Carter v. State ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: November 29, 2022
S22A1068. CARTER v. THE STATE
COLVIN, Justice.
Appellant Jared Carter was convicted of malice murder and
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection
with the death of his grandmother, 81-year-old Valeria Mann. 1 On
appeal, Appellant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was
1 Mann was killed on June 9, 2018. On June 12, 2018, a Houston County
grand jury indicted Appellant for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and
possession of a knife during the commission of a felony (Count 4). Appellant’s
first jury trial was held on November 17 through November 19, 2020, but ended
in a mistrial due to trial counsel becoming ill. A second jury trial was held on
April 6 through April 9, 2021. The jury found Appellant guilty of all counts.
Appellant was sentenced to serve life in prison for malice murder (Count 1)
and five years consecutive in prison for possession of a knife during the
commission of a felony (Count 4). All other counts were either merged for
sentencing purposes or vacated by operation of law. On April 14, 2021,
Appellant’s trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial, which was
amended through new counsel on December 15, 2021. The trial court denied
the amended motion on February 23, 2022. Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal. The case was docketed in this Court to the August 2022 term and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
insufficient to support his convictions, that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and that the trial court improperly admitted
hearsay testimony in violation of OCGA § 24-8-807 and the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. Appellant argues that, as a matter of Georgia statutory law,
the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his
convictions under OCGA § 24-14-6, because the evidence was
entirely circumstantial and did not exclude all reasonable
hypotheses other than Carter’s guilt. We disagree.
The evidence presented at trial showed the following. Around
8:00 p.m. on June 9, 2018, Appellant, who was living with Mann,
knocked on the door of their next-door neighbor, Bryan Martin.
When Martin opened the door, he saw Appellant sitting on a bench
with his elbows on his knees and his hands on his face. When Martin
asked Appellant what was wrong, Appellant said that he believed
Mann was dead because “she was laying on their floor and there was
blood.” Martin suggested calling 911, but Appellant stated that he
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could not because he had left his phone inside the house. Martin
went inside to make the call, and Appellant followed briefly, but
then left the residence and did not respond when Martin called out
for him.
When officers arrived on the scene, they found Mann lying on
the floor of her living room, unresponsive, with a knife nearby
covered in blood. Mann had a stab wound to her chest and had
lacerations on her head. Medical personnel pronounced Mann dead
at the scene. The medical examiner later determined that the cause
of Mann’s death was “multiple stab wounds, with other significant
conditions being blunt force injuries of the head.”
Officers searched the home and found in the kitchen a plastic
trash bag containing shards of a ceramic crock pot. Officers saw
blood stains all around the living room and found in the living room
trashcan paper towels with red stains and additional ceramic crock
pot pieces. Officers collected the knife, crock pot pieces, and paper
towels and sent them for forensic testing. Officers found no signs of
forced entry and no evidence that anything of value was taken,
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including Mann’s wallet, which was found near her body and
contained $140 in cash. Officers also found blood stains on the
bathroom floor and on bars of soap, indicating that someone had
attempted to clean up after the stabbing.
Officers questioned Appellant, who was sitting on the sidewalk
outside of the home, concerning his whereabouts during the day.
Appellant stated that he ran errands with Mann in the morning and
then drove her back home. Then, around 1:30 p.m., he “went for a
ride to just get out of the house” in Mann’s Toyota Camry to “clear
[his] mind” because he was frustrated he had not found a job since
moving in with Mann. Appellant was unable to specify where he
had driven. Appellant stated that he returned from his drive around
2:30 p.m. and stayed in the Camry, which did not have air
conditioning, because he did not want to return inside the house.
Appellant claimed that he was scrolling through Instagram and
YouTube and then “dozed off,” sleeping through the evening
thunderstorm that had occurred. When he woke up slightly before
8:00 p.m., Appellant went to the front door, but did not open it
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because something was blocking the door. Appellant then entered
the house through the back door and saw Mann on the floor covered
in blood, at which point Appellant went to Martin for help. Officers
noticed what appeared to be blood on Appellant’s shoes, which they
collected as evidence and sent for testing.
At trial, Ann Camp, Mann’s across-the-street neighbor,
testified that she was on her front porch from around 11:00 a.m.
until around 7:00 p.m. on June 9, 2018. Camp testified that she saw
Appellant and Mann leave the house that morning in Mann’s black
SUV and return sometime around 11:00 a.m. Camp stated that
Mann went directly inside the house and Appellant checked the
mailbox and then went inside the house. Camp did not see
Appellant leave the house again and did not see Appellant sitting in
the Camry. Camp further testified that, around 6:00 p.m., she
considered calling Mann because it looked like a bad storm was
approaching and the windows of both the SUV and Camry were
rolled down.
A DNA expert testified at trial that Mann’s blood was found on
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the knife, paper towels, and crock pot pieces. The expert also
testified that a mixture of DNA from at least two individuals, one of
whom was Mann, was found on a paper towel. The expert further
explained that the other contributor to the mixed DNA profile was
male, but that the contributor’s identity could not be determined
because the mixed profile contained mostly Mann’s DNA. Therefore,
the expert testified that “[Appellant] was excluded as a contributor
to the mixed DNA profile” but that she “would expect everyone in
the general population with the exception of [an] identical twin [to
Mann] to be excluded.” Forensic testing also confirmed that
Appellant’s shoes contained traces of blood. Analysts did not obtain
a DNA profile from the blood found on the shoes.
The State called numerous witnesses to testify to the nature of
Mann and Appellant’s relationship prior to Mann’s death.
Chaquana Carter, a social worker employed at Houston Medical
Center, with no apparent relation to Appellant, testified that on May
25, 2018, Mann visited the center to express her “concerns [and]
emotions regarding her grandson.” Mann told Carter that she was
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afraid of Appellant, wanted him out of her home, and that Appellant
was verbally and emotionally abusive. Carter testified that Mann
asked her not to contact the police because she did not want to
involve law enforcement out of concern for Appellant’s safety.
Carter further testified that Mann appeared frail, scared, and
confused during the visit.
Detective Paul Peck testified that, on May 30, 2018, he had
briefly spoken with Mann on the phone after he had received a
referral from Adult Protective Services. Mann told Detective Peck
that she had wanted Appellant out of her house because he was
“argumentative,” “disrespectful,” and “hostile.” Mann also revealed
to Detective Peck that Appellant would “bow up” at her and refused
to leave her home. Mann requested that Detective Peck refrain from
investigating the situation for at least a week because she hoped to
resolve the situation on her own.
Annie Pearl Fox, a close friend of Mann’s, also testified at trial.
Fox testified that, about six months before Mann’s death, Mann
expressed that she was afraid of Appellant and that Appellant had
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threatened to kill her. Mann also told Fox that if anything ever
happened to her, “[Appellant] did it.” Fox further testified that she
had asked Mann why Appellant was still staying with her and Mann
replied, “I just don’t want to put him out because he ain’t got
nowhere to go.” Fox also testified that on June 8, 2018, the day
before Mann’s death, Fox arrived at Mann’s home to help her clean
the house and run some errands. Fox recalled cleaning the ceramic
crock pot and putting it on the counter in the kitchen.
Appellant elected to testify at trial. Throughout his testimony,
Appellant maintained that he had been asleep in the car when Mann
was attacked. Appellant’s counsel presented alternative theories on
who had killed Mann—namely, that Mann was killed by an
unknown assailant or by her boyfriend, Thomas Randall, who had
planned to visit Mann from Connecticut the following day.
Appellant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient
to support his convictions because the circumstantial evidence
presented failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than
his guilt. We disagree. “To warrant a conviction on circumstantial
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evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6.
However, “not every hypothesis is a reasonable one, and the
evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference or
hypothesis — only those that are reasonable.” Graves v. State, 306
Ga. 485, 487 (1) (831 SE2d 747) (2019) (citation and punctuation
omitted; emphasis in original). “Whether alternative hypotheses are
reasonable . . . is principally a question for the jury, and this Court
will not disturb the jury’s finding unless it is insupportable as a
matter of law.” Robinson v. State, 309 Ga. 729, 731 (1) (a) (848 SE2d
441) (2020).2
2 Appellant appears to conflate the standard of review for a Georgia
statutory claim of insufficient evidence pursuant to OCGA § 24-14-6 with an
insufficient evidence claim as a matter of constitutional due process under
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt. 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). To the
extent that Appellant attempts to raise a constitutional due process sufficiency
claim, however, the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. See id.
at 319 (explaining that the proper inquiry for a constitutional due process
sufficiency claim is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).
9
Here, reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial, we
conclude that the jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable
Appellant’s alternative hypotheses that an unknown assailant or
Randall killed Mann. Appellant argues that no physical evidence
tied him to the crime scene, focusing in particular on the DNA
expert’s testimony that Appellant was “excluded” as a DNA
contributor to the mixed profile located on the paper towel.
However, as an initial matter, “the State was not required to
produce any physical evidence, as the testimony of a single witness
is generally sufficient to establish a fact, and the lack of
corroboration with physical evidence only goes to the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the testifying witness, which is solely
within the purview of the jury.” Johnson v. State, 296 Ga. 504, 505
(1) (769 SE2d 87) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Moreover, the record shows that the DNA expert testified that
Mann’s blood overwhelmed the mixed DNA sample and masked the
other contributor to the profile so significantly that no one, other
than Mann, could be identified.
10
The record further shows that Carter, Detective Peck, and Fox
all testified at trial that Mann had recently expressed being afraid
of Appellant because he was verbally and emotionally abusive and
that Mann had wanted Appellant out of her house. Camp testified
that she witnessed Mann and Appellant enter the house around
11:00 a.m., that she did not see Appellant leave the house again or
sit in the Camry as he had claimed, and that she did not see anyone
else enter or leave the house from approximately 11:00 a.m. through
7:00 p.m.
Furthermore, officers found no signs of forced entry and noted
that nothing of value had been taken from the home, making it
unlikely that an unknown person broke into Mann’s home and killed
her. Additionally, Detective Peck testified that, during their
investigation, officers eliminated all other persons of interest in
Mann’s killing. Consequently, the evidence was sufficient to
authorize the jury “to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis
save that of guilt.” OCGA § 24-14-6.
2. Appellant next asserts that he received constitutionally
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ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that his counsel failed
to object to the improper hearsay testimony of Carter and Fox at
trial. We are not persuaded. To succeed on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that “his counsel’s
performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered
prejudice as a result.” Washington v. State, 313 Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873
SE2d 132) (2022) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(2) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)). To prevail on the deficiency
prong, the defendant must overcome the “strong presumption that
[his] counsel performed reasonably” by showing that “no reasonable
lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed
to do what his lawyer did not.” Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 457 (2)
(807 SE2d 369) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). If a
defendant “fails to meet his or her burden of proving either prong of
the Strickland test, the reviewing court does not have to examine
the other prong.” Lawrence v. State, 286 Ga. 533, 533-534 (2) (690
SE2d 801) (2010).
Here, Appellant has failed to show that his trial counsel acted
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deficiently. Before trial, counsel responded to the State’s notice of
intent to present hearsay testimony by filing a motion in limine
asserting, among other things, that Mann’s out of court statements
to Carter and Fox did not satisfy OCGA § 24-8-807 (“Rule 807”), also
known as the residual hearsay exception. At the pretrial hearing,
the trial court ruled, over counsel’s objection, that Carter, Detective
Peck, and Fox could testify to Mann’s out of court statements
pursuant to Rule 807. Trial counsel objected to that ruling, thereby
preserving the issue of improper hearsay for appeal.
Appellant argues that counsel was deficient for failing to renew
her objection at trial. However, “[o]nce the court makes a definitive
ruling on the record admitting or excluding any evidence, either at
or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof
to preserve such claim of error for appeal.” OCGA § 24-1-103 (a) (2).
Thus, any objection trial counsel made to the hearsay testimony at
trial would have been unnecessary, because that objection was
already preserved. Therefore, Appellant has failed to establish that
his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient and that
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she performed “in an objectively unreasonable way considering all
the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.”
Broxton v. State, 306 Ga. 127, 132 (2) (829 SE2d 333) (2019).
Accordingly, Appellant has failed to satisfy the deficiency prong of
the Strickland test and his claim of ineffective assistance fails.
3. Finally, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by
allowing Carter and Fox to testify about Mann’s out of court
statements pursuant to Rule 807. Appellant further argues that the
testimony violated the Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. We are not
persuaded.
(a) Rule 807
After a hearing, the trial court ruled that Mann’s out of court
statements to Carter and Fox were admissible under the residual
exception to the hearsay rule. 3 The trial court noted that Mann was
unavailable to testify and found that Mann’s statements contained
3 Appellant does not challenge Mann’s out of court statements to
Detective Peck.
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circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness because the statements
were consistent and made “to multiple people on different occasions
in different settings.” Appellant argues that the record does not
support the trial court’s finding because, Appellant contends, Mann
did not discuss repeated violent incidents of abuse to various family
and friends and because Mann exhibited possible signs of dementia
and confusion. We see no abuse of discretion.
OCGA § 24-8-807 provides in pertinent part that “a statement
not specifically covered by any law but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness shall not be excluded
by the hearsay rule” upon the trial court’s determination that the
declarant is unavailable to testify and that “the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.” Id.
“Whether there are exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness is a
determination that focuses on the declarant and the circumstances
under which the declarant made the statement to the witness.”
Miller v. State, 303 Ga. 1, 5 (2) (810 SE2d 123) (2018) (emphasis in
original). Such guarantees of trustworthiness “must be equivalent
15
to cross-examined former testimony, statements under a belief of
impending death, statements against interest, and statements of
personal or family history” as “[t]hese categories of hearsay have
attributes of trustworthiness not possessed by the general run of
hearsay statements that tip the balance in favor of introducing the
information if the declarant is unavailable to testify.” Jacobs v.
State, 303 Ga. 245, 249 (2) (811 SE2d 372) (2018) (citations and
punctuation omitted). We have previously upheld the introduction
of out of court statements under the residual hearsay exception
where the trial court determined that the statements were
trustworthy because of the unavailable declarant’s “close
relationship” with the witness, see Rawls v. State, 310 Ga. 209, 214-
215 (3) (a) (i) (850 SE2d 90) (2020), because the unavailable
declarant had “no reason to concoct . . . a story,” see Tyner v. State,
305 Ga. 326, 330 (2) (825 SE2d 129) (2019), and because the
unavailable declarant made consistent statements to multiple
witnesses, see Lopez v. State, 311 Ga. 269, 274 (2) (a) (857 SE2d 467)
(2021). Although Rule 807 is “to be used very rarely and only in
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exceptional circumstances,” this Court will not overturn a trial
court’s finding that the statement is admissible under the residual
hearsay exception absent a finding that the trial court abused its
discretion. Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 390 (3) (846 SE2d 83)
(2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion
in admitting Mann’s out of court statements. The record shows that
Mann had a close relationship to Fox and revealed that she had no
motive to lie to Fox and Carter about her issues with Appellant.
Therefore, the trial court was authorized to conclude that there were
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness such that it could
admit Mann’s out of court statements under Rule 807. Although the
trial court noted concern that Mann had appeared confused and was
possibly suffering from dementia when she made the out of court
statements to Carter and Fox, the trial court found that her mental
state did not impair the trustworthiness of her statements and
uncertainty about an unavailable declarant’s mental state alone is
not sufficient for this Court to overturn the trial court’s admissibility
17
ruling when other factors of trustworthiness support the trial court’s
exercise of discretion in applying Rule 807. See, e.g., Davenport, 309
Ga. at 391 (declining to overturn the trial court’s admissibility ruling
pursuant to the residual exception solely because the declarant had
“substance abuse and mental illness issues”). Because we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mann’s out
of court statements into evidence pursuant to Rule 807, Appellant’s
claim fails.
(b) Confrontation Clause
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting
Mann’s statements because such statements were inadmissible
under the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Confrontation Clause provides that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .
to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const.
Amend. VI. “The Confrontation Clause generally prohibits the
admission of out-of-court testimonial statements made by a
declarant who is unavailable for cross-examination.” Stafford v.
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State, 312 Ga. 811, 824 (5) (b) (865 SE2d 116) (2021). “A statement
is testimonial if its primary purpose was to establish evidence that
could be used in a future prosecution.” Id. (citation omitted). This
Court has held that nontestimonial statements include statements
made to law enforcement that are “intended to describe current
circumstances that required immediate police action.” McCord v.
State, 305 Ga. 318, 323 (2) (a) (i) (825 SE2d 122) (2019).
Because Appellant did not object to the admission of the
testimony on the ground of a Confrontation Clause violation at the
trial level, we review Appellant’s claim only for plain error. See
McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129, 133 (2) (834 SE2d 741) (2019)
(explaining that, pursuant to OCGA § 24-1-103 (d), a claim of a
Confrontation Clause violation is reviewed only for plain error if no
such objection is made at trial). To establish plain error, Appellant
must point to an error that was not affirmatively waived,
the error must have been clear and not open to reasonable
dispute, the error must have affected his substantial
rights, and the error must have seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
19
Kemp v. State, 303 Ga. 385, 397-398 (3) (810 SE2d 515) (2018)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the trial court did not commit error—much less plain
error—by admitting Mann’s statements into evidence, as her
statements are nontestimonial and, therefore, do not trigger the
protections of the Confrontation Clause. See Johnson v. State, 294
Ga. 86, 91 (6) (750 SE2d 347) (2013) (holding that the admission of
nontestimonial hearsay did not run afoul of the Confrontation
Clause). Mann’s statements to Carter concerning Appellant’s
emotional and verbal abuse and her desire to get Appellant out of
her home were not testimonial, as they “were not made to assist a
future prosecution.” Denson v. State, 307 Ga. 545, 548 (2) (837 SE2d
261) (2019). Rather, the record shows that Mann specifically
requested that Carter not contact law enforcement because she did
not want to incriminate Appellant.
Similarly, Mann’s statement to Fox indicating that if anything
ever happened to her, “[Appellant] did it,” was nontestimonial as the
statement was made to a friend without any expectation that the
20
statement would be later used at a trial. See Turner v. State, 281
Ga. 647, 651 (3) (b) (641 SE2d 527) (2007) (concluding the victim’s
statements “indicating that he would not commit suicide and that
his wife would probably have something to do with it if he died” were
nontestimonial because he was speaking with close friends without
any expectation the statements would later be used at a trial). See
also Demons v. State, 277 Ga. 724, 727-728 (4) (595 SE2d 76) (2004)
(explaining that the fact a statement is made to a friend without a
reasonable expectation it will later be used at trial indicates the
statement is nontestimonial). Thus, Mann’s statements were
nontestimonial in nature. Therefore, the Confrontation Clause is
inapplicable, and Appellant’s claim of a Confrontation Clause
violation fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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