Ridley v. State ( 2023 )


Menu:
  •  NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
    Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
    opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
    prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
    official text of the opinion.
    In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: January 18, 2023
    S22A1081. RIDLEY v. THE STATE.
    PINSON, Justice.
    Kentrick Ridley was convicted of malice murder and related
    crimes in connection with the shooting death of Rico Bynum. 1 On
    appeal, Ridley contends that the evidence was not sufficient as a
    matter of due process to support his convictions, that the trial court
    The crimes occurred on April 25, 2016. In August 2017, Ridley was
    1
    indicted by a Fulton County grand jury for malice murder, felony murder,
    aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
    felony. At the conclusion of a jury trial held November 28 through December
    3, 2018, Ridley was found guilty on all four counts. Ridley was sentenced to life
    in prison without the possibility of parole for the malice-murder count and a
    consecutive term of five years probated for the firearm-possession count. The
    remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing
    purposes. Prior to his sentencing, Ridley filed a premature motion for new trial,
    which ripened upon the entry of the final disposition on January 2, 2019. See
    Southall v. State, 
    300 Ga. 462
    , 464-467 (1) (
    796 SE2d 261
    ) (2017). Through new
    counsel, Ridley amended his motion for new trial in February 2022. After a
    hearing in April 2022, the trial court denied the motion on May 13, 2022. Ridley
    filed a timely notice of appeal on May 23, 2022, and an amended notice of
    appeal on May 24, 2022. The appeal was docketed to the August 2022 term of
    this Court and was thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs.
    failed to fulfill its role as the “thirteenth juror,” and that the trial
    court erred by allowing the prosecutor to make certain statements
    during her closing argument. But the record shows that the evidence
    was sufficient to support Ridley’s convictions and that the trial court
    exercised its role as the thirteenth juror. And most of the closing-
    argument statements that Ridley challenges were proper comments
    on the defense’s failure to present evidence—made with express
    reference to the fact that the burden of proof rests “completely” with
    the State—while the remaining statement at issue properly asked
    the jury to draw a reasonable inference supported by undisputed
    evidence. So we affirm Ridley’s convictions and sentences.
    1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
    evidence at trial showed as follows. In the early morning hours of
    April 25, 2016, Bynum was shot and killed on Grand Avenue in
    Fulton County. The shooting was witnessed by Theresa Scruggs and
    Robert Green, both of whom testified at trial.
    (a) Scruggs testified that, as of April 2016, she was homeless,
    addicted to crack cocaine, and working as a prostitute. She became
    2
    friends with Bynum, a pimp, after she began buying drugs from him.
    Although Bynum wanted to have a romantic relationship with her,
    Scruggs initially refused because Bynum was married and living
    with his wife.
    Scruggs then met Ridley. They began a sexual relationship,
    and she moved in to Ridley’s apartment. But within two or three
    days, Bynum, who had kicked his wife out of his home, convinced
    Scruggs to come live with him. Scruggs testified that Ridley “wasn’t
    happy” about her leaving.
    According to Scruggs, the shooting occurred five or six days
    after she left Ridley for Bynum. During those five or six days, Ridley
    texted her constantly, asking her to come back, and he also called
    her, saying on one occasion that she “ha[d] until Monday to come
    back.” About two or three days before the shooting, after seeing
    Ridley’s text messages to Scruggs, Bynum called Ridley and warned
    him not to come back to that side of the neighborhood, “[i]f he knew
    what was good for him.”
    On the night of April 24, Scruggs and Bynum walked from their
    3
    home to the Express Zone gas station at the end of Grand Avenue.
    While Bynum stayed at the gas station to sell crack, Scruggs and
    another woman walked down the street, where they came across a
    man whom Scruggs ultimately joined in his car. The man, Albert
    Remler, told her he was a contractor, and, because Scruggs was
    interested in construction work, she gave him her name and phone
    number. She ultimately performed a sexual act in exchange for $10
    in cash plus a $20 check.
    Scruggs returned to the gas station and gave Remler’s $20
    check to Bynum. They went to a nearby check-cashing business but
    were unable to cash the check. They then walked back towards the
    gas station and encountered Robert Green, who joined them. After
    walking together for some distance, Green asked to talk to Scruggs,
    and the two turned around and walked away from Bynum down
    Grand Avenue.
    As Scruggs was walking with Green, Ridley appeared “from out
    of nowhere” with a gun. Scruggs asked what was going on, and
    Ridley responded, waving the gun and “hollering” that “nobody
    4
    threatens me. . . . [Y]ou choose him over me, and he calls me
    threatening me.” Trying to defuse the situation, Scruggs told Ridley
    she would leave with him. By this time, Bynum had started walking
    toward them. Ridley greeted Bynum with, “What’s up man,” and
    then began firing the gun. Bynum fell to the ground with a fatal
    gunshot wound to the neck.
    Ridley and Green ran from the scene. Scruggs first tried to talk
    to Bynum, and then she fled when she realized he wasn’t breathing.
    Within a few minutes, she was intercepted by Ridley and Green, who
    were in Ridley’s truck. Ridley pointed his gun at Scruggs and said,
    “[Y]ou can either die here with him or you can get in.” Scruggs got
    in the truck. Ridley drove to a motel, where Green sold Ridley’s gun.
    The trio then collected their belongings and left town for Memphis.
    Scruggs and Ridley stayed in Memphis until December 2016,
    when Ridley was apprehended by law enforcement officials. Scruggs
    testified that while they were in Memphis, Ridley would not let her
    leave his presence. She tried to escape twice, but failed each time.
    She did not contact the police during this time because she was
    5
    afraid.2
    Surveillance videos from the check-cashing business, the gas
    station, and Atlanta Police Department street cameras corroborated
    various details of Scruggs’s account of the events leading up to the
    shooting. In particular, the videos captured Ridley and Green
    walking in the area at 1:04 a.m. on April 25, less than 30 minutes
    before police were notified of Bynum’s shooting.
    (b) Green testified that he had become friends with Ridley after
    repairing Ridley’s truck. On the night of the shooting, Ridley asked
    Green to look at a problem with his truck, and after doing so, Green
    rode with Ridley to see whether the problem was fixed. They ended
    up at the Express Zone.
    According to Green, at some point after they arrived at the gas
    station, Scruggs walked up to them, followed by a man. Ridley and
    the man argued, and Ridley then shot the man. Green walked away
    and was soon picked up by Ridley. They drove off, Green sold
    2Scruggs did manage to leave Memphis in May 2016 for a brief time but
    then allowed Ridley to retrieve her, and the pair stopped in Atlanta for a brief
    time on their way back to Memphis.
    6
    Ridley’s gun, and he, Ridley, and Scruggs left town for Memphis.
    Green testified that he had previously cleaned Ridley’s gun, a .45-
    caliber automatic handgun.
    Investigators never found the gun used in the shooting, but
    they recovered six cartridge cases and one bullet from the crime
    scene, all of which were .45-caliber. A GBI firearms examiner
    testified that the six cartridge cases had all been fired from the same
    .45-caliber gun. The firearms examiner also testified that the three
    bullets recovered from Bynum’s body were .45-caliber too, and that
    they had been fired from the same gun as the bullet found at the
    scene.
    (c) The lead investigator in the case, Detective Michael Young,
    testified about the investigation and how his team had identified
    and located Scruggs and Ridley. The $20 check Scruggs and Bynum
    had tried to cash was recovered from Bynum’s pants pocket; this
    check led Detective Young to Remler, who still had the check stub
    on which Scruggs had written her name and phone number.
    Detective Young contacted Scruggs and arranged to meet with her
    7
    under the guise of needing help with a construction job. After
    revealing that he was a detective, Young interviewed Scruggs, and
    she identified Ridley as the shooter. Detective Young confirmed that
    surveillance videos and other evidence corroborated key aspects of
    Scruggs’s account.
    2. Ridley contends that the evidence was not sufficient to
    sustain his convictions as a matter of constitutional due process.
    Ridley asserts that the witnesses the State presented were not
    credible, notes that no physical evidence directly linked Ridley to the
    shooting, and contends that the State failed to connect him to the
    murder weapon. Ridley also points out that he never admitted to
    shooting Bynum, and that no video or audio recording showed that
    he was the shooter.
    When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
    as a matter of constitutional due process, the evidence presented at
    trial is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts to
    determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the
    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the crimes of
    8
    which he was convicted. See Jones v. State, 
    304 Ga. 594
    , 598 (2) (
    820 SE2d 696
    ) (2018) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (III)
    (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). In making this
    determination, we do not evaluate witness credibility, resolve
    inconsistencies in the evidence, or assess the weight of the evidence;
    these tasks are left to the sole discretion of the jury. See Walker v.
    State, 
    296 Ga. 161
    , 163 (1) (
    766 SE2d 28
    ) (2014). The jury’s verdicts
    will be upheld as long as some competent evidence, even if
    contradicted, supports each fact necessary to make out the State’s
    case. See Jones, 
    304 Ga. at 598
     (2).
    Applying this standard here, the evidence was sufficient to
    support Ridley’s convictions for malice murder and possession of a
    firearm in connection with that crime. 3 Both Scruggs and Green
    testified that they saw Ridley shoot Bynum. Surveillance footage
    showed Ridley in the area of the shooting shortly before it occurred.
    There was evidence that Ridley possessed a gun of the same caliber
    3 As noted above, the felony-murder count was vacated by operation of
    law, and the aggravated-assault count merged with the malice-murder count.
    9
    as the cartridge cases and bullets recovered from the scene and from
    Bynum’s body. Ridley had recently been threatened by Bynum and
    had a clear motive for committing the shooting. And immediately
    after the shooting, Ridley fled Atlanta for Memphis. This evidence
    was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Ridley guilty beyond
    a reasonable doubt of these crimes. See, e.g., Coates v. State, 
    310 Ga. 94
    , 98 (
    849 SE2d 435
    ) (2020) (evidence was sufficient to sustain
    convictions where eyewitnesses identified defendant as the shooter
    and defendant fled country immediately after the crimes); Jackson
    v. State, 
    288 Ga. 213
    , 214 (1) (
    702 SE2d 201
    ) (2010) (evidence was
    sufficient to sustain convictions where eyewitnesses identified
    defendant as the shooter and there was evidence that defendant had
    a motive to commit the shooting).
    3.   Ridley next contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion by failing to exercise its role as the “thirteenth juror” in
    considering his motion for new trial.
    “Even when the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a
    conviction, a trial judge may grant a new trial if the verdict of the
    10
    jury ‘is contrary to . . . the principles of justice and equity,’ OCGA §
    5-5-20, or if the verdict is ‘decidedly and strongly against the weight
    of the evidence.’ OCGA § 5-5-21.” Drennon v. State, 
    314 Ga. 854
    , 860
    (2) (__ SE2d __) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). When
    these so-called “general grounds” are properly raised in a timely
    motion for new trial, the trial judge must “exercise a broad discretion
    to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror.’” 
    Id.
     (citation and punctuation omitted).
    This role requires the judge to consider matters typically reserved
    to the jury, including conflicts in the evidence, witness credibility,
    and the weight of the evidence. See 
    id.
    The trial court performed its thirteenth-juror role here. This is
    plain from the face of the order denying Ridley’s motion for new trial.
    In that order, the court expressly states that it “re-examine[d] . . .
    the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, as an
    independent fact-finder” and that, having done so, it “decline[d] to
    grant a new trial on these general grounds.” So the record refutes
    Ridley’s contention that the court failed to fulfill its role as the
    thirteenth juror. See Strother v. State, 
    305 Ga. 838
    , 843 (3) (828
    
    11 SE2d 327
    ) (2019). And the merits of the trial court’s decision on the
    general grounds are not subject to our review: “this Court does not
    sit as an arbiter of the general grounds, which are solely within the
    discretion of the trial court.” 
    Id.
     (citation and punctuation omitted).
    This claim therefore fails.
    4.    Ridley also contends that the trial court abused its
    discretion in overruling his objections to certain statements the
    prosecutor made during closing arguments. He claims that several
    of the prosecutor’s statements improperly shifted the burden of proof
    to the defense, and that one statement argued facts not in evidence.
    Ridley is correct that these arguments are reviewed for abuse of
    discretion. See Moore v. State, 
    307 Ga. 290
    , 297 (5) (
    835 SE2d 610
    )
    (2019). We take each of these two arguments in turn.
    (a)    On several occasions during closing argument, the
    prosecutor noted for the jury that the defense had the same power
    to subpoena witnesses as the State. This point was responsive to the
    defense’s efforts throughout the trial to cast doubt on the State’s
    case by highlighting its failure to present testimony from various
    12
    people who, the defense claimed, would have had information
    relevant to the investigation. On the first occasion, the prosecutor
    stated:
    The one thing I want to tell you that’s real important is
    that the burden is on the State to prove [guilt] beyond a
    reasonable doubt. The defense has absolutely no burden
    whatsoever to do anything. They don’t have to do
    anything. The burden is completely on us, but the State
    has subpoena power to make people come to court. Given
    a subpoena they have to come to court. Bring your
    evidence with you. They have the exact same subpoena
    power.
    Ridley’s trial counsel objected on the ground of “shifting the burden.”
    The objection was overruled, and the prosecutor continued to press
    the point. Later in her closing, the prosecutor returned to this topic:
    [The] State’s not hiding anything from you. I told you in
    opening. Not putting up a bunch of witnesses who were
    not present and didn’t see the murder. The defense
    counsel asked . . . a bunch of questions of what would they
    . . . have said. If these witnesses were going to exonerate
    [Ridley] they could have subpoenaed [them.]
    Again, trial counsel objected based on burden-shifting, and the
    objection was overruled.
    At another point, the prosecutor stated:
    13
    Do you know what the defense is other than hey, the State
    didn’t put up four witnesses that never saw the homicide.
    Yeah, that’s right. The State didn’t bring four people that
    never saw the homicide. So that’s the defense, attacking
    the State. Well, somebody murdered this man. Somebody
    murdered Rico Bynum, right. He was gunned down.
    Trial counsel objected, arguing that “the State is implying that we
    have to give the person who committed the murder.” The objection
    was overruled, and the prosecutor went on:
    The burden is on the State to prove this to you beyond a
    reasonable doubt. The defense doesn’t have to prove
    someone else did it. But ladies and gentlemen, I’m
    allowed to ask you who else did it? What other evidence is
    there that anyone other than Kentrick Ridley did this?
    The State has proven it to you beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Ridley now contends that the trial court abused its discretion
    in overruling these objections, asserting that the prosecutor’s
    statements had the effect of communicating to the jury that the
    defense did bear some burden of proof.
    A prosecutor has “wide latitude in the conduct of closing
    argument, the bounds of which are in the trial court’s discretion.”
    Moore, 307 Ga. at 297 (5) (citation and punctuation omitted). And
    where the defense presents no evidence to rebut the evidence of
    14
    guilt, it is not improper for the prosecutor to point out that fact to
    the jury. See Kilgore v. State, 
    300 Ga. 429
    , 432 (2) (
    796 SE2d 290
    )
    (2017) (an argument that the defense has failed to rebut or explain
    the State’s evidence does not amount to improper burden-shifting);
    McCord v. State, 
    268 Ga. 842
    , 843 (3) (
    493 SE2d 129
    ) (1997) (same).
    The prosecutor’s statements here were proper comments on the
    defense’s failure to present evidence, made with express reference to
    the fact that the burden of proof rests “completely” with the State.
    So these statements were well within the bounds of proper closing
    argument, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    overruling Ridley’s objections to them.
    (b)   At one point during her closing argument, apparently
    trying to rebut the defense’s argument that Scruggs’s account of
    walking off with Green down Grand Avenue just before the shooting
    was not believable, the prosecutor stated:
    I’m sorry to have to do this, but if you’re a prostitute and
    a strange man say[s] hey, let’s go to the really real dark
    area by the wood in exchange for money for sex does your
    –
    15
    Trial counsel objected on the ground that the remark stated facts
    not in evidence. The court responded by directing the jury to
    “remember the evidence to the best of your collective ability.” The
    prosecutor went on:
    I’m not talking about evidence, ladies and gentlemen. The
    defense got up here and said it was unreasonable for Rico
    Bynum to let Theresa Scruggs walk off with [Green]. My
    argument is perfectly reasonable because if you’re the
    pimp you’re watching the guy and the girl walk off
    together to the dark area what do you think is going to
    happen over there if you’re the pimp.
    Ridley contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
    allowing the prosecutor to argue facts not in evidence. See OCGA §
    17-8-75 (“Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements
    of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the
    court to interpose and prevent the same.”). But the wide latitude
    afforded to a prosecutor making a closing argument includes the
    leeway to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Styles
    v. State, 
    308 Ga. 624
    , 629 (3) (
    842 SE2d 869
    ) (2020). The prosecutor’s
    statement asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference—supported
    by the undisputed evidence that Scruggs was a prostitute and
    16
    Bynum was a pimp—as to why Scruggs would have walked away
    with Green without any objection from Bynum. See Varner v. State,
    
    285 Ga. 300
    , 301 (2) (c) (
    676 SE2d 189
    ) (2009) (prosecutor’s reference
    to victim as a “battered woman” was a permissible inference from
    the evidence). So the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    overruling Ridley’s objection to the prosecutor’s statement.
    Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except LaGrua, J.,
    disqualified.
    17