State of Washington v. Roberto Reyes Arroyo ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                   FILED
    NOVEMBER 2, 2017
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )         No. 34593-9-111
    )
    Respondent,              )
    )
    v.                              )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    ROBERTO REYES ARROYO,                         )
    )
    Appellant.               )
    LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. -       Roberto Reyes Arroyo appeals five community custody
    conditions arising out of his conviction by plea to second degree murder and second
    degree assault. We accept the State's concessions as to two of the challenged conditions
    and order that the other three challenged conditions be slightly modified.
    FACTS
    Arroyo pleaded guilty to second degree murder and second degree assault. As part
    of his plea agreement, he agreed to the factual basis of police reports and the affidavit of
    probable cause, which lay out the following brief background.
    Juan Martinez and Andres Solis were drinking at a tavern in Walla Walla,
    Washington. Arroyo and his friends also were drinking at the tavern. Arroyo's group
    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    was watching Solis and Martinez throughout the night. When the latter two left, Arroyo's
    group followed them.
    As Solis and Martinez were walking toward their car in the parking lot, Solis heard
    someone call him a rat in Spanish. Solis turned and recognized Arroyo and his group as
    members of the 18th Street gang. Solis was at one point a member of the gang and had
    testified against another member of the 18th Street gang in a gang-related homicide trial a
    few years earlier.
    Arroyo's group instigated a fight with Solis and Martinez. During the fight,
    Arroyo fired several shots from a gun, injuring Solis and killing Martinez. Video
    recordings from both inside and outside the tavern led to the arrest of Arroyo and his
    group.
    The State charged Arroyo with first degree murder for the death of Martinez, and
    first degree assault and intimidating a witness for the assault of Solis. The State filed a
    notice of intent to rely on gang-related evidence. The State's theory was that Arroyo
    specifically targeted Solis because Solis had previously testified against a gang member in
    the earlier gang-related homicide trial. Arroyo agreed to plead guilty to second degree
    murder and second degree assault.
    2
    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    At sentencing, the Department of Corrections (DOC) provided the sentencing
    court with a presentence investigation and a proposed appendix of community custody
    conditions, designated as appendix F. The State also presented the sentencing court with
    a proposed appendix of community conditions, designated as appendix 4.3. Arroyo
    objected to appendix Fas being inconsistent with appendix 4.3, as well as possibly
    impermissible under the recently decided case of State v. Weatherwax, 
    193 Wash. App. 667
    ,
    
    376 P.3d 1150
    (2016), rev 'd, 
    188 Wash. 2d 139
    , 
    392 P.3d 1054
    (2017). The State withdrew
    the DOC' s appendix F. The court then signed the judgment and sentence that contains
    the proposed conditions outlined in appendix 4.3.
    Arroyo appealed.
    ANALYSIS
    COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITIONS
    Standard of review
    Arroyo raises constitutional challenges to five of his community custody
    conditions. This court reviews community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion.
    I   State v. Irwin, 
    191 Wash. App. 644
    , 652, 
    364 P.3d 830
    (2015). The abuse of discretion
    standard applies whether this court is reviewing a crime-related community custody
    condition or reviewing a community custody condition for vagueness. See 
    id. at 652,
    3
    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    656; State v. Sanchez Valencia, 
    169 Wash. 2d 782
    , 791-92, 
    239 P.3d 1059
    (2010); State v.
    Cordero, 
    170 Wash. App. 351
    , 373, 
    284 P.3d 773
    (2012). Imposing an unconstitutional
    condition is always an abuse of discretion. 
    Irwin, 191 Wash. App. at 652
    . Defendants may
    generally challenge community custody conditions that are contrary to statutory authority
    for the first time on appeal. State v. Bahl, 
    164 Wash. 2d 739
    , 744-45, 
    193 P.3d 678
    (2008).
    Guiding principles with respect to community custody conditions
    The guarantee of due process contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
    United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution requires
    that laws not be vague. State v. Magana, 197 Wn. App. 189,200,389 P.3d 654 (2016).
    Because a violation of a community custody condition subjects a person to arrest and
    incarceration, vagueness prohibitions extend to community custody conditions. See
    Sanchez 
    Valencia, 169 Wash. 2d at 791-92
    . A condition is not unconstitutionally vague so
    long as it provides ordinary people with fair warning of the proscribed conduct and has
    standards that are definite enough to protect against arbitrary enforcement. 
    Magana, 197 Wash. App. at 200-01
    .
    A defendant's constitutional rights during community placement are subject to the
    infringements authorized by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A
    RCW. State v. Riles, 
    135 Wash. 2d 326
    , 347, 
    957 P.2d 655
    (1998). The SRA directs a court
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    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    to impose certain mandatory conditions, authorizes a court to waive certain conditions,
    and authorizes a court to impose certain discretionary and special conditions. RCW
    9.94A.703. One of the authorized discretionary conditions is to comply with crime-
    related prohibitions or affirmative conditions. RCW 9.94A.505(9); RCW
    9.94A.703(3)(f).
    1.    Condition 2
    Condition 2 mandates that Arroyo "comply with all directions of [his] community
    corrections or probation officer." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 35. Arroyo contends this
    condition is vague and subject to arbitrary enforcement because it "does not place any
    limits on the ability" of his community corrections officer (CCO) to designate additional
    obligations. 
    Magana, 197 Wash. App. at 201
    .
    The State argues that this condition is akin to State v. Mc Williams, 
    177 Wash. App. 139
    , 
    311 P.3d 584
    (2013). There, the trial court ordered McWilliams to comply with
    '"Conditions per DOC; CCO."' 
    Id. at 152.
    On appeal, McWilliams argued that the
    condition was an improper delegation of authority. 
    Id. at 153.
    Relying on RCW
    9.94A.704(2)(a), the Mc Williams court affirmed the condition and held that the DOC has
    authority to "' establish and modify additional conditions of community custody based
    upon the risk to the community safety."' 
    Id. at 154.
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    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    We note that DOC's authority is actually broader than that noted in Mc Williams.
    RCW 9.94A.703(1)(b) explicitly requires "the offender to comply with any conditions
    imposed by the department under RCW 9.94A.704," not just RCW 9.94A.704(2)(a).
    Nevertheless, because the legislature did not grant DOC unbounded authority, we remand
    for the trial court to interlineate "authorized by RCW 9.94A.704" at the end of condition
    2.
    2.     Condition 9
    Condition 9 reads in its entirety:
    Your associates are to be approved by your community corrections or
    probation officer. You are not to associate with anyone whom you have
    met while in the institution. You are not to associate with any member of
    the Westside 18th Street gang or any other gang affiliated with the Westside
    18th Street gang as directed by your community corrections or probation
    officer.
    CP at 36.
    Arroyo argues that the first sentence is vague in that it grants unfettered discretion
    to his CCO. Also, citing to 
    Weatherwax, 193 Wash. App. at 677
    , he argues the condition
    sweeps too broadly because it is not limited to gang members or to other specifically
    described persons having a direct relation to the circumstances of the crime. The State
    counters that Weatherwax left intact the condition that prohibited association with known
    felons.
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    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    In Weatherwax, we held that a condition that prohibited the defendant from having
    any association with associates of gang members was unconstitutionally vague. 
    Id. at 680.
    We commented that the term "associates" would not be vague if the condition
    defined "associates" consistent with RCW 9.94A.030(13). 1 
    Id. at 681.
    Condition 9 suffers from similar constitutional infirmities. Here, the first sentence
    of condition 9 does not tether the CCO to any standard for choosing Arroyo's prohibited
    associates. For this reason, this sentence risks the danger of arbitrary enforcement. Also,
    the second sentence could be construed as prohibiting Arroyo from associating with staff,
    counselors, and similar persons at the institution who are not inmates. Condition 9 must
    be clarified on remand to prohibit a crime-related class of associates and limit the CCO's
    discretion to prohibiting Arroyo from associating only with those prohibited persons.
    3.       Condition 10
    Condition 10 states:
    You are not to possess weapons of any description including but not limited
    to firearms, knives of any description, and martial arts weaponry. You are
    not to possess ammunition or weapon replicas. You are not to remain in
    any vehicle wherein anyone possesses a weapon, ammunition, or weapon
    replica.
    1
    " ' Criminal
    street gang associate or member' means any person who actively
    participates in any criminal street gang and who intentionally promotes, furthers, or
    assists in any criminal act by the criminal street gang." RCW 9.94A.030(13).
    7
    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    CP at 36. Arroyo argues the condition is overbroad in that it bars him from using butter
    knives, plastic knives, or possessing a replica of any kind of weapon or any item that
    could conceivably be a weapon. He further argues the condition invites arbitrary
    enforcement because a CCO could determine whether household items, such as plastic
    knives, are weapons. He also contends the prohibition as it related to vehicles must be
    stricken because it permits him to be punished for being in a car with a person possessing
    a weapon when he has no knowledge of the presence of the weapon.
    The State concedes the prohibition of knives of any kind is excessive and should
    be modified to reference statutory standards that define dangerous weapons. We accept
    the State's concession. The State further concedes that lack of knowledge would be a
    defense to any asserted violation of the last sentence of condition 10. Because we are
    remanding, we further instruct the trial court to modify the last sentence of condition 10
    to add "if you know" and strike "wherein" before "anyone possesses a weapon."
    4.     Condition 13
    Condition 13 reads, "You are not to appear at any court proceeding unless you are
    a party, defendant in a criminal action, or subpoenaed as a witness." CP at 36. Arroyo
    contends this prohibition violates his basic right as a citizen to attend open court
    proceedings, a right protected by article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution.
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    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    The State counters that constitutional rights are subject to infringement by the SRA.
    
    Riles, 135 Wash. 2d at 347
    .
    A convicted defendant's constitutional rights may be restricted if "imposed
    sensitively" and "reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and
    public order." State v. Hearn, 
    131 Wash. App. 601
    , 607, 
    128 P.3d 139
    (2006) (citing State
    v. Riley, 
    121 Wash. 2d 22
    , 37-38, 
    846 P.2d 1365
    (1993)). "[D]iscouraging further criminal
    conduct is a goal of community placement." 
    Hearn, 131 Wash. App. at 608
    .
    We agree with the State that constitutional rights are subject to infringement by the
    SRA. But because such infringement must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the
    needs of the state and public order, condition 13 must be tailored so that any infringement
    does not go beyond a legitimate crime-related purpose.
    Arroyo shot Martinez and Solis in retaliation for Solis betraying the 18th Street
    gang by testifying against another gang member. The State charged Arroyo with
    intimidation of a witness in connection with the murder and assault, although he
    ultimately pleaded guilty to other charges. Protecting trial participants from retaliation by
    Arroyo is crime related. A community custody condition tailored to protect such persons
    would be a legitimate crime-related purpose. We direct the trial court to interlineate
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    No. 34593-9-III
    State v. Arroyo
    "involving a street gang associate or member" after the word "proceeding" in condition
    13.
    5.    Condition 14
    Condition 14 reads, "You are not to possess graffiti in any form." CP at 36.
    Arroyo argues this condition is both vague and overbroad. The State concedes this
    condition should be stricken in its entirety because other unchallenged conditions meet
    the same goals. We accept the State's concession.
    Remand for modification of community custody conditions.
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
    RCW 2.06.040.
    WE CONCUR:
    j
    bl
    10