Nathaniel Brown v. Julie L. Jones, Secretary, etc. , 221 So. 3d 1284 ( 2017 )


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  •                                       IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    NATHANIEL BROWN,                      NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    Appellant,                      DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    v.                                    CASE NO. 1D16-4480
    JULIE L. JONES, SECRETARY,
    FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
    CORRECTIONS,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed July 11, 2017.
    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
    James O. Shelfer, Judge.
    Nathaniel Brown, pro se, Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney
    General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    ORDER IMPOSING SANCTIONS
    PER CURIAM.
    Nathaniel Brown appealed the final order denying his petition for writ of
    mandamus, entered on September 9, 2016, by the circuit court in Brown v. Florida
    Department of Corrections, Case No. 2016 CA 000708 (2d Cir., Leon Cnty.). In
    Brown v. Jones, 42 Fla. L. Weekly D1300b (Fla. 1st DCA June 6, 2017), we
    affirmed the circuit court’s order. In light of Mr. Brown’s litigious history in this
    Court, the previous sanctions imposed by Brown v. State, 
    35 So. 3d 72
    (Fla. 1st
    DCA 2010), and the warning regarding his subsequent litigation in Brown v. State,
    
    186 So. 3d 625
    (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), we retained jurisdiction to pursue any
    additional sanctions against him pursuant to rule 9.410, Florida Rules of Appellate
    Procedure and section 944.279, Florida Statutes. See Steele v. State, 
    998 So. 2d 1146
    (Fla. 2008); Walker v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 
    70 So. 3d 665
    (Fla. 1st DCA
    2011).
    Upon this Court’s order to show cause why additional sanctions should not
    be imposed, Mr. Brown responded that his civil litigation and appeals should not
    be considered together with his criminal appeals and postconviction filings in the
    analysis of whether his filings were so frivolous and numerous that they amounted
    to abuse of the court process. This response does nothing to refute the “‘strong
    inference that unless he is stopped, [he] will continue filing nonmeritorious
    requests for relief in this Court.’” Johnson v. Rundle, 
    59 So. 3d 1080
    , 1082 (Fla.
    2011) (quoting Pettway v. McNeil, 
    987 So. 2d 20
    , 22 (Fla. 2008)); see also
    Williams v. Crews, 
    136 So. 3d 1119
    (Fla. 2014).
    Accordingly, in addition to the sanctions already imposed upon Mr. Brown’s
    ability to challenge his convictions and sentences pro se, we hereby direct the
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    Clerk to reject for filing any further appeals, petitions, motions, documents, or
    other papers unless such filings are signed by a member in good standing with The
    Florida Bar. See Martin v. State, 
    833 So. 2d 756
    (Fla. 2002); Jackson v. Fla. Dep’t
    of Corr., 
    790 So. 2d 398
    (Fla. 2001). Mr. Brown is again warned that violation of
    this order could result in referral to the Department of Corrections for sanctions
    under section 944.279, Florida Statutes.
    It is so ordered.
    WOLF, RAY, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.
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