans seeks remuneration
    over fifty years too late. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2501
    . He offers
    no additional evidence or arguments for why the Court of
    Federal Claims has jurisdiction in 2016 to consider his
    military back pay claim, see Appellant’s Br. 15–17 (chal-
    lenging the Court of Federal Claims’ statute of limitations
    finding only with respect to the claim for disability re-
    tirement, and not for back pay), and we find none.
    C. Disability Retirement Benefits
    The Court of Federal Claims found that it lacked ju-
    risdiction to consider Mr. Evans’s claim for disability
    retirement benefits because he had not previously submit-
    ted any such claim to a military board competent to
    conduct initial review, which is a necessary prerequisite
    to Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction. J.A. 3. Mr.
    Evans argues that the Court of Federal Claims erred
    because “[e]ven though the [disability retirement] claim
    was not formally requested at the [ABCMR,] it was an
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                     7
    implied claim and the [ABCMR] could have awarded
    damages on [its] own if the [discharge upgrade] was
    granted.” Appellant’s Br. 17; see 
    id.
     (“Since the [ABCMR]
    vehemently opposed his upgrade for unclear reasons,
    requesting disability [retirement] compensation would
    have been denied. The fact that the claim was not raised
    to the [ABCMR] specifically should not affect . . . appeal to
    the Court [of Federal Claims].”). We disagree with Mr.
    Evans.
    “[Military d]isability retirement cases . . . are gov-
    erned by 
    10 U.S.C. § 1201
     [(2012)].” Chambers v. United
    States, 
    417 F.3d 1218
    , 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see 
    10 U.S.C. § 1201
    (b) (mandating the requirements for disability
    retirement benefits, such as “the disability is of a perma-
    nent nature and stable,” and “the disability is not the
    result of the member’s intentional misconduct or willful
    neglect”). As Chambers explained,
    in the context of [§] 1201, Congress has entrusted
    the military boards with the task of determining
    whether a serviceman should be retired for disa-
    bility and therefore . . . no cause of action arises
    (and the statute of limitations does not run) until
    a proper board has acted or declined to act.
    
    417 F.3d at 1224
     (internal quotation marks, citation, and
    alterations omitted); see Real v. United States, 
    906 F.2d 1557
    , 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The generally accepted rule
    is that claims of entitlement to disability retirement pay
    do not accrue until the appropriate board either finally
    denies such a claim or refuses to hear it.”). That is,
    [t]he decision by the first statutorily authorized
    board which hears or refuses to hear the claim is
    the triggering event. If at the time of discharge
    an appropriate board was requested by the service
    member and the request was refused or if the
    board heard the service member’s claim but de-
    nied it, the limitations period begins to run upon
    8                                    EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    discharge. . . . A subsequent petition to the cor-
    rections board does not toll the running of the lim-
    itations period, . . . nor does a new claim accrue
    upon denial of the petition by the corrections
    board. However, where the [c]orrection [b]oard is
    not a reviewing tribunal but is the first board to
    consider or determine finally the claimant’s eligi-
    bility for disability retirement, the single cause of
    action accrues upon the [c]orrection [b]oard’s final
    decision.
    Real, 
    906 F.2d at 1560
     (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    The Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to
    consider Mr. Evans’s claim for military disability retire-
    ment benefits because he never submitted an initial
    request for such benefits to a competent military board.
    See Suppl. App. 43–195 (U.S. Army Records Packets);
    Appellant’s Br. 17 (admitting that no disability retire-
    ment submission was made to a competent military
    board). Rather, Mr. Evans simply repeatedly sought a
    discharge upgrade. See, e.g., Suppl. App. 43–47, 61–62,
    76–77, 81–82, 98–99, 108, 117–18, 135–37. In addition,
    his contention that submission of a disability retirement
    claim to the ABCMR was “implied” is unpersuasive. See
    Appellant’s Br. 17. We are unaware of any law or regula-
    tion authorizing or articulating the definition of an im-
    plied submission for benefits, and Mr. Evans offers none.
    See generally 
    id.
     Accordingly, absent initial consideration
    of a request for disability retirement benefits by a compe-
    tent military board, the Court of Federal Claims is unable
    to entertain such a claim. See Chambers, 
    417 F.3d at 1225
     (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction
    over disability retirement claims until a military board
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                    9
    evaluates a service member’s entitlement to such retire-
    ment in the first instance.”). 3
    D. The ABCMR’s Denial of Discharge Upgrade
    The Court of Federal Claims found that it lacked ju-
    risdiction to consider Mr. Evans’s challenge to the 2016
    ABCMR Decision denying his request for a discharge
    upgrade because the request did not entail a “money-
    mandating action,” as required by the Tucker Act. J.A. 3
    (citing 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1)). Mr. Evans argues that the
    Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction to hear his
    discharge upgrade denial claim under the Administrative
    Procedure Act (“APA”), 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 551
    –559, 701–706,
    1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012), which he
    alleges allows the Court of Federal Claims to “set aside an
    agency action that is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion[,] or contrary to law or regulation.” Appellant’s
    Br. 17 (citing 
    5 U.S.C. §§ 702
    –706). We disagree with Mr.
    Evans.
    The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is dic-
    tated by the Tucker Act. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1)
    (granting the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over
    3     Should Mr. Evans file a disability retirement
    claim with a competent military board in order to thereby
    gain Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over any poten-
    tial subsequent complaint, his claim may still be time-
    barred. Pursuant to Chambers,
    [a] service member’s failure to request a hearing
    board prior to discharge . . . can invoke the statute
    of limitations when the service member has suffi-
    cient actual or constructive notice of his disability,
    and hence, of his entitlement to disability retire-
    ment pay, at the time of discharge.
    
    417 F.3d at 1226
     (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted).
    10                                     EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    certain claims against the United States); Fisher v. Unit-
    ed States, 
    402 F.3d 1167
    , 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc in
    relevant part) (“It is hornbook law that the Tucker
    Act . . . confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal
    Claims over the specified categories of actions brought
    against the United States.”). Pursuant to the Tucker Act,
    an action may be maintained in the Court of Federal
    Claims if it is, inter alia, “founded . . . upon any express or
    implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated
    or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.”
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1491
    (a)(1). However, the Tucker Act “is itself
    only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any sub-
    stantive right enforceable against the United States for
    money damages.” United States v. Testan, 
    424 U.S. 392
    ,
    398 (1976). Rather, “[i]n order to invoke jurisdiction
    under the Tucker Act, a plaintiff must point to a substan-
    tive right to money damages against the United States.”
    Hamlet v. United States, 
    63 F.3d 1097
    , 1101 (Fed. Cir.
    1995). That is, “[a] plaintiff must assert a claim under a
    separate money-mandating constitutional provision,
    statute, or regulation, the violation of which supports a
    claim for damages against the United States.” James v.
    Caldera, 
    159 F.3d 573
    , 580 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In United
    States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, the Supreme
    Court clarified that
    [i]t is enough . . . that a statute creating a Tucker
    Act right be reasonably amenable to the reading
    that it mandates a right of recovery in damages.
    While the premise to a Tucker Act claim will not
    be lightly inferred, . . . a fair inference will do.
    
    537 U.S. 465
    , 473 (2003) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted); see United States v. Mitchell, 
    463 U.S. 206
    , 216–17 (1983) (“[T]he claimant must demonstrate
    that the source of substantive law he relies upon can
    fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
    Federal Government for the damages sustained.” (inter-
    nal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                       11
    The Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction to
    hear Mr. Evans’s challenge to the 2016 ABCMR Decision
    because a discharge upgrade is not money-mandating.
    We have held that “[the Tucker Act] gives the [Court of
    Federal Claims] power to order the correction of military
    records only incident of and collateral to its award of a
    money judgment.” Voge v. United States, 
    844 F.2d 776
    ,
    781 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Whereas § 1201 “is money-mandating
    because when the requirements of the statute are
    met . . . [,] the member is entitled to compensation,”
    Fisher, 402 F.3d at 1175 (en banc in relevant part), no
    such entitlement springs from a discharge upgrade, see
    Voge, 
    844 F.2d at 781
    . Moreover, because we agree the
    Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over Mr.
    Evans’s other claims involving money-mandating stat-
    utes, see supra Section I.B–C, his discharge upgrade claim
    is not “incident of and collateral to,” Voge, 
    844 F.2d at 781
    , any “money-mandating constitutional provision,
    statute, or regulation,” James, 159 F.3d at 580. The APA
    does not extend the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
    Claims and is not a money-mandating source of law. See
    Wopsock v. Natchees, 
    454 F.3d 1327
    , 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
    (“[T]he APA does not authorize an award of money dam-
    ages at all; to the contrary, . . . § 702[] specifically limits
    the Act to actions ‘seeking relief other than money dam-
    ages.’”). Thus, Mr. Evans’s discharge upgrade claim
    cannot be entertained.
    II. The Court of Federal Claims Did Not Abuse Its Discre-
    tion When It Denied Mr. Evans’s Post-Judgment Motions
    and Precluded Further Filing
    Mr. Evans claims that the Court of Federal Claims
    erred when it denied the Post-Judgment Motions, pre-
    cluded him from further filings (save for a notice of ap-
    peal), and threatened him with sanctions if he violated
    this preclusion. See Appellant’s Br. 10, 18; J.A. 55–58
    12                                   EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    (Orders on Appeal). We present the standard of review
    and then consider each argument in turn.
    A. Standard of Review
    We review the Court of Federal Claims’ denial of the
    Post-Judgment Motions, its preclusion of filings, and its
    threat of sanctions for an abuse of discretion. See 1-10
    Indus. Assocs., L.L.C. v. United States, 
    528 F.3d 859
    , 867
    (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“We review an order imposing sanctions
    under the abuse of discretion standard.” (citation omit-
    ted)); Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. United States, 
    254 F.3d 1367
    , 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[We] review[] the Court of
    Federal Claims’ denial of [Appellant’s] motion to modi-
    fy/reconsider for abuse of discretion.” (citations omitted)).
    “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court misunder-
    stands or misapplies the relevant law or makes clearly
    erroneous findings of fact.” Renda Marine, Inc. v. United
    States, 
    509 F.3d 1372
    , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
    B. The Post-Judgment Motions
    In his Post-Judgment Motions, Mr. Evans alleged,
    under Rules 59 and 60 of the Rules of the Court of Federal
    Claims (“RCFC”), that the Court of Federal Claims mis-
    characterized the Complaint and the case in its May 31
    Order and therefore addressed the wrong matter. See
    First Mot. for Recons. 2–4 (contending, inter alia, that the
    May 31 Order both relied upon an incorrect page length of
    the Complaint and found that Mr. Evans’s claims lacked
    case support, and that “these factors indicate there was
    an error in identifying the case to be dismissed”); Second
    Mot. for Recons. 2–4 (similar); Third Mot. for Recons. 2–4
    (similar); Mot. to Alter or Amend 1–3 (similar); see also
    RCFC 59 (governing when a court may reconsider its
    ruling or modify a judgment or order); RCFC 60 (govern-
    ing when a court may grant relief from a judgment or
    order). Mr. Evans argued that these errors warranted
    reconsideration of his case or relief from the Order dis-
    missing it for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., First Mot for
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                      13
    Recons. (requesting that the Court of Federal Claims
    reconsider and reverse the dismissal or grant Mr. Evans
    relief from the May 31 Order).
    In its June 5 Order, the Court of Federal Claims first
    clarified the relevant rule at issue, such that “[Mr. Evans]
    alleges clerical error or mistake under RCFC 60 (b)(1).”
    J.A. 55; see RCFC 60(b)(1) (stating that relief from an
    “order” may be granted due to “mistake, inadvertence,
    surprise, or excusable neglect”). The Court of Federal
    Claims then detailed how it had referenced and accurate-
    ly characterized the correct case filing date and Com-
    plaint page length in the original May 31 Order. See J.A.
    55 (explaining how the Complaint attached “exhibits so
    that the document was 155 pages in length”). Mr. Evans’s
    subsequent motions for reconsideration and Motion to
    Alter or Amend the Judgment put forth arguments identi-
    cal to those in his First Motion for Reconsideration. See
    Second Mot. for Recons. 2–4; Third Mot. for Recons. 2–4;
    Mot. to Alter or Amend 1–3. In due course, the Court of
    Federal Claims denied the Second Motion for Reconsider-
    ation, J.A. 56, denied the Third Motion for Reconsidera-
    tion and precluded Mr. Evans “from filing any further
    motions for reconsideration,” J.A. 57, and denied the
    Motion to Alter or Amend and precluded Mr. Evans “from
    filing any further motions of any kind except, if he intends
    to do so, a [n]otice of [a]ppeal,” J.A. 58. In the final deni-
    al, the Court of Federal Claims also stated that it “may
    enter appropriate sanctions if any additional filings are
    made in contradiction of this order.” J.A. 58. Mr. Evans
    argues that the Court of Federal Claims’ actions violated
    “his [c]onstitutional due process rights.” Appellant’s Br.
    18. We disagree.
    The Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its discre-
    tion because its actions were proper applications of the
    RCFC and fell within its broad discretion to manage its
    courtroom and cases. Under RCFC Rule 59, the Court of
    Federal Claims may reconsider its ruling or modify it for
    14                                    EVANS v. UNITED STATES
    any reason previously relied on for similar action by a
    federal court or “upon the showing of satisfactory evi-
    dence, cumulative or otherwise, that any fraud, wrong, or
    injustice has been done to the United States.” RCFC Rule
    59(a)(1). Under RCFC Rule 60, the lower court may grant
    relief from an order due to “mistake, inadvertence, sur-
    prise, or inexcusable neglect.” RCFC Rule 60(b)(1). The
    Post-Judgment Motions do not raise issues meriting
    reconsideration of or relief from the original May 31 Order
    or its modification. Given Mr. Evans’s primary conten-
    tions were that the Court of Federal Claims misstated the
    page length and filing date of the Complaint, see, e.g.,
    First Mot. for Recons. 2–4, the Court of Federal Claims
    correctly interpreted the Post-Judgment Motions to be
    alleging at most clerical errors and supported its denial of
    said allegations with evidence of record, see J.A. 55.
    Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its
    discretion, much less violate any of Mr. Evans’s constitu-
    tional rights, by denying this motion and subsequent ones
    that raised identical, frivolous allegations.
    C. Preclusion of Further Filing and Threatened Sanctions
    Given the repetitious contentions of Mr. Evans’s fil-
    ings, the Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its discre-
    tion, or violate any of Mr. Evans’s constitutional rights, by
    precluding further submissions and threatening sanctions
    should this preclusion be flouted.         In Chambers v.
    NASCO, Inc., the Supreme Court stated that
    certain implied powers must necessarily result to
    our [c]ourts of justice from the nature of their in-
    stitution, powers which cannot be dispensed with
    in a [c]ourt, because they are necessary to the ex-
    ercise of all others. For this reason, [c]ourts of
    justice are universally acknowledged to be vest-
    ed . . . with power to impose silence, respect, and
    decorum, in their presence, and submission to
    their lawful mandates. These powers are gov-
    EVANS v. UNITED STATES                                    15
    erned not by rule or statute but by the control
    necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
    affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
    disposition of cases.
    
    501 U.S. 32
    , 43 (1991) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted). Furthermore, in relevant part, Rule
    11(b) of the RCFC states that all representations made to
    the Court of Federal Claims may not be, inter alia, “pre-
    sented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause
    unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
    litigation,”    or “by a nonfrivolous argument,” RCFC
    11(b)(1)–(2), and must “have evidentiary support,” RCFC
    11(b)(3). In turn, RCFC 11(c) authorizes the Court of
    Federal Claims to “impose an appropriate sanction on
    any . . . party” that submits a motion with content contra-
    ry to the certifications made pursuant to RCFC 11(b).
    After responding to the claims of Mr. Evans’s First Motion
    for Reconsideration, see J.A. 55, it was well within the
    Court of Federal Claims’ discretion to preclude Mr. Evans
    from making further filings and to threaten sanctions
    when he continued submitting material containing sub-
    stantially the same allegations.
    CONCLUSION
    We have considered Mr. Evans’s remaining argu-
    ments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the
    Orders on Appeal of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims are
    AFFIRMED